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After nearly two decades of US leadership during the 1980s and 1990s, are Europe’s venture capital (VC) markets in the 2000s finally catching up regarding the provision of financing and successful exits, or is the performance gap as wide as ever? Are we amid an overall VC performance slump with no encouraging news? We attempt to answer these questions by tracking over 40,000 VC-backed firms stemming from six industries in 13 European countries and the US between 1985 and 2009; determining the type of exit – if any – each particular firm’s investors choose for the venture.
This paper argues that the key mechanisms protecting retail investors’ financial stake in their portfolio investments are indirect. They do not rely on actions by the investors or by any private actor directly charged with looking after investors’ interests. Rather, they are provided by the ecosystem that investors (are legally forced to) inhabit, as a byproduct of the mostly self-interested, mutually and legally constrained behavior of third parties without a mandate to help the investors (e.g., speculators, activists). This elucidates key rules, resolves the mandatory vs. enabling tension in corporate/securities law, and exposes passive investing’s fragile reliance on others’ trading.
Private Equity ist außerhalb des Fachpublikums von vielen Mythen und Missverständnissen umgeben. Dies fängt bereits bei der Funktionsweise und Größe des Sektors an, aber auch über die Profitabilität und die Gebührenstruktur von Private Equity Gesellschaften gibt es falsche Vorstellungen. Zudem werden immer wieder Vorwürfe laut, dass Private Equity zu massivem Arbeitsplatzabbau, einer hohen Anzahl von Konkursen und dem Unterlassen von langfristigen Investitionen führt. Dennoch wird Private Equity als wichtiges Instrument zur Finanzierung des deutschen Mittelstandes angeführt. Dieser Essay stellt den gängigen Vorurteilen zu Private Equity die neuesten Forschungsergebnisse gegenüber und versucht so, ein ausgewogenes Bild sowohl der Chancen und Risiken als auch des Einsatzgebiets von Private Equity zu zeichnen.
We study the returns the venture capital and private equity investment from 221 venture capital and private equity funds that are part of 72 venture capital and private equity firms, 5040 entrepreneurial firms (3826 venture capital and 1214 private equity), and spanning 32 years (1971 - 2003) and 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia. We make use of four main categories of variables to proxy for value-added activities and risks that explain venture capital and private equity returns: market and legal environment, VC characteristics, entrepreneurial firm characteristics, and the characteristics and structure of the investment. We show Heckman sample selection issues in regards to both unrealized and partially realized investments are important to consider for analysing the determinants of realized returns. We further compare the actual unrealized returns, as reported to investment managers, to the predicted unrealized returns based on the estimates of realized returns from the sample selection models. We show there exists significant systematic biases in the reporting of unrealized investments to institutional investors depending on the level of the earnings aggressiveness and disclosure indices in a country, as well as proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between investment managers and venture capital and private equity fund managers. Klassifikation: G24, G28, G31, G32, G35
In this article, we investigate risk return characteristics and diversification benefits when private equity is used as a portfolio component. We use a unique dataset describing 642 US-American portfolio companies with 3620 private equity investments. Information about precisely dated cash flows at the company level enables for the first time a cash flow equivalent and simultaneous investment simulation in stocks, as well as the construction of stock portfolios for benchmarking purposes. With respect to the methodology involved, we construct private equity, stock-benchmark and mixed-asset portfolios using bootstrap simulations. For the late 1990s we find a dramatic increase in the extent to which private equity outperforms stock investment. In earlier years private equity was underperforming its stock benchmarks. Within the overall class of private equity, returns on earlier private equity investment categories, like venture capital, show on average higher variations and even higher rates of failure. It is in this category in particular that high average portfolio returns are generated solely by the ability to select a few extremely well performing companies, thus compensating for lost investments. There is a high marginal diversifiable risk reduction of about 80% when the portfolio size is increased to include 15 investments. When the portfolio size is increased from 15 to 200 there are few marginal risk diversification effects on the one hand, but a large increase in managing expenditure on the other, so that an actual average portfolio size between 20 and 28 investments seems to be well balanced. We provide empirical evidence that the non-diversifiable risk that a constrained investor, who is exclusively investing in private equity, has to hold exceeds that of constrained stock investors and also the market risk. From the viewpoint of unconstrained investors with complete investment freedom, risk can be optimally reduced by constructing mixed asset portfolios. According to the various private equity subcategories analyzed, there are big differences in optimal allocations to this asset class for minimizing mixed-asset portfolio variance or maximizing performance ratios. We observe optimal portfolio weightings to be between 3% and 65%.
Private equity has grown remarkably in the last 30 years. Given its rise to prominence, exceptional profitability and a more prolific and publicly visible buyout activity, regulation in the private equity space seemed inevitable. The 2007 global financial crisis furnished an opportunity to doubt the industry’s role and magnify the key concerns, providing momentum for calls to regulate the industry more aggressively. Ultimately, the regulatory change came from the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), which has been described as one of the most rigorously debated and controversial pieces of financial regulation to ever emerge from the European Union (EU).
The AIFMD is unique and unprecedented, yet there has been very little written about it in the context of private equity. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to this area of research by examining the implications of AIFMD for private equity and arguing that this EU Directive has a re-shaping effect on the industry that inevitably marks the end of the light-touch regulation in this area. Whilst the desire of policymakers to act and intervene decisively during market
downturns is understandable, there is a risk that the response may not be appropriate and result in a crisis-induced over-reaction.
This thesis demonstrates, amongst other things, that the AIFMD has created a particularly
complex regulatory regime which for the hitherto unregulated or lightly regulated fund managers has had a significant effect in the EU and beyond. Examples of the most impactful
provisions relate to authorisation, marketing, depositaries, acquisition of control, remuneration, and transparency and disclosure. The implication are wide-ranging, and there is a clear conflict between the opportunities (e.g. EU passport, AIFMD as a global brand) and threats (e.g. excessive compliance costs, exodus of fund managers from the EU), which depend on a firm’s size, domicile and the gap needed to be aligned between the pre- and post-AIFMD regime.
Although there will be no stark triumph of one position over another in the assessment of the AIFMD until all of its elements are fully implemented, overall the impact of the Directive has been material, requiring substantial work to comply with (or adapt to) the requirements, which in some cases are not only particularly onerous and costly, but also a bit misguided, discouraging, or fairly irrelevant.
We estimate the risk and expected returns of private equity investments based on the market prices of exchange traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds. Our results indicate that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns of about one to two percent. We also find that the market expects listed private equity funds to earn zero to marginally negative abnormal returns net of fees. Both listed and unlisted private equity funds have market betas close to one and positive factor loadings on the Fama-French SMB factor. Private equity fund returns are positively correlated with GDP growth and negatively correlated with the credit spread. Finally, we find that market returns of exchange traded funds of funds and listed private equity funds predict changes in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity funds.
Financial theory creates a puzzle. Some authors argue that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts instead of equity contracts since risky but high returns are of relatively more value for a loan-financed firm. On the contrary, authors who focus explicitly on start-up finance predict that entrepreneurs are the more likely to seek equity-like venture capital contracts, the more risky their projects are. Our paper makes a first step to resolve this puzzle empirically. We present microeconometric evidence on the determinants of debt and equity financing in young and innovative SMEs. We pay special attention to the role of risk for the choice of the financing method. Since risk is not directly observable we use different indicators for financial and project risk. It turns out that our data generally confirms the hypothesis that the probability that a young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the financial risk. With regard to the intrinsic project risk, our results are less conclusive, as some of our indicators of a risky project are found to have a negative effect on the likelihood to be financed by private equity.