Refine
Year of publication
- 2017 (4)
Document Type
- Part of a Book (4)
Language
- English (4) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4) (remove)
Keywords
- Totalität (4) (remove)
Filippo Trentin's essay 'Warburg's Ghost: On Literary Atlases and the "Anatopic" Shift of a Cartographic Object' analyses the atlas as a method of assemblage in literary theory. It takes issue with the use of cartography advocated by proponents of a 'spatial turn' within literary studies, including Malcolm Bradbury's "Atlas of Literature", Franco Moretti's "Atlas of European Literature", and Sergio Luzzatto and Gabriele Pedullà's "Atlante della letteratura italiana". While these atlases claim to dismantle the normative canon of historicism and to offer a different way of gathering knowledge, Trentin argues that they often risk reproducing analogous positivistic, hierarchical, and colonizing assumptions. Showing a totalizing attitude embedded in modern atlases and in the 'cartographic reason' emerging from the sixteenth century onwards, the essay proposes a speculative and heuristic use of the term 'anatopy' that aims to capture the disorienting potentialities that are intrinsic to non-cartographic explorations of space. In particular, it interprets Aby Warburg's "Bilderatlas Mnemosyne" as an 'anatopic' object that keeps troubling any purely cartographic use of the atlas. In Trentin's reading, by theorizing an anti-foundational (and anti-identitarian) method of knowledge organization based on the morphological affect between disparate images and objects, Warburg's project leads to the profanation of the atlas as a topographical machine and, with its recurrences, intervals, and voids, destitutes its traditional apparatus of power. This disparate and anti-holistic aesthetic disposition challenges the solid foundations of the constructions of historicism and cartographic reason. It breaks up the technical explanation of cause and effect and substitutes it with a 'danced causality', which Trentin relates to Leo Bersani's idea of 'aesthetic subject' and the possibility of moving beyond an immobile and filial principle of identity formation towards a virtual and impersonal one that is located beyond the 'ego', as well as beyond the rigid borders of cartographic reason and the linearity of positivistic historicism.
Arnd Wedemeyer's article focuses on the German artist Joseph Beuys (1921–86), who did not shy away from describing the social order with traditional organic metaphors, such as the notion of a 'central organ'. However, it is above all the - plastic - relationship between society and art that is at issue in Wedemeyer's article, entitled 'Pumping Honey: Joseph Beuys at the documenta 6'. Using the term 'Soziale Plastik', Beuys not only classified his own artistic practice as essentially sculptural but, more importantly, thematized its heterogeneous yet anything but passive relationship to art market, exhibition, museum, and various modes of reception, as well as staked its political claim. Wedemeyer looks at Beuys's contribution to the 1977 documenta, 'Honey Pump at the Workplace', in order to argue that the layered invocation of plasticity characteristic of Beuys's practice and theorizing ought not be historicized, as is commonly done, as an instantiation of the excessive, transgressive - and quite possibly disingenuous - zeal of the neo-avant-garde. Beuys's 'Plastik' should not be confused with anti-aesthetic formlessness, base materialism, a post-Duchampian ruination of the 'objet trouvé', and least of all a Neoromantic or Wagnerian projection or hypostatization of the autonomous work of art. The avant-gardes of the twentieth century have rendered the relationship of art and aesthetics tenuous at best, their artistic 'innovations' straining against the supratemporally or anthropologically defined characteristics of aesthetic valuation, play, or force. While many have sought to address this problem by tethering art to society in a shared 'contemporaneity', the article explores the implications of recasting this relation as one of plasticity, using the conceptual richness harvested by Catherine Malabou.
A different take on knowledge, history, and totalization is presented in Jamila Mascat's essay 'Hegel and the Ad-venture of the Totality', which aims at exploring the controversial notion of the Hegelian totality. Countering Louis Althusser's critique of Hegel's 'expressive totality', where every part is thought to expresses the whole, it proposes to consider such a speculative figure as a temporalizing instance situated at the entanglement of Knowing and History. Firstly, it illustrates the paradoxical inclination of Hegel's totality to being both complete and a never-ending task. Secondly, it analyses the accomplishment of totality at the peak of the Science of Logic, focusing on the temporal circularity of the Concept ('Begriff'). Thirdly, drawing on the readings of Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite, the essay illustrates the peculiar relation between becoming and eternity that is located at the heart of Hegel's conception of time. Finally, it approaches the last section of the "Phenomenology of Spirit" devoted to Absolute Knowing in order to highlight the twofold movement of seizure ('Begreifen') and release ('Entlassen') that characterizes the activity of the Spirit and that is constitutive of the contingent ad-venture of the totality as a philosophical achievement. In other words, it is by embracing contingency as its limit that Absolute Knowing reaffirms the status of its absoluteness precisely because of its capacity to sacrifice itself and let it go. Critically engaging with Catherine Malabou's reading of plasticity in Hegel, Mascat highlights that Absolute Knowing is a process of totalization that entails cuts and interruptions. The essay shows that the Hegelian totality may be interpreted and actualized as a theoretical construct densely charged with temporal and historical implications: on the one hand, totality expresses a timely standpoint for thought - the standpoint of Hegel's age, which is, as claimed by the philosopher at the end of his "Lectures on the History of Philosophy", 'for the time being completed', as well as the standpoint of the present time to be speculatively accomplished; on the other hand, Hegel's idea of a speculative totalization sets for the philosophies yet to come the never-ending task of constituting and re-constituting wholes.
Wholes are said to be more than the sum of their parts. This 'more' contains both a promise and a threat. When different elements - which might be individuals, cultures, disciplines, or methods - form a whole, they not only join forces but also generate a surplus from which the parts can benefit. Being part of a whole is a way to acquire meaning and to extend beyond one's limited existence; and having a part in the whole is to have an enlarged agency. But wholes are also more powerful than the sum of their parts. Wholes constitute their parts: they determine what is a part and what is apart, what can become a part, and which parts have no part. Even if parts therefore may not be said to pre-exist a whole, there may still be something in them that exceeds being a part - if only the possibility of being part of a different whole.