Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (10)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (11)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (11)
Keywords
- Kredit (11) (remove)
In this study the firms' choice of the number of bank relationships is analyzed with respect to influential factors like borrower quality, size and the existence of a close housebank relationship. Then, the number of bank relationships is used as a proxy to examine if bank competition is reflected in loan terms. It is shown that the number of bank relationships is foremost determined by borrower size and the existence of a housebank relationship. Loan rate spreads are not effected by the number of bank relationships. However, borrowers with a small number of bank relationships provide more collateral and get more credit. These effects are amplified by a housebank relationship. Housebanks get more collateral and are ready to take a larger stake in the financing of their customers.
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. JEL - Klassifikation: G21 , G78 , G33
We survey contributions to the analysis of household liabilities, highlighting relevant theoretical aspects and outlining how data sources may support empirical testing and measurement efforts. Specifically, we classify aspects of household debt, discussing the theoretical and policy relevance of heterogeneity across individual and country dimensions. Aiming to illustrate conceptual and measurement issues, we refer to the approaches and results of some recent relevant country-specific work on administrative and survey data, and we argue that research in this area would greatly benefit from availability of appropriately classified household liabilities data and of cross-country institutional information. JEL Classification: G1, E21
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
Despite the relevance of credit financing for the profit and risk situation of commercial banks only little empirical evidence on the initial credit decision and monitoring process exists due to the lack of appropriate data on bank debt financing. The present paper provides a systematic overview of a data set generated during the Center for Financial Studies research project on "Credit Management" which was designed to fill this empirical void. The data set contains a broad list of variables taken from the credit files of five major German banks. It is a random sample drawn from all customers which have engaged in some form of borrowing from the banks in question between January 1992 and January 1997 and which meet a number of selection criteria. The sampling design and data collection procedure are discussed in detail. Additionally, the project's research agenda is described and some general descriptive statistics of the firms in our sample are provided.
Schon im ersten Weltkrieg, besonders aber seit dem Ausbruch der Weltwirtschaftskrise und erst recht im zweiten Weltkrieg hat der öffentliche Kredit in finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischer Hinsicht eine Bedeutung erlangt, wie nie zuvor. Er, der ehedem fast nur ein außerordentliches Mittel zur Überwindung vorübergehender finanzieller Schwierigkeiten des Staates gewesen war, entwickelte sich in dieser Zeit zu einem wirtschaftspolitischen Faktor ersten Ranges, ohne dessen Mitwirkung eine erfolgreiche Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik heute kaum denkbar ist. Besonders die durch den zweiten Weltkrieg geschaffene Zwangslage nötigte die einzelnen Volkswirtschaften, die durch ihn gebotenen finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischen Möglichkeiten in jeder Weise bis zur Grenze des absolut Möglichen auszuprobieren. Die konjunkturaktive öffentliche Kreditpolitik jener Zeit war von Anfang an kein einheitliches Ganzes, sondern entwickelte sich zu einem geschlossenen wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen System erst allmählich aus verschiedenen wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Einzelmaßnahmen. Sinn und Zweck dieser Arbeit ist es nun, rückschauend auf diese Entwicklung das Grundsätzliche dieser Politik herauszuarbeiten. Ihr besonderer Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf der Beantwortung der Fragen, inwieweit eine staatliche konjunkturaktive Kreditpolitik ein Heilmittel ist, um einen wirtschaftlichen Schrumpfungsprozess zum Stillstand zu bringen, inwieweit ein Reizmittel, um die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung voranzutreiben und inwieweit ein Gift, das schließlich den Ruin von Marktwirtschaft und Finanzwirtschaft herbeiführt.
This paper examines a practice that is nearly imperceptible to historians because the bulk of evidence for it is to be found in the interstices of the beaten paths of legal and social history and because it mixes economic and religious matters in a strikingly unfamiliar manner. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, excommunication for debt offered ordinary people an economical, efficacious enforcement mechanism for small-scale, daily, unwritten credit. At the same time, the practice offered holders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction an important opportunity to round out their incomes, particularly in the difficult fifteenth century. This transitional practice reveals a level of credit below that of the letters of change, annuities secured on real property, or written obligations beloved of economic historians and historians of banking. Studying the practice casts light on the transition from the face-to-face, local economies of the high Middle Ages to the regional economies of the early modern period, on how the Reformation shaped early modern regimes of credit, and on how the disappearance of ecclesiastical civil justice facilitated the emergence of early modern juridically sovereign territories.
We study the relation between the credit cycle and macro economic fundamentals in an intensity based framework. Using rating transition and default data of U.S. corporates from Standard and Poor’s over the period 1980–2005 we directly estimate the credit cycle from the micro rating data. We relate this cycle to the business cycle, bank lending conditions, and financial market variables. In line with earlier studies, these variables appear to explain part of the credit cycle. As our main contribution, we test for the correct dynamic specification of these models. In all cases, the hypothesis of correct dynamic specification is strongly rejected. Moreover, accounting for dynamic mis-specification, many of the variables thought to explain the credit cycle, turn out to be insignificant. The main exceptions are GDP growth, and to some extent stock returns and stock return volatilities. Their economic significance appears low, however. This raises the puzzle of what macro-economic fundamentals explain default and rating dynamics. JEL Classification: G11, G21
We studied information and interaction processes in six lending relationships between a universal bank and medium sized firms. The study is based on the credit files of the respective firms. If no problems occur in these lending relationships, bank monitoring is based mainly on cheap, retrospective and internal data. In case of distress, more expensive, prospective and external information is used. The level of monitoring and the willingness to renegotiate the lending relationship depends on what the lending officers can learn about the future prospects of the firm from the behaviour of the debtors. We identify both signalling and bonding activities. Such learning from past behaviour seems to allow monitoring at low cost, whereas the direct observation of the firm's investment outlook seems to be very costly. Also, too much knowledge about the firm's investments might leave the bank in a very strong bargaining position and distort investment incentives. Therefore, the traditional view of credit assessment as observation of the quality of a borrower's investment programme needs to be reconsidered.