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Last November, the media organisation of the „Islamic State“ (IS) published a video, the sole purpose of which was to prove that the „caliphate“ which the IS has established in June 2014 was in fact a proper state. The video highlighted a host of institutions in order to drive home the claim of real statehood, including examples like a working judiciary, a prison administration, a schooling system, and so on. At one point in the video, the IS claimed that it was also financially independent and had apt resources at its disposal, namely oil and gas.
However, while it is true that the IS controls a number of oil and gas fields in Syria as well as in Iraq, we have by now enough evidence to be rather sure that the economic base of the „caliphate“ is by no means sustainable...
After five years of the Syrian war, we can recognize “four” conflicting parties on the ground – Assad, ISIS, rebel groups and the Kurds. Each one of these conflicting parties has regional and international backers, who ironically do not agree with each other about whom they are fighting for or against. The Syrian regime is backed by Iran, Russia, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. ISIS is backed by the flood of global Jihadists from all over the world. Rebel groups are backed by Gulf States, Turkey, Jordan and the US. The Kurds are supported by the US. While in the media, we always say “the Syrian conflict, crisis or war”, I wonder what makes this war that much Syrian. It is rather a war on the land of Syria, in which more than 50% of Syria’s population have been displaced, over 220 thousand have been killed, and many more have been injured or imprisoned. According to Amnesty international, more than 12.8 million Syrian people are in “urgent need of humanitarian assistance”. In addition to this humanitarian catastrophe, most of the Syrian land and infrastructure have been destroyed. So what is that Syrian about the Syrian “war”?...
Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation wurde die spätpleistozäne und holozäne Landschaftsentwicklung im Umfeld der im Tal des Wadis Chuera in Nordsyrien liegenden bronzezeitlichen Siedlung Tell Chuera untersucht. Durch die Kombination von hochgenauen Vermessungen, Satellitenbildauswertungen und Untersuchungen der Wadisedimente konnten mehrere flussgeschichtliche Entwicklungsphasen erarbeitet und in einen chronostratigraphischen Rahmen eingeordnet werden. Über ein grobsandig-kiesiges System eines verzweigten Flusses wurden mindestens bis ins Obere Pleistozän mächtige Kieslagen im Untersuchungsgebiet sedimentiert. Innerhalb einer fossilen Rinne abgelagerte lössähnliche Sedimente, welche die Kiesfolgen partiell überlagern, konnten relativchronologisch ins Obere Pleistozän gestellt werden und dokumentieren vermutlich eine trockene Phase. Durch die mit scharfer Diskordanz über den Kiesen abgelagerten pelitischen Hochflutsedimente wird ein abrupter flussdynamischer Umbruch von dem eines ursprünglich verzweigten Flusses zu dem eines mäandrierenden Flusses mit Hochflutsedimentation nachgewiesen. IRSL-Datierungen stellen den Beginn der Ablagerung der Hochflutsedimente ins letzte Glazial. Der größte Teil der Sedimente wurde jedoch im frühen und mittleren Holozän (ca. 9 und 5 kaBP) abgelagert, so dass zu Beginn der Hauptsiedlungsphase am Tell Chuera (3. Jahrtausend v.Chr.) die Oberfläche der Überschwemmungsebene ihr heutiges Niveau nahezu erreicht hatte. Bis dahin führten großflächige Überschwemmungen zur Hochflutsedimentation in der Aue. Ein erneuter Wechsel der fluvialen Geomorphodynamik und der Sedimentationsverhältnisse zeigt sich darin, dass die letzten ca. 5000 Jahre keine nennenswerte Sedimentation in der Hochflutebene zu verzeichnen war. Es kam zu einer bis heute stattfindenden, lateralen Verlagerung der Mäander des Wadis und damit der Aufarbeitung von Teilen der Kiese und Hochflutsedimente. Siedlungsspuren im Wadiverlauf weisen auf eine Periodizität des Abflusses des Wadis Chuera zwischen etwa 4.7 und 4.2 kaBP hin. Die Theorie einer verstärkten Akkumulation von Kolluvien der Rahmenhöhen im Wadital als direkte Folge eines steigenden Siedlungsdrucks während der Hauptsiedlungsphase konnte widerlegt werden. Vielmehr handelt es sich bei den vermeintlichen Kolluvien um fluvial aufgearbeitete Hochflutsedimente. Anthropogene Eingriffe in den Landschaftshaushalt lassen sich in Form von Kalkkrustensteinbrüchen und einem komplexen Wegenetz nachweisen.
