Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (23)
- Conference Proceeding (1)
- Report (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (25)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (25)
Keywords
- Going Public (25) (remove)
Institute
Wir verwenden eine neue, auf der Burr-Verteilung basierende Spezifikation aus der Familie der Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) Modelle zur ökonometrischen Analyse der Transaktionsintensitäten während der Börseneinführung (IPO) der Deutsche Telekom Aktie. In diesem Fallbeispiel wird die Leistungsfähigkeit des neu entwickelten Burr-ACD-Modells mit den Standardmodellen von Engle und Russell verglichen, die im Burr-ACD Modell als Spezialfälle enthalten sind. Wir diskutieren außerdem alternative Möglichkeiten, Intra- Tagessaisonalitäten der Handelsintensität in ACD Modellen zu berücksichtigen.
Who knows what when? : The information content of pre-IPO market prices : [Version March/June 2002]
(2002)
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 160 non venture-backed, 79 venture-backed and 61 bridge financed companies going public at Germany´s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This study provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VCbacked IPOs.
We analyze the venture capitalist´s decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist´s participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project and / or on the experience of the venture capitalist. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the true value of the firm. An earlier version of this paper appeared as: The Decision of Venture Capitalists on Timing and Extent of IPOs (ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-12). This version July 2003.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature. Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option- like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
EFM Classification: 230, 410
Ja, der Ablauf der Lock-up-Frist ist ein kursrelevantes Ereignis. Wir untersuchen Kursreaktionen auf das Ende der Lock-up-Frist bei 142 Unternehmen des Neuen Marktes. Da der Ablauf der Sperrfrist bereits zum Zeitpunkt des Börsengangs bekannt ist, erwarten wir bei einem (semi-)informationseffizienten Kapitalmarkt durchschnittlich keine Kursreaktion. Im Rahmen einer Ereignisstudie zeigen wir aber, dass sich am Ende der Sperrfrist signifikant negative Überrenditen ergeben. Durch eine differenzierte Analyse stellen wir fest, dass firmenspezifische Faktoren (Volatilität, Performance, Free Float) die Kursreaktionen am Ende der Lock-up-Periode beeinflussen. Die Befunde unserer Untersuchung belegen die Notwendigkeit klarer Regeln für mehr Transparenz nach dem Börsengang. Bedeutsam sind die vorliegenden Ergebnisse vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Diskussion um eine Erweiterung der insiderrechtlichen Meldepflichen im Rahmen des 4. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes. This paper explores the materiality of expirations of lock-up provisions that prevent insiders from selling their shares after the initial public offering (IPO). We examine 172 lock-up agreements of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s New Market. Since the date of the lock-up expiration is common knowledge at the IPO, we would not expect to find abnormal returns surrounding the event day, assuming that markets are informationally efficient. However, using an event-study methodology we detect statistically significant negative abnormal returns and a twenty-five percent increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. The negative abnormal returns are larger for firms with high volatility, superior performance after the IPO, and low free float. The results of our study raise important regulatory issues with respect to disclosure rules of firms going public. We argue that insiders should be legally required to disclose their sell transactions in order to protect new and less informed shareholders.
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany´s Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign venture capital firms. The discrepancy in the investment and divestment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon, the value-added hypothesis and certification issues. German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than their counterparts from abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral structure of their portfolios differs from that of foreign venture capital firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take companies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually finance firms in a later stage, carry through fewer investment rounds and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In companies where a German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held by the group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at the IPO is higher and the committed lock-up period is longer.
This paper analyses the effects of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market on real investment decisions in emerging industries. We first propose a model of IPO timing based on divergence of opinion among investors and short-sale constraints. Using a real option approach, we show that firms are more likely to go public when the ratio of overvaluation over profits is high, that is after stock market run-ups. Because initial returns increase with the demand from optimistic investors at the time of the offer, the model provides an explanation for the observed positive causality between average initial returns and IPO volume. Second, we discuss the possibility of real overinvestment in high-tech industries. We claim that investing in the industry gives agents an option to sell the project on the stock market at an overvalued price enabling then the financing of positive NPV projects which would not be undertaken otherwise. It is shown that the IPO market can however also lead to overinvestment in new industries. Finally, we present some econometric results supporting the idea that funds committed to the financing of high-tech industries may respond positively to optimistic stock market valuations.
