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This paper investigates risk-taking in the liquid portfolios held by a large panel of Swedish twins. We document that the portfolio share invested in risky assets is an increasing and concave function of financial wealth, leading to different risk sensitivities across investors. Human capital, which we estimate directly from individual labor income, also drives risk-taking positively, while internal habit and expenditure commitments tend to reduce it. Our micro findings lend strong support to decreasing relative risk aversion and habit formation preferences. Furthermore, heterogeneous risk sensitivities across investors help reconcile individual preferences with representative-agent models.
We examine trust and trustworthiness of individuals with varying professional preferences and experiences. Our subjects study business and economics in Frankfurt, the financial center of Germany and continental Europe. In the trust game, subjects with a high interest in working in the financial industry return 25 percent less than subjects with a low interest. We find no evidence that the extent of professional experience in the financial industry has a negative impact on trustworthiness. We also do not find any evidence that the financial industry screens out less trustworthy individuals in the hiring process. In a prediction game that is strategically equivalent to the trust game, the amount sent by first-movers was significantly smaller when the second-mover indicated a high interest in working in finance. These results suggest that the financial industry attracts less trustworthy individuals, which may contribute to the current lack of trust in its employees.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the ECB has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross-country dataset which includes a rich set of socio-economic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust-building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long-run.
The efficacy of monetary authority actions depends primarily on the ability of the monetary authority to affect inflation expectations, which ultimately depend on agents' trust. We propose a model embedding trust cycles, as emerging from sequential coordination games between atomistic agents and the policy maker, in a monetary model. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factor, namely the price of future risk, and their expectation formation process: these effects in turn interact with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer survey we analyze the link between trust on the one side and the transmission mechanism of shocks and of the policy rate on the other: data show that the two interact significantly and in a way comparable to the obtained in our model.
We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term "trust". We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.
The paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to years with higher growth. Overall, our analysis of a panel of European countries provides support for this expectation. The difference in fiscal policies depending on government trust levels may help explaining why better governed countries have been found to have less severe business cycles. It suggests that trust and credibility play an important role not only in monetary policy, but also in fiscal policy.
Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumers' characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In the second-best efficient Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence framework, we allow for consumers to reveal their risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as utilitarian social welfare. Our analysis shows that the choice of information disclosure with respect to revelation of their risk type can substitute deductibles for consumers whose transparency aversion is sufficiently low. This can lead to a Pareto improvement of social welfare and a Pareto efficient market allocation. However, if all consumers are offered cross-subsidizing contracts, the introduction of a transparency contract decreases or even eliminates cross-subsidies. Given the prior existence of a WMS equilibrium, utility is shifted from individuals who do not reveal their private information to those who choose to reveal. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for the discussion on consumer protection in the context of digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the negative externalities that digitalization has on consumers who are not willing to take part in this development.
Climate change has become one of the most prominent concerns globally. In this paper, the authors study the transition risk of greenhouse gas emission reduction in structural environmental-macroeconomic DSGE models. First, they analyze the uncertainty in model prediction on the effect of unanticipated and pre-announced carbon price increases. Second, they conduct optimal model-robust policy in different settings. They find that reducing emissions by 40% causes 0.7% to 4% output loss with 2% on average. Pre-announcement of carbon prices affects the inflation dynamics significantly. The central bank should react slightly less to inflation and output growth during the transition risk. With optimal carbon price designs, it should react even less to inflation, and more to output growth.
On November 8, 2013, several members of the British House of Lords’ Subcommittee A conducted a hearing at the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany, on “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and its Implications for the UK”. Professors Otmar Issing and Jan Pieter Krahnen were called as expert witnesses.
The testimony began with a general discussion on the elements considered necessary for a functioning internal market. Do economic union and monetary union require a fiscal union or even a political union, beyond the elements of the banking union currently being prepared? In this context, also the critique of the German current account surplus and the international expectations that Germany stimulate internal demand to support growth in crisis countries, were discussed.
With regard to the monetary union, the members of the subcommittee asked for an assessment of how European nations and the banking industry would have fared in the banking crisis that followed the Lehman collapse, had there not been a common currency. Given the important role that the ECB has played in the course of the crisis management, the members further asked for an evaluation of the OMT-program of the ECB and also if the monetary union is in need of common debt instruments, in order to provide the ECB with the possibility of buying EU liabilities, comparable to the Fed buying US Treasury bonds. Finally, the dual role of the ECB for monetary policy and banking supervision was an issue touched on by several questions.
Using a unique data set on trade credit defaults among French firms, we investigate whether and how trade credit is used to relax financial constraints. We show that firms that face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are more likely to default on trade credit, especially when the shocks are unexpected, firms have little liquidity, are likely to be credit constrained or are close to their debt capacity. We estimate that credit constrained firms pass more than one fourth of the liquidity shocks they face on to their suppliers down the trade credit chain. The evidence is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate the consequences of credit constraints. In addition, we show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches firms that are large, liquid, and have access to financial markets. This suggests that liquidity is allocated from large firms with access to outside finance to small, credit constrained firms through trade credit chains.
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
There is a large, but yet growing debate about the need to complement the European monetary union with a stronger fiscal union. This paper reviews the potential trade-offs between effectiveness, moral hazard problems, and permanent redistribution. In particular, we contribute to the question of how member states may be willing to enter into a stronger fiscal union if the evolution of this union may imply large redistribution under incomplete contracting. We discuss clawback mechanisms that have been suggested in the literature, but conclude that clawbacks are undesirable, as they would essentially destroy the insurance value of a fiscal union. Instead, we propose that a clearly defined exit option as a guarantee against involuntary redistribution can make entry into a stronger fiscal union less risky and hence more attractive for member states.
Armstrong et al. (2022) review the empirical methods used in the accounting literature to draw causal inferences. They document a growing number of studies using quasi-experimental methods and provide a critical perspective on this trend as well as the use of these methods in the accounting literature. In this discussion, I complement their review by broadening the perspective. I argue for a design-based approach to accounting research that shifts attention from methods to the entire research design. I also discuss why studies that aim to draw causal inferences are important, how these studies fit into the scientific process, and why assessing the strength of the research design is important when evaluating studies and aggregating research findings.
A premise of the capabilities perspective in strategy is that firm-specific capabilities allow some firms to be unusually adept at exploiting growth opportunities. Since few firms have the capacity to internally generate the quantity or variety of strategic resources needed to exploit growth opportunities, the ability to externally acquire complementary resources is critical to the acquisition of competitive advantage. However, the external sourcing of resources exposes the firm’s strategic resources to risks of expropriation. We argue this threat gives capable firms incentive to use internally generated strategic resources to pursue growth opportunities before turning to external sources. A pecking order theory of strategic resource deployment is implied. Data from a 22-year sample of cross-border investment partnership decisions made by U.S.-based venture capital firms lend support to our theory.
