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This paper examines empirically the question whether the presence of foreign banks and a liberal trade regime with regard to financial services can contribute to a stabilization of capital flows to emerging markets. Since foreign banks, so the argument goes, provide better information to foreign investors and increase transparency, the danger of herding is reduced. Previous findings by Kono and Schuknecht (1998) confirmed empirically that such an effect does exist. This study expands their data set with respect to the length of the time period and the number of countries. Contrary to Kono and Schuknecht, it is found that foreign bank penetration tends to rather increase the volatility of capital flows. The trade regime variables are not significant in explaining cross-country variations in the volatility of capital flows. This result does not change significantly when alternative measures of volatility are considered. This paper was presented at the conference ''Financial crisis in transition countries: recent lessons and problems yet to solve'' on 13-14 July 2000 at the Institute for Economic Research (IWH) in Halle, Germany.
This paper discusses the role of internal corporate ratings as a means by which commercial banks condense their informational advantage and preserve it vis-à-vis a competitive lending market. In drawing on a unique data set collected from leading universal banks in Germany, we are able to evaluate the extent to which non-public information determines corporate ratings. As a point of departure, the paper describes a sample of rating systems currently in use, and points at methodological differences between them. Relying on a probit analysis, we are able to show that the set of qualitative, or soft, factors is not simply redundant with respect to publicly available accounting data. Rather, qualitative information tends to be decisive in at least one third of cases. It tends to improve the firms' overall corporate rating. In the case of conflicting rating changes, i.e. when qualitative and quantitative rating changes have opposing signs, quantitative criteria dominate the overall rating change. Furthermore, the more restrictive the weighting scheme as part of the rating methodology is, the stronger is the impact of qualitative information on the firms' overall rating. The implications of our results underline the need to define stringent rating standards, from both a risk management and a regulatory point of view. Revised edition published in: ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen 2001, Bd 54, Baden-Baden, Nomos
This paper provides a broad empirical examination of the major currencies' roles in international capital markets, with a special emphasis on the first year of the euro. A contribution is made as to how to measure these roles, both for international financing as well as for international investment. The times series collected for these measures allow for the identification of changes in the role of the euro during 1999 compared to the aggregate of euro predecessor currencies, net of intra -euro area assets/liabilities, before stage 3 of EMU. A number of key factors determining the currency distribution of international portfolio investments, such as relative market liquidity and relative risk characteristics of assets, are also examined empirically. It turns out that for almost all important market segments for which data are available, the euro immediately became the second most widely used currency for international financing and investment. For the flow of international bond and note issuance it experienced significant growth in 1999 even slightly overtaking the US dollar in the second half of the year. The euro's international investment role appears more static though, since most of the early external asset supply in euro is actually absorbed by euro area residents.
This paper examines the interaction of G7 real exchange rates with real output and interest rate differentials. Using cointegration methods, we generally find a link between the real exchange rate and the real interest differential. This finding contrasts with the majority of the extant research on the real exchange rate - real interest rate link. We identify a new measure of the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of the permanent component of the real exchange rate that is consistent with the dynamic equilibrium given by the cointegration relation. Furthermore, the presence of cointegration also allows us to identify real, nominal and transitory disturbances with only minimal identifying restrictions. Our findings suggest that persistent deviations of real exchange rates from their equilibrium value can have feedback effects on the underlying fundamentals, hence altering the equilibrium exchange rate itself. This has important implications for the persistence measures of real exchange rates that are reported elsewhere in the literature.
In this study the firms' choice of the number of bank relationships is analyzed with respect to influential factors like borrower quality, size and the existence of a close housebank relationship. Then, the number of bank relationships is used as a proxy to examine if bank competition is reflected in loan terms. It is shown that the number of bank relationships is foremost determined by borrower size and the existence of a housebank relationship. Loan rate spreads are not effected by the number of bank relationships. However, borrowers with a small number of bank relationships provide more collateral and get more credit. These effects are amplified by a housebank relationship. Housebanks get more collateral and are ready to take a larger stake in the financing of their customers.
The globalization of markets and companies has increased the demand for internationally comparable high quality accounting information resulting from a common set of accounting rules. Despite remarkable efforts of international harmonization for more than 25 years, accounting regulation is still the domain of national legislators or delegated standard setters. The paper starts by outlining the reasons for this state of affairs and by characterizing the different institutional backgrounds of accounting standard setting in four selected countries as well as on the international level. This is followed by a summary of important international differences in accounting rules and a summary of the empirical evidence of the impact of different rules on the resulting numbers and their relevance to users. It is argued that neither a priori theoretical reasoning nor the evidence from empirical studies provides a convincing basis for choices between accounting regimes and even less so between specific accounting rules. As there is a broad consensus that there is a need for one set of global accounting standards the final sections of the paper discuss currently existing and proposed structures of international accounting standard setting. The evolving new IASC structure is critically evaluated.
This paper discusses the role of the credit rating agencies during the recent financial crises. In particular, it examines whether the agencies can add to the dynamics of emerging market crises. Academics and investors often argue that sovereign credit ratings are responsible for pronounced boom-bust cycles in emerging-markets lending. Using a vector autoregressive system this paper examines how US dollar bond yield spreads and the short-term international liquidity position react to an unexpected sovereign credit rating change. Contrary to common belief and previous studies, the empirical results suggest that an abrupt downgrade does not necessarily intensify a financial crisis.
Bank internal ratings of corporate clients are intended to quantify the expected likelihood of future borrower defaults. This paper develops a comprehensive framework for evaluating the quality of standard rating systems. We suggest a number of principles that ought to be met by 'good rating practice'. These 'generally accepted rating principles' are potentially relevant for the improvement of existing rating systems. They are also relevant for the development of certification standards for internal rating systems, as currently discussed in a consultative paper issued by the Bank for International Settlement in Basle, entitled 'A new capital adequacy framework'. We would very much appreciate any comments by readers that help to develop these rating standards further. Simply send us an E-mail, or give us a call.
This paper measures the economy-wide impact of bank distress on the loss of relationship benefits. We use the near-collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the period 1988 to 1991 to measure the impact of bank distress announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a distressed bank. We find that although banks experience large and permanent downward revisions in their equity value during the event period, firms maintaining relationships with these banks face only small and temporary changes, on average, in stock price. In other words, the aggregate impact of bank distress on the real economy appears small. We analyze the cross-sectional variation in firm abnormal returns and find that firms that maintain international bank relationships suffer more upon announcement of bank distress.
This paper presents evidence that spillovers through shifts in bank lending can help explain the pattern of contagion. To test the role of bank lending in transmitting currency crises we examine a panel of data on capital flows to 30 emerging markets disaggregated by 11 banking centers. In addition we study a cross-section of emerging markets for which we construct a number of measures of competition for bank funds. For the Mexican and Asian crises, we find that the degree to which countries compete for funds from common bank lenders is a fairly robust predictor of both disaggregated bank flows and the incidence of a currency crisis. In the Russian crisis, the common bank lender helps to predict the incidence of contagion but there is also evidence of a generalized outflow from all emerging markets. We test extensively for robustness to sample, specification and definition of the common bank lender effect. Overall our findings suggest that spillovers through banking centers may be more important in explaining contagion than similarities in macro-economic fundamentals and even than trade linkage.