We present a survey on the role of initial public offerings (Epos) and venture capital (VC) in Germany after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1983 IPOs hardly played a role at all and only a minor role thereafter. In addition, companies that chose an IPO were much older and larger than the average companies going public for the first time in the US or the UK. The level of IPO underpricing in Germany, in contrast, has not been fundamentally different from that in other countries. The picture for venture capital financing is not much different from that provided by IPOs in Germany. For a long time venture capital financing was hardly significant, particularly as a source of early stage financing. The unprecedented boom on the Neuer Markt between 1997 and 2000, when many small venture capital financed firms entered the market, provides a striking contrast to the preceding era. However, by US standards, the levels of both IPO and venture capital activities remained rather low even in this boom phase. The extent to which recent developments will have a lasting impact on the financing of German firms, the level of IPO activity, and venture capital financing, remains to be seen. At the time of writing, activity has come to a near stand still and the Neuer Markt has just been dissolved. The low number of IPOs and the fairly low volume of VC financing in Germany before the introduction of the Neuer Markt are a striking and much debated phenomenon. Understanding the reasons for these apparent peculiarities is vital to understanding the German financial system. The potential explanations that have been put forward range from differentces in mentality to legal and institutional impediments and the availability of alternative sources of financing. Moreover the recent literature discusses how interest groups may have benefited and influenced the situation. These groups include politicians, unions/workers, managers/controlling-owners of established firms as well as banks. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
This paper provides empirical evidence on initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the pricing and long-run performance of IPOs using a unique data set collected on the German capital market before World War I. Our findings indicate that underpricing of IPOs has existed, but has significantly decreased over time in our sample. Employing a mixture of distributions approach we also find evidence of price stabilization of IPOs. Concerning long-run performance, investors who bought their shares in the early after-market and held them for more than three years experienced significantly lower returns than the respective industry as a whole. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ABN-AMRO Conference on IPOs in Amsterdam, the Annual Meetings of the European Finance Association, the Annual Meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik, the IX Tor Vergata International Conference on Banking and Finance in Rome, and at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt.
We analyze the desinvestment decision of venture capitalists in the course of an IPO of their portfolio firms. The capital market learns of the project quality only in the period following the IPO. Venture capitalists with high-quality firms face a trade-off between immediately selling their stake in the venture at a price below the true value and having to wait until the true value is revealed. We show that the dilemma may be resolved via a reputation-acquiring mechanism in a repeated game set-up. Thereby, we can explain, e.g., the advent of "hot-issue market behavior" involving early disinvestments and a high degree of price uncertainty. Furthermore, we provide a new rationale for underpricing. Young venture capitalists may use underpricing as a device for credibly committing themselves to acquiring reputation.
In den vergangenen Jahren haben sich die Kapitalmärkte und das Anlegerinteresse an der Aktie in Deutschland stark verändert. Die Suche nach einer notwendigen und rentablen Ergänzung traditioneller Altersvorsorgeformen hat dazu ebenso beigetragen wie die Privatisierung von im Staatsbesitz gehaltenen Unternehmen. Aber auch der Börsengang einer Vielzahl junger Unternehmen sorgt in bisher nicht gekanntem Ausmaß für zusätzliches Interesse der „Erbengeneration“, der die Beteiligung kostengünstig über Online-Broker ermöglicht wird. Eine hervorragende Bedeutung kommt in diesem Zusammenhang dem Neuen Markt der Deutschen Börse zu, der sich seit seiner Einrichtung 1997 hinsichtlich der Zahl der Neuemissionen, der Marktkapitalisierung und der Börsenumsätze auch im internationalen Vergleich außergewöhnlich erfolgreich entwickelt hat. Der gegenwärtige Konjunkturabschwung, der von einem starken Rückgang der Kurse an den Börsen und darunter auch vor allem am Neuen Markt begleitet wurde, gibt Gelegenheit, über allfällige Verbesserungen des regulatorischen Umfelds nachzudenken, die helfen sollen, die Effizienz des organisierten Kapitalmarkts weiter zu steigern und das Vertrauen der Anleger in das ordnungsgemäße Funktionieren des Markts zu festigen. Die Deutsche Börse hat mit Verbesserungen des Regelwerks Neuer Markt bereits wichtige Schritte in diese Richtung unternommen.
