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In this publication, researchers from the social and economic sciences and medicine as well as practitioners from the media and politics reflect on the influence of scientific expertise in times of crisis. Differences and similarities between the Covid-19 pandemic, the financial and economic crisis, the refugee crisis and the climate crisis are elaborated. The interviews were conducted in November/December 2021.
In der Publikation reflektieren Forschenden aus den Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Medizin sowie Praktiker aus Medien und Politik den Einfluss wissenschaftlicher Expertise in Krisenzeiten. Dabei werden Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen der Covid-19-Pandemie, der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, der Flüchtlingskrise und der Klimakrise herausgearbeitet. Die Gespräche wurden im November/Dezember 2021 geführt.
Passt das deutsche Dreisäulensystem in eine zunehmend harmonisierte Bankenstruktur für Europa?
(2018)
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, einschließlich der großen Banken in Aktionärsbesitz, den öffentlichen Banken und den Genossenschaftsbanken. Fast nirgendwo anders in Europa hat ein solches Dreisäulensystem überlebt. Passt es also noch in ein Europa, in dem die Bankpolitik, die Regulierung und die Aufsicht inzwischen weitgehend in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen? Für eine Bewahrung des Systems sprechen vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Stabilität. Angesichts ihrer Gruppenzugehörigkeit sind die deutschen "stakeholder-value-orientierten" Banken der Säulen 2 und 3 finanziell keineswegs weniger erfolgreich, sogar ein wenig erfolgreicher als die "shareholder-value-orientierten" Großbanken der Säule 1. Insbesondere schwanken ihre Geschäftszahlen deutlich weniger als jene der Großbanken, die in der Regel ein riskanteres Geschäftsmodell verfolgen. In vielen Privatbanken ist die Gewinnorientierung und damit auch die Bereitschaft, hohe Risiken einzugehen, aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht zu hoch, was die Systemstabilität tendenziell gefährdet. Zudem erfüllen die Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen eine regionalpolitische Ausgleichsfunktion und haben eine gesamtwirtschaftlich stabilisierende Wirkung.
Common systemic risk measures focus on the instantaneous occurrence of triggering and systemic events. However, systemic events may also occur with a time-lag to the triggering event. To study this contagion period and the resulting persistence of institutions' systemic risk we develop and employ the Conditional Shortfall Probability (CoSP), which is the likelihood that a systemic market event occurs with a specific time-lag to the triggering event. Based on CoSP we propose two aggregate systemic risk measures, namely the Aggregate Excess CoSP and the CoSP-weighted time-lag, that reflect the systemic risk aggregated over time and average time-lag of an institution's triggering event, respectively. Our empirical results show that 15% of the financial companies in our sample are significantly systemically important with respect to the financial sector, while 27% of the financial companies are significantly systemically important with respect to the American non-financial sector. Still, the aggregate systemic risk of systemically important institutions is larger with respect to the financial market than with respect to non-financial markets. Moreover, the aggregate systemic risk of insurance companies is similar to the systemic risk of banks, while insurers are also exposed to the largest aggregate systemic risk among the financial sector.
Fünf Jahre nach Beginn der Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise („Finanzkrise“) kämpfen wir weiterhin mit den elementaren Problemen: Bei Märkten und Marktteilnehmern fehlt es an Stabilität und Vertrauen. Viele Banken stehen immer noch nicht auf eigenen Füßen und nehmen die ihnen in Europa traditionell zukommende zentrale Rolle für Wachstum und Entwicklung nicht wahr. Den guten Absichten, auf die sich die großen politischen Mächte während der ersten G-20 Treffen 2008 und 2009 verständigt hatten, ist eine Reihe von sinnvollen Ideen und Konzepten gefolgt. Die Voraussetzungen für einen grundlegenden reformerischen Erfolg sind somit gegeben – doch nun muss die Umsetzung folgen. Dazu bedarf es mutiger Entscheidungen. Im Jahr 2014 muss die europäische Politik gleich mehrere Weichen stellen. Der Bundesregierung kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. Sie muss den Mut haben zu radikaler Ordnungspolitik!
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis: evidence from the CFS survey
(2011)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty CFS working paper series, 2010, 18. Revised Version July 2011
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which reflects these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate constitutional bonding of economic processes, as well as of other social processes.
On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which reflects these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate constitutional bonding of economic processes, as well as of other social processes.
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis : evidence from the CFS survey
(2010)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty