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Why bank money creation?
(2022)
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.
We study money creation and destruction in today’s monetary architecture and examine the impact of monetary policy and capital regulation in a general equilibrium setting. There are two types of money created and destructed: bank deposits, when banks grant loans to firms or to other banks and central bank money, when the central bank grants loans to private banks. We show that equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of the monetary policy or capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency.
We establish a benchmark result for the relationship between the loanable funds and the money-creation approach to banking. In particular, we show that both processes yield the same allocations when there is no uncertainty and thus no bank default. In such cases, using the much simpler loanable funds approach as a shortcut does not imply any loss of generality.
We review arguments for and against reserve requirements and conclude that the main question is whether a distinction between money creation and intermediation can be made. We argue that such a distinction can be made in a money-in-advance economy and show that if the money-in-advance constraint is universally binding then reserve requirements on checkable accounts have no effect on intermediation. We then proceed to show that in a model in which trade is uncertain and sequential, a fractional reserve banking system gives rise to endogenous monetary shocks. These endogenous monetary shocks lead to fluctuations in capacity utilisation and waste. When the moneyin-advance constraint is universally binding, a 100% reserve requirement on checkable accounts can eliminate this waste.