Bundesligavereine und Börse
(1997)
Die Bundesliga lebe "heute noch im Zeitalter der Postkutsche". Diese Zustandsbeschreibung entstammt dem Munde des Präsidenten eines bedeutenden deutschen Fußballvereins, und sie bezieht sich auf die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen des Berufsfußballs in Deutschland. Die Klubs der beiden deutschen Lizenzligen sind ausnahmslos als eingetragene Vereine (§ 21 BGB) organisiert. Längst hat sich die Erkenntnis durchgesetzt, daß diese Rechtsform nicht mehr das passende Organisationskleid für Klubs mit Millionenumsätzen darstellt. Spielergehälter, Sponsoren- und Werbeeinnahmen, Erlöse aus Fernsehübertragungen und dem Verkauf von Eintrittskarten sowie Fanartikeln (sog. Merchandising) steigen stetig an. Die hierdurch gekennzeichnete Expansion des Marktes für das "Produkt Fußball" stellt die Vereine ebenso wie der zunehmende, durch das Bosman-Urteil des EuGH begünstigte Wettbewerbsdruck im europäischen Berufsfußball vor neue Herausforderungen. Neue Finanzierungsquellen sind gefragt. Doch hat die Aktiengesellschaft, obgleich seit langem als Alternative zum Verein diskutiert, in Deutschland bisher nicht Einzug in den bezahlten Fußball gehalten. Das soll sich in naher Zukunft ändern. Der amtierende Champions-League-Sieger Borussia Dortmund ließ Anfang Juli 1997 verlauten, der Mitgliederversammlung solle im Oktober oder November des Jahres eine Satzungsänderung vorgeschlagen werden, welche die Umwandlung des wirtschaftlichen Geschäftsbetriebs (Profiabteilung und Abteilung Merchandising) in eine Aktiengesellschaft zum Ziel hat. Zunächst soll die neuzugründende Gesellschaft eine 100%ige Tochter des Vereins bleiben, der als solcher nur noch die Sportbereiche Jugend, Amateure, Tischtennis und Handball umfaßt. In Absprache mit dem Deutschen Fußball-Bund (DFB) sollen sodann Möglichkeiten für einen späteren Börsengang erarbeitet werden. Über einen solchen Schritt denkt inzwischen auch der FC Bayern München e.V. nach. Der Manager des Vereins erwartet die ersten Aktiengesellschaften für den Juli 1999 und schätzt den Börsenwert seines Klubs auf 500 Millionen DM.
Es gibt Überlegungen, Kreditinstituten den Besitz der Anteilsmehrheit an Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGs) zu untersagen. Dahinter steht die Vorstellung, daß solche Beteiligungen Gestaltungsspielräume eröffnen, die mißbräuchlich genutzt werden. Die Neuemission von Aktien ist einer der Fälle, die in diesem Zusammenhang erörtert werden. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu prüfen, ob die zum Konzernverbund einer konsortialführenden Bank gehörenden KAGs bei Erstemissionen anders behandelt werden als andere KAGs.
Untersucht werden 46 Neuemissionen der Jahre 1994 bis 1997. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, daß die KAGs in ihren Anlageentscheidungen unabhängig sind, und daß keine mißbräuchliche Nutzung eventuell vorhandener Informationsvorsprünge vorliegt.
Es gibt Überlegungen, Kreditinstituten den Besitz der Anteilsmehrheit an Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGs) zu untersagen. Dahinter steht die Vorstellung, daß solche Beteiligungen Gestaltungsspielräume eröffnen, die mißbräuchlich genutzt werden. Die Neuemission von Aktien ist einer der Fälle, die in diesem Zusammenhang erörtert werden. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu prüfen, ob die zum Konzernverbund einer konsortialführenden Bank gehörenden KAGs bei Erstemissionen anders behandelt werden als andere KAGs. Untersucht werden 46 Neuemissionen der Jahre 1994 bis 1997. Daten über von den Fonds erworbene Aktien wurden den Rechenschafts- und Halbjahresberichten entnommen. Im Durchschnitt erwerben die untersuchten Fonds etwa 7% der emittierten Aktien. Ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Höhe des Anteilserwerbs und der nachfolgend realisierten Rendite kann nicht nachgewiesen werden. Die der jeweils konsortialführenden Bank zuzuordnenden Fonds erwerben mehr Anteile an einer Neuemission, wenn die ihnen zugeordnete Bank bei der Emission als Konsortialführerin auftritt. Eine Vorhersagbarkeit in dem Sinne, daß der Anteilserwerb in Beziehung zu der nachfolgend realisierten Rendite stünde, kann nicht festgestellt werden. Zudem ergeben sich keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß KAGs bei schlechtem Renditeverlauf der Neuemissionen Kurspflegeaufgaben übernehmen. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, daß die KAGs in ihren Anlageentscheidungen unabhängig sind, und daß keine mißbräuchliche Nutzung eventuell vorhandener Informationsvorsprünge vorliegt. Allerdings ist die Datenbasis, bedingt durch die Vorschriften über die Rechnungslegung der Fonds, unbefriedigend. Es wäre daher zu überlegen, den Fonds stringentere Berichtspflichten aufzuerlegen.
