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This country report was prepared for the 19th World Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in Vienna in 2014. It is structured as a questionnaire and provides an overview of the legal framework for Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and other alternative license models like (e.g.) Creative Commons under German law. The first set of questions addresses the applicable statutory provisions and the reported case law in this area. The second section concerns contractual issues, in particular with regard to the interpretation and validity of open content licenses. The third section deals with copyright aspects of open content models, for example regarding revocation rights and rights to equitable remuneration. The final set of questions pertains to patent, trademark and competition law issues of open content licenses.
Im World Wide Web werden diverse Dinge kostenlos angeboten. So auch die so genannte Open-Source-Software. Dass viele Akteure freie und kostenlos zugängliche Software entwickeln, ohne in geregelter Weise dafür entlohnt zu werden, wirft die Frage nach der grundsätzlichen Vereinbarkeit dieses Phänomens mit dem herrschenden kapitalistischen Wirtschaftssystem auf. Ökonomisches Verhalten scheint außer Kraft gesetzt. Statt von „Ökonomie“ könnte man in diesem Fall von „Geschenkökonomie“ bzw. „Gift Economy“ reden. Es stellt sich die Frage, welche Rolle Gaben/Geschenke im Rahmen des Open-Source-Phänomens spielen und inwiefern dieses Phänomen durch die vorhandenen Theorien zur Gift Economy erklärt werden kann. Um die Forschungsfragen zufrieden stellend zu beantworten, bedarf es einerseits einer Präzisierung auf theoretischer Ebene, die neben den bestehenden Theorien zur Gift Economy das Phänomen Open-Source im Besonderen berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus soll das Phänomen Open Source in Form einer qualitativen empirischen Studie, welche die je spezifischen Motive des ,Zusammenhandelns’ der Open-Source-Programmierer zum Gegenstand hat, daraufhin untersucht werden, welche Rolle Gabe/Geschenke in Bezug auf dieses spielen. Ziel ist es hierbei, eine Typologie des Open-Source-Programmierers zu entwickeln. Anhand dieser Typologie soll deutlich werden, welche unterschiedlichen thematischen Kontexte für das Phänomen Open-Source rele¬vant sind. Auf Basis der Forschungsergebnisse ist es dann zudem möglich, in einer Schlussfolgerung die Theorie der Gift Economy auf der sicheren Basis em¬pirischer Daten gegebenenfalls weitergehend zu differenzieren.
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.