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Misselling through agents
(2009)
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's "suitability" for the specific needs of customers. When structuring sales-force compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from "misselling" unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
In his speech at the conference „The SNB and its Watchers“, Otmar Issing, member of the ECB Governing Council from its start in 1998 until 2006, takes a look back at more than twenty years of the conference series „The ECB and Its Watchers“. In June 1999, Issing established this format together with Axel Weber, then Director of the Center for Financial Studies, to discuss the monetary policy strategy of the newly founded central bank with a broad circle of participants, that is academics, bank economists and members of the media on a „neutral ground“. At the annual conference, the ECB and its representatives would play an active role and engage in a lively exchange of view with the other participants. Over the years, Volker Wieland took over as organizer of the conference series, which also was adopted by other central banks. In his contribution at the second conference „The SNB and its Watchers“, Issing summarizes the experience gained from over twenty years of the ECB Watchers Conference.
The Eurosystem and the Deutsche Bundesbank will incur substantial losses in 2023 that are likely to persist for several years. Due to the massive purchases of securities in the last 10 years, especially of government bonds, the banks' excess reserves have risen sharply. The resulting high interest payments to the banks since the turnaround in monetary policy, with little income for the large-scale securities holdings, led to massive criticism. The banks were said to be making "unfair" profits as a result, while the fiscal authorities had to forego the previously customary transfers of central bank profits. Populist demands to limit bank profits by, for example, drastically increasing the minimum reserve ratios in the Eurosystem to reduce excess reserves are creating new severe problems and are neither justified nor helpful. Ultimately, the EU member states have benefited for a very long time from historically low interest rates because of the Eurosystem's extraordinary loose monetary policy and must now bear the flip side consequences of the massive expansion of central bank balance sheets during the necessary period of monetary policy normalisation.
The so-called Troika, consisting of the EU-Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was supposed to support the member states of the euro area which had been hit hard by a sovereign debt crisis. For that purpose, economic adjustment programs were drafted and monitored in order to prevent the break-up of the euro area and sovereign defaults. The cooperation of these institutions, which was born out of necessity, has been partly successful, but has also created persistent problems. With the further increase of public debt, especially in France and Italy, the danger of a renewed crisis in the euro area was growing. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) together with the European Commission will replace the Troika in the future, following decisions of the EU Summit of December 2018. It shall play the role of a European Monetary Fund in the event of a crisis. The IMF, on the other side, will no longer play an active role in solving sovereign debt crises in the euro area. The current course is, however, inadequate to tackle the core problems of the euro zone and to avoid future crises, which are mainly structural in nature and due to escalating public debt and lack of international competitiveness of some member countries. The current Corona crisis will aggravate the institutional problems. It has led to a common European fiscal response ("Next Generation EU"). This rescue and recovery program will not be financed by ESM resources and will not be monitored by the ESM. One important novelty of this package is that it involves the issuance of substantial common European debt.
Debt levels in the eurozone have reached new record highs. The member countries have tried to cushion the economic consequences of the corona pandemic with a massive increase in government spending. End of 2021 public debt in relation to GDP will approach 100% on average. There are various calls to abolish or soften the Maastricht rules of limiting sovereign debt. We see the risk of a new sovereign debt crisis in this decade if it is not possible to bring public debt down to an acceptable level. Our new fiscal rule would be suitable and appropriate for this purpose, because obviously the Maastricht criteria have failed. In contrast to the rigid 3% Maastricht-criterion, our rule is flexible and it addresses the main problem: excessively high public debt ratios. And it lowers the existing incentives for highly indebted governments to exert expansionary pressure on monetary policy. If obeyed strictly, our rule reinforces the snowball effect and reduces the excessively high debt ratios within a manageable period, even if nominal growth is weak. This is confirmed by simulations with different scenarios as well as with the hypothetical application of the new fiscal rule to eurozone economies from 2022 to 2026. Finally, we take up the recent proposal by ESM economists to increase the permissible debt ratio from 60 to 100% of GDP in the eurozone.
The term structure of interest rates is crucial for the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets and the macroeconomy. Disentangling the impact of monetary policy on the components of interest rates, expected short rates and term premia, is essential to understanding this channel. To accomplish this, we provide a quantitative structural model with endogenous, time-varying term premia that are consistent with empirical findings. News about future policy, in contrast to unexpected policy shocks, has quantitatively significant effects on term premia along the entire term structure. This provides a plausible explanation for partly contradictory estimates in the empirical literature.
The term structure of interest rates is crucial for the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets and the macroeconomy. Disentangling the impact of monetary policy on the components of interest rates, expected short rates, and term premia is essential to understanding this channel. To accomplish this, we provide a quantitative structural model with endogenous, time-varying term premia that are consistent with empirical findings. News about future policy, in contrast to unexpected policy shocks, has quantitatively significant effects on term premia along the entire term structure. This provides a plausible explanation for partly contradictory estimates in the empirical literature.
Rising temperatures, falling ratings: the effect of climate change on sovereign creditworthiness
(2021)
How will a changing climate impact the creditworthiness of governments over the very long term? Financial markets need credible, digestible information on how climate change translates into material risks. To bridge the gap between climate science and real-world financial indicators, the authors simulate the effect of climate change on sovereign credit ratings for 108 countries, creating the world’s first climate-adjusted sovereign credit rating. The study offers a first methodological approach to extend the long-term rating to an ultra-long-term reality, aiming at long-term investors, but also regulators and rating agencies.
This paper proposes a new approach for modeling investor fear after rare disasters. The key element is to take into account that investors’ information about fundamentals driving rare downward jumps in the dividend process is not perfect. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs persist for some time. Thus, belief dynamics are a source of apparent excess volatility relative to a rational expectations benchmark. Due to the low frequency of disasters, even an infinitely-lived investor will remain uncertain about the exact probability. Our analysis is conducted in continuous time and offers closed-form solutions for asset prices. We distinguish between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in determining their demand for risky assets, while adaptive learners take beliefs as given. Thus, risky assets tend to be lower-valued and price-dividend ratios vary less under adaptive versus rational learning for identical priors. Keywords: beliefs, Bayesian learning, controlled diffusions and jump processes, learning about jumps, adaptive learning, rational learning. JEL classification: D83, G11, C11, D91, E21, D81, C61
This paper studies the macro-financial implications of using carbon prices to achieve ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets. My empirical evidence shows a 0.6% output loss and a rise of 0.3% in inflation in response to a 1% shock on carbon policy. Furthermore, I also observe financial instability and allocation effects between the clean and highly polluted energy sectors. To have a better prediction of medium and long-term impact, using a medium-large macro-financial DSGE model with environmental aspects, I show the recessionary effect of an ambitious carbon price implementation to achieve climate targets, a 40% reduction in GHG emission causes a 0.7% output loss while reaching a zero-emission economy in 30 years causes a 2.6% output loss. I document an amplified effect of the banking sector during the transition path. The paper also uncovers the beneficial role of pre-announcements of carbon policies in mitigating inflation volatility by 0.2% at its peak, and our results suggest well-communicated carbon policies from authorities and investing to expand the green sector. My findings also stress the use of optimal green monetary and financial policies in mitigating the effects of transition risk and assisting the transition to a zero-emission world. Utilizing a heterogeneous approach with macroprudential tools, I find that optimal macroprudential tools can mitigate the output loss by 0.1% and investment loss by 1%. Importantly, my work highlights the use of capital flow management in the green transition when a global cooperative solution is challenging.
The authors embed human capital-based endogenous growth into a New-Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market and skill obsolescence from long-term unemployment. The model can account for key features of the Great Recession: a decline in productivity growth, the relative stability of inflation despite a pronounced fall in output (the "missing disinflation puzzle"), and a permanent gap between output and the pre-crisis trend output.
In the model, lower aggregate demand raises unemployment and the training costs associated with skill obsolescence. Lower employment hinders learning-by-doing, which slows down human capital accumulation, feeding back into even fewer vacancies than justified by the demand shock alone. These feedback channels mitigate the disinflationary effect of the demand shock while amplifying its contractionary effect on output. The temporary growth slowdown translates into output hysteresis (permanently lower output and labor productivity).
Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. The authors show how such features in a central bank’s collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise arise.
This paper characterises optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous
firm entry, a cash-in-advance constraint and preset wages. Firms must make pro
fits to cover entry costs; thus the markup on goods prices is efficient. However, because leisure is not priced at a markup, the consumption-leisure tradeoff is distorted. Consequently, the real wage, hours and production are suboptimally low. Due to the labour requirement in entry, insufficient labour supply also implies that entry is too low. The paper shows that in the absence of
fiscal instruments such as labour income subsidies, the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves higher welfare than under flexible wages. The policy maker uses the money supply instrument to raise the real wage - the cost of leisure - above its flexible-wage level, in response to expansionary shocks to productivity and entry costs. This raises labour supply, expanding production and
rm entry.