For some time now the buzzword 'transparency' has been bandied about in the media almost daily. For example, calls were made for greater transparency in the financial system in connection with developments in the Asian financial markets. But the call for greater transparency goes far beyond the financial markets. It is now regarded as a necessary part of "good governance" demanded of all economic policy makers. As the World Bank's chief economist Joseph Stiglitz put it: 'No one would dare say that they were against transparency (....): It would be like saying you were against motherhood or apple pie.' This paper focuses on transparency in monetary policy, in particular with respect to the European System of Central Bank.
This study uses Markov-switching models to evaluate the informational content of the term structure as a predictor of recessions in eight OECD countries. The empirical results suggest that for all countries the term spread is sensibly modelled as a two-state regime-switching process. Moreover, our simple univariate model turns out to be a filter that transforms accurately term spread changes into turning point predictions. The term structure is confirmed to be a reliable recession indicator. However, the results of probit estimations show that the markov-switching filter does not significantly improve the forecasting ability of the spread.
Modeling short-term interest rates as following regime-switching processes has become increasingly popular. Theoretically, regime-switching models are able to capture rational expectations of infrequently occurring discrete events. Technically, they allow for potential time-varying stationarity. After discussing both aspects with reference to the recent literature, this paper provides estimations of various univariate regime-switching specifications for the German three-month money market rate and bivariate specifications additionally including the term spread. However, the main contribution is a multi-step out-of-sample forecasting competition. It turns out that forecasts are improved substantially when allowing for state-dependence. Particularly, the informational content of the term spread for future short rate changes can be exploited optimally within a multivariate regime-switching framework.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
Die Betreuer am neuen Markt sollen die Effizienz des Handels durch Bereitstellung zusätzlicher Liquidität erhöhen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Liquiditätsbeitrag der Betreuer in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Jahren. Die Beteiligung der Betreuer am Umsatz des Marktes hat im beobachteten Zeitraum deutlich abgenommen. Ihre Orderlimits und -volumina hingegen haben die Markttiefe erhöht. Weiterhin zeigt sich, daß die Betreuer sowohl in liquiditätsschwachen Titeln als auch in liquiditätsschwachen Marktphasen zur Steigerung der Liquidität beigetragen haben.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb : eine ressourcenorientierte Analyse
(1999)
Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt die Vorgehensweise und die wichtigsten Ergebnisse einer internationalen Finanzplatzstudie vor, die im Jahre 1998 im Auftrag des Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main) durchgeführt wurde. Ziel dieser Studie war es, aus der Analyse wichtiger Finanzplatzressourcen und den Wechselwirkungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Ressourcen Rückschlüsse auf Frankfurts Position im internationalen Finanzplatzwettbewerb zu ziehen. Aus ressourcenorientierter Sicht (Resource-Based-View) konnte gezeigt werden, daß der Finanzplatz Frankfurt einerseits größere Wettbewerbsnachteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren New York und London aufweist, die kurz- und mittelfristig kaum aufholbar sind. Andererseits besitzt der Finanzplatz Frankfurt Wettbewerbsvorteile gegenüber den Finanzzentren Paris und Tokyo. Diese sind aus der Sicht Frankfurts kurz- bis mittelfristig verteidigbar. Im Gegensatz zu den Wettbewerbsnachteilen Frankfurts im Vergleich zu den angelsächsischen Finanzplätzen fallen die Wettbewerbsvorteile Frankfurts gegenüber Paris und Tokyo aber deutlich geringer aus.
This paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions. It shows, in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector behavior, that such inertial behavior on the part of the central bank may indeed be optimal, in the sense of minimizing a loss function that penalizes inflation variations, deviations of output from potential, and interest-rate variability. Sluggish adjustment characterizes an optimal policy commitment, even though no such inertia would be present in the case of a reputationless (Markovian) equilibrium under discretion. Optimal interest-rate feedback rules are also characterized, and shown to involve substantial positive coefficients on lagged interest rates. This provides a theoretical explanation for the numerical results obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) in their quantitative model of the U.S. economy.
This paper analyses two reasons why inflation may interfere with price adjustment so as to create inefficiencies in resource allocation at low rates of inflation. The first argument is that the higher the rate of inflation the lower the likelihood that downward nominal rigidities are binding (the Tobin argument) which implies a non-linear Phillips-curve. The second argument is that low inflation strengthens nominal price rigidities and thus impairs the flexibility of the price system resulting in a less efficient resource allocation. It is argued that inflation can be too low from a welfare point of view due to the presence of nominal rigidities, but the quantitative importance is an open question.
As inflation rates in the United States decline, analysts are asking if there are economic reasons to hold the rates at levels above zero. Previous studies of whether inflation "greases the wheels" of the labor market ignore inflation's potential for disrupting wage patterns in the same market. This paper outlines an institutionally-based model of wage-setting that allows the benefits of inflation (downward wage flexibility) to be separated from disruptive uncertainty about inflation rate (undue variation in relative prices). Our estimates, using a unique 40-year panel of wage changes made by large mid-western employers, suggest that low rates of inflation do help the economy to adjust to changes in labor supply and demand. However, when inflation's disruptive effects are balanced against this benefit the labor market justification for pursuing a positive long-term inflation goal effectively disappears.
Since 1990, a number of countries have adopted inflation targeting as their declared monetary strategy. Interpretations of the significance of this movement, however, have differed widely. To some, inflation targeting mandates the single-minded, rule-like pursuit of price stability without regard for other policy objectives; to others, inflation targeting represents nothing more than the latest version of cheap talk by central banks unable to sustain monetary commitments. Advocates of inflation targeting, including the adopting central banks themselves, have expressed the view that the efforts at transparency and communication in the inflation targeting framework grant the central bank greater short-run flexibility in pursuit of its long-run inflation goal. This paper assesses whether the talk that inflation targeting central banks engage in matters to central bank behavior, and which interpretation of the strategy is consistent with that assessment. We identify five distinct interpretations of inflation targeting, consistent with various strands of the current literature, and identify those interpretations as movements between various strategies in a conventional model of time-inconsistency in monetary policy. The empirical implications of these interpretations are then compared to the response of central banks to movements in inflation of three countries that adopted inflation targets in the early 1990s: The United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. For all three, the evidence shows a break in the behavior of inflation consistent with a strengthened commitment to price stability. In no case, however, is there evidence that the strategy entails a single-minded pursuit of the inflation target. For the U.K., the results are consistent with the successful implementation the optimal state-contingent rule, thereby combining flexibility and credibility; similarly, New Zealand's improved inflation performance was achieved without a discernable increase in counter-inflationary conservatism. The results for Canada are less clear, perhaps reflecting the broader fiscal and international developments affecting the Canadian economy during this period.