The banking system is highly interconnected and these connections can be conveniently represented as an interbank network. This survey presents a systematic overview of the recent advances in the theoretical literature on interbank networks. We assess our current understanding of the structure of interbank networks, of how network characteristics affect contagion in the banking system and of how banks form connections when faced with the possibility of contagion and systemic risk. In particular, we highlight how the theoretical literature on interbank networks offers a coherent way of studying interconnections, contagion processes and systemic risk, while emphasizing at the same time the challenges that must be addressed before general results on the link between the structure of the interbank network and financial stability can be established. The survey concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of interbank network models with a special focus on macroprudential policies and monetary policy.
This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory PSI. From this analysis the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived. These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis, the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived.
These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process, which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Moreover, the idea that nearly all positions on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet should be subjected to bail-in is misguided. Instead, a concentration of PSI in instruments that fall under the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is preferable.
Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
We use a unique data set from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to study liquidity effects in the US structured product market. Our main contribution is the analysis of the relation between the accuracy in measuring liquidity and the potential degree of disclosure. Having access to all relevant trading information, we provide evidence that transaction cost measures that use dealer specific information such as trader identity and trade direction can be efficiently proxied by measures that use less detailed information. This finding is important for all market participants in the context of OTC markets, as it fosters our understanding of the information contained in transaction data. Thus, our results provide guidance for improving transparency while maintaining trader confidentiality. In addition, we analyze liquidity in the structured product market in general and show that securities that are mainly institutionally traded, guaranteed by a federal authority, or have low credit risk, tend to be more liquid.
Analysing causality among oil prices and, in general, among financial and economic variables is of central relevance in applied economics studies. The recent contribution of Lu et al. (2014) proposes a novel test for causality— the DCC-MGARCH Hong test. We show that the critical values of the test statistic must be evaluated through simulations, thereby challenging the evidence in papers adopting the DCC-MGARCH Hong test. We also note that rolling Hong tests represent a more viable solution in the presence of short-lived causality periods.
Discussions about the banking union have restarted. Its success so far is limited: national banking sectors are still overwhelmingly exposed to their own countries’ economies, cross border banking has not increased and capital and liquidity remain locked within national boundaries. The policy letter highlights that the current debate, centered on sovereign exposures and deposit insurance, misses critical underlying problems in the supervision and resolution frameworks. The ECB supervisors’ efforts to facilitate cross-border banking have been hampered by national ringfencing. The resolution framework is not up to its task: limited powers of the SRB, prohibitive access conditions and limited size of the Single Resolution Fund limit its effectiveness. A lack of a coherent European framework for insolvency unlevels the regulatory field and creates incentives to bypass European rules. The new Commission and European Parliament, with the new ECB leadership, provide a unique opportunity to address these shortcomings and make the banking union work.
We study whether and how time preferences change over the life cycle, exploiting representative long-term panel data. We estimate the age patterns of discount rates from age 25 to 80. In order to identify age effects, we have to disentangle them from cohort and period factors. We address this identification problem by estimating individual fixed effects models, where we substitute period effects with determinants of time preferences that depend on calendar years. We find that discount rates decrease with age and the decline is remarkably linear over the life cycle.
Households regularly fail to make optimal financial decisions. But what are the underlying reasons for this? Using two conceptually distinct measures of time inconsistency based on bank account transaction data and behavioral measurement experiments, we show that the excessive use of bank account overdrafts is linked to time inconsistency. By contrast, there is no correlation between a survey-based measure of financial literacy and overdraft usage. Our results indicate that consumer education and information may not suffice to overcome mistakes in households’ financial decision-making. Rather, behaviorally motivated interventions targeting specific biases in decision-making should also be considered as effective policy tools.
In light of the failed negotiations with Greece, Jan Krahnen argues that an effective reform agenda for Greece can only be designed by the elected government. Fundamental reforms will take time to take full effect and euro area member states will, in the meantime, have to offer Greece a basic level of economic security.
Krahnen demands that policy makers and the professional public involved view the Greek crisis as an opportunity to take the next necessary steps to formulate a reform agenda for the European Monetary Union. A community of supranational and non-party researchers and intellectuals could take the initiative and in a structured process develop a trustworthy and realistic concept that drafts the next big step towards a political union of Europe, including elements of a fiscal union.
Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects perceive the same game. Moreover, game perceptions depend not only on the game itself but also on the order of games (i.e., the broader experimental context in which the game is embedded) and the subject herself. This highlights that the control of experiments does not necessarily extend to game perceptions. The paper also demonstrates that perceptions are correlated with game behavior and moderate the relationship between game behavior and field behavior, thereby underscoring the importance and relevance of game perceptions for economic research.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
We investigate the effect of overreaction in the fine art market. Using a unique sample of auction prices of modern prints, we define an overvalued (undervalued) print as a print that was bought for a price above (below) its high (low) auction pricing estimate. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, we predict that overvalued (undervalued) prints generate a negative (positive) excess return at a subsequent sale. Our empirical findings confirm our expectations. We report that prints that were bought for a price 10 percent above (below) its high (low) pricing estimate generate a positive (negative) excess return of 12 percent (17 percent) after controlling for the general price movement on the prints market. The price correction for overvalued (undervalued) prints is more pronounced during recessions (expansions).
Public employee pension systems throughout the developed world have traditionally been of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) variety, where pensioner payments are financed by taxes (contributions) levied on the working generation. But as the number of retirees rises relative to the working-age group, such systems have begun to face financial distress. This trend has been exacerbated in many countries, among them Germany, by high unemployment rates producing further deterioration of the contribution base. In the long run, public sector pension benefits will have to be cut or contributions increased, if the systems are to be maintained. An alternative path sometimes offered to ease the crunch of paying for public employee pensions is to move toward funding: here, plan assets are gradually built up, invested, and enhanced returns devoted to partly defray civil servants’ pension costs. In this study, we evaluate the impact of introducing partial prefunding, paired with a strategic investment policy for the German federal state of Hesse. The analysis assesses the impact of introducing a supplementary tax-sponsored pension fund whose contributions are invested in the capital market and used to relieve the state budget from (some) pension payments. Our model determines the expectation and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of economic pension costs using a stochastic simulation process for pension plan assets. This approach simultaneously determines the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation that controls the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the same time controlling investment risk. Specifically, we offer answers to the following questions: 1. How can the plan be designed to control cash-flow shortfall risk, so as to mitigate the potential burden borne by future generations of taxpayers? 2. What is the optimal asset allocation for this fund as it is built up, to generate a maximum return while simultaneously restricting capital market and liability risk? 3. What are reasonable combinations of annual contribution rates and asset allocation to a state-managed pension fund, which will limit costs of providing promised public sector pensions? We anticipate that this research will interest several sorts of policymaker groups. First, focusing on the German case, the state and Federal governments should find it relevant, as these entities face considerable public sector pension liabilities. Second, our findings will also be of interest to other European countries, as most have substantial underfunded defined benefit plans for civil servants. In what follows, we first offer a brief description of the structure of civil servant pensions in Germany, focusing on their benefit formulas, their financing, and the resulting current as well as future plan obligations for taxpayers. Next, we turn to an analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ pension plan and evaluate how much would have to be contributed to fund this plan in a nonstochastic context. Subsequently we evaluate the asset-liability and decision-making process from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine sensible plan asset allocation behavior. A final section summarizes findings and implications.