When the Iranian revolution embarked against Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime in the late 70s, it wasn’t a social revolution aiming at changing the society, but rather a political one with legitimate demands similar to what Syrians once were looking forward to achieve in 2011. When all this started in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the most central and inspirational figure in the Iranian revolution was still in exile. This is a story that happened 35 years ago and we cannot but see the rhyming of its events with the current Syrian imbroglio...
This is the seventh article in our series on refugees. This article deals with the accommodation of Syrian refugees living in Germany. Based on my personal experience living in a refugee camp („Heim“) in the city of Cologne (Köln), and based on relevant literature, the article will, firstly, address the different types of temporary residences for refugees in Germany, and, secondly, the process through which refugees pass while looking for a permanent accommodation. Thirdly, and most importantly, the article discusses the ongoing shift within Köln’s urban and social structure in the light of the emerging resettlement of refugees. Although the urban structure of Köln, like many other German cities, has a certain level of urban segregation manifested in the settlement of immigrant communities (Friedrichs 1998, p.1), I argue that, on the contrary, the resettlement of Syrian refugees shows coherence and dispersion. The article is accompanied by a mapping survey that investigates on the spatial aspect of the accommodation distribution...
Some are arguing that the the Responsibility to Protect, an international norm that aims to prevent mass atrocities, was faltering, because of its abuse in Libya and its non-application in Syria. However, Gregor Hofmann argues in this cross-post from the ICRtoP-Blog that the critics' interpretation was limiting R2P to its interventionist aspects. If one looks at the whole set of norms that is included in R2P, it becomes apparent that R2P is under pressure, but not yet death...
Practicing politics within religious frameworks is more likely to increase states‘ fragility. While employing religious references in political discourses could foster positive outcomes such as avoiding dangerous eruptions of violence under authoritarian regimes, it could also increase the space for political and religious elites to instrumentalise religion for their own interests. Such patterns of instrumentalisation are more common in the Middle East; especially the dominant religion in the region is Islam, which enjoys a decentralised mode of function...
Islamic State (IS), previously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has shown nothing but destruction, chaos and sectarianism. Through terror strategies, they rapidly spread over great parts of eastern Syria and north and central Iraq. Their new recruits came from all over the world, but mainly from Islamic countries. Arab countries had the biggest share of recruits. While IS was assembling supporters and sympathisers, Sunni Clergymen constantly called for ‘material and moral’ support to the Syrian rebels, and accordingly, thousands of foreign fighters flooded into Syria for Jihad. According to a Soufan Group research in 2014 on the foreign fighters in Syria, it is estimated that the highest number of foreign fighters came from Tunisia (about 3,000), Saudi Arabia (about 2,500), Morocco (about 1,500), Russia (about 800), France (700), Turkey and the United Kingdom (about 400 each). These numbers exclude the Syrians and Iraqis who are already in IS...
It is estimated that a number between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters have been flocking to Iraq and Syria since the breakout of the war in 2011.
An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq shows that there is a significant increase in the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria. Data provided by the Soufan Group in 2014 estimated that the identifiable number of foreign fighters is approximately 12,000 from 81 countries. It was also believed that the number of foreign Jihadists coming form Western countries does not exceed 3000: “Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand”, according to Soufan’s initial report on Foreign Fighters in Syria. Now the number exceeds 27,000 foreign fighters from at least 86 countries...