How do changes in market structure affect the US business cycle? We estimate a monetary DSGE model with endogenous
rm/product entry and a translog expenditure function by Bayesian methods. The dynamics of net business formation allow us to identify the 'competition effect', by which desired price markups and inflation decrease when entry rises. We
find that a 1 percent increase in the number of competitors lowers desired markups by 0.18 percent. Most of the cyclical variability in inflation is driven by markup fluctuations due to sticky prices or exogenous shocks rather than endogenous changes in desired markups.
How do changes in market structure affect the US business cycle? We estimate a monetary DSGE model with endogenous
rm/product entry and a translog expenditure function by Bayesian methods. The dynamics of net business formation allow us to identify the 'competition effect', by which desired price markups and inflation decrease when entry rises. We
find that a 1 percent increase in the number of competitors lowers desired markups by 0.18 percent. Most of the cyclical variability in inflation is driven by markup fluctuations due to sticky prices or exogenous shocks rather than endogenous changes in desired markups.
This paper investigates the effect of a change in informational environment of borrowers on the organizational design of bank lending. We use micro-data from a large multinational bank and exploit the sudden introduction of a credit registry, an information-sharing mechanism across banks, for a subset of borrowers. Using within borrower and loan officer variation in a difference-in-difference empirical design, we show that expansion of credit registry led to an improvement in allocation of credit to affected
borrowers. There was a concurrent change in the organizational structure of the bank that involved a dramatic increase in delegation of lending decisions of affected borrowers to loan officers. We also find a significant expansion in scope of activities of loan officers who deal primarily with affected borrowers, as well as of their superiors. There is suggestive evidence that larger banks in the economy were better able to implement similar changes as our bank. We argue that these patterns can be understood within the framework of incentive-based and information cost processing theories. Our findings could help rationalize why improvements in the information environment of borrowers may be altering the landscape of lending by moving decisions outside the boundaries of financial intermediaries.
There is substantial disagreement about the consequences of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, which constitutes the most extensive tax reform in the United States in more than 30 years. Using a large-scale two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, we find that the TCJA increases GDP by about 2% in the medium-run and by about 2.5% in the long-run. The shortrun impact depends crucially on the degree and costs of variable capital utilization, with GDP effects ranging from 1 to 3%. At the same time, the TCJA does not pay for itself. In our analysis, the reform decreases tax revenues and raises the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 15 percentage points in the medium-run until 2025. We show that combining the TCJA with spending cuts can dampen the increase in government indebtedness without reducing its expansionary effect.
This paper develops and implements a backward and forward error analysis of and condition numbers for the numerical stability of the solutions of linear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Comparing seven different solution methods from the literature, I demonstrate an economically significant loss of accuracy specifically in standard, generalized Schur (or QZ) decomposition based solutions methods resulting from large backward errors in solving the associated matrix quadratic problem. This is illustrated in the monetary macro model of Smets and Wouters (2007) and two production-based asset pricing models, a simple model of external habits with a readily available symbolic solution and the model of Jermann (1998) that lacks such a symbolic solution - QZ-based numerical solutions miss the equity premium by up to several annualized percentage points for parameterizations that either match the chosen calibration targets or are nearby to the parameterization in the literature. While the numerical solution methods from the literature failed to give any indication of these potential errors, easily implementable backward-error metrics and condition numbers are shown to successfully warn of such potential inaccuracies. The analysis is then performed for a database of roughly 100 DSGE models from the literature and a large set of draws from the model of Smets and Wouters (2007). While economically relevant errors do not appear pervasive from these latter applications, accuracies that differ by several orders of magnitude persist.
On the accuracy of linear DSGE solution methods and the consequences for log-normal asset pricing
(2021)
This paper demonstrates a failure of standard, generalized Schur (or QZ) decomposition based solutions methods for linear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models when there is insufficient eigenvalue separation about the unit circle. The significance of this is demonstrated in a simple production-based asset pricing model with external habit formation. While the exact solution afforded by the simplicity of the model matches post-war US consumption growth and the equity premium, QZ-based numerical solutions miss the later by many annualized percentage points.
This paper presents and compares Bernoulli iterative approaches for solving linear DSGE models. The methods are compared using nearly 100 different models from the Macroeconomic Model Data Base (MMB) and different parameterizations of the monetary policy rule in the medium-scale New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) iteratively. I find that Bernoulli methods compare favorably in solving DSGE models to the QZ, providing similar accuracy as measured by the forward error of the solution at a comparable computation burden. The method can guarantee convergence to a particular, e.g., unique stable, solution and can be combined with other iterative methods, such as the Newton method, lending themselves especially to refining solutions.
The authors relax the standard assumption in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature that exogenous processes are governed by AR(1) processes and estimate ARMA (p,q) orders and parameters of exogenous processes. Methodologically, they contribute to the Bayesian DSGE literature by using Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) to sample from the unknown ARMA orders and their associated parameter spaces of varying dimensions.
In estimating the technology process in the neoclassical growth model using post war US GDP data, they cast considerable doubt on the standard AR(1) assumption in favor of higher order processes. They find that the posterior concentrates density on hump-shaped impulse responses for all endogenous variables, consistent with alternative empirical estimates and the rigidities behind many richer structural models. Sampling from noninvertible MA representations, a negative response of hours to a positive technology shock is contained within the posterior credible set. While the posterior contains significant uncertainty regarding the exact order, the results are insensitive to the choice of data filter; this contrasts with the authors’ ARMA estimates of GDP itself, which vary significantly depending on the choice of HP or first difference filter.
The authors present and compare Newton-based methods from the applied mathematics literature for solving the matrix quadratic that underlies the recursive solution of linear DSGE models. The methods are compared using nearly 100 different models from the Macroeconomic Model Data Base (MMB) and different parameterizations of the monetary policy rule in the medium-scale New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) iteratively. They find that Newton-based methods compare favorably in solving DSGE models, providing higher accuracy as measured by the forward error of the solution at a comparable computation burden. The methods, however, suffer from their inability to guarantee convergence to a particular, e.g. unique stable, solution, but their iterative procedures lend themselves to refining solutions either from different methods or parameterizations.
Highlights
• Six Newton methods for solving matrix quadratic equations in linear DSGE models.
• Compared to QZ using 99 different DSGE models including Smets and Wouters (2007).
• Newton methods more accurate than QZ with comparable computation burden.
• Apt for refining solutions from alternative methods or nearby parameterizations.
Abstract
This paper presents and compares Newton-based methods from the applied mathematics literature for solving the matrix quadratic that underlies the recursive solution of linear DSGE models. The methods are compared using nearly 100 different models from the Macroeconomic Model Data Base (MMB) and different parameterizations of the monetary policy rule in the medium-scale New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) iteratively. We find that Newton-based methods compare favorably in solving DSGE models, providing higher accuracy as measured by the forward error of the solution at a comparable computation burden. The methods, however, suffer from their inability to guarantee convergence to a particular, e.g. unique stable, solution, but their iterative procedures lend themselves to refining solutions either from different methods or parameterizations.
The authors propose a new method to forecast macroeconomic variables that combines two existing approaches to mixed-frequency data in DSGE models. The first existing approach estimates the DSGE model in a quarterly frequency and uses higher frequency auxiliary data only for forecasting. The second method transforms a quarterly state space into a monthly frequency. Their algorithm combines the advantages of these two existing approaches.They compare the new method with the existing methods using simulated data and real-world data. With simulated data, the new method outperforms all other methods, including forecasts from the standard quarterly model. With real world data, incorporating auxiliary variables as in their method substantially decreases forecasting errors for recessions, but casting the model in a monthly frequency delivers better forecasts in normal times.
We present determinacy bounds on monetary policy in the sticky information model. We find that these bounds are more conservative here when the long run Phillips curve is vertical than in the standard Calvo sticky price New Keynesian model. Specifically, the Taylor principle is now necessary directly - no amount of output targeting can substitute for the monetary authority’s concern for inflation. These determinacy bounds are obtained by appealing to frequency domain techniques that themselves provide novel interpretations of the Phillips curve.
The authors examine the effectiveness of labor cost reductions as a means to stimulate economic activity and assesses the differences which may occur with the prevailing exchange rate regime. They develop a medium-scale three-region DSGE model and show that the impact of a cut in the employers’ social security contributions rate does not vary significantly under different exchange rate regimes. They find that both the interest rate and the exchange rate channel matters. Furthermore, the measure appears to be effective even if it comes along with a consumption tax increase to preserve long-term fiscal sustainability.
