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Blockchain verspricht, Intermediäre wie Banken überflüssig zu machen und durch dezentrale Peer-to-Peer-Netzwerke zu ersetzen. Dieser Beitrag stellt die Frage nach der Realisierbarkeit dieser Ankündigung sowie danach, welche gesellschaftlichen Implikationen damit verbunden sind. Eine historisch informierte theoretische Analyse zeigt, dass die Erzeugung von Kreditgeld durch Banken ein für kapitalistische Gesellschaften existenzieller Vorgang ist. Die Fiktion des Geldwerts bedarf ihrerseits glaubwürdiger Intermediäre, die dauerhaft in der Lage sind, die zeitliche und räumliche Stabilität des Geldes zu inszenieren. Explorative Interviews mit Akteuren im Finanzsektor in Kombination mit einer inhaltsanalytischen Auswertung von einschlägigen Blogs, White Papers und Artikeln der Wirtschaftspresse lassen vermuten, dass Blockchain Intermediäre keineswegs ausschaltet, sondern diejenigen mächtiger werden lässt, die in der Lage sind, die Technologie ihren Bedürfnissen entsprechend umzugestalten.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2020)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying
trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.