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The recent financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the pros and cons of fair-value accounting (FVA). This debate presents a major challenge for FVA going forward and standard setters’ push to extend FVA into other areas. In this article, we highlight four important issues as an attempt to make sense of the debate. First, much of the controversy results from confusion about what is new and different about FVA. Second, while there are legitimate concerns about marking to market (or pure FVA) in times of financial crisis, it is less clear that these problems apply to FVA as stipulated by the accounting standards, be it IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Third, historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be the remedy. There are a number of concerns about HCA as well and these problems could be larger than those with FVA. Fourth, although it is difficult to fault the FVA standards per se, implementation issues are a potential concern, especially with respect to litigation. Finally, we identify several avenues for future research. JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
The paper analyses the effects of three sets of accounting rules for financial instruments - Old IAS before IAS 39 became effective, Current IAS or US GAAP, and the Full Fair Value (FFV) model proposed by the Joint Working Group (JWG) - on the financial statements of banks. We develop a simulation model that captures the essential characteristics of a modern universal bank with investment banking and commercial banking activities. We run simulations for different strategies (fully hedged, partially hedged) using historical data from periods with rising and falling interest rates. We show that under Old IAS a fully hedged bank can portray its zero economic earnings in its financial statements. As Old IAS offer much discretion, this bank may also present income that is either positive or negative. We further show that because of the restrictive hedge accounting rules, banks cannot adequately portray their best practice risk management activities under Current IAS or US GAAP. We demonstrate that - contrary to assertions from the banking industry - mandatory FFV accounting adequately reflects the economics of banking activities. Our detailed analysis identifies, in addition, several critical issues of the accounting models that have not been covered in previous literature. December 2002. Revised: June 2003. Later version: http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2005/1026/ with the title: "Accounting for financial instruments in the banking industry : conclusions from a simulation model"
Accounting for financial instruments in the banking industry: conclusions from a simulation model
(2003)
The paper analyses the effects of three sets of accounting rules for financial instruments - Old IAS before IAS 39 became effective, Current IAS or US GAAP, and the Full Fair Value (FFV) model proposed by the Joint Working Group (JWG) - on the financial statements of banks. We develop a simulation model that captures the essential characteristics of a modern universal bank with investment banking and commercial banking activities. We run simulations for different strategies (fully hedged, partially hedged) using historical data from periods with rising and falling interest rates. We show that under Old IAS a fully hedged bank can portray its zero economic earnings in its financial statements. As Old IAS offer much discretion, this bank may also present income that is either positive or negative. We further show that because of the restrictive hedge accounting rules, banks cannot adequately portray their best practice risk management activities under Current IAS or US GAAP. We demonstrate that - contrary to assertions from the banking industry - mandatory FFV accounting adequately reflects the economics of banking activities. Our detailed analysis identifies, in addition, several critical issues of the accounting models that have not been covered in previous literature.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enable me to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
JEL classification: G13; J33; M41; M52
Recent changes in accounting regulation for financial instruments (SFAS 133, IAS 39) have been heavily criticized by representatives from the banking industry. They argue for retaining a historical cost based "mixed model" where accounting for financial instruments depends on their designation to either trading or nontrading activities. In order to demonstrate the impact of different accounting models for financial instruments on the financial statements of banks, we develop a bank simulation model capturing the essential characteristics of a modern universal bank with investment banking and commercial banking activities. In our simulations we look at different scenarios with periods of increasing/decreasing interest rates using historical data and with different banking strategies (fully hedged; partially hedged). The financial statements of our model bank are prepared under different accounting rules ("Old" IAS before implementation of IAS 39; current IAS) with and without hedge accounting as offered by the respective sets of rules. The paper identifies critical issues of applying the different accounting rules for financial instruments to the activities of a universal bank. It demonstrates important shortcomings of the "Old" IAS rules (before IAS 39), and of the current IAS rules. Under the current IAS rules the results of a fully hedged bank may have to show volatility in income statements due to changes in market interest rates. Accounting results of a partially hedged bank in the same scenario may be less affected even though there are economic gains or losses.