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Our study examines the existence and the nature of private benefits of control in Germany. We do this by analyzing initial public offerings of founding-family owned firms and tracking their fate up to ten years following the IPO. Our sample includes a uniquely rich data set of 105 IPOs of family-owned firms floated from 1970 to 1991 on German stock exchanges. We find that, first, even ten years after the IPO, family owners, in the cross section, continue to exercise considerable control. Second, we show that there exist substantial private benefits of control in these firms and - to our understanding for the first time - we empirically measure what the nature of these private benefits really is. We also show that the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights via the issuance of dual-class shares is used to create controlling shareholder structures in order to preserve these private benefits. Third, we find a puzzling and significant underperformance of dual-class share IPOs, which can be explained by ex ante unanticipated expropriation of minority shareholders due to poor investor protection in Germany. This Version: 4th draft, November 2001 This paper has been presented at the European Financial Management Association 2001 Meeting in Lugano, the CEPR Conference "The Firm and its Stakeholders" in Courmayeur, the Fall 2000 WAFA Conference in Washington, D.C., the European Economic Association 2000 Conference in Bozen, the ABN AMRO International Conference on IPOs in Amsterdam, the SIRIF Conference on Corporate Governance in Edinburgh, the Financial Center Seminar at the Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, and the G-Forum on Entrepreneurship Research in Vienna. Klassifikation: G14, G32, G15
This paper provides empirical evidence on initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the pricing and long-run performance of IPOs using a unique data set collected on the German capital market before World War I. Our findings indicate that underpricing of IPOs has existed, but has significantly decreased over time in our sample. Employing a mixture of distributions approach we also find evidence of price stabilization of IPOs. Concerning long-run performance, investors who bought their shares in the early after-market and held them for more than three years experienced significantly lower returns than the respective industry as a whole. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ABN-AMRO Conference on IPOs in Amsterdam, the Annual Meetings of the European Finance Association, the Annual Meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik, the IX Tor Vergata International Conference on Banking and Finance in Rome, and at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt.
Es gibt Überlegungen, Kreditinstituten den Besitz der Anteilsmehrheit an Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGs) zu untersagen. Dahinter steht die Vorstellung, daß solche Beteiligungen Gestaltungsspielräume eröffnen, die mißbräuchlich genutzt werden. Die Neuemission von Aktien ist einer der Fälle, die in diesem Zusammenhang erörtert werden. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu prüfen, ob die zum Konzernverbund einer konsortialführenden Bank gehörenden KAGs bei Erstemissionen anders behandelt werden als andere KAGs.
Untersucht werden 46 Neuemissionen der Jahre 1994 bis 1997. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, daß die KAGs in ihren Anlageentscheidungen unabhängig sind, und daß keine mißbräuchliche Nutzung eventuell vorhandener Informationsvorsprünge vorliegt.
This paper aims to analyze the impact of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after the IPO. We thereby investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives and track record of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis by using a data set embracing all IPOs which occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after the IPO compared to all other IPOs and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. Obviously, independent VCs, which concentrated mainly on growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) and large firms (high market value), were able to add value by leading to less post-IPO idiosyncratic risk and more return (after controlling for all other effects). On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs (being small and having a high book-to-market ratio) showed relative underperformance. Klassifikation: G10, G14, G24 . 29th January 2004 .
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.