Finally, they assess whether obtained theoretical results hold up empirically by applying the local projection method. Regression results suggest that changes in employers’ social security contributions rates have statistically significant real effects – a one percentage point reduction leads to an average cumulative rise in output of around 1.3 percent in the medium term. Moreover, the outcome does not differ significantly across the different exchange rate regimes.
Die Abhandlung ist eine überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der vom Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability am 19. Juni 2006 veranstalteten Guest Lecture des Autors zum Thema "Demystifying Hedge Funds"
The forward guidance trap
(2023)
This paper examines the policy experience of the Fed, ECB and BOJ during and after the Covid-19 pandemic and draws lessons for monetary policy strategy and ist communication. All three central banks provided appropriate accommodation during the pandemic but two failed to unwind this accommodation in a timely manner. The Fed and ECB guided real interest rates to inappropriately negative levels as the economy recovered from the pandemic, fueling high inflation. The policy error can be traced to decisions regarding forward guidance on policy rates that delayed lift-off while the two central banks continued to expand their balance sheets. The Fed and the ECB fell into the forward guidance trap. This could have been avoided if policy were guided by a forward- looking rule that properly adjusted the nominal interest rate with the evolution of the inflation outlook.
What happened in Cyprus? The economic consequences of the last communist government in Europe
(2014)
This paper reviews developments in the Cypriot economy following the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2008 and leading to the economic collapse of the island five years later. The main cause of the collapse is identified with the election of a communist government in February 2008, within two months of the introduction of the euro, and its subsequent choices for action and inaction on economic policy matters. The government allowed a rapid deterioration of public finances, and despite repeated warnings, damaged the country's creditworthiness and lost market access in May 2011. The destruction of the island's largest power station in July 2011 subsequently threw the economy into recession. Together with the intensification of the euro area crisis in the summer and fall of 2011, these events weakened the banking system which was vulnerable due to its exposure in Greece. Rather than deal with its fiscal crisis, the government secured a loan from the Russian government that allowed it to postpone action until after the February 2013 election. Rather than protect the banking system, losses were imposed on banks and a campaign against them was coordinated and used as a platform by the communist party for the February 2013 election. The strategy succeeded in delaying resolution of the crisis and avoiding short-term political cost for the communist party before the election, but also in precipitating a catastrophe right after the election.
Under ordinary circumstances, the fiscal implications of central bank policies tend to be seen as relatively minor and escape close scrutiny. The global financial crisis of 2008, however, demanded an extraordinary response by central banks which brought to light the immense power of central bank balance sheet policies as well as their major fiscal implications. Once the zero lower bound on interest rates is reached, expanding a central bank’s balance sheet becomes the central instrument for providing additional monetary policy accommodation. However, with interest rates near zero, the line separating fiscal and monetary policy is blurred. Furthermore, discretionary decisions associated with asset purchases and liquidity provision, as well as with lender-of-last-resort operations benefiting private entities, can have major distributional effects that are ordinarily associated with fiscal policy. In the euro area, discretionary central bank decisions can have immense distributional effects across member states. However, decisions of this nature are incompatible with the role of unelected officials in democratic societies. Drawing on the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, this paper explores the tensions arising from central bank balance sheet policies and addresses pertinent questions about the governance and accountability of independent central banks in a democratic society.
The Federal Reserve’s muddled mandate to attain simultaneously the incompatible goals of maximum employment and price stability invites short-term-oriented discretionary policymaking inconsistent with the systematic approach needed for monetary policy to contribute best to the economy over time. Fear of liftoff—the reluctance to start the process of policy normalization after the end of a recession—serves as an example. Causes of the problem are discussed, drawing on public choice and cognitive psychology perspectives. The Federal Reserve could adopt a framework that relies on a simple policy rule subject to periodic reviews and adaptation. Replacing meeting-by-meeting discretion with a simple policy rule would eschew discretion in favor of systematic policy. Periodic review of the rule would allow the Federal Reserve the flexibility to account for and occasionally adapt to the evolving understanding of the economy. Congressional legislation could guide the Federal Reserve in this direction. However the Federal Reserve may be best placed to select the simple rule and could embrace this improvement on its own, within its current mandate, with the publication of a simple rule along the lines of its statement of longer-run goals.
What institutional arrangements for an independent central bank with a price stability mandate promote good policy outcomes when unconventional policies become necessary? Unconventional monetary policy poses challenges. The large scale asset purchases needed to counteract the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates have uncomfortable fiscal and distributional consequences and require central banks to assume greater risks on their balance sheets.
In his paper, Athanasios Orphanides draws lessons from the experience of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) since the late 1990s for the institutional design of independent central banks. He comes to the conclusion that lack of clarity on the precise definition of price stability, coupled with concerns about the legitimacy of large balance sheet expansions, hinders policy: It encourages the central bank to eschew the decisive quantitative easing needed to reflate the economy and instead to accommodate too-low inflation. The BoJ’s experience with the zero lower bound suggests important benefits from a clear definition of price stability as a symmetric 2% goal for inflation, which the Bank adopted in 2013.
Following the experience of the global financial crisis, central banks have been asked to undertake unprecedented responsibilities. Governments and the public appear to have high expectations that monetary policy can provide solutions to problems that do not necessarily fit in the realm of traditional monetary policy. This paper examines three broad public policy goals that may overburden monetary policy: full employment; fiscal sustainability; and financial stability. While central banks have a crucial position in public policy, the appropriate policy mix also involves other institutions, and overreliance on monetary policy to achieve these goals is bound to disappoint. Central Bank policies that facilitate postponement of needed policy actions by governments may also have longer-term adverse consequences that could outweigh more immediate benefits. Overburdening monetary policy may eventually diminish and compromise the independence and credibility of the central bank, thereby reducing its effectiveness to preserve price stability and contribute to crisis management.
Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe
(2014)
Marvin Goodfriend’s (2014) insightful, informative and provocative work explains concisely and convincingly why the Fed needs rules and boundaries. This paper reviews the broader institutional design problem regarding the effectiveness of the central bank in practice and confirms the need for rules and boundaries. The framework proposed for improving the Fed incorporates key elements that have already been adopted in the European Union. The case of ELA provision by the ECB and the Central Bank of Cyprus to Marfin-Laiki Bank during the crisis, however, suggests that the existence of rules and boundaries may not be enough to limit harmful discretion. During a crisis, novel interpretations of the legal authority of the central bank may be introduced to create a grey area that might be exploited to justify harmful discretionary decisions even in the presence of rules and boundaries. This raises the question how to ensure that rules and boundaries are respected in practice
Despite a number of helpful changes, including the adoption of an inflation target, the Fed’s monetary policy strategy proved insufficiently resilient in recent years. While the Fed eased policy appropriately during the pandemic, it fell behind the curve during the post-pandemic recovery. During 2021, the Fed kept easing policy while the inflation outlook was deteriorating and the economy was growing considerably faster than the economy’s natural growth rate—the sum of the Fed’s 2% inflation goal and the growth rate of potential output.
The resilience of the Fed’s monetary policy strategy could be enhanced, and such errors be avoided with guidance from a simple natural growth targeting rule that prescribes that the federal funds rate during each quarter be raised (cut) when projected nominal income growth exceeds (falls short) of the economy’s natural growth rate. An illustration with real-time data and forecasts since the early 1990s shows that Fed policy has not persistently deviated from this simple rule with the notable exception of the period coinciding with the Fed’s post-pandemic policy error.
The complexity resulting from intertwined uncertainties regarding model misspecification and mismeasurement of the state of the economy defines the monetary policy landscape. Using the euro area as laboratory this paper explores the design of robust policy guides aiming to maintain stability in the economy while recognizing this complexity. We document substantial output gap mismeasurement and make use of a new model data base to capture the evolution of model specification. A simple interest rate rule is employed to interpret ECB policy since 1999. An evaluation of alternative policy rules across 11 models of the euro area confirms the fragility of policy analysis optimized for any specific model and shows the merits of model averaging in policy design. Interestingly, a simple difference rule with the same coefficients on inflation and output growth as the one used to interpret ECB policy is quite robust as long as it responds to current outcomes of these variables.
We analyze cyclical co-movement in credit, house prices, equity prices, and longterm interest rates across 17 advanced economies. Using a time-varying multi-level dynamic factor model and more than 130 years of data, we analyze the dynamics of co-movement at different levels of aggregation and compare recent developments to earlier episodes such as the early era of financial globalization from 1880 to 1913 and the Great Depression. We find that joint global dynamics across various financial quantities and prices as well as variable-specific global co-movements are important to explain fluctuations in the data. From a historical perspective, global co-movement in financial variables is not a new phenomenon, but its importance has increased for some variables since the 1980s. For equity prices, global cycles play currently a historically unprecedented role, explaining more than half of the fluctuations in the data. Global cycles in credit and housing have become much more pronounced and longer, but their importance in explaining dynamics has only increased for some economies including the US, the UK and Nordic European countries. We also include GDP in the analysis and find an increasing role for a global business cycle.