Derivatives usage in risk management by U.S. and German non-financial firms : a comparative survey
(1998)
This paper is a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton School survey of derivative usage among US non-financial firms and a 1997 companion survey on German non-financial firms. It is not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a comparative study, drawing a comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match the sample of German firms on both size and industry composition. We find that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. Aside from this higher overall usage, the general pattern of usage across industry and size groupings is comparable across the two countries. In both countries, foreign currency derivative usage is most common, followed closely by interest rate derivatives, with commodity derivatives a distant third. Usage rates across all three classes of derivatives are higher for German firms than US firms. In contrast to the similarities, firms in the two countries differ notably on issues such as the primary goal of hedging, their choice of instruments, and the influence of their market view when taking derivative positions. These differences appear to be driven by the greater importance of financial accounting statements in Germany than the US and stricter German corporate policies of control over derivative activities within the firm. German firms also indicate significantly less concern about derivative related issues than US firms, which appears to arise from a more basic and simple strategy for using derivatives. Finally, among the derivative non-users, German firms tend to cite reasons suggesting derivatives were not needed whereas US firms tend to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for derivatives, but a hesitation to use them for some reason.
The purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss inflation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules. The paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules, attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of inflation targeting, compares inflation targeting to the other monetary policy rules, and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the European system of Central Banks.
Despite the relevance of credit financing for the profit and risk situation of commercial banks only little empirical evidence on the initial credit decision and monitoring process exists due to the lack of appropriate data on bank debt financing. The present paper provides a systematic overview of a data set generated during the Center for Financial Studies research project on "Credit Management" which was designed to fill this empirical void. The data set contains a broad list of variables taken from the credit files of five major German banks. It is a random sample drawn from all customers which have engaged in some form of borrowing from the banks in question between January 1992 and January 1997 and which meet a number of selection criteria. The sampling design and data collection procedure are discussed in detail. Additionally, the project's research agenda is described and some general descriptive statistics of the firms in our sample are provided.
We studied information and interaction processes in six lending relationships between a universal bank and medium sized firms. The study is based on the credit files of the respective firms. If no problems occur in these lending relationships, bank monitoring is based mainly on cheap, retrospective and internal data. In case of distress, more expensive, prospective and external information is used. The level of monitoring and the willingness to renegotiate the lending relationship depends on what the lending officers can learn about the future prospects of the firm from the behaviour of the debtors. We identify both signalling and bonding activities. Such learning from past behaviour seems to allow monitoring at low cost, whereas the direct observation of the firm's investment outlook seems to be very costly. Also, too much knowledge about the firm's investments might leave the bank in a very strong bargaining position and distort investment incentives. Therefore, the traditional view of credit assessment as observation of the quality of a borrower's investment programme needs to be reconsidered.
Shares trading in the Bolsa mexicana de Valores do not seem to react to company news. Using a sample of Mexican corporate news announcements from the period July 1994 through June 1996, this paper finds that there is nothing unusual about returns, volatility of returns, volume of trade or bid-ask spreads in the event window. This suggests one of five possibilities: our sample size is small; or markets are inefficient; or markets are efficient but the corporate news announcements are not value-relevant; or markets are efficient and corporate news announcements are value-relevant, but they have been fully anticipated; or markets are efficient and corporate news announcements are value-relevant, but unrestricted insider trading has caused prices to fully incorporate the information. The evidence supports the last hypothesis. The paper thus points towards a methodology for ranking emerging stock markets in terms of their market integrity, an approach that can be used with the limited data available in such markets.
No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.
Where do we stand in the theory of finance? : a selective overview with reference to Erich Gutenberg
(1998)
For the past 20 years, financial markets research has concerned itself with issues related to the evaluation and management of financial securities in efficient capital markets and with issues of management control in incomplete markets. The following selective overview focuses on key aspects of the theory and empirical experience of management control under conditions of asymmetric information. The objective is examine the validity of the recently advanced hypothesis on the myths of corporate control. The present overview is based on Gutenberg's position that there exists a discrete corporate interest, as distinct from and separate from the interests of the shareholders or other stakeholders. In the third volume of Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen, published in 1969, this position of Gutenberg's is coupled with an appeal for a so-called financial equilibrium to be maintained. Not until recently have models grounded in capital market theory been developed which also allow for a firm's management to exercise autonomy vis-à-vis its stakeholder. This paper was prepared for the Erich Gutenberg centenary conference on December 12 and 13, 1997 in Cologne.
This study examines the relation of bank loan terms like interest rates, collateral, and lines of credit to borrower risk defined by the banks' internal credit rating. The analysis is not restricted to a static view. It also incorporates rating transition and its implications on the relation. Money illusion and phenomena linked with relationship banking are discovered as important factors. The results show that riskier borrowers pay higher loan rate premiums and rely more on bank finance. Housebanks obtain more collateral and provide more finance. Caused by money illusion in times of high market interest rates loan rate premiums are relatively small whereas in times of low market interest rates they are relatively high. There was no evidence for an appropriate adjustment of loan terms to rating changes. But bank market power represented by a weighted average of credit rating before and after a rating transition serves to compensate for low earlier profits caused by phenomena of interest rate smoothing. Klassifikation: G21.
Banks increasingly recognize the need to measure and manage the credit risk of their loans on a portfolio basis. We address the subportfolio "middle market". Due to their specific lending policy for this market segment it is an important task for banks to systematically identify regional and industrial credit concentrations and reduce the detected concentrations through diversification. In recent years, the development of markets for credit securitization and credit derivatives has provided new credit risk management tools. However, in the addressed market segment adverse selection and moral hazard problems are quite severe. A potential successful application of credit securitization and credit derivatives for managing credit risk of middle market commercial loan portfolios depends on the development of incentive-compatible structures which solve or at least mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In this paper we identify a number of general requirements and describe two possible solution concepts.
In nur wenigen Jahren wird die Euopäische Union um eine Gruppe osteuropäischer Staaten erweitert werden. Diese Erweiterung birgt Chancen und Risiken. Die Chancen liegen unter anderem in der Erweiterung der Märkte und gegenseitigen Handelsbeziehungen. Voraussetzung hierfür ist allerdings gegenseitiges Verständnis im doppelten Sinn dieses Wortes. Wenn die Menschen sich nicht verstehen, werden auch neue Möglichkeiten nicht genutzt werden können, wenn die Wirtschaft nicht die richtige Sprache findet, kann sie nichts verkaufen. Für alle wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Bereiche ist eine funktionierende verbale Kommunikation unerläßlich. Wie viel mehr gilt dies für grenzüberschreitende Beziehungen. Die Erweiterung der EU wird nur dann in eine Integration der neuen Kandidaten münden können, wenn die Verständigung zwischen allen Beteiligten gesichert ist. In dem vorliegenden Bändchen weisen die Autoren nach, dass nur durch Sprachkultur und eine einschlägige Forschung, die auch die kulturspezifischen Konnationen mit berücksichtigt, eine interkulturelle Sprachkompetenz erworben werden kann. In der Sprachenvielfalt eines vereinten Europa wird eine solche Kompetenz mehr denn je gefragt sein. Welche Wege uns diesem Ziel näher bringen und welche Möglichkeiten die deutsche Sprache hat, der wachsenden Sprachkonkurrenz international zu begegnen, das ist die Fragestellung der hier publizierten Studien, die dazu eine Fülle von Vorschlägen, Empfehlungen und Anregungen beisteuern. Die Arbeiten sind Ergebnisse des forost-Projektes "Sprachkultur und Sprachkultivierung in Osteuropa – ein paradigmatischer Vergleich", das sich innerhalb der Gruppe III des Forschungsverbundes "Nationale Identität, ethnischer Pluralismus und internationale Beziehungen" dieser Thematik gewidmet hat.