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms that become more central in the network as a result of the shock experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. We find that information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. We also find that firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, as this reinforces information complementarities, or when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, as well as when they suffer from low profitability and low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher compensation for board directors.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
We use data from a German online brokerage and a survey to show that retail investors sharply reduce risk-taking in response to nearby firm bankruptcies, which are not pre- dictive of returns. The effects on trading are spatially highly concentrated, immediate and not persistent. They seem to operate through more pessimistic expected returns and increased risk aversion and do not reflect wealth effects or changes in background risks. Investors learn about bankruptcies through immediate coverage in local newspapers. Our findings suggest that non-informative local experiences that make downside risks of stock investment more salient contribute to idiosyncratic short-term fluctuations in trading.
After the Global Financial Crisis a controversial rush to fiscal austerity followed in many countries. Yet research on the effects of austerity on macroeconomic aggregates was and still is unsettled, mired by the difficulty of identifying multipliers from observational data. This paper reconciles seemingly disparate estimates of multipliers within a unified and state-contingent framework. We achieve identification of causal effects with new propensity-score based methods for time series data. Using this novel approach, we show that austerity is always a drag on growth, and especially so in depressed economies: a one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into 4 percent lower real GDP after five years when implemented in the slump rather than the boom. We illustrate our findings with a counterfactual evaluation of the impact of the U.K. government’s shift to austerity policies in 2010 on subsequent growth.
The theoretical derivation of credit market segmentation as the result of a free market process
(2003)
Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whether specific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads to implicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks "refuse" to increase their interest rates beyond this ceiling as this would lower their net returns. Although the maximum interest rate increases as the size of enterprises decreases, such ceilings nonetheless constrain the banks’ ability to set interest rates at a level that would enable them to cover costs. If transaction costs are high, the total costs associated with granting small and medium-sized loans will exceed the maximum average return which the banks can earn by issuing such loans. For this reason, banks do not lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, and, as a consequence, these businesses have no access to formal sector loans. Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for them to rely on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until they reach a certain size. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not make economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they face a growth constraint imposed by the credit market. Medium-sized enterprises earn a lower RoI than small ones, which is why borrowing in the informal credit market is not a worthwhile option for them. Moreover, they do not have access to credit from formal financial institutions, and are thus excluded from obtaining any kind of financing in either of the two credit markets. As the result of free, unregulated market forces we get a stable equilibrium in which the credit market is segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal (large loan) segment and, in between, a "non-market" (medium loan) segment.
Using experimental data from a comprehensive field study, we explore the causal effects of algorithmic discrimination on economic efficiency and social welfare. We harness economic, game-theoretic, and state-of-the-art machine learning concepts allowing us to overcome the central challenge of missing counterfactuals, which generally impedes assessing economic downstream consequences of algorithmic discrimination. This way, we are able to precisely quantify downstream efficiency and welfare ramifications, which provides us a unique opportunity to assess whether the introduction of an AI system is actually desirable. Our results highlight that AI systems’ capabilities in enhancing welfare critically depends on the degree of inherent algorithmic biases. While an unbiased system in our setting outperforms humans and creates substantial welfare gains, the positive impact steadily decreases and ultimately reverses the more biased an AI system becomes. We show that this relation is particularly concerning in selective-labels environments, i.e., settings where outcomes are only observed if decision-makers take a particular action so that the data is selectively labeled, because commonly used technical performance metrics like the precision measure are prone to be deceptive. Finally, our results depict that continued learning, by creating feedback loops, can remedy algorithmic discrimination and associated negative effects over time.
This study looks at the interrelationship between fiscal policy and safe assets as there is surprisingly little analysis about this beyond fleeting references. The study argues that from a certain point more public debt will not “buy” more safety: countries face a kind of “safe-assets Laffer curve” with a maximum amount of safe assets at some level of indebtedness. The position and “stability” of this curve depend on a number of national and international factors, including the international risk appetite and, as a more recent factor, QE policies by central banks. The study also finds evidence of declining safe assets as reflected in government debt ratings.
We investigate the characteristics of infrastructure as an asset class from an investment perspective of a limited partner. While non U.S. institutional investors gain exposure to infrastructure assets through a mix of direct investments and private fund vehicles, U.S. investors predominantly invest in infrastructure through private funds. We find that the stream of cash flows delivered by private infrastructure funds to institutional investors is very similar to that delivered by other types of private equity, as reflected by the frequency and amounts of net cash flows. U.S. public pension funds perform worse than other institutional investors in their infrastructure fund investments, although they are exposed to underlying deals with very similar project stage, concession terms, ownership structure, industry, and geographical location. By selecting funds that invest in projects with poor financial performance, U.S. public pension funds have created an implicit subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class, which we estimate within the range of $730 million to $3.16 billion per year depending on the benchmark.
We analyze global data about electricity generation and document that the risk exposure of a firm’s owners and its workers depends on competitors’ ability or willingness to change their output in response to productivity shocks. Competitor inflexibility appears to be a risk factor: the sales of firms with more inflexible competitors respond more strongly to aggregate sales shocks. As a consequence, competitor inflexibility also affects the stability of firms’ total wage- and dividend-payments. Firms with relatively flexible competitors appear to smoothen both wages and dividends, but an increase in competitor inflexibility is associated with less dividend-smoothing and more wage-smoothing. Our evidence supports the idea that labor productivity risk associated with competitor inflexibility should be borne by firms’ shareholders, rather than by their workers.
With free delivery of products virtually being a standard in E-commerce, product returns pose a major challenge for online retailers and society. For retailers, product returns involve significant transportation, labor, disposal, and administrative costs. From a societal perspective, product returns contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and packaging disposal and are often a waste of natural resources. Therefore, reducing product returns has become a key challenge. This paper develops and validates a novel smart green nudging approach to tackle the problem of product returns during customers’ online shopping processes. We combine a green nudge with a novel data enrichment strategy and a modern causal machine learning method. We first run a large-scale randomized field experiment in the online shop of a German fashion retailer to test the efficacy of a novel green nudge. Subsequently, we fuse the data from about 50,000 customers with publicly-available aggregate data to create what we call enriched digital footprints and train a causal machine learning system capable of optimizing the administration of the green nudge. We report two main findings: First, our field study shows that the large-scale deployment of a simple, low-cost green nudge can significantly reduce product returns while increasing retailer profits. Second, we show how a causal machine learning system trained on the enriched digital footprint can amplify the effectiveness of the green nudge by “smartly” administering it only to certain types of customers. Overall, this paper demonstrates how combining a low-cost marketing instrument, a privacy-preserving data enrichment strategy, and a causal machine learning method can create a win-win situation from both an environmental and economic perspective by simultaneously reducing product returns and increasing retailers’ profits.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state.
