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This paper examines a practice that is nearly imperceptible to historians because the bulk of evidence for it is to be found in the interstices of the beaten paths of legal and social history and because it mixes economic and religious matters in a strikingly unfamiliar manner. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, excommunication for debt offered ordinary people an economical, efficacious enforcement mechanism for small-scale, daily, unwritten credit. At the same time, the practice offered holders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction an important opportunity to round out their incomes, particularly in the difficult fifteenth century. This transitional practice reveals a level of credit below that of the letters of change, annuities secured on real property, or written obligations beloved of economic historians and historians of banking. Studying the practice casts light on the transition from the face-to-face, local economies of the high Middle Ages to the regional economies of the early modern period, on how the Reformation shaped early modern regimes of credit, and on how the disappearance of ecclesiastical civil justice facilitated the emergence of early modern juridically sovereign territories.
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juni 2006]
(2006)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.