Output gap revisions can be large even after many years. Real-time reliability tests might therefore be sensitive to the choice of the final output gap vintage that the real-time estimates are compared to. This is the case for the Federal Reserve’s output gap. When accounting for revisions in response to the global financial crisis in the final output gap, the improvement in real-time reliability since the mid-1990s is much smaller than found by Edge and Rudd (Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016, 98(4), 785-791). The negative bias of real-time estimates from the 1980s has disappeared, but the size of revisions continues to be as large as the output gap itself.
The authors systematically analyse how the realtime reliability assessment is affected through varying the final output gap vintage. They find that the largest changes are caused by output gap revisions after recessions. Economists revise their models in response to such events, leading to economically important revisions not only for the most recent years, but reaching back up to two decades. This might improve the understanding of past business cycle dynamics, but decreases the reliability of real-time output gaps ex post.
We propose a simple modification of the time series filter by Hamilton (2018) that yields reliable and economically meaningful real-time output gap estimates. The original filter relies on 8-quarter-ahead forecast errors of a simple autoregression of log real GDP. While this approach yields a cyclical component of GDP that is hardly revised with new incoming data due to the one-sided filtering approach, it does not cover typical business cycle frequencies evenly, but short business cycles are muted and medium length business cycles are amplified. Further, the estimated trend is as volatile as GDP itself and can thus hardly be interpreted as potential GDP. A simple modification that is based on the mean of 4- to 12-quarter-ahead forecast errors shares the favorable real-time properties of the Hamilton filter, but leads to a much better coverage of typical business cycle frequencies and a smooth estimated trend. Based on output growth and inflation forecasts and a comparison to revised output gap estimates from policy institutions, we find that real-time output gaps based on the modified Hamilton filter are economically much more meaningful measures of the business cycle than those based on other simple statistical trend-cycle decomposition techniques such as the HP or the Bandpass filter.
The authors present evidence of a new propagation mechanism for wealth inequality, based on differential responses, by education, to greater inequality at the start of economic life. The paper is motivated by a novel positive cross-country relationship between wealth inequality and perceptions of opportunity and fairness, which holds only for the more educated. Using unique administrative micro data and a quasi-field experiment of exogenous allocation of households, the authors find that exposure to a greater top 10% wealth share at the start of economic life in the country leads only the more educated placed in locations with above-median wealth mobility to attain higher wealth levels and position in the cohort-specific wealth distribution later on. Underlying this effect is greater participation in risky financial and real assets and in self-employment, with no evidence for a labor income, unemployment risk, or human capital investment channel. This differential response is robust to controlling for initial exposure to fixed or other time-varying local features, including income inequality, and consistent with self-fulfilling responses of the more educated to perceived opportunities, without evidence of imitation or learning from those at the top.
Policymakers attach an important role to the macroeconomic outlook of households. Using a representative online panel form the U.S., the authors examine how individuals' macroeconomic expectations causally affect their personal economic prospects and their behavior and provide them with different professional forecasts about the likelihood of a recession. The authors find that groups with the largest exposure to aggregate risk, such as individuals working in cyclical industries, are most likely to respond to an improved macroeconomic outlook, while a large fraction of the population is unlikely to react.
We create an alternative version of the present utility value formula to explicitly show that every store-of-value in the economy bears utility-interest (non-pecuniary income) for ist holder regardless of possible interest earnings from financial markets. In addition, we generalize the well-known welfare measures of consumer and producer surplus as present value concepts and apply them not only for the production and usage of consumer goods and durables but also for money and other financial assets. This helps us, inter alia, to formalize the circumstances under which even a producer of legal tender might become insolvent. We also develop a new measure of seigniorage and demonstrate why the well-established concept of monetary seigniorage is flawed. Our framework also allows us to formulate the conditions for liability-issued money such as inside money and financial instruments such as debt certificates to become – somewhat paradoxically – net wealth of the society.
Despite the increasing use of cashless payment instruments, the notion that cash loses importance over time can be unambiguously refuted. In contrast, the authors show that cash demand increased steeply over the past 30 years. This is not only true on a global scale, but also for the most important currencies in advanced countries (USD, EUR, CHF, GBP and JPY). In this paper, they focus especially on the role of different crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and analyse the demand for small and large banknote denominations since the 1990s in an international perspective. It is evident that cash demand always increases in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself. However, largely unaffected from crises we observe a trend increase in global cash aligned with a shift from transaction balances towards more hoarding, especially in the form of large denomination banknotes.
We analyze the repercussions of different kinds of uncertainty on cash demand, including uncertainty of the digital infrastructures, confidence crises of the financial system, natural disasters, political uncertainties, and inflationary crises. Based on a comprehensive literature survey, theoretical considerations and complemented by case studies, we derive a classification scheme how cash holdings typically evolve in each of these types of uncertainty by separating between demand for domestic and international cash as well as between transaction and store of value balances. Hereby, we focus on the stabilizing macroeconomic properties of cash and recommend guidelines for cash supply by central banks and the banking system. Finally, we exemplify our analysis with five case studies from the developing world, namely Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
The authors focus on the stabilizing role of cash from a society-wide perspective. Starting with conceptual remarks on the importance of money for the economy in general, special attention is paid to the unique characteristics of cash. As these become apparent especially during crisis periods, a comparison of the Great Depression (1929 – 1933) and the Great Recession 2008/09 shows the devastating effects of a severe monetary contraction and how a fully elastic provision of cash can help to avoid such a situation.
The authors find interesting similarities to both crises in two separate case studies, one on the demonetization in India 2016 and the other on cash supply during various crises in Greece since 2008. The paper concludes that supply-driven cash withdrawals from circulation (either by demonetization or by capital controls) destabilize the economy if electronic payment substitutes are not instantly available.
However, as there is no perfect substitute for cash due to its unique properties, from the viewpoint of the society as a whole an efficient payment mix necessarily includes cash: It helps to stabilize the economy not only in times of crises in general, no matter which government is in place. The authors argue that it should be the undisputed task of central banks to ensure that cash remains in circulation in normal times and is provided in a fully elastic way in times of crisis.
To broaden the scope of monetary policy, cash abolishment is often suggested as a means of breaking through the zero lower bound. However, practically nothing is said about the welfare costs of such a proposal. Rösl, Seitz and Tödter argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be analyzed analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. They gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the euro area and for Germany.
Their findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by money holders are large, notably if implemented in the current low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percentage points on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for the euro area and of €18bn for Germany. Therefore, the authors argue that cash abolishment or negative interest rates on cash to break through the zero lower bound at any price can hardly be a meaningful policy goal.
This paper provides an overview of conceptual issues and recent research findings concerning the structure and the role of financial systems and an introduction into the new research area of comparative financial systems. The authors start by pointing out the importance of financial systems in general and then sketch different ways of describing and analysing national financial systems. They advocate using what they call a “systemic approach”. This approach focuses on the fit between the various elements that constitute any financial system as a major determinant of how well a given financial system performs its functions. In its second part the paper discusses recent research concerning the relationships between financial sector development and general economic growth and development. The third part is dedicated to comparative financial systems. It first analyses the similarities and, more importantly, the differences of the financial systems of major industrialised countries and points out that these differences seem to remain in existence in spite of the current wave of liberalisation, deregulation and globalisation. This leads to the concluding discussion of what the systemic approach suggests with respect to the question of whether the financial systems of different countries are likely to converge to a common structure. Key words: Financial sector, financial system, growth and development, convergence JEL classification: G32, G34, G38
I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short-term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.
This chapter aims to provide a hands-on approach to New Keynesian models and their uses for macroeconomic policy analysis. It starts by reviewing the origins of the New Keynesian approach, the key model ingredients and representative models. Building blocks of current-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are discussed in detail. These models address the famous Lucas critique by deriving behavioral equations systematically from the optimizing and forward-looking decision-making of households and firms subject to well-defined constraints. State-of-the-art methods for solving and estimating such models are reviewed and presented in examples. The chapter goes beyond the mere presentation of the most popular benchmark model by providing a framework for model comparison along with a database that includes a wide variety of macroeconomic models. Thus, it offers a convenient approach for comparing new models to available benchmarks and for investigating whether particular policy recommendations are robust to model uncertainty. Such robustness analysis is illustrated by evaluating the performance of simple monetary policy rules across a range of recently-estimated models including some with financial market imperfections and by reviewing recent comparative findings regarding the magnitude of government spending multipliers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of important objectives for on-going and future research using the New Keynesian framework.
Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse: 1. Das Gemeinschaftsrecht garantiert durch Art. 108 EGV umfassend die Weisungsfreiheit der Europäischen Zentralbank und der nationalen Zentralbanken als Institution.. Diese Garantie erfasst auch die natürlichen Personen, die Mitglieder der Entscheidungsgremien sind. 2. Hinzu treten weiter Regelungen des Gemeinschaftsvertrages und der Satzung von ESZB und EZB, welche diese Garantie zu einer allgemeinen Unabhängigkeitsgarantie ausbauen und verstärken. 3. Garantiert ist vor allem auch die persönlicher Unabhängigkeit der Mitglieder in den Entscheidungsgremien. 4. Von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, sind diese Regelungen für das sekundäre Gemeinschaftsrecht unantastbar. Als Teil des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts können sie prinzipiell nur durch Vertragsänderung, also einstimmig verändert werden. 5. Diese europarechtlichen Garantien werden über Art. 88 Satz 2 GG für die Bundesbank als integrales Bestandteil des ESZB in das deutsche Verfassungsrecht transponiert. Daraus ergibt sich eine „gemeinschaftsrechtlich vermittelte verfassungsrechtliche Unabhängigkeitsgarantie“ für die Bundesbank. 6. Die Regelung ist mit dem Demokratieprinzip vereinbar. 7. Änderungen der umfassenden Garantie können die verfassungsrechtlichen Voraussetzungen für die Übertragung der währungs- und notenbankpolitischen Befugnisse auf das ESZB entfallen lassen. 8. Der Entwurf einer Verfassung für Europa enthält keine verfassungsrechtlich relevanten Relativierungen der Unabhängigkeitsgarantie. 9. Das Ziel der Preisstabilität hat den ihm gebührenden Rang behalten. Bei genauer Analyse zeigt sich auch, dass sein besonderer Rang für die Tätigkeit des ESZB nicht beeinträchtigt ist. 10. Ein Vergleich der verschiedenen sprachlichen Fassungen des Verfassungsvertrages zeigt auch, dass – entgegen dem deutschen Text – die EZB nicht als – möglicherweise weniger unabhängiges - Organ der EU, sondern als sonstige Einrichtung eingestuft worden ist.
Zusammenfassung und Ergebnisse Es ist noch zu früh, eine abschließende Bewertung der Entwicklung auf den Finanzmärkten während der letzten zwei Jahre vorzunehmen. In jedem Fall sind aber alle Regelungen auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Das Aufsichtsrecht hat insgesamt seine Aufgabe, Finanzstabilität zu gewährleisten, nicht erfüllt. Wesentliche Schritte für eine grundlegende Reform sind: - ein striktes Verständnis des Aufsichtsrechts als Sonderordnungsrecht - eine drastische Reduktion der Komplexität der Rechtsvorschriften - die Internationalisierung und Europäisierung der Aufsicht - die Steigerung der Transparenz der Verbriefung einschließlich eines möglichen Zulassungsverfahrens und des Verbots bestimmter gefährlicher „Produkte“ - die vollständige Neuausrichtung der Bewertung von Finanzunternehmen und ihrer „Produkte“ („ratings“) - Die Schaffung geeigneter Regeln und Verfahren, um auch systemisch relevante Institutionen der Marktdisziplin, also ihrem Untergang, auszusetzen - Die Grundlage für kurzfristige Entscheidung über Fortführung, Zerlegung oder Abwicklung eines Instituts als Maßnahme der Gefahrenabwehr muss geschaffen werden. Ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken ist nicht angezeigt - Die Einbeziehung des menschlichen Verhaltens und der Persönlichkeitsstruktur der maßgebenden Personen in den Finanzinstitutionen
The European Monetary Union euro has done very well since its initiation. Price stability has been secured and the external value of the new currency is more than satisfactory. The confidence in it is also shown by its increasing use as a global reserve currency. It has been a stabilizing factor in the current crisis. The recent budgetary problems of some member states are principally not a problem of the Monetary Union. It is therefore in no way justified to speak of a "Euro-crisis". It is true, however, that the Monetary Union restricts the number of possibilities for member states to solve their financial problems but it does not eliminate them entirely that outside help would have become indispensible. The purchase of debt instruments of member states in financial distress by the ECB is questionable from an economic, and more important, from a legal point of view. The longer the duration, the less legally justifiable is it. Financial support for member states in severe financial distress might be acceptable as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism. A permanent support mechanism needs a basis in the primary law of the EU. The treatment of the risk of "sovereign" debt in the legal framework for financial institutions urgently needs improvement. Especially the capital requirements for credit institutions have to be adjusted.
Die Spielbankenunternehmer haben in Nordrhein-Westfalen eine Spielbankabgabe in Höhe von 80 % der Bruttospielerträge zu entrichten, § 4 Abs. 2 Satz 1 des Spielbankengesetzes NW1. Nach Absatz 3 derselben Norm sind sie dafür von denjenigen Landes- und Gemeindesteuern befreit, die in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang mit dem Betrieb der Spielbank stehen. Ein „angemessener“ Anteil dieser Abgabe ist den jeweiligen Spiel-bankgemeinden wegen der Befreiung des Spielbankunternehmers von Gemeindesteuern zuzuwenden. Durch Rechtsverordnung bestimmt der Innenminister im Einvernehmen mit dem Finanzminister die Höhe dieses Anteils, § 4 Abs. 2 Satz 3 Spielbankgesetz NW. Dies ist in § 1 der Verord-nung über den Anteil der Spielbankgemeinden an der Spielbankabgabe vom 8. Mai 19852 geschehen. Nr. 7 des Haushaltsstrukturgesetzes 20063 hat diesen Anteil von 15 % auf 12 % abgesenkt. Die Absenkung ist am 1. Juli 2006 in Kraft getreten, § 2 Nr. 2 des Haushaltsstrukturgesetzes 2006. Als Folge von Artikel 2 des Gesetzes zur Eindämmung missbräuchlicher Steuergestaltungen wird die zu zahlende Umsatzsteuer seit dem 6. Mai 2006 auf die Spielbankabgabe angerechnet. Das bedeutet, dass sich der Landesanteil an den Bruttospielerträgen um die anzurechnende Umsatzsteuer verringert. Im Folgenden soll untersucht werden, ob Rechte der Spielbankgemeinden in Nordrhein-Westfalen verletzt worden sind. Es handelt sich um die Städte Aachen, Bad Oeynhausen, Dortmund und Duisburg.
In the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB), the statement that „we act within our mandate“ is often referred to. Also among practitioners of the Eurosystem the term „mandate“ has become popular. In his Working Paper, Helmut Siekmann analyzes the legal foundation of the tasks and objectives of the Eurosysstem and price stability as a legal term. He finds that the primary law of the EU only very sparsely employs the term „mandate“. It is never used in the context of monetary policy and its institutions. Moreover, he comes to the conclusion that inflation targeting as a task, competence, or objective of the Eurosystem is legally highly questionable according to the common standards of interpretation.
Gegen den Landeshaushalt 2022 des Freistaats Thüringen bestehen nach Einschätzung von Helmut Siekmann erhebliche verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken. In einem Gutachten kommt Siekmann zu dem Schluss, dass sich die festgestellten globalen Minderausgaben im Vergleich zum gesamten Haushaltsvolumen nicht rechtfertigen lassen. Der verfassungsrechtlich gebotene Haushaltsausgleich sei nur dadurch erzielt worden, dass die eigentlich gebotenen Einzelkürzungen nicht vom Parlament entschieden, sondern der Exekutive überlassen worden seien. Durch Globale Minderausgaben soll der Ausgleich von Einnahmen und Ausgaben erreicht werden, ohne dafür erforderliche und politisch oft schwer durchsetzbare Kürzungen bei Einzeltiteln vornehmen zu müssen.
In Thüringen fehlen der Minderheitskoalition aus Linke, SPD und Grünen im Parlament vier Stimmen für eine eigene Mehrheit. Sie muss damit bei allen Entscheidungen eine Unterstützung der oppositionellen CDU aushandeln. Siekmann weist in seinem Gutachten darauf hin, dass die Veranschlagung von globalen Minderausgaben gleich welcher Art in keinem Fall die Exekutive ermächtigt, bestehende Verpflichtungen nicht zu erfüllen.