By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus underincentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
The salience of ESG ratings for stock pricing: evidence from (potentially) confused investors
(2021)
We exploit the a modification to Sustainanlytics’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating methodology, which is subsequently adopted by Morningstar, to study whether ESG ratings are salient for stock pricing. We show that the inversion of the rating scale but not new information leads some investors to make incorrect assessments about the meaning of the change in ESG ratings. They buy (sell) stocks they misconceive as ESG upgraded (downgraded) even when the opposite is true. This trading behavior exerts transitory price pressure on affected stocks. Our paper highlights the importance of ESG ratings for investors and consequently for asset prices.
This paper summarizes key elements of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme. It briefly explains how it is possible for the German Court to disagree with the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, it makes suggestions concerning a practical way forward for the Governing Council of the ECB in light of these developments.
Several recent studies have expressed concern that the Haar prior typically imposed in estimating sign-identi.ed VAR models may be unintentionally informative about the implied prior for the structural impulse responses. This question is indeed important, but we show that the tools that have been used in the literature to illustrate this potential problem are invalid. Speci.cally, we show that it does not make sense from a Bayesian point of view to characterize the impulse response prior based on the distribution of the impulse responses conditional on the maximum likelihood estimator of the reduced-form parameters, since the the prior does not, in general, depend on the data. We illustrate that this approach tends to produce highly misleading estimates of the impulse response priors. We formally derive the correct impulse response prior distribution and show that there is no evidence that typical sign-identi.ed VAR models estimated using conventional priors tend to imply unintentionally informative priors for the impulse response vector or that the corre- sponding posterior is dominated by the prior. Our evidence suggests that concerns about the Haar prior for the rotation matrix have been greatly overstated and that alternative estimation methods are not required in typical applications. Finally, we demonstrate that the alternative Bayesian approach to estimating sign-identi.ed VAR models proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) su¤ers from exactly the same conceptual shortcoming as the conventional approach. We illustrate that this alternative approach may imply highly economically implausible impulse response priors.
We explore how personality traits are related to household borrowing behavior. Using survey data representative for the Netherlands, we consider the Big Five personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion and neuroticism), as well as the belief that one is master of one’s fate (locus of control). We hypothesize that personality traits can complement as well as substitute financial knowledge of a household. We present three sets of results. First, we find that personality traits are positively correlated with borrowing expectations. Locus of control, extraversion and agreeableness are correlated with informal borrowing expectations, which is the expectation that one can borrow from family and friends. With respect to expectations on the approval of a formal loan application, it is locus of control and conscientiousness that are positively associated. Effect sizes are large and economically meaningful. Second, we find that personality traits are important for borrowing constraints. A more internal locus of control and higher neuroticism are correlated with being denied for credit, as well as discouraged borrowing. Our third set of results reports findings on personality traits and loan regret, and how traits are correlated with dealing with loan troubles. Many households in our sample express regret (21%), but more open, more agreeable and more neurotic individuals are more likely to express regret. Our results are not driven by financial knowledge, time preferences or risk attitudes. Overall these findings imply that non-cognitive traits are important for borrowing behavior of households.
Although oil price shocks have long been viewed as one of the leading candidates for explaining U.S. recessions, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which oil price shocks explain recessions. We provide the first formal analysis of this question with special attention to the possible role of net oil price increases in amplifying the transmission of oil price shocks. We quantify the conditional recessionary effect of oil price shocks in the net oil price increase model for all episodes of net oil price increases since the mid-1970s. Compared to the linear model, the cumulative effect of oil price shocks over course of the next two years is much larger in the net oil price increase model. For example, oil price shocks explain a 3% cumulative reduction in U.S. real GDP in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a 5% cumulative reduction during the financial crisis. An obvious concern is that some of these estimates are an artifact of net oil price increases being correlated with other variables that explain recessions. We show that the explanatory power of oil price shocks largely persists even after augmenting the nonlinear model with a measure of credit supply conditions, of the monetary policy stance and of consumer confidence. There is evidence, however, that the conditional fit of the net oil price increase model is worse on average than the fit of the corresponding linear model, suggesting much smaller cumulative effects of oil price shocks for these episodes of at most 1%.
In fifteen European countries, China, and the US, stocks and business equity as a share of total household assets are represented by an increasing and convex function of income/wealth. A parsimonious model fitted to the data shows why background labor- income risk can explain much of this risk-taking pattern. Uncontrollable labor-income risk stresses middle-income households more because labor income is a larger fraction of their total lifetime resources compared with the rich. In response, middle-income households re-duce (controllable) financial risk. Richer households, having less pressure, can afford more risk-taking. The poor take low risk because they avoid jeopardizing their subsistence consumption.
We study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets.
We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements can be imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level.
Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer “green” over “dirty” assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on “dirty” issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of “green” disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies.
However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
This paper empirically tests the role of bank lending tightening on non-financial corporate (NFC) bond issuance in the eurozone. By utilizing a unique data set provided by the ECB Bank Lending Survey, we capture the "pure" credit supply effect on corporate external financing. We find that tightened credit standards positively affect the NFC bond issuance: A 1pp increase in banks reporting considerable tightening on loans leads to around a 7% increase in firms' bond issuance in the eurozone. Focusing on a spectrum of aspects contributing to bank credit tightening, we document that banks' balance sheet constraints, as well as the perception of risk lead to significantly higher NFC bond issuance. In addition, we show that stricter lending conditions, such as wider margins, higher collateral requirements and covenants significantly increase NFC bond issuance volumes too. Furthermore, the impact of bank credit tightening on firms' bond issuance is particularly observable in core eurozone countries and not in peripheral countries. This is partially due to the underdeveloped of debt capital markets in the peripheral countries.
Insurance guarantee schemes aim to protect policyholders from the costs of insurer insolvencies. However, guarantee schemes can also reduce insurers’ incentives to conduct appropriate risk management. We investigate stock insurers’ risk-shifting behavior for insurance guarantee schemes under the two different financing alternatives: a flat-rate premium assessment versus a risk-based premium assessment. We identify which guarantee scheme maximizes policyholders’ welfare, measured by their expected utility. We find that the risk-based insurance guarantee scheme can only mitigate the insurer’s risk-shifting behavior if a substantial premium loading is present. Furthermore, the risk-based guarantee scheme is superior for improving policyholders’ welfare compared to the flat-rate scheme when the mitigating effect occurs.
This paper studies the effect of graduating from college on lifetime earnings. We develop a quantitative model of college choice with uncertain graduation. Departing from much of the literature, we model in detail how students progress through college. This allows us to parameterize the model using transcript data. College transcripts reveal substantial and persistent heterogeneity in students’ credit accumulation rates that are strongly related to graduation outcomes. From this data, the model infers a large ability gap between college graduates and high school graduates that accounts for 54% of the college lifetime earnings premium.
