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Nicht nur die Geräuschkulisse des Brexits absorbierte ein Stück weit die Aufmerksamkeit für das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) zur Zulässigkeit des Anleihenkaufprogramms der EZB. Denn immerhin entschied Luxemburg damit über eine der nach wie vor seltenen Vorlagen aus Karlsruhe. Dazu mag auch beigetragen haben, dass seit der Stellungnahme des Generalanwalts Wathelet nicht mehr damit gerechnet wurde, dass der EuGH der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) einen sprichwörtlichen Strich durch die Rechnung machen würde. Dennoch ist das Urteil aus einigen Gründen bemerkenswert.
When Christine Lagarde announced her first, moderate rescue package, she called upon member states to provide fiscal aid. But the markets showed to have lost confidence in fiscal policy. In the absence of strong monetary policy signals, the slide continued until Lagarde in her second attempt opened the floodgates.
The recovery plan of the Commission entitled "Next Generation EU" proposes a compromise that goes beyond the ominous lowest common denominator. With a package of EUR 750bn in total, comprising EUR 250bn in loans and the rest in grants, the Commission paves the way for both forward-looking public finance and constitutional innovation. The proposals are masterpieces of high-tech legal engineering. Again, European constitutional law evolves through crisis. Yet, again, it stands to reason how far the proposed instruments will shift the European Union towards enhancing solidarity and democracy.
Warum das Stichwort Corona Bonds so viele falsche Assoziationen weckt, und wie sie beschaffen sein müssten, damit auch Deutschland damit gut klarkommt: Vor der morgigen Sitzung der Eurogruppe spricht Max Steinbeis mit MATTHIAS GOLDMANN über seinen Vorschlag und die damit verknüpften Chancen und Risiken.
Bitcoin stands like no other cryptocurrency for the profound transformation of financial markets in the digital economy. While the last few months saw the free trade in goods struggle against trends towards protectionism, cryptocurrencies seemed to tear down one border after the other – physical, geographic, and legal ones alike. A libertarian’s wet dream. Blockchain presents itself as a fortress against state intervention, for whatever purpose. Finally, a technological, market-based solution would put an end to the problem of monetary policy, payment transactions, and make whole chunks of government regulation superfluous. ...
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäubles Behauptung, Griechenland könne wegen Art. 125 AEUV nur außerhalb der Eurozone seine Schulden gegenüber anderen Euro-Staaten und EFSF bzw. ESM restrukturieren, beruht auf einem Denkfehler, wenn nicht gar auf einem Taschenspielertrick. Die Pringle-Rechtsprechung des EuGH zeigt: Das Europarecht schaufelt sich nicht sein eigenes Grab. Man muss es nicht erst umgehen, um die Ziele der Union wahrhaft zu verwirklichen.
Si bien el discurso sobre los derechos humanos se volvió fundamental para desafiar la austeridad en el período que siguió a la Gran Crisis Financiera desde una perspectiva histórica, el que los derechos humanos desempeñen este papel es más la excepción que la regla. El discurso en materia de derechos humanos en el contexto de la austeridad inducida por la deuda soberana ha variado mucho con el tiempo. Lejos de mostrar progreso, su historia revela los cambios del paradigma del derecho de los derechos humanos. Las páginas que siguen hacen foco en uno de esos cambios, ocurrido en la transición entre las décadas de los setenta y ochenta. En la década de los setenta, los Estados recientemente independizados invocaban los derechos humanos en especial para afirmar su soberanía y alejar la interferencia internacional. El paradigma estructural sobre derechos humanos desapareció abruptamente de los debates sobre austeridad en la década de los ochenta, cuando la crisis de deuda soberana golpeó al Sur Global y creó la necesidad de asistencias multilaterales para obtener liquidez. Frente a la presión de reconsiderar el impacto social de los programas de ajuste estructural que promovía, el Fondo Monetario Internacional desplazó los términos del debate y en lugar de hablar de “necesidades humanas”, un término relacionado con los derechos humanos, pasó a hablar de “capital humano”. En consecuencia, en el momento en que los derechos humanos adquirían el estatus de “última utopía”, dejaron de tener relevancia para la austeridad. Por lo tanto, que el discurso sobre los derechos humanos promueva o no los objetivos sociales dependerá del contexto y del momento histórico. El artículo culmina con una propuesta de paradigma político del derecho de los derechos humanos que refleja estas perspectivas.
Wallonien lässt die westliche Welt zappeln – und wird dafür je nach politischem Standpunkt des Betrachters als einzig aufrechtes gallisches Dorf besungen oder als eigennützige Erpresserbande geschmäht. Stutzig macht jedoch die prompte Reaktion, man hätte CETA besser doch nicht als "gemischtes Abkommen" einstufen sollen, sondern als Abkommen zwischen der EU und Kanada ohne direkte Beteiligung der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Reaktion zeugt von Demokratieverachtung.
