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Nicht nur die Geräuschkulisse des Brexits absorbierte ein Stück weit die Aufmerksamkeit für das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) zur Zulässigkeit des Anleihenkaufprogramms der EZB. Denn immerhin entschied Luxemburg damit über eine der nach wie vor seltenen Vorlagen aus Karlsruhe. Dazu mag auch beigetragen haben, dass seit der Stellungnahme des Generalanwalts Wathelet nicht mehr damit gerechnet wurde, dass der EuGH der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) einen sprichwörtlichen Strich durch die Rechnung machen würde. Dennoch ist das Urteil aus einigen Gründen bemerkenswert.
The expansion of actors and instruments in sovereign debt markets through bond financing generated a coordination problem among bondholders during the debt restructuring process. There is a risk that an individual bondholder will be passive or act against the restructuring slowing down or even precluding the process of restructuring even though it is in the general interest of bondholders as a group, not to mention the population of the country experiencing the shortage of funds for public welfare. In particular, the disruptions to sovereign debt restructuring by frivolous litigation is considered as one of the main threats.
This dissertation is the first major study devoted to sovereign bonds structured through a trust arrangement and the promising features that such a legal structure possesses for an effective and efficient sovereign debt restructuring. It provides a comprehensive inquiry into the evolution of the mechanisms to coordinate creditors, with a focus on bondholders and institutional frameworks which facilitated this coordination. It examines intriguing primary sources from League of Nations archives and provides in-depth case studies on the functionality of the trustees in sovereign bond restructurings performed by Argentina in 2016 and Ecuador in 2008.
Assessing the utility of trust arrangements to address coordination problems, this thesis is driven by the puzzle: How to better balance (i) the need for smooth sovereign debt restructurings, which by definition entails some losses for creditors, with (ii) bondholders’ legitimate interests? What approach can be used in constructing a legal and institutional framework for trustees to promote the best interest of the bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring? As a solution, it seems that incentives for bond trustees to pursue debt sustainability will achieve both goals.
In this regard, recognition of the concept of debt sustainability, being in substance the IMF and WB debt sustainability assessment, as the best interest of bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring is beneficial from multiple aspects. It enables a bond trustee to excel in its role as a guardian of bondholders by following the best interest of bondholders in exercising its discretion. Moreover, it fosters an equilibrium between the interests of private creditors and a state taking into account its socio-political aspects.
We develop a dynamic recursive model where political and economic decisions interact, to study how excessive debt-GDP ratios affect political sustainability of prudent fiscal policies. Rent seeking groups make political decisions – to cooperate (or not) – on the allocation of fiscal budgets (including rents) and issuance of sovereign debt. A classic commons problem triggers collective fiscal impatience and excessive debt issuing, leading to a vicious circle of high borrowing costs and sovereign default. We analytically characterize debt-GDP thresholds that foster cooperation among rent seeking groups and avoid default. Our analysis and application helps in understanding the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for fiscal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quantifies the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector involvement in the case of Greece.
Debt levels in the eurozone have reached new record highs. The member countries have tried to cushion the economic consequences of the corona pandemic with a massive increase in government spending. End of 2021 public debt in relation to GDP will approach 100% on average. There are various calls to abolish or soften the Maastricht rules of limiting sovereign debt. We see the risk of a new sovereign debt crisis in this decade if it is not possible to bring public debt down to an acceptable level. Our new fiscal rule would be suitable and appropriate for this purpose, because obviously the Maastricht criteria have failed. In contrast to the rigid 3% Maastricht-criterion, our rule is flexible and it addresses the main problem: excessively high public debt ratios. And it lowers the existing incentives for highly indebted governments to exert expansionary pressure on monetary policy. If obeyed strictly, our rule reinforces the snowball effect and reduces the excessively high debt ratios within a manageable period, even if nominal growth is weak. This is confirmed by simulations with different scenarios as well as with the hypothetical application of the new fiscal rule to eurozone economies from 2022 to 2026. Finally, we take up the recent proposal by ESM economists to increase the permissible debt ratio from 60 to 100% of GDP in the eurozone.
Rising temperatures, falling ratings: the effect of climate change on sovereign creditworthiness
(2021)
How will a changing climate impact the creditworthiness of governments over the very long term? Financial markets need credible, digestible information on how climate change translates into material risks. To bridge the gap between climate science and real-world financial indicators, the authors simulate the effect of climate change on sovereign credit ratings for 108 countries, creating the world’s first climate-adjusted sovereign credit rating. The study offers a first methodological approach to extend the long-term rating to an ultra-long-term reality, aiming at long-term investors, but also regulators and rating agencies.
What happened in Cyprus? The economic consequences of the last communist government in Europe
(2014)
This paper reviews developments in the Cypriot economy following the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2008 and leading to the economic collapse of the island five years later. The main cause of the collapse is identified with the election of a communist government in February 2008, within two months of the introduction of the euro, and its subsequent choices for action and inaction on economic policy matters. The government allowed a rapid deterioration of public finances, and despite repeated warnings, damaged the country's creditworthiness and lost market access in May 2011. The destruction of the island's largest power station in July 2011 subsequently threw the economy into recession. Together with the intensification of the euro area crisis in the summer and fall of 2011, these events weakened the banking system which was vulnerable due to its exposure in Greece. Rather than deal with its fiscal crisis, the government secured a loan from the Russian government that allowed it to postpone action until after the February 2013 election. Rather than protect the banking system, losses were imposed on banks and a campaign against them was coordinated and used as a platform by the communist party for the February 2013 election. The strategy succeeded in delaying resolution of the crisis and avoiding short-term political cost for the communist party before the election, but also in precipitating a catastrophe right after the election.