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We collect data on the size distribution of all U.S. corporate businesses for 100 years. We document that corporate concentration (e.g., asset share or sales share of the top 1%) has increased persistently over the past century. Rising concentration was stronger in manufacturing and mining before the 1970s, and stronger in services, retail, and wholesale after the 1970s. Furthermore, rising concentration in an industry aligns closely with investment intensity in research and development and information technology. Industries with higher increases in concentration also exhibit higher output growth. The long-run trends of rising corporate concentration indicate increasingly stronger economies of scale.
Consumers purchase energy in many forms. Sometimes energy goods are consumed directly, for instance, in the form of gasoline used to operate a vehicle, electricity to light a home, or natural gas to heat a home. At other times, the cost of energy is embodied in the prices of goods and services that consumers buy, say when purchasing an airline ticket or when buying online garden furniture made from plastic to be delivered by mail. Previous research has focused on quantifying the pass-through of the price of crude oil or the price of motor gasoline to U.S. inflation. Neither approach accounts for the fact that percent changes in refined product prices need not be proportionate to the percent change in the price of oil, that not all energy is derived from oil, and that the correlation of price shocks across energy markets is far from one. This paper develops a vector autoregressive model that quantifies the joint impact of shocks to several energy prices on headline and core CPI inflation. Our analysis confirms that focusing on gasoline price shocks alone will underestimate the inflationary pressures emanating from the energy sector, but not enough to overturn the conclusion that much of the observed increase in headline inflation in 2021 and 2022 reflected non-energy price shocks.
This paper examines optimal enviromental policy when external financing is costly for firms. We introduce emission externalities and industry equilibrium in the Holmström and Tirole (1997) model of corporate finance. While a cap-and- trading system optimally governs both firms` abatement activities (internal emission margin) and industry size (external emission margin) when firms have sufficient internal funds, external financing constraints introduce a wedge between these two objectives. When a sector is financially constrained in the aggregate, the optimal cap is strictly above the Pigouvian benchmark and emission allowances should be allocated below market prices. When a sector is not financially constrained in the aggregate, a cap that is below the Pigiouvian benchmark optimally shifts market share to less polluting firms and, moreover, there should be no "grandfathering" of emission allowances. With financial constraints and heterogeneity across firms or sectors, a uniform policy, such as a single cap-and-trade system, is typically not optimal.
Central banks have faced a succession of crises over the past years as well as a number of structural factors such as a transition to a greener economy, demographic developments, digitalisation and possibly increased onshoring. These suggest that the future inflation environment will be different from the one we know. Thus uncertainty about important macroeconomic variables and, in particular, inflation dynamics will likely remain high.
This note argues that in a situation of an inelastic natural gas supply a restrictive monetary policy in the euro zone could reduce the energy bill and therefore has additional merits. A more hawkish monetary policy may be able to indirectly use monopsony power on the gas market. The welfare benefits of such a policy are diluted to the extent that some of the supply (approximately 10 percent) comes from within the euro zone, which may give rise to distributional concerns.
This study examines the recent literature on the expectations, beliefs and perceptions of investors who incorporate Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) considerations in investment decisions with the aim to generate superior performance and also make a societal impact. Through the lens of equilibrium models of agents with heterogeneous tastes for ESG investments, green assets are expected to generate lower returns in the long run than their non- ESG counterparts. However, at the short run, ESG investment can outperform non-ESG investment through various channels. Empirically, results of ESG outperformance are mixed. We find consensus in the literature that some investors have ESG preference and that their actions can generate positive social impact. The shift towards more sustainable policies in firms is motivated by the increased market values and the lower cost of capital of green firms driven by investors’ choices.
The importance of agile methods has increased in recent years, not only to manage IT projects but also to establish flexible and adaptive organisational structures, which are essential to deal with disruptive changes and build successful digital business strategies. This paper takes an industry-specific perspective by analysing the dissemination, objectives and relative popularity of agile frameworks in the German banking sector. The data provides insights into expectations and experiences associated with agile methods and indicates possible implementation hurdles and success factors. Our research provides the first comprehensive analysis of agile methods in the German banking sector. The comparison with a selected number of fintechs has revealed some differences between banks and fintechs. We found that almost all banks and fintechs apply agile methods in IT projects. However, fintechs have relatively more experience with agile methods than banks and use them more intensively. Scrum is the most relevant framework used in practice. Scaled agile frameworks are so far negligible in the German banking sector. Acceleration of projects is apparently the most important objective of deploying agile methods. In addition, agile methods can contribute to cost savings and lead to improved quality and innovation performance, though for banks it is evidently more challenging to reach their respective targets than for fintechs. Overall our findings suggest that German banks are still in a maturing process of becoming more agile and that there is room for an accelerated adoption of agile methods in general and scaled agile frameworks in particular.
Employing the art-collection records of Burton and Emily Hall Tremaine, we consider whether early-stage art investors can be understood as venture capitalists. Because the Tremaines bought artists’ work very close to an artwork’s creation, with 69% of works in our study purchased within one year of the year when they were made, their collecting practice can best be framed as venture-capital investment in art. The Tremaines also illustrate art collecting as social-impact investment, owing to their combined strategy of art sales and museum donations for which the collectors received a tax credit under US rules. Because the Tremaines’ museum donations took place at a time that U.S. marginal tax rates from 70% to 91%, the near “donation parity” with markets, creating a parallel to ESG investment in the management of multiple forms of value.
With Big Data, decisions made by machine learning algorithms depend on training data generated by many individuals. In an experiment, we identify the effect of varying individual responsibility for the moral choices of an artificially intelligent algorithm. Across treatments, we manipulated the sources of training data and thus the impact of each individual’s decisions on the algorithm. Diffusing such individual pivotality for algorithmic choices increased the share of selfish decisions and weakened revealed prosocial preferences. This does not result from a change in the structure of incentives. Rather, our results show that Big Data offers an excuse for selfish behavior through lower responsibility for one’s and others’ fate.
In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.