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German soldiers were not actively engaged in Gulf War I or the post-11 September war on terrorism. Coincidentally, however, Germany reflected upon fundamental changes in immigration and asylum law in the early 1990s as well as in the early 2000s. Yet, the relationship between immigration, asylum, and terrorism was conceived of very differently. In the early 1990s, measures combating terrorism did not directly relate to immigration and asylum law. Rather, they were primarily connected to criminal law. IN the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, measures against terrorism and changes in immigration law were intrinsically entwined.
Part IV of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
One element within US counter-terrorism strategies is “reducing terrorist group cohesion”, as the think tank RAND recommends in one of its reports. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) puts these recommendations into actions. Reports like ”Cracks in the Foundation” or ”Dysfunction and Decline” vividly depict the internal disagreement and disunity between al-Qaeda central (AQ) and its regional affiliates, most of all AQ in Iraq (AQI). Albeit these reports are drafted by pundits and certainly provide meaningful and often rare insights into the inner life of the global jihadi movement, they also serve another purpose: to deliberately amplify the very same trend they describe: disunity...
Part V of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
Since 2003, several organizations in the Arab world swore allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida and became part of what was been called “al-Qaeda’s affiliate network”. The emergence of al-Qaeda groups in Saudi Arabia 2003, Iraq 2004, Algeria 2007 and Yemen 2009 convinced many supporters and enemies that there was a truly global network of jihadist groups at work, commanded and controlled by the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
However, the reality was a lot more complicated. Far from being subordinate to Osama Bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri, these organizations were not willing to submit to al-Qaeda command and control. Their relationship with “al-Qaeda central” was rather an alliance between independent partners of different strength. Although the al-Qaeda leadership sometimes influenced decisions taken by the regional groupings, there are numerous examples of “affiliates” ignoring its advice even regarding strategic issues.