Aus der Vielzahl der damit verbundenen Probleme sollen im Folgenden einige Aspekte etwas näher betrachtet werden. Dabei sollen die Maßnahmen zur unmittelbaren Krisenbewältigung ausgeklammert werden. Auch können die drängenden Fragen nach der Rolle der Geldpolitik sowie der globalen außenwirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichte, die beide einen erheblichen, wenn nicht gar entscheidenden Beitrag zur Entstehung der Instabilitäten geleistet haben,19 hier nicht näher behandelt werden. Das Hauptaugenmerk soll stattdessen auf folgende Fragenkreise gelegt werden: I. Der Beitrag der Rechtsordnung zu Entstehung und Verlauf der Krise II. Verbesserung von Aufsicht und Kontrolle als Kern einer Neugestaltung III. Die Rolle der Ratingagenturen IV. Die reale Bedeutung von Finanzmärkten und Finanzinstitutionen V. Überlegungen zur Prävention Dabei sollen nicht Detailregelungen im Vordergrund der Betrachtung stehen, sondern die grundsätzliche Rolle der Rechtsordnung für die Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte.
Der Präsident der Europäischen Kommission, José Manuel Barroso, hat im Oktober 2008 eine Gruppe von Sachverständigen unter Vorsitz des früheren Präsidenten des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Banque de France, Jacques de Larosière, mit der Ausarbeitung von Ratschlägen zur Zukunft der europäischen Finanzregulierung („financial regulation“) und Aufsicht („supervision“) beauftragt. Die Gruppe hat ihren Bericht am 25. Februar 2009 vorgelegt. Kapitel III des Berichts behandelt das Aufsichtssystem auf EU-Ebene und gelangt im Wesentlichen zu zwei Empfehlungen: - Errichtung einer präventiv tätigen, institutsübergreifenden („macroprudential“) Aufsichtseinrichtung mit dem Namen „European Systemic Risk Council“ [ESRC] - Umwandlung der bestehenden Ebene-3 Ausschüsse („3L3 committees“) in ein neues europäisches System von Finanzaufsicht [ESFS] mit hoheitlichen Funktionen Vor allem die geforderte Neustrukturierung der Aufsicht ist unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten kritisch zu würdigen. Die Erwägungen konzentrieren sich dabei auf die Frage, ob die Umsetzung der Vorschläge ohne Änderung des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts möglich erscheint. Der Abschluss von separaten Verwaltungsabkommen oder von Staatsverträgen, mit denen ad hoc neue Einrichtungen geschaffen werden könnten, soll im Folgenden nicht weiter untersucht werden. Zwar könnte auf diese Weise ein vollständiger Rechtsrahmen für Aufsichtseinrichtungen auf EU-Ebene geschaffen werden. Er könnte auch die Grundlage für die Übertragung von Hoheitsbefugnissen bilden, doch wäre dies mit gravierenden Nachteilen verbunden. Es ist keineswegs sicher, dass alle Mitglieder der EU eine solche Vereinbarung unterzeichnen würden, so dass unterschiedliche Aufsichtssysteme entstehen würden. Einer der Hauptgründe für eine Aufsicht auf europäischer Ebene würde verfehlt. Zum anderen würde eine institutionelle Parallelstruktur im Kernbereich der EU, dem gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt mit den Grundfreiheiten, geschaffen, die zahlreiche gravierende Probleme der Koordination und Abstimmung zwischen diesen, voneinander unabhängigen Systemen hervorrufen würde.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie und des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen Keine Hilfe für Banken ohne einen neuen Ordnungsrahmen für die Finanzmärkte Stellungnahme 14/2328 Antrag der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen : Keine Hilfe für Banken ohne einen neuen Ordnungsrahmen für Finanzmärkte Drucksache 14/7680 Fragenkatalog zur Anhörung von Sachverständigen am 04. Februar 2009 zum Antrag der Fraktion Bündnis90/Die Grünen Tableau Anhörung von Sachverständigen 57. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie 85. Sitzung des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 4. Februar 2009
Demographic change in industrialized nations has been a matter of common interest for some time. The financial implications of an ageing society are also increasingly discussed, particularly with regard to pension systems. The impact of this development on public finances is, however, only gradually being realized and the constitutional framework of public finances in Germany and the European Union just falls short of ignoring it entirely. This paper is a preliminary assessment of the burden of an ageing society under the fiscal law, specifically in respect of prospective entitlements to the public pension system. The first part analyses the provisions of the German constitution on finances (Finanzverfassungsrecht) to identify what rules, if any, exist addressing such (potential) expenditures, which lie in the immediate or very distant future. The second part of the paper analyses the fiscal requirements under European Union law. In the third and final part a few comments on the proposed national pact on stability and the recent moves to amend the German Federal Constitution are presented.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen am 29. Oktober 2009 Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung NRW : LANDTAG NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 14. Wahlperiode - Drucksache 14/9380 - 10.06.2009 Gesetz über die Feststellung eines zweiten Nachtrags zum Haushaltsplan des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 und zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Fonds für eine Inanspruchnahme des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen aus der im Zusammenhang mit der Risikoabschirmung zugunsten der WestLB AG erklärten Garantie (Zweites Nachtragshaushaltsgesetz 2009) - Auszug Ergänzung der Landesregierung NRW zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung - Drucksache 14/9380 (Zweites Nachtragshaushaltsgesetz 2009) - Drucksache 14/9510 – 01.07.2009 - Auszug Zweite Ergänzung der Landesregierung zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung - Drucksachen 14/9380 und 14/9510 (1. Ergänzung) - Drucksache 14/9910 – 02.10.2009 - Auszug
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND ERGEBNISSE (1) Die Schaffung des Europäischen Ausschusses für Systemrisiken stößt nicht auf durchgreifende rechtliche Bedenken. (2) Es ist nicht sicher, dass die Errichtung der neuen Europäischen Aufsichtbehörden ohne entsprechende Änderung des Primärrechts zulässig ist. (3) Es kommt entscheidend darauf an, welche rechtsverbindlichen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse tatsächlich den Behörden verliehen werden. (4) Die nach dem Kompromiss vom 2. Dezember 2009 noch verbliebenen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse der Behörden gegenüber Privaten und gegenüber nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden sind rechtlich kaum abgesichert. (5) Wenn die hoheitlichen Befugnisse weitgehend oder vollständig beseitigt werden, bestehen Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Geeignetheit und Erforderlichkeit der Einrichtungen. (6) Die weitreichenden Unabhängigkeitsgarantien sind nicht mit den Anforderungen demokratischer Aufsicht und Kontrolle zu vereinbaren. (7) Für die Einräumung von Unabhängigkeit ist nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht eine ausdrückliche Regelung in der Verfassung, wie in Art. 88 Satz 2 GG, erforderlich. (8) Die transnationale Kooperation von Verwaltungsbehörden bedarf zumindest dann einer gesetzlichen Ermächtigung, wenn faktisch verbindliche Entscheidungen getroffen werden.
Inhalt Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Föderalismuskommission II für eine zukunftsfähige Gestaltung der Finanzsysteme nutzen. Stellungnahme für das Expertengespräch des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen am 14.02.2008 Stellungnahme 14/1785 Antrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS90/Die Grünen im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen: Drucksache 14/4338 Fragenkatalog zum Expertengespräch des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses und des Hauptausschusses am 14.02.2008
Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse: 1. Europäische Zentralbank und Bundesbank erfüllen im Wesentlichen hoheitliche Aufgaben. 2. Die Erfüllung hoheitlicher Aufgaben darf nicht dazu dienen, den allgemeinenStaatsbedarf zu finanzieren. Akzidentiell anfallende Erlöse können jedoch imHaushalt vereinnahmt werden. 3. Die gesetzliche Anordnung, Bundesbankgewinne an den Bund abzuführen(§ 27 BBankG), ist mit den finanzverfassungsrechtlichen Maximen der Staatsfinanzierung vereinbar. Es liegt auch kein Verstoß gegen das Steuerstaatsprinzip vor. 4. Ertragsgesichtspunkte dürfen aber keinesfalls und in keiner Weise in die Entscheidungen einfließen, mit denen hoheitliche Aufgaben erfüllt werden. 5. Die Vereinnahmung von Bundesbankgewinnen durch den Bund stellt keine Kreditaufnahme dar, die im Rahmen der Verschuldungsgrenzen des Art. 115 Abs. 1 GG zu berücksichtigen wäre. 6. Weder die Bundesregierung noch der Bundestag haben die Kompetenz, auf die Komponenten einzuwirken, die zur Entstehung des Bundesbankgewinns führen. Dafür ist ausschließlich das Europäische System der Zentralbanken zuständig, soweit währungspolitische Gesichtspunkte betroffen sind. 7. Das gilt insbesondere auch für die Entscheidung über den Verkauf von Gold oder Devisenreserven. Es besteht keinerlei Anrecht des Bundes auf diese Vermögensgegenstände, solange die Bundesbank besteht. 8. Einwirkungen dieser Art sind mit der europarechtlich und verfassungsrechtlich garantierten Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbanken nicht zu vereinbaren. Schon der bloße Versuch einer Beeinflussung ist verboten, Art. 108 EGV und Art. 88 Satz 2 GG. 9. Die gesetzlichen Vorschriften über die Gewinnabführung verstoßen als solche derzeit aber noch nicht gegen höherrangiges Recht, auch wenn sie starke Anreize für die Politik schaffen, sich über die Unabhängigkeitsgarantien hinwegzusetzen. 10. Die Bundesbank darf sich nicht aus währungspolitischen Erwägungen weigern, den zur Ausschüttung bereitstehenden Gewinn auszuzahlen. 11. Der unmittelbare Einsatz des Gewinns zur Schuldentilgung würde alle Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Unabhängigkeitsgarantie beseitigen.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Haushaltsausschusses zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen für ein Gesetz zur Änderung der Hessischen Landeshaushaltsordnung Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen für ein Gesetz zur Änderung der Hessischen Landeshaushaltsordnung (LHO) : Drucksache 17/265 Liste der Anzuhörenden im Haushaltsausschuss : am 17.09.2008 zur Drucksache 17/265
Missachtung rechtlicher Vorgaben des AEUV durch die Mitgliedstaaten und die EZB in der Schuldenkrise
(2012)
