Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (5)
Language
- English (5)
Has Fulltext
- yes (5)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (5) (remove)
Keywords
- credit risk (5) (remove)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (5) (remove)
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of changes in banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects during and after the crisis. First, public, bailed out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sovereign stress by purchasing domestic public debt more than other banks, with public banks’ purchases growing especially in coincidence with the largest ECB liquidity injections. Second, bank exposures significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending. This amplification of the impact on lending does not appear to arise from spurious correlation or reverse causality.
This paper analyzes the risk properties of typical asset-backed securities (ABS), like CDOs or MBS, relying on a model with both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic components. The examined properties include expected loss, loss given default, and macro factor dependencies. Using a two-dimensional loss decomposition as a new metric, the risk properties of individual ABS tranches can directly be compared to those of corporate bonds, within and across rating classes. By applying Monte Carlo Simulation, we find that the risk properties of ABS differ significantly and systematically from those of straight bonds with the same rating. In particular, loss given default, the sensitivities to macroeconomic risk, and model risk differ greatly between instruments. Our findings have implications for understanding the credit crisis and for policy making. On an economic level, our analysis suggests a new explanation for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating methodology for structured finance instruments. JEL Classification: G21, G28
We investigate whether government credit guarantee schemes, extensively used at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, led to substitution of non-guaranteed with guaranteed credit rather than fully adding to the supply of lending. We study this issue using a unique euro-area credit register data, matched with supervisory bank data, and establish two main findings. First, guaranteed loans were mostly extended to small but comparatively creditworthy firms in sectors severely affected by the pandemic, borrowing from large, liquid and well-capitalized banks. Second, guaranteed loans partially substitute pre-existing non-guaranteed debt. For firms borrowing from multiple banks, the substitution mainly arises from the lending behavior of the bank extending guaranteed loans. Substitution was highest for funding granted to riskier and smaller firms in sectors more affected by the pandemic, and borrowing from larger and stronger banks. Overall, the evidence indicates that government guarantees contributed to the continued extension of credit to relatively creditworthy firms hit by the pandemic, but also benefited banks’ balance sheets to some extent.
Low risk anomalies?
(2016)
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that beta- and volatility-based low risk anomalies are driven by return skewness. The empirical patterns concisely match the predictions of our model which generates skewness of stock returns via default risk. With increasing downside risk, the standard capital asset pricing model increasingly overestimates required equity returns relative to firms' true (skew-adjusted) market risk. Empirically, the profitability of betting against beta/volatility increases with firms' downside risk. Our results suggest that the returns to betting against beta/volatility do not necessarily pose asset pricing puzzles but rather that such strategies collect premia that compensate for skew risk.
The European low-carbon transition began in the last few decades and is accelerating to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. This paper examines how climate-related transition indicators of a large European corporate firm relate to its CDS-implied credit risk across various time horizons. Findings show that firms with higher GHG emissions have higher CDS spreads at all tenors, including the 30-year horizon, particularly after the 2015 Paris Agreement, and in prominent industries such as Electricity, Gas, and Mining. Results suggest that the European CDS market is currently pricing, to some extent, albeit small, the exposure to transition risk for a firm across different time horizons. However, it fails to account for a company’s efforts to manage transition risks and its exposure to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. CDS market participants seem to find challenging to risk-differentiate ETS-participating firms from other firms.