Regulatory failures, which came to the fore after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, lead to the question of why some activities by financial institutions were not regulated prior to the crisis of 2007, even though regulators knew about certain dangers to financial stability? The repo-market, although centrally involved in the last crisis, still awaits stringent regulation. At the same time, the regulatory cycle seems to come to an end, boding ill for future crises which will be amplified by this market. In this situation, NGOs are needed to make regulators act upon their knowledge and to tighten their regulations.
Coming (great) events cast their (long) shadow before. As the financial crisis gave birth to the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the imminent Brexit now serves as an impulse to rather extensively reorganize it. Pursuant to the preferences of the Commission—as revealed in its draft for a regulation amending the regulations founding the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA)—the supervision (and regulation) of the financial sectors should be further centralized and integrated and additional powers should be given to the ESAs. To a large degree these alterations are intended to adjust the competences of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to better meet its new objectives under the Capital Markets Union (“CMU”). In view that an equivalent to the CMU or the Banking Union—in the sense of a European Insurance Union—is not yet on the horizon for the insurance sector (or the occupational pensions sector), one could prima vista take the view that insurance supervision and regulation is once again taken captive by the necessity of regulatory reforms stemming from other financial sectors. However, even if that is partially the case, the outcome of the intended reforms might still be advantageous for the insurance sector and an important step in the right direction. Therefore, it needs to be intensively discussed.
At this stage, some of the most prominent envisioned changes to the structure, tasks and powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and their necessity, usefulness or counter-productivity still have to be examined.
I analyze the real effects of the quality of the judicial enforcement by showing that an increase in the average duration of civil proceedings reduces firms' employment. I exploit a reorganization of court districts in Italy as an exogenous shock to court productivity and, using an instrumental variable approach, estimate an elasticity of employment to average trial length between -0.24 and -0.29. These results are very different from OLS estimates which do not control for endogeneity, and suggest that stronger law enforcement eases financing constraints. The effects are more pronounced in highly levered and more financially dependent firms, and appear to affect mainly firms in less financially developed areas. Revenues respond more slowly than employment to the reform, and wages fall as the judiciary improves. There is no evidence of effects on capital structure and profitability. These results offer a more complete picture of the interplay between legal institutions and real economic outcomes.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
The "quiet life hypothesis (QLH)" posits that banks enjoy the advantages of market power in terms of foregone revenues or cost savings. We suggest a unified approach to measure competition and efficiency simultaneously to test this hypothesis. We estimate bank-specific Lerner indices as measures of competition and test if cost and profit efficiency are negatively related to market power in the case of German savings banks.We find that both market power and average revenues declined among these banks between 1996 and 2006. While we find clear evidence supporting the QLH, estimated effects of the QLH are small from an economical perspective.
For the Neuer Markt year 2001 is not considered as one of its best, compared to its prior performance. Investors who once piled into the Neuer Markt have now become wary of the exchange, which was launched in 1997 as Europe’s leading growth market and answer to the U.S.‘s Nasdaq Stock Market. The Neuer Markt’s reputation has been marred by the misleading information policy from several Neuer Markt companies, publishing false annual and quarterly data. Some of these companies are responsible for having misinformed investors of their pending bankruptcies. Under these circumstances, it is time to find an explanation for the dramatic loss of credibility in Neuer Markt enterprises. Finding an answer, two aspects come under consideration: • What type of information (annual versus quarterly reports) was available for investors and • of what quality were these provided data. Interim reports can be seen as important instrument in the reporting system to inform all kinds of investors. For this reason we examine the quality of Neuer Markt quarterly reports by concentrating on the disclosure level of 52 Neuer Markt companies‘ reports for the third quarter 1999 and 2000. To enable comparison we establish four disclosure indexes that measure the report’s compliance with the Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations as well as with IAS and US GAAP interim reporting standards. The results demonstrate that the level of disclosure has increased over time. Then we aim to find typical attributes of Neuer Markt enterprises that provide high or low level of accounting information in their quarterly reports. Nevertheless the study also shows that there is not any correlation between market capitalization and the quality of interim reports. However, it can be suggested that an additional enforcement mechanism could improve quality and lure investors back. A step towards this aim is the standardization project of quarterly reports of Deutsche Boerse AG.
The propagation of regional shocks in housing markets: evidence from oil price shocks in Canada
(2018)
Shocks to the demand for housing that originate in one region may seem important only for that regional housing market. We provide evidence that such shocks can also affect housing markets in other regions. Our analysis focuses on the response of Canadian housing markets to oil price shocks. Oil price shocks constitute an important source of exogenous regional variation in income in Canada because oil production is highly geographically concentrated. We document that, at the national level, real oil price shocks account for 11% of the variability in real house price growth over time. At the regional level, we find that unexpected increases in the real price of oil raise housing demand and real house prices not only in oil-producing regions, but also in other regions. We develop a theoretical model of the propagation of real oil price shocks across regions that helps understand this finding. The model differentiates between oil-producing and non-oil-producing regions and incorporates multiple sectors, trade between provinces, government redistribution, and consumer spending on fuel. We empirically confirm the model prediction that oil price shocks are propagated to housing markets in non-oil-producing regions by the government redistribution of oil revenue and by increased interprovincial trade.
The pricing of digital art
(2023)
The intersection of recent advancements in generative artificial intelligence and blockchain technology has propelled digital art into the spotlight. Digital art pricing recognizes that owners derive utility beyond the artwork’s inherent value. We incorporate the consumption utility associated with digital art and model the stochastic discount factor and risk premiums. Furthermore, we conduct a calibration analysis to analyze the effects of shifts in the real and digital economy. Higher returns are required in a digital market upswing due to increased exposure to systematic risk and digital art prices are especially responsive to fluctuations in business cycles within digital markets.
In the last decade, central bank interventions, flights to safety, and the shift in derivatives clearing resulted in exceptionally high demand for high quality liquid assets, such as German treasuries, in the securities lending market besides the traditional repo market activities. Despite the high demand, the realizable securities lending income has remained economically negligible for most beneficial owners. We provide empirical evidence of pricing inefficiencies in the non-transparent, oligopolistic securities lending market for German treasuries from 2006 to 2015. Consistent with Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005)’s theory, we find that the less connected market participants’ interests are underrepresented, evident in the longer maturity segment, where lenders are more likely to be conservative passive investors, such as pension funds and insurance firms. The low price elasticity in this segment hinders these beneficial owners to fully capitalize on the additional income from securities lending, giving rise to important negative welfare implications.
We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences − trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity − predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (2022). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.