During the last years the lending business has come under considerable competitive pressure and bank managers often express concern regarding its profitability vis-a-vis other activities. This paper tries to empirically identify factors that are able to explain the financial performance of bank lending activities. The analysis is based on the CFS-data-set that has been collected in 1997 from 200 medium-sized firms. Two regressions are performed: The first is directed towards relationships between the interest rate premiums and various determining factors, the second aims at detecting relationships between those factors and the occurrence of several types of problems during the course of a credit engagement. Furthermore, the results of both regressions are used to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the impact of certain parameters on credit terms and distress probabilities. The findings are somewhat “puzzling“: First, the rating is not as significant as expected. Second, credit contracts seem to be priced lower for situations with greater risks. Finally, the results do not fully support any of three hypotheses that are often advanced to describe the role of collateral and covenants in credit contracts.
The German financial market is often characterized as a bank-based system with strong bank-customer relationships. The corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending. It is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and "normal" banks as to their credit policy. Therefore, we analyze a new data set, representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading German banks over a period of five years. We use credit-file data rather than industry survey data and, thus, focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions. In particular, we use bank-internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status to control for information-intensive relationships.
This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.
Es werden verschiedene Methoden zur Messung der Risikoeinstellung einzelner Individuen vorgestellt und kritisch diskutiert. Berücksichtigt werden unter anderem Selbsteinschätzungen und experimentell orientierte Verfahren. Die Zusammenstellung wendet sich insbesondere an Wissenschaftler und Praktiker, die nach anwendbaren Verfahren zur Risikoeinstellungsmessung suchen.
Ein Value-at-Risk-Limit wird als DM-Betrag gekennzeichnet, der von den tatsächlichen Handelsverlusten innerhalb einer bestimmten Zeitdauer nur mit geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit überschritten werden darf. Da der Bankvorstand i.d.R. Jahres-Value-at-Risk-Limite beschließt, im Handelsbereich die Geschäfte aber für einen kurzfristigen - unterstellt wird ein eintägiger - Planungshorizont abgeschlossen werden, ist zu klären, wie Jahres-Limite in Tages-Limite umgerechnet und während des Jahres realisierte Gewinne und Verluste auf die Limite angerechnet werden können. Auf der Grundlage des Umrechnungsverfahrens nach der Quadratwurzel-T-Formel lassen sich drei Verfahren für die Ermittlung des Tages-Limits unterscheiden: 1. Realisierte Gewinne und Verluste werden nicht angerechnet (starres Limit). 2. Bei Verlusteintritt vermindert sich das Tages-Limit für die Restperiode, realisierte Gewinne machen Kürzungen rückgängig (Verlustbegrenzungslimit). 3. Tages-Limite werden um Gewinne und Verluste angepaßt, wodurch eine Erweiterung des Handlungsspielraumes möglich ist (dynamisches Limit). Die drei Limite werden in einem Simulationsmodell gegeneinander abgewogen, wobei unterstellt wird, ein Händler handle nur eine einzige Aktie und antizipiere in 55% der Fälle die Kursrichtung. Die Simulationsergebnisse sind bei den unterstellten Renditeprozessen (geometrische Brownsche Bewegung und reale Renditen von 77 deutschen Aktien für die Zeit vom 01.01.1974 bis 31.12.1995) weitgehend identisch. Das dynamische Limit produziert deutlich höhere durchschnittliche Ergebnisse als das starre Limit und das Verlustbegrenzungslimit. Überschreitungen des Jahres-Limits treten nur beim starren Verfahren auf, die Häufigkeit ist allerdings wesentlich geringer als die zulässige Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1 %.
In this paper we analyze the relation between fund performance and market share. Using three performance measures we first establish that significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns of the funds in the sample exist. Thus, investors may react to past fund performance when making their investment decisions. We estimated a model relating past performance to changes in market share and found that past performance has a significant positive effect on market share. The results of a specification test indicate that investors react to risk-adjusted returns rather than to raw returns. This suggests that investors may be more sophisticated than is often assumed.
From the mid-seventies on, the central banks of most major industrial countries switched to monetary targeting. The Bundesbank was the first central bank to take this step, making the switch at the end of 1974. This changeover to monetary targeting was due to the difficulties which the Bundesbank - like other central banks - was facing in pursuing its original strategy, and whichcame to a head in the early seventies, when inflation escalated. A second factor was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which created the necessary scope for national monetary targeting. Finally, the advance of monetarist ideas fostered the explicit turn towards monetary targets, although the Bundesbank did not implement these in a mechanistic way. Whereas the Bundesbank has adhered to its policy of monetary targeting up to the present, nowadays monetary targeting plays only a minor role worldwide. Many central banks have switched to the strategy of direct inflation targeting. Others favour a more discretionary approach or a policy which is geared to the exchange rate. In the academic debate, monetary targeting is often presented as an outdated approach which has long since lost its basis of stable money demand. These findings give riseto a number of questions: Has monetary targeting actually become outdated? Which role is played by the concrete design of this strategy, and, against this background, how easily can it be transferred to European monetary union? This paper aims to answer these questions, drawing on the particular experience which the Bundesbank has gained of monetary targeting. It seems appropriate to discuss monetary targeting by using a specific example, since this notion is not very precise. This applies, for example, to the money definition used, the way the target is derived, the stringency applied in pursuing the target and the monetary management procedure.
In this speech (given at the CFSresearch conference on the Implementation of Price Stability held at the Bundesbank Frankfurt am Main, 10. - 12. Sept 1998), John Vickers discusses theoretical and practical issues relating to inflation targeting as used in the United Kingdom doing the past six years. After outlining the role of the Bank s Monetary Policy Committee, he considers the Committee s task from a theoretical perspective, beforediscussing the concept and measurement of domestically generated inflation.
Credit Unions are cooperative financial institutions specializing in the basic financial needs of certain groups of consumers. A distinguishing feature of credit unions is the legal requirement that members share a common bond. This organizing principle recently became the focus of national attention as the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress took opposite sides in a controversy regarding the number of common bonds that could co-exist within the membership of a single credit union. Despite its importance, little research has been done into how common bonds affect how credit unions actually operate. We frame the issues with a simple theoretical model of credit-union formation and consolidation. To provide intuition into the flexibility of multiple-group credit unions in serving members, we simulate the model and present some comparative-static results. We then apply a semi-parametric empirical model to a large dataset drawn from federally chartered occupational credit unions in 1996 to investigate the effects of common bonds. Our results suggest that credit unions with multiple common bonds have higher participation rates than credit unions that are otherwise similar but whose membership shares a single common bond.
"In this paper, I analyse the conduct of business rules included in the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) which has replaced the Investment Services Directive (ISD). These rules, in addition to being part of the regulation of investment intermediaries, operate as contractual standards in the relationships between intermediaries and their clients. While the need to harmonise similar rules is generally acknowledged, in the present paper I ask whether the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture, which governs securities lawmaking in the EU, has in some way improved regulation in this area. In section II, I examine the general aspects of the Lamfalussy process. In section III, I critically analyse the MiFID s provisions on conduct of business obligations, best execution of transactions and client order handling, taking into account the new regime of trade internalisation by investment intermediaries and the ensuing competition between these intermediaries and market operators. In sectionIV, I draw some general conclusions on the re-regulation made under the Lamfalussy regulatory structure and its limits. In this section, I make a few preliminary comments on the relevance of conduct of business rules to contract law, the ISD rules of conduct and the role of harmonisation."
