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Why bank money creation?
(2022)
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.
We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.
The banking system is highly interconnected and these connections can be conveniently represented as an interbank network. This survey presents a systematic overview of the recent advances in the theoretical literature on interbank networks. We assess our current understanding of the structure of interbank networks, of how network characteristics affect contagion in the banking system and of how banks form connections when faced with the possibility of contagion and systemic risk. In particular, we highlight how the theoretical literature on interbank networks offers a coherent way of studying interconnections, contagion processes and systemic risk, while emphasizing at the same time the challenges that must be addressed before general results on the link between the structure of the interbank network and financial stability can be established. The survey concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of interbank network models with a special focus on macroprudential policies and monetary policy.
Does BPO pay off at the firm-level? Although there are several studies which analyze the potential benefits of BPO, there is a virtual absence of research papers on BPO outcomes. Based on an analysis of 137 Business process outsourcing (BPO) ventures at 254 German banks in a period between 1994 and 2005, we found that the outsourcer's financial performance in terms of profitability and cost efficiency was increased significantly compared to industry peers without BPO. The increase stems not from workforce reductions but rather from increased employee productivity. Further, we show how BPO governance ensures BPO success: individually negotiated outsourcing contracts help to improve cost efficiency and profitability measures. Relational governance based on trust has only positive effects on profitability. Keywords: Business Process Outsourcing, firm performance, firm characteristics, banking, German banks, governance JEL Classifications: G21, L14, L21, L24
The spreading of the Covid-19 virus causes a reduction in economic activity worldwide and may lead to new risks to financial stability. The authors draw attention to the urgency of the targeted mitigation strategies on the European level and suggest taking coordinated action on the fiscal side to provide liquidity to affected firms in the corporate sector. Otherwise, virus-related cashflow interruptions could lead to a new full-blown banking crisis. Monetary policy measures are unlikely to mitigate cash liquidity shortages at the level of individual firms. Coordinated action at European level is decisive to prevent markets from losing confidence in the resilience of banks, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. In contrast to the euro crisis of 2011, the cause of the current crisis does not lie in the financial markets; therefore, the risk of moral hazard for banks or states is low.
Using a novel regulatory dataset of fully identified derivatives transactions, this paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the structure of the euro area interest rate swap (IRS) market after the start of the mandatory clearing obligation. Our dataset contains 1.7 million bilateral IRS transactions of banks and non-banks. Our key results are as follows:
1) The euro area IRS market is highly standardised and concentrated around the group of the G16 Dealers but also around a significant group of core “intermediaries"(and major CCPs).
2) Banks are active in all segments of the IRS euro market, whereas non-banks are often specialised.
3) When using relative net exposures as a proxy for the “flow of risk" in the IRS market, we find that risk absorption takes place in the core as well as the periphery of the network but in absolute terms the risk absorption is largely at the core.
4) Among the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios, the leverage ratio plays a key role in determining a bank's IRS trading activity.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from banks’ trading activities. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative reforms in the US, the UK and the EU, specifically with respect to the role of proprietary trading. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of proprietary trading, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the US and in the current proposal of the European Commission (Barnier proposal), is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it is likely to crowd out desired trading activities, thereby possibly affecting financial stability negatively. Second, trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations, as suggested under the Vickers Report for the UK and the Liikanen proposal for the EU, is a more effective solution. Separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies and risk management across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
This working paper suggests to analyse agencification as a double process of institutional and policy centralisation. To that end, it develops a categorisation of agencies that incorporates these two dimensions. More specifically, it is argued that mixed outcomes where the levels of institutional and policy centralisation diverge can be expected to be the rule rather than the exception, in line with the hybrid nature of EU agencies as inbetweeners. Moreover, the fiduciary setting hits important legal constraints given the limits to delegation in the EU context. Against this backdrop a process whereby institutional centralisation develops incrementally and remains limited, yet is accompanied by a process of substantial policy centralisation, appears as the most promising path for EU agencification. A fiduciary setting, where a strong agency enjoys a high degree of independence and operates in a centralised policy space, by contrast, should be the exception. The comparative study of the process of agencification in the energy and banking sector is insightful in the light of these expectations. The incremental nature of institutional change in energy exemplifies the usual path of agencification, which is conducive to a weak agency operating in a relatively centralised policy space. Agencification in banking, by contrast, has led to a rather unusual outcome where the strong agency model combines with a fragmented policy context.
During the last years the lending business has come under considerable competitive pressure and bank managers often express concern regarding its profitability vis-a-vis other activities. This paper tries to empirically identify factors that are able to explain the financial performance of bank lending activities. The analysis is based on the CFS-data-set that has been collected in 1997 from 200 medium-sized firms. Two regressions are performed: The first is directed towards relationships between the interest rate premiums and various determining factors, the second aims at detecting relationships between those factors and the occurrence of several types of problems during the course of a credit engagement. Furthermore, the results of both regressions are used to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the impact of certain parameters on credit terms and distress probabilities. The findings are somewhat “puzzling“: First, the rating is not as significant as expected. Second, credit contracts seem to be priced lower for situations with greater risks. Finally, the results do not fully support any of three hypotheses that are often advanced to describe the role of collateral and covenants in credit contracts.
Derivatives usage in risk management by U.S. and German non-financial firms : a comparative survey
(1998)
This paper is a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton School survey of derivative usage among US non-financial firms and a 1997 companion survey on German non-financial firms. It is not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a comparative study, drawing a comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match the sample of German firms on both size and industry composition. We find that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. Aside from this higher overall usage, the general pattern of usage across industry and size groupings is comparable across the two countries. In both countries, foreign currency derivative usage is most common, followed closely by interest rate derivatives, with commodity derivatives a distant third. Usage rates across all three classes of derivatives are higher for German firms than US firms. In contrast to the similarities, firms in the two countries differ notably on issues such as the primary goal of hedging, their choice of instruments, and the influence of their market view when taking derivative positions. These differences appear to be driven by the greater importance of financial accounting statements in Germany than the US and stricter German corporate policies of control over derivative activities within the firm. German firms also indicate significantly less concern about derivative related issues than US firms, which appears to arise from a more basic and simple strategy for using derivatives. Finally, among the derivative non-users, German firms tend to cite reasons suggesting derivatives were not needed whereas US firms tend to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for derivatives, but a hesitation to use them for some reason.