The paper discusses an additional reform proposal for enhancing Social Security solvency which reframes the existing debate in a different light. In our research, we focus on incentives to prolong working years and to delay benefits claiming as a way of sustaining Social Security. Specifically, we analyze how the offer of a budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment - instead of the current delayed retirement credit – would encourage people to delay claiming their OASI benefits and work longer. The results of our research will be useful for policymakers, namely in (1) measuring who would delay claiming benefits if offered a lump sum instead of higher annuity payments, (2) examining how long they would wait, and (3) how much longer, if at all, they would continue working in the interim.
Using the negotiation process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the way regulators form their positions on regulatory issues in the process of international standard-setting and the consequences on the resultant harmonized framework. Leveraging on leaked voting records and corroborating them using machine learning techniques on publicly available speeches, we construct a unique dataset containing the positions of banks and national regulators on the regulatory initiatives of Basel II and III. We document that the probability of a regulator opposing a specific initiative increases by 30% if their domestic national champion opposes the new rule, particularly when the proposed rule disproportionately affects them. We find the effect is driven by regulators who had prior experience of working in large banks – lending support to the private-interest theories of regulation. Meanwhile smaller banks, even when they collectively have a higher share in the domestic market, do not have any impact on regulators’ stand – providing little support to public-interest theories of regulation. Finally, we show this decision-making process manifests into significant watering down of proposed rules, thereby limiting the potential gains from harmonization of international financial regulation.
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.
Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.
Direct financing of consumer credit by individual investors or non-bank institutions through an implementation of marketplace lending is a relatively new phenomenon in financial markets. The emergence of online platforms has made this type of financial intermediation widely available. This paper analyzes the performance of marketplace lending using proprietary cash flow data for each individual loan from the largest platform, Lending Club. While individual loan characteristics would be important for amateur investors holding a few loans, sophisticated lenders, including institutional investors, usually form broad portfolios to benefit from diversification. We find high risk-adjusted performance of approximately 40 basis points per month for these basic loan portfolios. This abnormal performance indicates that Lending Club, and similar marketplace lenders, are likely to attract capital to finance a growing share of the consumer credit market. In the absence of a competitive response from traditional credit providers, these loans lower costs to the ultimate borrowers and increase returns for the ultimate lenders.
We analyze the performance of marketplace lending using loan cash flow data from the largest platform, Lending Club. We find substantial risk-adjusted performance of about 40 basis points per month for the entire loan portfolio. Other loan portfolios grouped by risk category have similar risk-adjusted performance. We show that characteristics of the local bank sector for each loan, such as concentration of deposits and the presence of national banks, are related to the performance of loans. Thus, marketplace lending has the potential to finance a growing share of the consumer credit market in the absence of a competitive response from the traditional incumbents.
We show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a fiscal adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather than of individual fiscal shocks. Simulation of fiscal plans adopted by 16 OECD countries over a 30-year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design. Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly, in terms of output losses, than tax-based ones and have especially low output costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go changes in taxes and spending. The difference between tax-based and spending-based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies, including monetary policy. It is mainly due to the different response of business confidence and private investment.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
André Prüm has asked me to talk about “La Théorie de l´organe” supposing that this is a German invention. Well, we cannot claim the authorship or copyright for that, but it is true that this doctrine is still dominating German doctrinal thinking in company law. Let me first look at the historical development and background of this theory and then ask for its actual meaning and practical consequences.
The old boy network: the impact of professional networks on remuneration in top executive jobs
(2016)
We investigate the impact of social networks on earnings using a dataset of over 20,000 senior executives of European and US firms. The size of an individual's network of influential former colleagues has a large positive association with current remuneration. An individual at the 75th percentile in the distribution of connections could expect to have a salary nearly 20 per cent higher than an otherwise identical individual at the median. We use a placebo technique to show that our estimates reflect the causal impact of connections and not merely unobserved individual characteristics. Networks are more weakly associated with women's remuneration than with men's. This mainly reflects an interaction between unobserved individual characteristics and firm recruitment policies. The kinds of firm that best identify and advance talented women are less likely to give them access to influential networks than are firms that do the same for the most talented men.
In this note, we first highlight different developments for banks under direct ECB supervision within the SSM that may prompt further investigation by supervisors. We find that banks that were weakly capitalized at the start of direct ECB supervision (1) still face elevated levels of non-performing loans, (2) are less cost-efficient and (3) reduced their share of subordinated debt financing over the last years. We then stress the importance of continuous and ongoing cost-benefit analysis regarding banking supervision in Europe. We also encourage processes to question existing supervisory practices to ensure a lean and efficient banking supervision. Finally, we underline the need of continuous and intensified coordination among regulatory bodies in the Banking Union since the efficacy of European bank supervision rests on its interplay with many different institutions.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.
This chapter aims to provide a hands-on approach to New Keynesian models and their uses for macroeconomic policy analysis. It starts by reviewing the origins of the New Keynesian approach, the key model ingredients and representative models. Building blocks of current-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are discussed in detail. These models address the famous Lucas critique by deriving behavioral equations systematically from the optimizing and forward-looking decision-making of households and firms subject to well-defined constraints. State-of-the-art methods for solving and estimating such models are reviewed and presented in examples. The chapter goes beyond the mere presentation of the most popular benchmark model by providing a framework for model comparison along with a database that includes a wide variety of macroeconomic models. Thus, it offers a convenient approach for comparing new models to available benchmarks and for investigating whether particular policy recommendations are robust to model uncertainty. Such robustness analysis is illustrated by evaluating the performance of simple monetary policy rules across a range of recently-estimated models including some with financial market imperfections and by reviewing recent comparative findings regarding the magnitude of government spending multipliers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of important objectives for on-going and future research using the New Keynesian framework.
The modern tontine: an innovative instrument for longevity risk management in an aging society
(2016)
The changing social, financial and regulatory frameworks, such as an increasingly aging society, the current low interest rate environment, as well as the implementation of Solvency II, lead to the search for new product forms for private pension provision. In order to address the various issues, these product forms should reduce or avoid investment guarantees and risks stemming from longevity, still provide reliable insurance benefits and simultaneously take account of the increasing financial resources required for very high ages. In this context, we examine whether a historical concept of insurance, the tontine, entails enough innovative potential to extend and improve the prevailing privately funded pension solutions in a modern way. The tontine basically generates an age-increasing cash flow, which can help to match the increasing financing needs at old ages. However, the tontine generates volatile cash flows, so that - especially in the context of an aging society - the insurance character of the tontine cannot be guaranteed in every situation. We show that partial tontinization of retirement wealth can serve as a reliable supplement to existing pension products.
Fleckenstein et al. (2014) document that nominal Treasuries trade at higher prices than inflation-swapped indexed bonds, which exactly replicate the nominal cash flows. We study whether this mispricing arises from liquidity premiums in inflation-indexed bonds (TIPS) and inflation swaps. Using US data, we show that the level of liquidity affects TIPS, whereas swap yields include a liquidity risk premium. We also allow for liquidity effects in nominal bonds. These results are based on a model with a systematic liquidity risk factor and asset-specific liquidity characteristics. We show that these liquidity (risk) premiums explain a substantial part of the TIPS underpricing.