Christine Lagarde verband die Ankündigung ihres ersten, moderaten Rettungspakets mit der Aufforderung an die Mitgliedstaaten, fiskalische Hilfen bereitzustellen. Die Märkte scheinen sich das Vertrauen in die Fiskalpolitik indessen abgewöhnt zu haben. Da starke geldpolitische Signale zunächst ausblieben, ging die Talfahrt weiter, bis Lagarde im zweiten Versuch in die Fußstapfen ihres Vorgängers trat und die Schleusen öffnete.
While the debate about the needs and merits of cryptocurrency regulation is ongoing, the unprecedented price hikes of cryptocurrencies towards the end of 2017 triggered a somewhat unexpected sort of regulation in the form of public statements by governments and financial supervisors. It kicked in rather quickly and turned out to be much more effective than imagined. These interventions can be identified as one of the main factors that drove asset prices down, thereby preventing destabilizing bubbles. The experience of the supervisory response to the cryptocurrency bubble of the past months keeps important insights for any prospective regulation of cryptocurrencies. First, public statements are a highly effective regulatory tool in the short term as they manage market expectations, a fact which is well-known as forward guidance in monetary policy. So far, the legal framework in the EU takes insufficient account of the regulatory role of public statements. Second, regulation needs to keep up with the incredible speed of fintech innovations. Some regulators addressed the challenge by adopting a ‘sandbox’ approach. However, the ‘sandbox’ approach clearly calls for international cooperation. To achieve a balance between safety and innovation, international cooperation should emulate the experimental character of sandboxes. One could conceive of a ‘sandbox for regulators’, an arrangement which would facilitate the exchange of information on regulatory initiatives among authorities but also the coordination of communication and forward guidance.
On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 – in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB’s monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ’s findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters – and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.
Le gouvernement de soi et des autres: Zu Auftrittsverboten für türkische Regierungsmitglieder
(2017)
Die hochproblematische Verfassungsreform in der Türkei führt innerhalb der EU zu ungewöhnlichen Allianzen: In seltener Einmütigkeit wird länderübergreifend von ganz rechts bis weit ins linke politische Spektrum hinein ein Auftrittsverbot für türkische Politiker gefordert. Das gefühlt häufigste Argument bemüht dabei die Souveränität: Man möchte die Kampagne der türkischen Regierung für ihre die Gewaltenteilung gefährdende Verfassungsreform nicht auch noch im eigenen Land haben. In einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft weckt solche Einmütigkeit Zweifel, die sich bei näherem Hinschauen verfestigen – und zwar in juristischer wie politischer Hinsicht.
Monetary policy and prudential supervision – from functional separation to a holistic approach?
(2018)
When prudential supervision was put in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), it was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation between monetary policy and financial supervision. However, the financial crisis showed that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other and that an overly strict separation might generate systemic risk. As a consequence, the prevalent model of “functional separation” – central banking and financial supervision in separate entities – has been questioned and calls for a more holistic approach increased.
This policy letter states that from a legal perspective, such a holistic approach would be in conformity with the current legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Although the realization of a holistic approach might intensify the doubts of democratic legitimation under the framework of the ESCB, the independence of the ECB should not be given up. As viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem that would render central bank independence moot do not seem to be available and given the great importance of the independence of the European institutions for the European integration, the democratic control over the ECB should be strengthened instead of stripping the ECB of its independence.
In a political and economic perspective, the recent ECJ judgment on the OMT program is not more than a footnote, a short sideshow in a seemingly never-ending sequel of another dimension. Legally, however, I find the case quite remarkable. Unlike its Advocate General, the ECJ did not yield to the temptation to respond in kind to the FCC’s provocations. In particular, it avoids the issue of domestic vs. European constitutional identity that juxtaposed the FCC and the Advocate General. Instead, the ECJ has shown political responsibility and legal foresight in framing what could become a masterpiece of truly cooperative, other-regarding constitutional pluralism.
It seems that the BVerfG has learned a lesson. Yesterday’s referral about the the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) sets a completely different tone. It reads like a modest and balanced plea for judicial dialogue, rather than an indictment. Fifty years after the original event, a new Summer of Love seems to thrive between the highest judicial bodies. It shows no traces of the aplomb with which Karlsruhe presented its stance to Luxembourg three years ago.
The case for corona bonds
(2020)
Corona bonds are feasible and important to preserve the European project. We set out a number of principles that might serve as a blueprint for the European institutions. Importantly, Corona bonds could be issued through a new public law entity and include all the safeguards required for the protection of the fundamental values of the EU. This proposal is pragmatic in the sense that it facilitates the choice European leaders have to make now; necessary to secure the resilience of the European Union. The political risks are significantly higher now than in 2010. The gargantuan challenge of tackling the combined impact of climate change, migration, digitalization, geopolitical shifts, and the spread of autocracy, requires leadership and joint action by the Council and the Eurogroup.
Governments, economists and intellectuals have called for common European bonds or increased own EU funds to address the recession induced by Covid19. Unfortunately, the German government, joined by the other members of the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Finland, the Netherlands), has categorically rejected to look into any such measures and favours using the ESM. This reaction created a déjà vu experience for citizens and governments of the heavily affected southern Member States of the EU. The proposal to use the ESM raises fears of another wave of austerity amounting to yet another lost decade for economic, social, and ecological development in Europe.
This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.