Zusammenfassung und Ergebnisse
1. Es gibt gute Argumente für ein generelles Verbot (freiwilliger) Unterstützungsleistungen an Euro-Mitgliedstaaten.
2. Die Vereinbarkeit der Leistungen der EU im Rahmen des EFSM mit Art. 122 Abs. 2 AEUV ist fraglich. Die Beurteilung der Kausalitätsfrage ist maßgebend.
3. Die Vereinbarkeit der Leistungen der Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der speziellen Griechenlandhilfe und im Rahmen der EFSF mit dem AEUV in der damals geltenden Fassung ist nicht sicher.
4. Die Einführung von Art. 136 Abs. 3 AEUV modifiziert das Vertragsrecht und ist wohl noch in Einklang mit Art. 48 Abs. 6 EUV erfolgt.
5. ESM und Fiskalpakt verstoßen nach der Änderung des Primärrechts wohl nicht gegen den AEUV.
6. Unabdingbar für die Schaffung des ESM sind aber das Inkrafttreten von Art. 136 Abs. 3 AEUV und
7. Der Erwerb von Forderungen gegen Mitgliedstaaten über einen längeren Zeitraum und zur Erleichterung von Zinslasten überschreitet die Befugnisse und Zuständigkeiten des ESZB.
8. Der Erwerb von Forderungen gegen Mitgliedstaaten über einen längeren Zeitraum und zur Erleichterung von Zinslasten ist nicht mit dem Verbot der Kreditgewährung durch Zentralbanken an Hoheitsträger nach Art. 123 AEUV zu vereinbaren
9. Die Gewährung von langfristigen Krediten an Banken verstößt ebenfalls gegen die Zuständigkeitsordnung des AEUV und ist bei einer Weiterleitung der Mittel an Hoheitsträger nicht mit Art. 123 AEUV zu vereinbaren.
10. Die Akzeptierung von ausfallgefährdeten Forderungen als Sicherheit für die Gewährung von Krediten durch das ESZB verstößt gegen Art. 18.1., zweiter Spiegelstrich, Satzung ESZB/EZB.
In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted several times to support the EU Member States and banking systems in financial distress by purchasing debt instruments: Covered Bonds Programmes (CBP), Securities Market Programmes (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), and Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), followed by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and then the Extended Asset Purchase Programmes (EAPP) – colloquially labelled as Quantitative Easing (QE).
Initially, the support measures of the ESCB might have to be judged as monetary policy but the selectivity of OMT and – even more – SMP in conjunction with the transfer of risks to the ESCB speak against it.
Helmut Siekmann erläutert in seinem Beitrag die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass weder eine „Haftung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Verluste der EZB noch eine Verpflichtung zur Auffüllung von aufgezehrtem Eigenkapital“ besteht.
Dieser Beitrag ist zuerst erschienen in: Festschrift für Theodor Baums zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, S. 1145-1179, Helmut Siekmann, Andreas Cahn, Tim Florstedt, Katja Langenbucher, Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Tobias Tröger, Ulrich Segna, Hrsg., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2017
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND ERGEBNISSE (1) Die Schaffung des Europäischen Ausschusses für Systemrisiken stößt nicht auf durchgreifende rechtliche Bedenken. (2) Es ist nicht sicher, dass die Errichtung der neuen Europäischen Aufsichtbehörden ohne entsprechende Änderung des Primärrechts zulässig ist. (3) Es kommt entscheidend darauf an, welche rechtsverbindlichen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse tatsächlich den Behörden verliehen werden. (4) Die nach dem Kompromiss vom 2. Dezember 2009 noch verbliebenen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse der Behörden gegenüber Privaten und gegenüber nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden sind rechtlich kaum abgesichert. (5) Wenn die hoheitlichen Befugnisse weitgehend oder vollständig beseitigt werden, bestehen Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Geeignetheit und Erforderlichkeit der Einrichtungen. (6) Die weitreichenden Unabhängigkeitsgarantien sind nicht mit den Anforderungen demokratischer Aufsicht und Kontrolle zu vereinbaren. (7) Für die Einräumung von Unabhängigkeit ist nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht eine ausdrückliche Regelung in der Verfassung, wie in Art. 88 Satz 2 GG, erforderlich. (8) Die transnationale Kooperation von Verwaltungsbehörden bedarf zumindest dann einer gesetzlichen Ermächtigung, wenn faktisch verbindliche Entscheidungen getroffen werden.
The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
In its meeting on 6 September 2012, the Governing Council of the ECB took decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (OMT). This decision was challenged in the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) by a number of constitutional complaints and other petitions. In its seminal judgment of 14 January 2014, the German court expressed serious doubts on the compatibility of the ECB’s decision with the European Union law.
It admitted the complaints and petitions even though actual purchases had not been executed and the control of acts of an organ of the EU in principle is not the task of the GFCC. As justification for this procedure the court resorted to its judicature on a reserved “ultra vires” control and the defense of the “constitutional identiy” of Germany. In the end, however, the court referred the case pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings on several questions of EU law. In substance, the German court assessed OMT as an act of economic policy which is not covered by the competences of the ECB. Furthermore, it judged OMT as a – by EU primary law – prohibited monetary financing of sovereign debt. The defense of the ECB (disruption of monetary policy transmission mechanism) was dismissed without closer scrutiny as being “irrelevant”. Finally the court opened, however, a way for a compromise by an interpretation of OMT in conformity with EU law under preconditions, specified in detail.
Procedure and findings of this judgment were harshly criticized by many economists but also by the majority of legal scholars. This criticism is largely convincing in view of the admissibility of the complaints. Even if the “ultra vires” control is in conformity with prior decisions of court it is in this judgment expanded further without compelling reasons. It is also questionable whether the standing of the complaining parties had to be accepted and whether the referral to the ECJ was indicated. The arguments of the court are, however, conclusive in respect of the transgression of competences by the ECB and – to somewhat lesser extent – in respect of the monetary debt financing. The dismissal of the defense as “irrelevant” is absolutey persuasive.
Inhalt:
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Helmut Siekmann: Stellungnahme für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet (Drucksache 16/4165) vom 10.02.2014
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der Piraten Gesetz zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet vom 08.10.2013
Ein Freibrief für die Notenbank bedeutet, genau genommen, die Bankrotterklärung des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates vor technokratischen Beliebigkeiten, schreibt Helmut Siekmann in diesem Namensbeitrag. Er betont, dass die Europäische Union eine unverzichtbare Einrichtung ist und ein echter Bundesstaat sein sollte. Sie sei aber im Wesentlichen (nur) ein Rechtskonstrukt, weshalb es umso wichtiger sei, dass die rechtlichen Regeln, auf denen sie beruht, genauestens beachtet werden.
(1) Unter „öffentlichen Banken“ sind Kreditinstitute in unmittelbarer oder mittelbarer Trägerschaft einer Gebietskörperschaft zu verstehen.
(2) Eine Bestandsaufnahme ergibt, dass ein nennenswerter Teil der „öffentlichen Banken“ materiell privatisiert oder stark umgeformt worden ist.
(3) Die Sicherung der Kunden durch Anstaltslast und Gewährträgerhaftung ist weitgehend beseitigt worden, ohne dass dies den Betroffenen hinreichend deutlich gemacht worden ist.
