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In this chapter, I examine the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Both are distinct sources of public international law (Art. 38(1)(b) and (c) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice). In a first step, I analyze the different meanings of principles as a “source” of international law. Second, I consider different approaches to principles as a norm type in legal theory. Third, I discuss attempts in international legal doctrine to facilitate conceptual issues by either unifying general principles as a source with the source of customary international law or by equating general principles as a source and as a norm type. Finally, I propose that the delimitation between customary international law and general principles of law as sources of international law should follow the distinction between situations dominated by factual reciprocity (which justify customary norms) and situations where such factual reciprocity is absent (which justify general principles). The jurisgenerative processes leading to the emergence of general principles of international law are processes of changing identities and argumentative self-entrapment.
Scholarship and practice
(2016)
How can I as an international lawyer, conscious that international law is deeply implicated in today’s global injustices and that the course of history will not be changed by any grand legal design, practice law responsibly? Taking as a point of departure my own desire not to seek comfort in the formulation of a critique of law, but to aspire to a responsible practice, I consult two quite different bodies of work: first, critical theory of law and second, recent scholarship on international law that argues a practice guided by ethics may enhance the legitimacy of international law. I turn then to my own practice of international economic law focusing on my occasional role as legal expert on the so-called megaregionals the EU aims to conclude with Canada and the United States. I propose that the debate on international economic law lacks an investigation into the role of law in shaping political economy; that this lack can be explained by the compartmentalization of expertise which leads to justification gaps with respect to projects such as the megaregionals. One way how lawyers can assume responsibility is to work on closing these gaps even if it means leaving the ‘inside’ of the legal discipline. Finally, I suggest that a responsible legal practice of social change might follow Roberto Unger’s call for institutional imagination. Maybe I can satisfy my wish for a transformative practice by joining forces with friends in experimenting with institutions, hoping to build an alternative political economy.
Constitutionalization beyond the nation state can be observed as an evolutionary process that leads in two quite different directions: (1) constitutions evolve in transnational political processes outside the nation state; (2) simulta-neously, constitutions evolve outside international politics in global society’s ‘private’ sectors. What, however, is the specifically societal element in societal constitutionalism? This is currently the object of a controversy regarding the subjects of non-state constitutions, their origin, their legitimization, their scope, and their internal structures. This article interprets the controversy as a theme with a number of variations. What is the distinctive ‘compositional principle’ in each particular variation? Which problems become evident in its ‘development’? What are its most valuable ‘motifs’? The article starts with David Sciulli’s theme of societal constitutionalism. Then it presents six variations on Sciulli. In a first group, constitutionalization is perceived as the expansion of a single rationality into all spheres of society. In a second group, the motif of the unity of the consti-tution can still be heard, despite the essential pluralism of societal constitution-alism. In the final movement, three further variations will then reprise and devel-op further the most important motifs, in a resumption of the original theme.
The article, which summarizes key findings of my German book ‘Die Gemeinfreiheit. Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik’ (‘The Public Domain: Theory, Func-tion, Doctrine’), asks whether there are any provisions or principles under Ger-man and EU law that protect the public domain from interference by the legisla-ture, courts and private parties. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to step out of the intellectual property (IP) system and to analyze this body of law from the outside, and – even more important – to develop a positive legal conception of the public domain as such. By giving the public domain a proper doctrinal place in the legal system, the structural asymmetry between heavily theorized and protected IP rights on the one hand and a neglected public do-main on the other is countered. The overarching normative purpose is to devel-op a framework for a balanced IP system, which can only be achieved if the public domain forms an integral part of the overall regulation of information.
According to the prevailing view, the purpose of digital copyright is to balance conflicting interests in exclusivity on the one hand and in access to information on the other. This article offers an alternative reading of the conflicts surrounding copyright in the digital era. It argues that two cultures of communication coexist on the internet, each of which has a different relationship to copyright. Whereas copyright institutionalizes and supports a culture of exclusivity, it is at best neutral towards a culture of free and open access. The article shows that, depending on the future regulation of copyright and the internet in general, the dynamic coexistence of these cultures may well be replaced by an overwhelming dominance of the culture of exclusivity.
Dieser Beitrag ist ein Besprechungsaufsatz zu Beatrice Brunhöbers 2010 erschienener Dissertation Die Erfindung „demokratischer Repräsentation“ in den Federalist Papers (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 14), in der Brunhöber die innovative – und auch die Verfassungsentwicklung andernorts prägende – Kraft der Verbindung von Demokratie, politischer Repräsentation und Föderalismusidee durch die amerikanischen Verfassungsväter herausarbeitet. Auf der Basis von Brunhöbers Untersuchung geht es insbesondere darum, wie sich das von Hamilton, Madison und Jay entworfene ‚alte‘ Konzept zur Gestaltung eines starken Gemeinwesens (eingeschlossen das vertrauensbildende Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung) für einen integrativen Umgang mit den ‚modernen‘ Gegebenheiten pluralistischer Gesellschaften nutzbar machen läßt, im Blick die Gesamtheit (und Vielfalt) des Staatsvolkes als Geltungsfundament legitimer Herrschaft. Im Hintergrund steht die Frage nach Möglichkeiten zur Nutzbarmachung historischer Vergewisserungen für heutige Debatten überhaupt.
Ecolabels are frequently presented as consumer information tools that efficiently promote environmental aims such as the sustainability of fisheries. Two recent WTO dispute settlement cases -- Tuna II and COOL -- have called into question the characterisation of labels as ‘consumer information tools’ by illuminating the regulatory power and purposes of labelling. Tuna II moreover clarifies that WTO law does not necessarily privilege ecolabelling over more openly interventionist government measures aimed at environmental protection. In this contribution I first sketch two views of ecolabelling -- one that depicts ecolabelling as primarily aiming at consumer information and another that stresses the regulatory function of labelling. I then turn to the dispute settlement reports in Tuna II and COOL in order to specify the government authority involved in many labelling schemes. I conclude this contribution with the call for a critical assessment of ecolabelling. The power of ecolabelling may be employed to reshape markets and promote green growth. At the same time, however, it may consolidate a trend that places the consumer at the centre of initiatives for societal change and loses sight of potentially more radical transformations through the engagement of human beings as citizens.
This country report was prepared for the 19th World Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in Vienna in 2014. It is structured as a questionnaire and provides an overview of the legal framework for Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and other alternative license models like (e.g.) Creative Commons under German law. The first set of questions addresses the applicable statutory provisions and the reported case law in this area. The second section concerns contractual issues, in particular with regard to the interpretation and validity of open content licenses. The third section deals with copyright aspects of open content models, for example regarding revocation rights and rights to equitable remuneration. The final set of questions pertains to patent, trademark and competition law issues of open content licenses.
Concepts of legal capacity and legal subjectivity have developed gradually through intermediate stages. Accordingly, there are numerous types of legal subjects and partial legal subjects, and ever-new types can develop, at the latest once the law confronts new social and technological challenges. Today such challenges seem to be making themselves felt especially in the field of information and communication technologies. Their specific communicative conditions resulting from the technological networking of social communication have a particularly pronounced influence on legal attributions of identity and action, and hence above all on issues of liability in electronic commerce. Here in particular it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish concrete human actors and, for example, to identify them as authors of declarations of intent or even as individually responsible agencies of legal transgressions. The communicative processes in this area appear instead as new kinds of chains of effects whose actors seem to be more socio-technical ensembles of people and things – whereby the artificial components of these hybrid human being-thing linkages can sometimes even be represented as driving forces and independent agents.
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
(2014)
This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants’ efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.