Die rechtliche Beurteilung der Verwendung des Gewinns von Zentralbanken bewegt sich im Überschneidungsbereich von: 1) Währungsrecht 2) Finanzverfassungsrecht und 3) Finanzpolitik. Rechtliche Bedenken ergeben sich im Wesentlichen aus den verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben für die Staatsfinanzierung sowie aus der Garantie der Unabhängigkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank und der Bundesbank. Maßgebende Rechtsquellen sind sowohl das Recht der Europäischen Union als auch das deutsche Finanzverfassungsrecht, angereichert um das einfache Haushaltsrecht des Bundes.
Das Recht der sog. eigenkapitalersetzenden Gesellschafterdarlehen ist in der jüngeren Vergangenheit zunehmend Gegenstand der Kritik geworden. Mit dem nachfolgenden Beitrag wird auf der Grundlage einer kritischen Analyse der lex lata ein Vorschlag für eine Vereinfachung der Regeln über die Gesellschafterfremdfinanzierung in der Krise entwickelt.
This paper proves correctness of Nocker s method of strictness analysis, implemented for Clean, which is an e ective way for strictness analysis in lazy functional languages based on their operational semantics. We improve upon the work of Clark, Hankin and Hunt, which addresses correctness of the abstract reduction rules. Our method also addresses the cycle detection rules, which are the main strength of Nocker s strictness analysis. We reformulate Nocker s strictness analysis algorithm in a higherorder lambda-calculus with case, constructors, letrec, and a nondeterministic choice operator used as a union operator. Furthermore, the calculus is expressive enough to represent abstract constants like Top or Inf. The operational semantics is a small-step semantics and equality of expressions is defined by a contextual semantics that observes termination of expressions. The correctness of several reductions is proved using a context lemma and complete sets of forking and commuting diagrams. The proof is based mainly on an exact analysis of the lengths of normal order reductions. However, there remains a small gap: Currently, the proof for correctness of strictness analysis requires the conjecture that our behavioral preorder is contained in the contextual preorder. The proof is valid without referring to the conjecture, if no abstract constants are used in the analysis.
Work on proving congruence of bisimulation in functional programming languages often refers to [How89,How96], where Howe gave a highly general account on this topic in terms of so-called lazy computation systems . Particularly in implementations of lazy functional languages, sharing plays an eminent role. In this paper we will show how the original work of Howe can be extended to cope with sharing. Moreover, we will demonstrate the application of our approach to the call-by-need lambda-calculus lambda-ND which provides an erratic non-deterministic operator pick and a non-recursive let. A definition of a bisimulation is given, which has to be based on a further calculus named lambda-~, since the na1ve bisimulation definition is useless. The main result is that this bisimulation is a congruence and contained in the contextual equivalence. This might be a step towards defining useful bisimulation relations and proving them to be congruences in calculi that extend the lambda-ND-calculus.
In this paper we demonstrate how to relate the semantics given by the nondeterministic call-by-need calculus FUNDIO [SS03] to Haskell. After introducing new correct program transformations for FUNDIO, we translate the core language used in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler into the FUNDIO language, where the IO construct of FUNDIO corresponds to direct-call IO-actions in Haskell. We sketch the investigations of [Sab03b] where a lot of program transformations performed by the compiler have been shown to be correct w.r.t. the FUNDIO semantics. This enabled us to achieve a FUNDIO-compatible Haskell-compiler, by turning o not yet investigated transformations and the small set of incompatible transformations. With this compiler, Haskell programs which use the extension unsafePerformIO in arbitrary contexts, can be compiled in a "safe" manner.
This paper proposes a non-standard way to combine lazy functional languages with I/O. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach, a tiny lazy functional core language FUNDIO , which is also a call-by-need lambda calculus, is investigated. The syntax of FUNDIO has case, letrec, constructors and an IO-interface: its operational semantics is described by small-step reductions. A contextual approximation and equivalence depending on the input-output behavior of normal order reduction sequences is defined and a context lemma is proved. This enables to study a semantics of FUNDIO and its semantic properties. The paper demonstrates that the technique of complete reduction diagrams enables to show a considerable set of program transformations to be correct. Several optimizations of evaluation are given, including strictness optimizations and an abstract machine, and shown to be correct w.r.t. contextual equivalence. Correctness of strictness optimizations also justifies correctness of parallel evaluation. Thus this calculus has a potential to integrate non-strict functional programming with a non-deterministic approach to input-output and also to provide a useful semantics for this combination. It is argued that monadic IO and unsafePerformIO can be combined in Haskell, and that the result is reliable, if all reductions and transformations are correct w.r.t. to the FUNDIO-semantics. Of course, we do not address the typing problems the are involved in the usage of Haskell s unsafePerformIO. The semantics can also be used as a novel semantics for strict functional languages with IO, where the sequence of IOs is not fixed.
Context unification is a variant of second order unification. It can also be seen as a generalization of string unification to tree unification. Currently it is not known whether context unification is decidable. A specialization of context unification is stratified context unification, which is decidable. However, the previous algorithm has a very bad worst case complexity. Recently it turned out that stratified context unification is equivalent to satisfiability of one-step rewrite constraints. This paper contains an optimized algorithm for strati ed context unification exploiting sharing and power expressions. We prove that the complexity is determined mainly by the maximal depth of SO-cycles. Two observations are used: i. For every ambiguous SO-cycle, there is a context variable that can be instantiated with a ground context of main depth O(c*d), where c is the number of context variables and d is the depth of the SO-cycle. ii. the exponent of periodicity is O(2 pi ), which means it has an O(n)sized representation. From a practical point of view, these observations allow us to conclude that the unification algorithm is well-behaved, if the maximal depth of SO-cycles does not grow too large.
Context unification is a variant of second-order unification and also a generalization of string unification. Currently it is not known whether context uni cation is decidable. An expressive fragment of context unification is stratified context unification. Recently, it turned out that stratified context unification and one-step rewrite constraints are equivalent. This paper contains a description of a decision algorithm SCU for stratified context unification together with a proof of its correctness, which shows decidability of stratified context unification as well as of satisfiability of one-step rewrite constraints.
It is well known that first order uni cation is decidable, whereas second order and higher order unification is undecidable. Bounded second order unification (BSOU) is second order unification under the restriction that only a bounded number of holes in the instantiating terms for second order variables is permitted, however, the size of the instantiation is not restricted. In this paper, a decision algorithm for bounded second order unification is described. This is the fist non-trivial decidability result for second order unification, where the (finite) signature is not restricted and there are no restrictions on the occurrences of variables. We show that the monadic second order unification (MSOU), a specialization of BSOU is in sum p s. Since MSOU is related to word unification, this is compares favourably to the best known upper bound NEXPTIME (and also to the announced upper bound PSPACE) for word unification. This supports the claim that bounded second order unification is easier than context unification, whose decidability is currently an open question.
