Refine
Document Type
- Conference Proceeding (6)
- Article (2)
- Working Paper (2)
Has Fulltext
- yes (10) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (10) (remove)
Keywords
- law (10) (remove)
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
In der gegenwärtigen Corona-Krise erscheinen die Entstehung der Krise – die Verbreitung der Krankheit Covid-19 zur Pandemie – und die Bewältigung der Krise – die rechtlichen Einschränkungen und Maßnahmen – scharf getrennt. Die Entstehung der Krise geht auf ein Stück Natur zurück, auf ein für Menschen bedrohliches Virus. Die Bewältigung der Krise geht mit staatlichem und gesellschaftlichem Handeln einher, das in zahlreichen Ländern im Rahmen rechtlicher Ausnahmezustände erfolgte. Den markanten Trennungspunkt zwischen Entstehung und Bewältigung der Krise bildet die Ausrufung der Ausnahmemaßnahmen, durch die in das Pandemiegeschehen interveniert wurde. Diese Einteilung kann den Eindruck erwecken, die mit Natur verbundene Entstehung der Krise sei eine Zeit, die gänzlich vor dem Handeln liegt: eben die Zeit des natürlichen Prozesses, die von der mit Handeln verbundenen Bewältigung der Krise abgekoppelt sei. Dieser Aufsatz zielt demgegenüber darauf, die Phasen der Entstehung und der Bewältigung der Corona- Krise in ihrer jeweiligen Ambivalenz hervortreten zu lassen. Das Ziel ist dabei ein doppeltes: Einerseits soll hervortreten, inwiefern die Phase der Entstehung der Krise nicht nur prä-aktiv und die Krise damit keine bloß natürlich gegebene, sondern auch eine gesellschaftlich gemachte ist. Andererseits soll deutlich werden, in welcher Weise die Phase der Bewältigung der Pandemie nicht allein krisenreaktiv, sondern auch krisenproduktiv ist.
Einleitend werde ich die genannte Zeitlichkeit – Entstehung und Bewältigung – erläutern, die einem gängigen Krisenverständnis zugrunde liegt, das auch in der gegenwärtigen Pandemie wirksam ist. Darauf werde ich darlegen, inwiefern das Denken des Ausnahmezustands ein Denken ebendieser Zeitlichkeit und damit zweier Phasen der Krise ist (I.1), und zeigen, warum sich die gegenwärtige Krise gerade aufgrund ihrer Verbindung mit Natur in dieses Denken einfügt (I.2). Auf dieser Grundlage gehe ich dazu über, ein komplizierteres Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Krise zu gewinnen, indem ich darlege, wie in ihrer Entstehung natürliche Prozessualität und gesellschaftliches Handeln untrennbar zusammenwirken (II.1) und an welchen Punkten ihrer Bewältigung die Krisenreaktion so in Krisenproduktion umschlägt, dass das gesellschaftliche bzw. staatliche Handeln wiederum auf Natur zurückwirkt (II.2). Durch diese Schritte soll deutlich werden, inwiefern sich in der gegenwärtigen Krise weder natürliche Prozesse und soziale Praxis noch Krisenreaktion und Krisenproduktion äußerlich gegenüberstehen, sondern intern verbunden sind. Das eingangs erläuterte Krisenverständnis erfährt dadurch eine Modifikation.
The concept of the political in Carl Schmitt’s works is not only defined by the distinction between friend and enemy, but also by the criterion of breaching the rules in a normatively unbound act of decision. According to Schmitt, this decision is, however, not arbitrary, but provoked by the necessity of a historical situation. This aspect of necessity calls the freedom of the decision into question and leads to tensions within Schmitt’s theory of the political. More explicitly than in Schmitt’s political and legal writings, this conflict between freedom and necessity is exposed in his theory of tragedy. In a reading of his book Hamlet or Hecuba, published in 1956, I will show, in a first step, how the act of breaching the rules is not external to normativity, but occurs from within normativity itself. It is the act of self-breaching – of breaking the rules of its own genre – by which, according to Schmitt, modern tragedy is defined. This breach, however, is compelled by the necessity of a real, i. e. extraliterary, event. In a second step, I will expound on how this idea of self-breaching, which also characterises Schmitt’s understanding of the political, leads to a loss of decision which not only questions his idea of sovereignty, but also topples his concept of the political.
Estudio de la producción científica sobre la Escuela de Salamanca en los últimos años y perspectivas de futuro. Se plantea la dificultad de delimitación temporal de la Escuela y se propone la ampliación de su ámbito de estudio, no sólo a los temas tradicionales como la teología (moral, el problema del mal, la polémica De auxiliis), el derecho (el derecho natural y los derechos humanos, la soberanía, la guerra justa,…) y la economía (la propiedad privada, el dinero, el valor y el precio, el interés), sino también a problemas científicos sobre el espacio, el tiempo y otros.
This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere can be placed in the context of development of sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted with Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Alexander concentrates on interrelation and mutual penetration of the civil sphere and law while Luhmann regards law as an autonomous system following its own logic. While Alexander claims that his theory is rooted both in sociology and philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy.
This paper traces the development of National Socialist cultural and legal policy towards the arts. It examines the role of censure in this development starting with Hitler's first attempts at power in the Weimar republic. It then looks more closely into aspects of the development of new policies in and after 1933 and their implementation in institutions of the totalitarian state. As the paper shows, policies were carried out within a legal framework that included parliament and constitutional law but they were often also accompanied by aggressive political actions. Racial and nationalistic ideologies were at the heart of the National Socialist discourse about culture. This discourse quickly established modernity as its principal enemy and saw modernist culture (in the broad sense of the word), and especially art criticism, as being under Jewish domination. True German Kultur was set against this; Hitler himself promoted German art both through exhibitions and through policies which included the removal of un-German art and the exclusion of writers and artists who did not conform the cultural ideal. As Jewish artists and intellectuals in modernist culture posed the greatest threat to the establishment of a new German culture, Nazi policies towards the arts embarked on a process of censure, exclusion and annihilation. The purpose of these policies was nothing less than the elimination of all modernist (Jewish and ‘degenerate’) culture and any memory of it.
To become self-reflexive, Jurisprudence must to establish a dialogue: the human sciences should lose their exotic character in the eyes of Legal Science. It is in the middle between the "order" and the thinking about it, where the "naked experience" happens, that culture and therefore Law builds itself e it is constructed. This paper demonstrates the need to use other human sciences, with emphasis on anthropology, as "methodological strategies" for Jurisprudence self-reflection to become more faithful to the reality of the researched object. Anthropology has the power to show what is "anti-modern". It questions the intellectual space of modernity where the hard definition of antagonisms detached from reality occurs - West/East, “I”/other, civilized/barbarian. Jurisprudence consolidates antagonisms: the diversity and plurality of human societies are rarely seen as a fact but as an aberration, always demanding a justification. It is necessary to create a methodology using what is most extraordinary and human in the analysis of fact: "Anthopological Blues". Anthropology is capable of breaking with the classical conception of scientific methodology that is based on stiffness to produce absolute truths and also support the fulfillment of legal concepts with content and meaning, providing a reinterpretation of science as a human instrument of intervention on reality.
Axiomatic method and the law
(2012)