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The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 (DFA) was the legislative response by the US Government to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. DFA’s rescission of Rule 436 (g) of the Securities Act of 1933 - the exemption from liability clause - was the response to the post-crisis perception that credit rating agencies were insufficiently constrained by reputational risk considerations and consistently failed to provide high quality and accurate credit ratings as a consequence of the immunity they enjoyed and the regulatory reliance placed on ratings, as well as the conflicts of interest that they faced. This paper investigates whether the market failure event that occurred in the Asset Backed Securities market immediately after DFA was signed into law on July 21, 2010 was due to real economic concerns held by rating agencies about operating under a liability regime or whether it was merely an act of brinkmanship on the part of the rating agencies. The paper also predominantly examines US case law to identify the dilution of the freedom of speech defence in state courts, the conflict of interest issues and the legal challenges faced by plaintiffs when bringing a lawsuit against credit rating agencies, and proposes a novel co-pay and capped liability model to address the concerns of both credit rating agencies and investors.
This paper applies the theory of structured finance to the regulation of asset backed securities. We find the current regulation in Europe (Article 405 of the CRR) and the US (Section D of Dodd-Frank Act) to be severely flawed with respect to its key intention: the imposition of a strict loss retention requirement. While nominal retention is always 5%, the true level of loss retention varies across available retention options between zero loss retention and full loss retention at the extreme ends. Based on a standard model of structured finance transactions, we propose a new risk retention metric RM measuring the level of an issuer’s skin-in-the-game. The new metric could help to achieve a better implementation of CRR/CRD-IV and DFA, by making disclosure of the RM-number compulsory for all ABS transactions. There are also implications for the operation of rating agencies. On a general level, the RM metric will be instrumental in achieving simplicity and transparency in securitizations (STS).
In the United States, on April 1, 2014, the set of rules commonly known as the "Volcker Rule", prohibiting proprietary trading activities in banks, became effective. The implementation of this rule took more than three years, as “proprietary trading” is an inherently vague concept, overlapping strongly with genuinely economically useful activities such as market-making. As a result, the final Rule is a complex and lengthy combination of prohibitions and exemptions.
In January 2014, the European Commission put forward its proposal on banking structural reform. The proposal includes a Volcker-like provision, prohibiting large, systemically relevant financial institutions from engaging in proprietary trading or hedge fund-related business. This paper offers lessons to be learned from the implementation process for the Volcker rule in the US for the European regulatory process.