This paper describes the development of a typesetting program for music in the lazy functional programming language Clean. The system transforms a description of the music to be typeset in a dvi-file just like TEX does with mathematical formulae. The implementation makes heavy use of higher order functions. It has been implemented in just a few weeks and is able to typeset quite impressive examples. The system is easy to maintain and can be extended to typeset arbitrary complicated musical constructs. The paper can be considered as a status report of the implementation as well as a reference manual for the resulting system.
The extraction of strictness information marks an indispensable element of an efficient compilation of lazy functional languages like Haskell. Based on the method of abstract reduction we have developed an e cient strictness analyser for a core language of Haskell. It is completely written in Haskell and compares favourably with known implementations. The implementation is based on the G#-machine, which is an extension of the G-machine that has been adapted to the needs of abstract reduction.
This paper describes context analysis, an extension to strictness analysis for lazy functional languages. In particular it extends Wadler's four point domain and permits in nitely many abstract values. A calculus is presented based on abstract reduction which given the abstract values for the result automatically finds the abstract values for the arguments. The results of the analysis are useful for veri fication purposes and can also be used in compilers which require strictness information.
A partial rehabilitation of side-effecting I/O : non-determinism in non-strict functional languages
(1996)
We investigate the extension of non-strict functional languages like Haskell or Clean by a non-deterministic interaction with the external world. Using call-by-need and a natural semantics which describes the reduction of graphs, this can be done such that the Church-Rosser Theorems 1 and 2 hold. Our operational semantics is a base to recognise which particular equivalencies are preserved by program transformations. The amount of sequentialisation may be smaller than that enforced by other approaches and the programming style is closer to the common one of side-effecting programming. However, not all program transformations used by an optimising compiler for Haskell remain correct in all contexts. Our result can be interpreted as a possibility to extend current I/O-mechanism by non-deterministic deterministic memoryless function calls. For example, this permits a call to a random number generator. Adding memoryless function calls to monadic I/O is possible and has a potential to extend the Haskell I/O-system.
Automatic termination proofs of functional programming languages are an often challenged problem Most work in this area is done on strict languages Orderings for arguments of recursive calls are generated In lazily evaluated languages arguments for functions are not necessarily evaluated to a normal form It is not a trivial task to de ne orderings on expressions that are not in normal form or that do not even have a normal form We propose a method based on an abstract reduction process that reduces up to the point when su cient ordering relations can be found The proposed method is able to nd termination proofs for lazily evaluated programs that involve non terminating subexpressions Analysis is performed on a higher order polymorphic typed language and termi nation of higher order functions can be proved too The calculus can be used to derive information on a wide range on di erent notions of termination.
We consider unification of terms under the equational theory of two-sided distributivity D with the axioms x*(y+z) = x*y + x*z and (x+y)*z = x*z + y*z. The main result of this paper is that Dunification is decidable by giving a non-deterministic transformation algorithm. The generated unification are: an AC1-problem with linear constant restrictions and a second-order unification problem that can be transformed into a word-unification problem that can be decided using Makanin's algorithm. This solves an open problem in the field of unification. Furthermore it is shown that the word-problem can be decided in polynomial time, hence D-matching is NP-complete.
We consider the problem of unifying a set of equations between second-order terms. Terms are constructed from function symbols, constant symbols and variables, and furthermore using monadic second-order variables that may stand for a term with one hole, and parametric terms. We consider stratified systems, where for every first-order and second-order variable, the string of second-order variables on the path from the root of a term to every occurrence of this variable is always the same. It is shown that unification of stratified second-order terms is decidable by describing a nondeterministic decision algorithm that eventually uses Makanin's algorithm for deciding the unifiability of word equations. As a generalization, we show that the method can be used as a unification procedure for non-stratified second-order systems, and describe conditions for termination in the general case.
1. Das Gemeinschaftsrecht garantiert durch Art. 108 EGV umfassend die Weisungsfreiheit der Europäischen Zentralbank und der nationalen Zentralbanken als Institution. Diese Garantie erfasst auch die natürlichen Personen, die Mitglieder der Entscheidungsgremien sind. 2. Hinzu treten weiter Regelungen des Gemeinschaftsvertrages und der Satzung von ESZB und EZB, welche diese Garantie zu einer allgemeinen Unabhängigkeitsgarantie ausbauen und verstärken. 3. Garantiert ist vor allem auch die persönlicher Unabhängigkeit der Mitglieder in den Entscheidungsgremien. 4. Von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, sind diese Regelungen für das sekundäre Gemeinschaftsrecht unantastbar. Als Teil des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts können sie prinzipiell nur durch Vertragsänderung, also einstimmig verändert werden. 5. Diese europarechtlichen Garantien werden über Art. 88 Satz 2 GG für die Bundesbank als integrales Bestandteil des ESZB in das deutsche Verfassungsrecht transponiert. Daraus ergibt sich eine „gemeinschaftsrechtlich vermittelte verfassungsrechtliche Unabhängigkeitsgarantie“ für die Bundesbank. 6. Die Regelung ist mit dem Demokratieprinzip vereinbar. 7. Änderungen der umfassenden Garantie können die verfassungsrechtlichen Voraussetzungen für die Übertragung der währungs- und notenbankpolitischen Befugnisse auf das ESZB entfallen lassen. 8. Der Entwurf einer Verfassung für Europa enthält keine verfassungsrechtlich relevanten Relativierungen der Unabhängigkeitsgarantie. 9. Das Ziel der Preisstabilität hat den ihm gebührenden Rang behalten. Bei genauer Analyse zeigt sich auch, dass sein besonderer Rang für die Tätigkeit des ESZB nicht beeinträchtigt ist. 10. Ein Vergleich der verschiedenen sprachlichen Fassungen des Verfassungsvertrages zeigt auch, dass – entgegen dem deutschen Text – die EZB nicht als – möglicherweise weniger unabhängiges - Organ der EU, sondern als sonstige Einrichtung eingestuft worden ist.
Das neue Insiderrecht
(2004)
Mit Inkrafttreten von Art. 1 des Gesetzes zur Verbesserung des Anlegerschutzes (Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz - AnSVG) am 30. Oktober 2004 hat das WpHG zahlreiche Änderungen erfahren. Die nachfolgenden Ausführung gehen anhand einiger ausgewählter Beispiel der Frage nach, inwieweit die Marktmißbrauchsrichtlinie und ihre Umsetzung durch das AnSVG das bisher geltende Insiderrecht geändert haben. Vorab sei bemerkt, daß die Aufgabe, das neue Recht einigermaßen zutreffend zu interpretieren, durch die Besonderheiten des Rechtssetzungsverfahrens, das schließlich in die Neufassung des WpHG eingemündet ist, nicht gerade erleichtert wird: Die europarechtlichen Vorgaben finden sich nicht mehr nur in einer einzigen Richtlinie, sondern sind aufgrund des Komitologieverfahrens über zahlreiche Rechtsakte verteilt. Für das Insiderrecht sind neben der Marktmißbrauchsrichtlinie mehrere Durchführungsrichtlinien und eine Verordnung der Kommission von Bedeutung, für deren Verständnis wiederum die CESR-Vorschläge zusätzliche Anhaltspunkte bieten. Da schon die deutsche Fassung der Richtlinien in etlichen Punkten von den jeweiligen englischen Version und das WpHG wiederum nicht selten von den Richtlinien abweicht, entsteht bisweilen eine Art "stille Post"-Effekt, der es noch mehr als schon bislang notwendig macht, sich bei der Auslegung der Begriffe des WpHG zu vergewissern, ob sich die Umsetzung durch den deutschen Gesetzgeber innerhalb des europarechtlichen Rahmens bewegt. Insbesondere auf der Sanktionenseite ist das nicht durchweg der Fall.
