Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (4)
Language
- English (4) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4) (remove)
Keywords
- Aktienrecht (4) (remove)
Institute
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob der Mehrheitsaktionär einer Gesellschaft im Vorfeld eines Zwangsausschlusses von Minderheitsaktionären (sog. Squeeze-Out) versucht, die Kapitalmarkterwartungen negativ zu beeinflussen. Ein solches "manipulatives" Verhalten wird häufig in der juristischen wie betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur unterstellt, da der Aktienkurs fü die Abfindungshöhe die Wertuntergrenze bildet. Unsere empirische Untersuchung der Bilanz- und Pressemitteilungspolitik von Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen im Vorfeld der Ankündigung einer solchen Maßnahme am deutschen Kapitalmarkt zeigt, dass in diesem Zeitraum tatsächlich ein signifikanter Anstieg (Rückgang) der im Ton pessimistischen (optimistischen) Pressemitteilungen feststellbar ist. Allerdings zeigt sich weiter, dass die Aktien der Squeeze-Out-Kandidaten bereits im Vorfeld und am Tag der Ankündigung so hohe positive Überrenditen erzielen, dass der von uns quantifizierte kumulierte Effekt der Informationspolitik auf die Börsenbewertung einen insgesamt nur sehr geringen Einfluss ausübt und von anderen Faktoren (z.B. Abfindungsspekulationen) dominiert wird. JEL: M41, M40, G14, K22
The road to shareowner power
(1999)
A dramatic rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This will require changing the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new System. lt would eliminate the natura1 monopoly feature of the current System, and spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
The previous proposal for a company law directive on takeovers in 1990 was rejected in Germany almost unanimously for several different reasons. The new "slimmed down" draft proposal, in the light of the subsidiarity principle, takes the different approaches to investorprotection in the various member states better into account. Notably, the most controversial principle of the previous draft, viz. the mandatory bid rule as the only means of investorprotection in case of a change of control, has been given up. Therefore a much higher degree of acceptance seems likely. The Bundesrat (upper house) and the industry associations have already expressed their consent; the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) will deal with the proposal shortly. The technique of a "frame directive" leaves ample leeway for the member states. That will shift the discussion back to the national level and there will lead to the question as to how to make use of this leeway (cf. II, III, below) rather than to a debate about principles as in the past. It seems likely that criticism will confine itself to more technical questions (cf. IV, below).