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A counterparty credit limit (CCL) is a limit imposed by a financial institution to cap its maximum possible exposure to a specified counterparty. Although CCLs are designed to help institutions mitigate counterparty risk by selective diversification of their exposures, their implementation restricts the liquidity that institutions can access in an otherwise centralized pool. We address the question of how this mechanism impacts trade prices and volatility, both empirically and via a new model of trading with CCLs. We find empirically that CCLs cause little impact on trade. However, our model highlights that in extreme situations, CCLs could serve to destabilize prices and thereby influence systemic risk.
The paper analyses the contagion channels of the European financial system through the stochastic block model (SBM). The model groups homogeneous connectivity patterns among the financial institutions and describes the shock transmission mechanisms of the financial networks in a compact way. We analyse the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis and show that the network exhibits a strong community structure with two main blocks acting as shock spreader and receiver, respectively. Moreover, we provide evidence of the prominent role played by insurances in the spread of systemic risk in both crises. Finally, we demonstrate that policy interventions focused on institutions with inter-community linkages (community bridges) are more effective than the ones based on the classical connectedness measures and represents consequently, a better early warning indicator in predicting future financial losses.
This paper investigates systemic risk in the insurance industry. We first analyze the systemic contribution of the insurance industry vis-à-vis other industries by applying 3 measures, namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall, on 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies listed in Europe over the last 14 years. We then analyze the determinants of the systemic risk contribution within the insurance industry by using balance sheet level data in a broader sample. Our evidence suggests that i) the insurance industry shows a persistent systemic relevance over time and plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks, and that ii) within the industry, those insurers which engage more in non-insurance-related activities tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of diversification as potential determinant of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Finally, we confirm that size is also a significant driver of systemic risk, whereas price-to-book ratio and leverage display counterintuitive results.
This paper investigates systemic risk in the insurance industry. We first analyze the systemic contribution of the insurance industry vis-à-vis other industries by applying 3 measures, namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall, on 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies listed in Europe over the last 14 years. We then analyze the determinants of the systemic risk contribution within the insurance industry by using balance sheet level data in a broader sample. Our evidence suggests that i) the insurance industry shows a persistent systemic relevance over time and plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks, and that ii) within the industry, those insurers which engage more in non-insurance-related activities tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of diversification as potential determinant of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Finally, we confirm that size is also a significant driver of systemic risk, whereas price-to-book ratio and leverage display counterintuitive results.
Life insurance convexity
(2023)
Life insurers sell savings contracts with surrender options, which allow policyholders to prematurely receive guaranteed surrender values. These surrender options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Hence, higher interest rates raise surrender rates, as we document empirically by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in monetary policy. Using a calibrated model, we then estimate that surrender options would force insurers to sell up to 2% of their investments during an enduring interest rate rise of 25 bps per year. We show that these fire sales are fueled by surrender value guarantees and insurers’ long-term investments.
Life insurance convexity
(2021)
Life insurers massively sell savings contracts with surrender options which allow policyholders to withdraw a guaranteed amount before maturity. These options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Using data on German life insurers, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates raises surrender rates by 17 basis points. We quantify the resulting liquidity risk in a calibrated model of surrender decisions and insurance cash flows. Simulations predict that surrender options can force insurers to sell up to 3% of their assets, depressing asset prices by 90 basis points. The effect is amplified by the duration of insurers' investments, and its impact on the term structure of interest rates depends on life insurers' investment strategy.