Vocational training programmes have been the most important active labour market policy instrument in Germany in the last years. However, the still unsatisfying situation of the labour market has raised doubt on the efficiency of these programmes. In this paper, we analyse the effects of the participation in vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany. Based on administrative data for the time between the October 1999 and December 2002 of the Federal Employment Administration, we apply a bivariate mixed proportional hazards model. By doing so, we are able to use the information of the timing of treatment as well as observable and unobservable influences to identify the treatment effects. The results show that a participation in vocational training prolongates the unemployment duration in Eastern Germany. Furthermore, the results suggest that locking-in effects are a serious problem of vocational training programmes. JEL Classification: J64, J24, I28, J68
We propose a new framework for modelling time dependence in duration processes on financial markets. The well known autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) approach introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) will be extended in a way that allows the conditional expectation of the duration process to depend on an unobservable stochastic process, which is modelled via a Markov chain. The Markov switching ACD model (MSACD) is a very flexible tool for description and forecasting of financial duration processes. In addition the introduction of an unobservable, discrete valued regime variable can be justified in the light of recent market microstructure theories. In an empirical application we show, that the MSACD approach is able to capture several specific characteristics of inter trade durations while alternative ACD models fail. Furthermore, we use the MSACD to test implications of a sequential trade model.
Our article integrates the manager’s care in the literature on auditor’s liability. With unobservable efforts, we face a double moral hazard setting. It is well-known that efficient liability rules without punitive damages do not exist under these circumstances. However, we show that the problem can be solved through strict liability, contingent auditing fees, and fair insurance contracts. Neither punitive damages nor deductibles above the damages are required.
Highly interconnected global supply chains make countries vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. The authors estimate the macroeconomic effects of global supply chain shocks for the euro area. Their empirical model combines business cycle variables with data from international container trade.
Using a novel identification scheme, they augment conventional sign restrictions on the impulse responses by narrative information about three episodes: the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, the Suez Canal obstruction in 2021, and the Shanghai backlog in 2022. They show that a global supply chain shock causes a drop in euro area real economic activity and a strong increase in consumer prices. Over a horizon of one year, the global supply chain shock explains about 30% of inflation dynamics. They also use regional data on supply chain pressure to isolate shocks originating in China.
Their results show that supply chain disruptions originating in China are an important driver for unexpected movements in industrial production, while disruptions originating outside China are an especially important driver for the dynamics of consumer prices.
This paper revisits the macroeconomic effects of the large-scale asset purchase programmes launched by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England from 2008. Using a Bayesian VAR, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of shocks to asset purchase announcements and assess changes in their effectiveness based on subsample analysis. The results suggest that the early asset purchase programmes had significant positive macroeconomic effects, while those of the subsequent ones were weaker and in part not significantly different from zero. The reduced effectiveness seems to reflect in part better anticipation of asset purchase programmes over time, since we find significant positive macroeconomic effects when we consider shocks to survey expectations of the Federal Reserve’s last asset purchase programme. Finally, in all estimations we find a significant and persistent positive impact of asset purchase shocks on stock prices.
This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical performance of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank’s bidding depends on bank characteristics. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB’s main refinancing operations, we find evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs. Our results indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes. JEL classification: E52, D44
Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the long-term impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human capital at different stages in the children's development process. We quantitatively characterize both the long-term earnings consequences on children from a Covid-19 induced loss of schooling, as well as the associated welfare losses. Due to self-productivity in the human capital production function, skill attainment at a younger stage of the life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages, and thus younger children are hurt more by the school closures than older children. We find that parental reactions reduce the negative impact of the school closures, but do not fully offset it. The negative impact of the crisis on children's welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low assets. The school closures themselves are primarily responsible for the negative impact of the Covid-19 shock on the long-run welfare of the children, with the pandemic-induced income shock to parents playing a secondary role.
Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human capital at different stages in the children’s development process. We quantitatively characterize the long-term consequences from a Covid-19 induced loss of schooling, and find average losses in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of the affected children of close to 1%, as well as welfare losses equivalent to about 0.6% of permanent consumption. Due to self-productivity in the human capital production function, skill attainment at a younger stage of the life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages, and thus younger children are hurt more by the school closures than older children. We find that parental reactions reduce the negative impact of the school closures, but do not fully offset it. The negative impact of the crisis on children’s welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low assets. The school closures themselves are primarily responsible for the negative impact of the Covid-19 shock on the long-run welfare of the children, with the pandemic-induced income shock to parents playing a secondary role.
This paper studies the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidities at the firm level. I trace out the long-run investment and growth trajectories of firms which are more adversely affected by a transitory shock to aggregate credit supply. Affected firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years following the shock, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap. I show that affected firms with a higher degree of wage rigidity exhibit a steeper drop in investment and grow more slowly than affected firms with more flexible wages.
This paper analyses the long-term effects of improved small-scale lending, often provided by microfinance institutions set up with the support of development aid. The analysis shows that some common assumptions about microfinance are not true at all: First, it shows that the impact on income will accrue not to the microenterprises themselves, but rather to the consumers of their products. Second, microfinance will have a significant positive effect on the wage levels of employees in the informal sector. Third, microfinance will cause high growth rates in the informal production sector, whereas the trade sector will either contract or at best grow very little.
In this paper, we investigate how the introduction of complex, model-based capital regulation affected credit risk of financial institutions. Model-based regulation was meant to enhance the stability of the financial sector by making capital charges more sensitive to risk. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the model-based approach in Germany and the richness of our loan-level data set, we show that (1) internal risk estimates employed for regulatory purposes systematically underpredict actual default rates by 0.5 to 1 percentage points; (2) both default rates and loss rates are higher for loans that were originated under the model-based approach, while corresponding risk-weights are significantly lower; and (3) interest rates are higher for loans originated under the model-based approach, suggesting that banks were aware of the higher risk associated with these loans and priced them accordingly. Further, we document that large banks benefited from the reform as they experienced a reduction in capital charges and consequently expanded their lending at the expense of smaller banks that did not introduce the model-based approach. Counter to the stated objectives, the introduction of complex regulation adversely affected the credit risk of financial institutions. Overall, our results highlight the pitfalls of complex regulation and suggest that simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.
In this paper, we investigate how the introduction of complex, model-based capital regulation affected credit risk of financial institutions. Model-based regulation was meant to enhance the stability of the financial sector by making capital charges more sensitive to risk. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the model-based approach in Germany and the richness of our loan-level data set, we show that (1) internal risk estimates employed for regulatory purposes systematically underpredict actual default rates by 0.5 to 1 percentage points; (2) both default rates and loss rates are higher for loans that were originated under the model-based approach, while corresponding risk-weights are significantly lower; and (3) interest rates are higher for loans originated under the model-based approach, suggesting that banks were aware of the higher risk associated with these loans and priced them accordingly. Further, we document that large banks benefited from the reform as they experienced a reduction in capital charges and consequently expanded their lending at the expense of smaller banks that did not introduce the model-based approach. Counter to the stated objectives, the introduction of complex regulation adversely affected the credit risk of financial institutions. Overall, our results highlight the pitfalls of complex regulation and suggest that simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.
