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Institute
Data is considered the new oil of the economy, but privacy concerns limit their use, leading to a widespread sense that data analytics and privacy are contradictory. Yet such a view is too narrow, because firms can implement a wide range of methods that satisfy different degrees of privacy and still enable them to leverage varied data analytics methods. Therefore, the current study specifies different functions related to data analytics and privacy (i.e., data collection, storage, verification, analytics, and dissemination of insights), compares how these functions might be performed at different levels (consumer, intermediary, and firm), outlines how well different analytics methods address consumer privacy, and draws several conclusions, along with future research directions.
EMITTERS OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER FINANCIAL PRODUCTS LACK INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR CUSTOMERS. THEY MOSTLY OPERATE WITH A PRODUCT-CENTRIC MARKE TING CONCEPT. WITH INFORMATION ABOUT CUSTOMERS, THEY COULD SHIFT TOWARDS A MORE CUSTOMER-CENTRIC STRATEGY. HOWEVER, SUCH A STRATEGY DEMANDS INFOR MATION THAT IS HARDLY AVAILABLE. VIRTUAL PORTFOLIOS CAN BRIDGE THIS GAP AND PROVIDE EMITTERS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS WITH KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THEIR CUSTOMERS AND THEIR COMPETITORS. THIS ARTICLE ILLUSTRATES THE INSIGHTS THAT VIRTUAL PORTFOLIOS CAN PROVIDE TO EMITTERS OF A MUTUAL FUND.
UNDER LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION, REGULATORS CHOOSE NOT TO INTERFERE BECAUSE THEY SEEK TO STIMULATE INNOVATION AND PROTECT ENTERPRISES FROM THE COSTS IMPOSED BY REGULATORY COMPLIANCE. YET, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ABILITY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION TO ENSURE CONSUMER PROTECTION IS LACKING. THIS ARTICLE TESTS EMPIRICALLY WHETHER THE CURRENT LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION OF PRICE ADVERTISING CLAIMS ON THE MOST POPULAR REWARD-BASED CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM, KICKSTARTER, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT CONSUMERS.
Most event studies rely on cumulative abnormal returns, measured as percentage changes in stock prices, as their dependent variable. Stock price reflects the value of the operating business plus non-operating assets minus debt. Yet, many events, in particular in marketing, only influence the value of the operating business, but not non-operating assets and debt. For these cases, the authors argue that the cumulative abnormal return on the operating business, defined as the ratio between the cumulative abnormal return on stock price and the firm-specific leverage effect, is a more appropriate dependent variable. Ignoring the differences in firm-specific leverage effects inflates the impact of observations pertaining to firms with large debt and deflates those pertaining to firms with large non-operating assets. Observations of firms with high debt receive several times the weight attributed to firms with low debt. A simulation study and the reanalysis of three previously published marketing event studies shows that ignoring the firm-specific leverage effects influences an event study's results in unpredictable ways.
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR DIGITAL CONSUMER ATTENTION IS CRUCIAL FOR BANKS’ STRATEGIC ACTIONS. THEREFORE, BANKS NEED TO DETERMINE THE MARKET THEY COMPETE FOR, THEIR SUCCESS ON THIS MARKET, AND WHO THEY COMPETE WITH FOR CONSUMER ATTENTION. USING ORGANIC SEARCH ENGINE DATA, WE PROPOSE A NEW APPROACH TO (I) DEFINE THE DIGITAL MARKET, (II) IDENTIFY THE PLAYERS IN THE MARKET, (III) ESTIMATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL CONSUMER ATTENTION ACROSS BANKS, AND (IV) UNCOVER THE COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURE FOR THE ONLINE RETAIL BANKING MARKET IN GERMANY.
DESPITE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT CUSTOMERS EXHIBIT HIGHER DISCOUNT RATES THAN FIRMS, IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW DIFFERENCES IN DISCOUNT RATES AFFECT OPTIMAL PRICES, PROFITS, AND WELFARE OF COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS (WHICH COULD BE GOODS OR SERVICES). WE SHOW FOR COMPLEMENTARY PROUCTS THAT HIGHER DISCOUNT RATES OF CUSTOMERS DO NOT INCREASE PROFIT OR CONSUMER SURPLUS. FIRMS, INCLUDING BANKS, WOULD BE ADVISED TO SEEK TO REDUCE EXCESSIVE DISCOUNT RATES AMONG CONSUMERS.
Telecommunications companies traditionally offer several tariffs from which their customers can choose the tariff that best suits their preferences. Yet, customers sometimes make choices that are not optimal for them because they do not minimize their bill for a certain usage amount. We show in this paper that companies should be very concerned about choices in which customers pick tariffs that are too small for them because they lead to a significant increase in customers churn. In contrast, this is not the case if customers choose tariffs that are too big for them. The reason is that in particular flat-rates provide customers with the additional benefit that they guarantee a constant bill amount that consumption can be enjoyed more freely because all costs are already accounted for.