Europäische Bankkonzerne sind nicht nur verpflichtet, konsolidierte Jahresabschlüsse zu erstellen, sie müssen seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre darüber hinaus ihr gesamtes regulatives Eigenkapital im Wege eines weiteren Konsolidierungsverfahrens ermitteln. Dieses Verfahren hat der deutsche Gesetzgeber im Kreditwesengesetz kodifiziert. Der folgende Beitrag erörtert offene Fragen, die sich bei Anwendung der kreditwesenrechtlichen Vorschriften über die Kapitalkonsolidierung stellen, und zeigt die Konsequenzen auf, die das Konsolidierungsverfahren auf die Geschäftsentfaltungsmöglickeiten der Konzernunternehmen hat. Die anschließende Analyse der Zweckmäßigkeit des Verfahrens soll belegen, dass sich die Pflicht zur Durchführung einer besonderen bankaufsichtsrechtlichen Kapitalkonsolidierung kaum rechtfertigen lässt. Der Autor plädiert daher für deren Abschaffung und für die Einführung einer generellen Pflicht zur Unterlegung von Bank-an-Bank Beteiligungen mit Haftungsmitteln.
Das Bankgeheimnis stellt weder ein absolutes Verbot der Weitergabe kundenbezogener Informationen noch ein Verbot der Abtretung von Forderungen gegen Kunden dar. Die aus dem Bankgeheimnis folgende Pflicht zur vertraulichen Behandlung von Informationen über Kunden wird ihrerseits durch immanente Grenzen beschränkt, soweit es die Ausübung von Gläubigerrechten der Bank in Frage steht. Eine Veräußerung und Abtretung von Forderungen und die dafür notwendige Weitergabe der Kundendaten wird daher durch das Bankgeheimnis nicht ausgeschlossen. Das Bankgeheimnis verpflichtet die Bank allerdings dazu, bei der Ausübung ihrer Gläubigerrechte die Vertraulichkeit der Informationen über die Geschäftsbeziehung so weit wie nur möglich zu wahren. Weitergehende Schranken zieht auch das Datenschutzrecht der Verwaltung und Verwertung von Forderungen durch die Bank nicht.
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BGH vom 24. November 2003, II ZR 171/01 : Das Urteil des BGH vom 24. 11. 2003 verschärft das Recht der Kapitalerhaltung empfindlich. Der Leitsatz, Kreditgewährungen an Gesellschafter, die nicht aus Rücklagen oder Gewinnvorträgen, sondern zu Lasten des gebundenen Vermögens der GmbH erfolgen, sind auch dann grundsätzlich als verbotene Auszahlung von Gesellschaftsvermögen zu bewerten, wenn der Rückzahlungsanspruch gegen den Gesellschafter im Einzelfall vollwertig sein sollte und die zugehörigen Urteilsgründe lassen erhebliche Auswirkungen nicht nur auf das Finanzierungsgebaren kleiner Gesellschaften, um die es in dem vom BGH entschiedenen Fall ging, sondern auch auf die Möglichkeiten der Innenfinanzierung großer Konzerne befürchten.
Der vorliegende Aufsatz befasst sich mit Fragen, die auftreten, wenn die an einer deutschen Börse notierten Aktien einer deutschen Gesellschaft auch an der New York Stock Exchange (im Folgenden “NYSE”) notiert werden und zwar ohne Zwischenschaltung von Hinterlegungsscheinen (American Depositary Receipts, im Folgenden “ADR”). Der Aufsatz behandelt dagegen nicht die Rechtsfragen, die sowohl bei einer Börsennotierung von Aktien als auch bei einer Börsennotierung von ADR einer deutschen Gesellschaft gelöst werden müssen, z.B. Rechtsfragen, die sich auf das US-amerikanische Kapitalmarktrecht, insbesondere das Bilanzrecht, die US-amerikanischen Anforderungen an die Corporate Governance, das Insiderverbot und Verhaltensregeln im Umgang mit der Presse beziehen.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
Lassen Sie mich einleitend mit fünf Thesen zu Basel II beginnen: 1. Basel II stellt einen flexiblen Regulierungsansatz dar, welcher auf einem Mix von privater Selbstregulierung und einer ständigen Überwachung durch staatliche Aufsichtsbehörden beruht. Möglicherweise repräsentiert Basel II einen Prototyp für einen neuartigen Regulierungsansatz im 21. Jahrhundert. 2. An dem Prozess bei Basel II auf internationaler Ebene nehmen neben staatlichen Stellen auch Marktteilnehmergruppen teil. Die Verhandlungen, die derzeit noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, erfolgen außerhalb der etablierten Regierungszirkel. Die Regelungen werden in unterschiedlich zusammengesetzten Unter- und Nebengruppen beim Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht vorbereitet. 3. Basel II reflektiert den Fakt der sich rasch wandelnden Finanzmärkte und anhaltender Fortentwicklungen bei den Bankgeschäften. Insoweit bildet Basel II eher einen Prozess als einen festen Zustand ab. 4. Stärker als die bisherigen Aufsichtsregularien bewirkt Basel II einen Anpassungsdruck in Richtung eines globalen Standards, im Zuge dessen eine Nivellierung der bestehenden, historisch gewachsenen und national geprägten Finanzierungsformen latent einhergehen dürfte. 5. Basel II verlangt eine aufwendige Betreuung –sowohl im Hinblick auf dessen Ausgestaltung als Regelungswerk als auch auf dessen praktische Anwendung. Expertise gewinnt an Bedeutung. Daraus könnten möglicherweise Verunsicherungen oder gar ein latentes Unbehagen bei den Bankkunden resultieren. Hier erscheint eine Aufklärung über die sachlichen Zusammenhänge bei Basel II angebracht.