Using loan-level data from Germany, we investigate how the introduction of model-based capital regulation affected banks’ ability to absorb shocks. The objective of this regulation was to enhance financial stability by making capital requirements responsive to asset risk. Our evidence suggests that banks ‘optimized’ model-based regulation to lower their capital requirements. Banks systematically underreported risk, with under reporting being more pronounced for banks with higher gains from it. Moreover, large banks benefitted from the regulation at the expense of smaller banks. Overall, our results suggest that sophisticated rules may have undesired effects if strategic misbehavior is difficult to detect.
Joint Institutional Frameworks in bilateral relations are circumscribed in policy scope, can lack adequate instruments for dynamic adaptation and provide limited access to decision-making processes internal to the contracting parties. Informal governance, the involvement of private actors as well as rules such as equivalence provide avenues to remedy these limits in bilateral relations in sectoral governance. Through bilateral agreements, the scope of territorially bound political authority is expanded. The formalised and institutionalised frameworks and bodies established are, however, frequently accompanied by mechanisms of informal cooperation and special rules either to cover policy fields where no contractual relation exists, to provide for flexible solutions where needed, or to involve both public and private actors that otherwise do not have access to formal decision-making bodies. This SAFE working paper conceptualises formal and informal modes of cooperation and varying actor constellations. It discusses their relevance for the case of bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) and Switzerland in sectoral governance. More specifically, it draws lessons from EU-Swiss sectoral governance of financial and electricity markets for the future relations of the EU with the United Kingdom (UK). The findings suggest that there are distinct governance arrangements across sectors, while the patterns of sectoral governance are expected to look very much alike in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in the years to come. The general takeaway is that Brexit will have repercussions for the EU’s external relations with other third countries, putting ever more emphasis on formal and rule-based approaches, while leaving a need for sector-specific cross border co-operation.
The paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EU’s financial-stability architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one EU Member State. The paper identifies challenges and possible ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture.
In its meeting on 6 September 2012, the Governing Council of the ECB took decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (OMT). This decision was challenged in the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) by a number of constitutional complaints and other petitions. In its seminal judgment of 14 January 2014, the German court expressed serious doubts on the compatibility of the ECB’s decision with the European Union law.
It admitted the complaints and petitions even though actual purchases had not been executed and the control of acts of an organ of the EU in principle is not the task of the GFCC. As justification for this procedure the court resorted to its judicature on a reserved “ultra vires” control and the defense of the “constitutional identiy” of Germany. In the end, however, the court referred the case pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings on several questions of EU law. In substance, the German court assessed OMT as an act of economic policy which is not covered by the competences of the ECB. Furthermore, it judged OMT as a – by EU primary law – prohibited monetary financing of sovereign debt. The defense of the ECB (disruption of monetary policy transmission mechanism) was dismissed without closer scrutiny as being “irrelevant”. Finally the court opened, however, a way for a compromise by an interpretation of OMT in conformity with EU law under preconditions, specified in detail.
Procedure and findings of this judgment were harshly criticized by many economists but also by the majority of legal scholars. This criticism is largely convincing in view of the admissibility of the complaints. Even if the “ultra vires” control is in conformity with prior decisions of court it is in this judgment expanded further without compelling reasons. It is also questionable whether the standing of the complaining parties had to be accepted and whether the referral to the ECJ was indicated. The arguments of the court are, however, conclusive in respect of the transgression of competences by the ECB and – to somewhat lesser extent – in respect of the monetary debt financing. The dismissal of the defense as “irrelevant” is absolutey persuasive.
The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
The paper traces the developments from the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union to this date. It discusses the fact that the primary mandate of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is confined to safeguarding price stability and does not include general economic policy. Finally, the paper contributes to the discussion on whether the primary law of the European Union would support a eurozone exit. The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
The leading premium
(2022)
In this paper, we consider conditional measures of lead-lag relationships between aggregate growth and industry-level cash-flow growth in the US. Our results show that firms in leading industries pay an average annualized return 3.6\% higher than that of firms in lagging industries. Using both time series and cross sectional tests, we estimate an annual pure timing premium ranging from 1.2% to 1.7%. This finding can be rationalized in a model in which (a) agents price growth news shocks, and (b) leading industries provide valuable resolution of uncertainty about the growth prospects of lagging industries.
In a production economy with trade in financial markets motivated by the desire to share labor-income risk and to speculate, we show that speculation increases volatility of asset returns and investment growth, increases the equity risk premium, and reduces welfare. Regulatory measures, such as constraints on stock positions, borrowing constraints, and the Tobin tax have similar effects on financial and macroeconomic variables. Borrowing limits and a financial transaction tax improve welfare because they substantially reduce speculative trading without impairing excessively risk-sharing trades.
Between 2016 and 2022, life insurers in several European countries experienced negative longterm interest rates, which put pressure on their business models. The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of negative interest rates on the stock performance of life insurers. To measure the sensitivities, I estimate the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve using the Nelson-Siegel model and empirical proxies. Panel regressions show that the effect of changes in the level is up to three times greater in a negative interest rate environment than in a positive one. Thus, a 1ppt decline in long-term interest rates reduces the stock returns of European life insurers by up to 10ppt when interest rates are below 0%. I also show that the relationship between the level and the sensitivity to interest rates is convex, and that life insurers benefit from rising interest rates across all maturity types.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
Intangible assets as goodwill, licenses, research and development or customer relations become in high technology and service orientated economies more and more important. But comparing the book values of listed companies and their market capitalization the financial reports seems to fail the information needs of market participants regarding the estimate of the proper firm value. Moreover, with the introduction of Anglo-American accounting systems in Europe and Asia we can observe even in the accounts of companies sited in the same jurisdiction diverging accounting practices for intangible assets caused by different accounting standards. To assess the relevance of intangible assets in Japanese and German accounts of listed companies we therefore measure certain balance sheet and profit and loss relations according to goodwill and self-developed software. We compare and analyze valuation rules for goodwill and software costs according to German GAAP, Japanese GAAP, US GAAP and IAS to determine the possible impact of diverging rules in the comparability of the accounts. Our results show that the comparability of the accounts is impaired because of different accounting practices. The recognition and valuation of goodwill and self-developed software varies significantly according to the accounting regime applied. However, for the recognition of self-developed software, the effect on the average impact on asset coefficients or profit is not that high. Moreover, an industry bias can only be found for the financial industry. In contrast, for goodwill accounting we found major differences especially between German and Japanese Blue Chips. The introduction of the new goodwill impairment only approach and the prohibition of the pooling method may have a major impact especially for Japanese companies’ accounts.