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No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.
This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.
Derivatives usage in risk management by U.S. and German non-financial firms : a comparative survey
(1998)
This paper is a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton School survey of derivative usage among US non-financial firms and a 1997 companion survey on German non-financial firms. It is not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a comparative study, drawing a comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match the sample of German firms on both size and industry composition. We find that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. Aside from this higher overall usage, the general pattern of usage across industry and size groupings is comparable across the two countries. In both countries, foreign currency derivative usage is most common, followed closely by interest rate derivatives, with commodity derivatives a distant third. Usage rates across all three classes of derivatives are higher for German firms than US firms. In contrast to the similarities, firms in the two countries differ notably on issues such as the primary goal of hedging, their choice of instruments, and the influence of their market view when taking derivative positions. These differences appear to be driven by the greater importance of financial accounting statements in Germany than the US and stricter German corporate policies of control over derivative activities within the firm. German firms also indicate significantly less concern about derivative related issues than US firms, which appears to arise from a more basic and simple strategy for using derivatives. Finally, among the derivative non-users, German firms tend to cite reasons suggesting derivatives were not needed whereas US firms tend to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for derivatives, but a hesitation to use them for some reason.
We review arguments for and against reserve requirements and conclude that the main question is whether a distinction between money creation and intermediation can be made. We argue that such a distinction can be made in a money-in-advance economy and show that if the money-in-advance constraint is universally binding then reserve requirements on checkable accounts have no effect on intermediation. We then proceed to show that in a model in which trade is uncertain and sequential, a fractional reserve banking system gives rise to endogenous monetary shocks. These endogenous monetary shocks lead to fluctuations in capacity utilisation and waste. When the moneyin-advance constraint is universally binding, a 100% reserve requirement on checkable accounts can eliminate this waste.
Es werden verschiedene Methoden zur Messung der Risikoeinstellung einzelner Individuen vorgestellt und kritisch diskutiert. Berücksichtigt werden unter anderem Selbsteinschätzungen und experimentell orientierte Verfahren. Die Zusammenstellung wendet sich insbesondere an Wissenschaftler und Praktiker, die nach anwendbaren Verfahren zur Risikoeinstellungsmessung suchen.
In this paper we analyze the relation between fund performance and market share. Using three performance measures we first establish that significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns of the funds in the sample exist. Thus, investors may react to past fund performance when making their investment decisions. We estimated a model relating past performance to changes in market share and found that past performance has a significant positive effect on market share. The results of a specification test indicate that investors react to risk-adjusted returns rather than to raw returns. This suggests that investors may be more sophisticated than is often assumed.
Ein Value-at-Risk-Limit wird als DM-Betrag gekennzeichnet, der von den tatsächlichen Handelsverlusten innerhalb einer bestimmten Zeitdauer nur mit geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit überschritten werden darf. Da der Bankvorstand i.d.R. Jahres-Value-at-Risk-Limite beschließt, im Handelsbereich die Geschäfte aber für einen kurzfristigen - unterstellt wird ein eintägiger - Planungshorizont abgeschlossen werden, ist zu klären, wie Jahres-Limite in Tages-Limite umgerechnet und während des Jahres realisierte Gewinne und Verluste auf die Limite angerechnet werden können. Auf der Grundlage des Umrechnungsverfahrens nach der Quadratwurzel-T-Formel lassen sich drei Verfahren für die Ermittlung des Tages-Limits unterscheiden: 1. Realisierte Gewinne und Verluste werden nicht angerechnet (starres Limit). 2. Bei Verlusteintritt vermindert sich das Tages-Limit für die Restperiode, realisierte Gewinne machen Kürzungen rückgängig (Verlustbegrenzungslimit). 3. Tages-Limite werden um Gewinne und Verluste angepaßt, wodurch eine Erweiterung des Handlungsspielraumes möglich ist (dynamisches Limit). Die drei Limite werden in einem Simulationsmodell gegeneinander abgewogen, wobei unterstellt wird, ein Händler handle nur eine einzige Aktie und antizipiere in 55% der Fälle die Kursrichtung. Die Simulationsergebnisse sind bei den unterstellten Renditeprozessen (geometrische Brownsche Bewegung und reale Renditen von 77 deutschen Aktien für die Zeit vom 01.01.1974 bis 31.12.1995) weitgehend identisch. Das dynamische Limit produziert deutlich höhere durchschnittliche Ergebnisse als das starre Limit und das Verlustbegrenzungslimit. Überschreitungen des Jahres-Limits treten nur beim starren Verfahren auf, die Häufigkeit ist allerdings wesentlich geringer als die zulässige Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1 %.
Why do banks issue contingent convertible debt? To answer this question we study comprehensive data covering all issues by publicly traded banks in Europe of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) that count as additional tier 1 capital (AT1). We find that banks with lower asset volatility are more likely to issue AT1 CoCos than their riskier counterparts, but that CDS spreads do not react following issue announcements. Our estimates therefore suggest that agency costs play a crucial role in banks' ability to successfully issue CoCos. The agency costs may be higher for CoCos than for equity explaining why we observe riskier or lowly capitalized banks to issue equity rather than CoCos.