The objective of this study is to determine whether specific industries across countries or within countries are more likely to reach a stage of profitability and make a successful exit. In particular, we assess whether firms in certain industries are more prone to exit via IPO, be acquired, or exit through a leveraged buy-out. We are also interested in analyzing whether substantial differences across industries and countries arise when looking separately at the success’ rate of firms which have received venture funding at the early seed and start-up stages, vis-à-vis firms that received funding at later stages. Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can be explained by country-specific factors, there are also important idiosyncratic differences across industries: In particular, firms in the biotech and the medical / health / life science sectors tend to be significantly more likely to have a successful exit via IPO, while firms in the computer industry and communications and media are more prone to exit via merger or acquisition. Key differences across industries also emerge when considering infant versus mature firms, and their preferred exit. JEL Classification: G24, G3 Keywords:
This paper aims to analyze the impact of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after the IPO. We thereby investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives and track record of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis by using a data set embracing all IPOs which occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after the IPO compared to all other IPOs and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. Obviously, independent VCs, which concentrated mainly on growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) and large firms (high market value), were able to add value by leading to less post-IPO idiosyncratic risk and more return (after controlling for all other effects). On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs (being small and having a high book-to-market ratio) showed relative underperformance. Klassifikation: G10, G14, G24 . 29th January 2004 .
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
Im folgenden sollen Alternativen des Delisting, der Beendigung der Notierung eines zum Börsenhandel zugelassenen Unternehmens, erörtert werden. Dieses Thema hat mit der Berücksichtigung im Dritten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz (III. FMFG) erneut an Aktualität gewonnen. Einleitend wird ein Überblick über das Delisting im engeren Sinne (d. h. ohne vorangehende Umwandlung), also den Börsenrückzug nur auf Antrag der Gesellschaft ohne Änderung der Rechtsform des betreffenden Unternehmens, gegeben. Dabei wird sich der Beitrag darauf beschränken, den Totalrückzug (sog. going private ) zu untersuchen. Das Interesse an einem going private kann vielfältiger Natur sein. In Betracht kommt beispielsweise ein vollständiger Börsenrückzug, um den börsenrechtlichen Publizitätspflichten zu entkommen und somit durch die abnehmende Transparenz aus den Negativschlagzeilen zu gelangen, um Kosten zu senken, um einer Aufkaufgefahr entgegenzutreten oder sogar um ein freezeout von Kleinaktionären vorzubereiten. Allerdings sind neben den börsenrechtlichen Voraussetzungen insbesondere die gesellschaftsrechtlichen Anforderungen unklar und erschweren daher einen praktikablen Totalrückzug. In der Beratungspraxis kann jedenfalls nicht mit Sicherheit vorhergesagt werden, welche gesellschaftsrechtlichen und börsenrechtlichen Bedingungen erfüllt sein müssen, damit ein reguläres going private vonstatten gehen kann. Dies zeigt sich besonders deutlich, wenn man sich die unterschiedlichen Lösungsvorschläge zur Beteiligung der Hauptversammlung vergegenwärtigt, wobei insbesondere im Hinblick auf die erforderliche Mehrheit die unterschiedlichsten Ansichten vertreten werden [dazu unten I 1) b)] und zudem eine klärende Rechtsprechung fehlt. Deshalb wird eine rechtssichere Alternative zum regulären going private vorgestellt, die es einer rückzugsgeneigten Gesellschaft ermöglicht, in praktikabler Weise ein vollständiges Delisting zu erreichen. Der Hauptteil des vorliegenden Beitrages ist daher dem going private über das UmwG gewidmet, nämlich der Darstellung der Börsenrückzugsmöglichkeit durch Verschmelzung oder Formwechsel einerseits ( kaltes Delisting ) und der Erörterung der auf diesem Weg des Delisting auftretenden Umgehungsprobleme andererseits [dazu unten II].