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The authors identify U.S. monetary and fiscal dominance regimes using machine learning techniques. The algorithms are trained and verified by employing simulated data from Markov-switching DSGE models, before they classify regimes from 1968-2017 using actual U.S. data. All machine learning methods outperform a standard logistic regression concerning the simulated data. Among those the Boosted Ensemble Trees classifier yields the best results. The authors find clear evidence of fiscal dominance before Volcker. Monetary dominance is detected between 1984-1988, before a fiscally led regime turns up around the stock market crash lasting until 1994. Until the beginning of the new century, monetary dominance is established, while the more recent evidence following the financial crisis is mixed with a tendency towards fiscal dominance.
Industry classification groups firms into finer partitions to help investments and empirical analysis. To overcome the well-documented limitations of existing industry definitions, like their stale nature and coarse categories for firms with multiple operations, we employ a clustering approach on 69 firm characteristics and allocate companies to novel economic sectors maximizing the within-group explained variation. Such sectors are dynamic yet stable, and represent a superior investment set compared to standard classification schemes for portfolio optimization and for trading strategies based on within-industry mean-reversion, which give rise to a latent risk factor significantly priced in the cross-section. We provide a new metric to quantify feature importance for clustering methods, finding that size drives differences across classical industries while book-to-market and financial liquidity variables matter for clustering-based sectors.
Industry concentration and markups in the US have been rising over the last 3-4 decades. However, the causes remain largely unknown. This paper uses machine learning on regulatory documents to construct a novel dataset on compliance costs to examine the effect of regulations on market power. The dataset is comprehensive and consists of all significant regulations at the 6-digit NAICS level from 1970-2018. We find that regulatory costs have increased by $1 trillion during this period. We document that an increase in regulatory costs results in lower (higher) sales, employment, markups, and profitability for small (large) firms. Regulation driven increase in concentration is associated with lower elasticity of entry with respect to Tobin's Q, lower productivity and investment after the late 1990s. We estimate that increased regulations can explain 31-37% of the rise in market power. Finally, we uncover the political economy of rulemaking. While large firms are opposed to regulations in general, they push for the passage of regulations that have an adverse impact on small firms.