(4) Die bestehenden „öffentlichen Banken“ sind deutlich vielgestaltiger organisiert als noch vor wenigen Jahren.
(5) Auch „öffentliche Banken“ unterliegen regelmäßig der „allgemeinen“ Aufsicht und Kontrolle, wie sie für privatwirtschaftliche Institute in ihrer jeweiligen Rechtsform gelten.
(6) Darüber hinaus ist aus verfassungsrechtlichen Gründen eine besondere Leitung, Aufsicht und Kontrolle der „öffentliche Banken“ durch ihr Trägergemeinwesen erforderlich; nicht zuletzt um die Einhaltung ihres besonderen öffentlichen Auftrags kontrollieren zu können.
(7) Die Prüfung durch Wirtschafsprüfer kann diese Aufgaben nicht erfüllen.
(8) Sie ist an erster Stelle Aufgabe der Exekutive des Trägergemeinwesens.
(9) Eine bloße Rechtsaufsicht ist verfassungsrechtlich problematisch, jedenfalls dann wenn eine Einstandspflicht des Trägergemeinwesens besteht.
(10) Die Mitwirkung in Aufsichtsgremien der „öffentliche Banken“ ist keine hinreichende Aufsicht in diesem Sinne.
(11) Darüber hinaus sind die parlamentarische Kontrolle und die Kontrolle durch die Rechnungshöfe ganz wesentlich.
(12) Die Kontrolle durch Sicherungseinrichtungen kann wirksam und sinnvoll sein.
(13) Öffentlich-rechtliche und privatrechtliche Mischformen dürfen nicht zu einer Ausdünnung von Aufsicht und Kontrolle führen.
(14) Der Einsatz des Instituts der Beleihung ist nur dann rechtlich akzeptabel, wenn ein durchgehender Aufsichts- und Leitungsstrang auch gegenüber dem Beliehenen gesichert ist.
(15) Überlegungen zur Neuordnung der „öffentlichen Banken“ müssen zuerst die Frage beantworten, ob und welche Bankdienstleistungen der Staat unmittelbar oder mittelbar anbieten sollte.
(16) Eine Grundversorgung der Bevölkerung mit einfachen Bankdienstleistungen, die sicher, einfach, kostengünstig und leicht erreichbar sind, ist eine staatliche Aufgabe. Hier liegt in weitem Umfang Marktversagen vor.
(17) Ob ein reformiertes Einlagensicherungssystem die notwendige Sicherheit bieten kann, ist zweifelhaft, solange keine Staatsgarantie für die Sicherungseinrichtungen besteht.
(18) Es ist an eine Reaktivierung von Anstaltslast und Gewährträgerhaftung für einfache Institute zur Grundversorgung der Bevölkerung zu denken.
(19) Leitung und Kontrolle des Managements „öffentlicher Banken“ müssen wesentlich strenger werden, um jegliche Risiken für die öffentlichen Haushalte auszuschließen. Gehaltsmäßig muss ihre Leitung so uninteressant sein, dass sie weder für Politiker noch für „Finanzingenieure“ attraktiv ist.
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions.
This paper summarizes key elements of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme. It briefly explains how it is possible for the German Court to disagree with the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, it makes suggestions concerning a practical way forward for the Governing Council of the ECB in light of these developments.
This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using an exogenous variation in organizational design, induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India during 1999-2006, and employing a difference-in-differences research strategy, we find that increased hierarchization of a branch decreases its ability to produce "soft" information on loans, leads to increased standardization of loans and rationing of "soft information" loans. Furthermore, this loss of information brings about a reduction in performance on loans: delinquency rates and returns on similar loans are worse in more hierarchical branches. We also document how hierarchical structures perform better in environments that are characterized by a high degree of corruption, thus highlighting the benefits of hierarchical decision making in restraining rent seeking activities. Finally, we document a channel - managerial interference - through which hierarchy affects loan outcomes.
In the euro area, monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank for 20 member countries. However, countries are heterogeneous in their economic development, including their inflation rates. This paper combines a New Keynesian model and a neural network to assess whether the European Central Bank (ECB) conducted monetary policy between 2002 and 2022 according to the weighted average of the inflation rates within the European Monetary Union (EMU) or reacted more strongly to the inflation rate developments of certain EMU countries.
The New Keynesian model first generates data which is used to train and evaluate several machine learning algorithms. They authors find that a neural network performs best out-of-sample. They use this algorithm to generally classify historical EMU data, and to determine the exact weight on the inflation rate of EMU members in each quarter of the past two decades. Their findings suggest disproportional emphasis of the ECB on the inflation rates of EMU members that exhibited high inflation rate volatility for the vast majority of the time frame considered (80%), with a median inflation weight of 67% on these countries. They show that these results stem from a tendency of the ECB to react more strongly to countries whose inflation rates exhibit greater deviations from their long-term trend.
The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone was characterized by a monetary policy, which has been constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, and several countries, which faced high risk spreads on their sovereign bonds. How is the government spending multiplier affected by such an economic environment?While prominent results in the academic literature point to high government spending multipliers at the ZLB, higher public indebtedness is often associated with small government spending multipliers. I develop a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks that captures both features of this economic environment, the ZLB and fiscal stress. In this model, I analyze the effects of government spending shocks. I find that not only are multipliers large at the ZLB, the presence of fiscal stress can even increase their size. For longer durations of the ZLB,multipliers in this model can be considerably larger than one.
JEL Classification: E32, E 44, E62
I have assessed changes in the monetary policy stance in the euro area since its inception by applying a Bayesian time-varying parameter framework in conjunction with the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithm. I find that the estimated policy response has varied considerably over time. Most of the results suggest that the response weakened after the onset of the financial crisis and while quantitative measures were still in place, although there are also indications that the weakening of the response to the expected inflation gap may have been less pronounced. I also find that the policy response has become more forceful over the course of the recent sharp rise in inflation. Furthermore, it is essential to model the stochastic volatility relating to deviations from the policy rule as it materially influences the results.
The Federal Reserve has been publishing federal funds rate prescriptions from Taylor rules in its Monetary Policy Report since 2017. The signals from the rules aligned with Fed action on many occasions, but in some cases the Fed opted for a different route. This paper reviews the implications of the rules during the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge and derives projections for the future.
In 2020, the Fed took the negative prescribed rates, which were far below the effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as support for extensive and long-lasting quantitative easing. Yet, the calculations overstate the extent of the constraint, because they neglect the supply side effects of the pandemic.
The paper proposes a simple model-based adjustment to the resource gap used by the rules for 2020. In 2021, the rules clearly signaled the need for tightening because of the rise of inflation, yet the Fed waited until spring 2022 to raise the federal funds rate. With the decline of inflation over the course of 2023, the rules’ prescriptions have also come down. They fall below the actual federal funds rate target range in 2024. Several caveats concerning the projections of the interest rate prescriptions are discussed.
In this paper we investigate the comparative properties of empirically-estimated monetary models of the U.S. economy using a new database of models designed for such investigations. We focus on three representative models due to Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Taylor (1993a). Although these models differ in terms of structure, estimation method, sample period, and data vintage, we find surprisingly similar economic impacts of unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate. However, optimized monetary policy rules differ across models and lack robustness. Model averaging offers an effective strategy for improving the robustness of policy rules.
Recently there has been an explosion of research on whether the equilibrium real interest rate has declined, an issue with significant implications for monetary policy. A common finding is that the rate has declined. In this paper we provide evidence that contradicts this finding. We show that the perceived decline may well be due to shifts in regulatory policy and monetary policy that have been omitted from the research. In developing the monetary policy implications, it is promising that much of the research approaches the policy problem through the framework of monetary policy rules, as uncertainty in the equilibrium real rate is not a reason to abandon rules in favor of discretion. But the results are still inconclusive and too uncertain to incorporate into policy rules in the ways that have been suggested.
During the 1970s, industrial countries, including the US and continental Europa, experienced a combination of slow productivity growth and high unemplyoment. Subsequent research has shown that the standard model of unemployment actually gives counterfactual predictions. Motivated by the observation that the 1970s were also characterized by high and rising inflation, Tesfaselassie and Wolters examine the effect of growth on unemployment in the presence of nominal price rigidity.
The authors demonstrate that the effect of growth on unemployment may be positive or negative. Faster growth leads to lower unemployment if the rate of inflation is high enough. There is a threshold level of inflation below which faster growth leads to higher unemployment and above which faster growth leads to lower unemployment. The threshold level in turn depends on labor market characteristics, such as hiring efficiency, the job destruction rate, workers' relative bargaining power and the opportunity cost of work.