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
Der Titel des Vortrags benennt eine der wichtigsten Abgrenzungsfragen, die man sich zu stellen hat, sobald man es mit Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation zu tun hat. Was ist zulässiges Marktverhalten, was muss jeder Marktteilnehmer tun dürfen, ohne mit einem Bein im Gefängnis zu stehen und wo fängt die verbotene Kursmanipulation an? Eine bedeutsame Unterscheidung für die aktiven Akteure am Kapitalmarkt, um Klarheit darüber zu haben, was erlaubt ist und was nicht. Der Markt braucht das Vertrauen der Anleger, und Anleger vertrauen nur in ordnungsgemäß funktionierende Märkte, in Märkte, an denen Preisbildungsmechanismen funktionieren und kontrolliert werden. Daher ist es notwendig,Vorkehrungen zu treffen, die gewährleisten, dass Märkte funktionieren und Preise sich an Märkten manipulationsfrei bilden können und auch bilden. Auf der präventiven Seite tragen hierzu die Handelsregeln der verschiedenen Börsen bei, die insbesondere dezidierte Regelungen zur Preisbildung beinhalten. Sie sollen gewährleisten, dass Preise ordnungsgemäß zustande kommen und einen fairen Ausgleich von Angebot und Nachfrage darstellen. Ergänzt wird dieser präventive Aspekt durch die repressive Seite, nämlich die Ahndung von Fehlverhalten. Hierzu gab es bisher die Regelung des Kursbetrugs in § 88 Börsengesetz. Diese Vorschrift existierte inhaltlich bereits über 100 Jahre, in denen sie aber, wenn nicht tot, so doch zumindest annähernd scheintot war. Denn es sind kaum Verurteilungen oder sonstige Maßnahmen auf der Grundlage dieser Norm bekannt. Wollte man aus diesem Schattendasein allerdings folgern, dass aufgrund des integren Verhaltens der Marktteilnehmer eine solche Regelung obsolet sei, so wäre das ein Fehlschluss. Mit dem Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, das zum 01. Juli 2002 in Kraft tat, wurde dann auch eine Reform durchgeführt. Die alte Vorschrift wurde gestrichen und durch die neue Regelung des Verbots der Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation im Wertpapierhandelsgesetz ersetzt. Dort wurden §§ 20a und 20b neu eingefügt. Die Aufgabe der Überwachung dieses Manipulationsverbots und die Verfolgung von Verstößen wurde der BaFin übertragen.
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
Bei der Regulierung und Aufsicht auf den internationalen Wertpapiermärkten gibt es immer noch viele Unterschiede bei den Regelungsinhalten und in der Prioritätensetzung. Die steigende weltweite Verflechtung der Finanzsektoren und deren Akteure sowie die hohe Kapitalmobilität machen es jedoch zunehmend erforderlich, auch die Aufsicht zunehmend zu internationalisieren. Internationale Aufsichtsstandards wiederum können grenzüberschreitende Aktivitäten von Marktteilnehmern erleichtern und sicherer machen. Es ist inzwischen anerkannt, dass eine gute und effiziente Regulierung einen Finanzplatz gerade im internationalen Umfeld attraktiv macht und so dessen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit erhöht. Es ist daher von großer Bedeutung, die nationale Aufsicht internationalen Standards folgen zu lassen. Eine wichtige Funktion bei der Aufstellung dieser Standards haben die internationalen Organisationen wie IOSCO im Wertpapierhandel, die IAIS im Versicherungs- und der Baseler Ausschuss im Bankenbereich inne. In vielfältiger Weise ist deren Arbeit für den Finanzplatz Deutschland richtungsweisend. Das sind wichtige Gründe, weshalb die Teilnahme an Aktivitäten der IOSCO, Mitarbeit an Berichten, Standards und Resolutionen der IOSCO dem deutschen Kapitalmarkt und insbesondere dem Wertpapierhandel in Deutschland nützen kann. Um näher verständlich machen zu können, auf welche Weise IOSCO dem deutschen Kapitalmarkt in diesem Sinne nützlich sein kann, und Arbeiten in der IOSCO von Bedeutung für das deutsche Recht im Bereich des Wertpapierhandels sind, ist es zunächst wichtig, die Organisation IOSCO (1) , ihre Zielsetzung (2) und Struktur (3) zu verstehen, und die Bereiche zu kennen, in denen IOSCO arbeitet (4) sowie die Formen und jeweilige Bindungswirkung der Produkte der IOSCO (5). Wichtig in diesem Zusammenhang sind auch Art und Weise, auf die in IOSCO Beschlossenes unser Finanzsystem tangieren kann und bereits tangiert hat.
Die Begrenzung der Beteiligungen von Einlagenkreditinstituten an Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG ist mit der Einführung des Begriffs der qualifizierten Beteiligung (§ 1 Abs. 15 KWG) durch das Vierte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz1 neu geregelt worden, nachdem § 12 KWG bereits zuvor im Rahmen der 6. KWG-Novelle2 gänzlich umgestaltet wurde3. Bislang knüpfte die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Reglementierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen an den Begriff der bedeutenden Beteiligung im Sinne von § 1 Abs. 9 KWG an. Da dieser Begriff zugleich Anknüpfungspunkt für die Regeln über die Anteilseignerkontrolle gemäß § 2b KWG ist und beiden Regelungsbereichen ein unterschiedlicher Normzweck zugrunde liegt, hat es der Gesetzgeber aus Gründen der Rechtsklarheit für erforderlich gehalten, den Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung einzuführen, um nicht völlig unterschiedliche Sachverhalte mit dem gleichen juristischen Term zu besetzen 4. § 2b KWG dient dazu, die an Instituten tatsächlich bestehenden Machtverhältnisse offenzulegen, um es der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) zu ermöglichen, etwaige Gefahren für die Funktionsfähigkeit von Instituten rechtzeitig abzuwehren5. Demgegenüber sollen durch die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 und 2 KWG in erster Linie Ansteckungsrisiken reduziert werden6. Beteiligungen können die Solidität des beteiligten Unternehmens in Gefahr bringen, wenn das Beteiligungsunternehmen in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten gerät oder sogar insolvent wird. Für Einlagenkreditinstitute ist die Gefahr einer beteiligungsbedingten Ansteckung besonders hoch, da sie ihre Aktiva durch die Hereinnahme von Einlagen überwiegend fremd finanzieren7. Die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Beteiligungsreglementierung verdient vor dem Hintergrund ihrer neuen Fassung eine nähere Überprüfung. Bei der Untersuchung wird insbesondere der für die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen zentrale Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung nach 1 Abs. 15 KWG analysiert (dazu III.). Darüber hinaus werden die sonstigen Tatbestandsmerkmale des § 12 Abs. 1 KWG (dazu II. und IV.) sowie die Folgen der Überschreitung vorgegebener Beteiligungsbegrenzungen erörtert (dazu V.). Eine Beurteilung der Regulierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG rundet den Beitrag ab.
Bei der Bestimmung von Eingriffsbefugnissen der BaFin jenseits der vom Gesetz vorgesehenen besonderen Kompetenzen ist Zurückhaltung geboten: Die Auffangermächtigung nach § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG ist keine Allzweckwaffe nach Art der polizeilichen Generalklausel, sondern soll lediglich die besonderen Ermittlungs- und Eingriffsbefugnisse der Behörde dort ergänzen, wo diese Befugnisse auch im Zusammenwirken mit anderen Rechtsfolgen von Pflichtverstößen nicht ausreichen, um die Regelungen des Gesetzes durchzusetzen und das Gesetz dieses Sanktionsdefizit auch nicht bewusst in Kauf nimmt. In den praktisch wichtigen Fällen der Erzwingung von Pflichtangeboten, der Änderung von Angeboten nach ihrer Veröffentlichung und des Einschreitens gegen unzulässige Abwehrmaßnahmen ist danach für den Rückgriff auf § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG kaum Raum. Beim Rechtsschutz Dritter gegenüber der BaFin verfolgt das Gesetz eine mittlere Linie: Amtshaftungsansprüche wegen fehlerhafter Aufsicht und Ansprüche auf Einschreiten der Behörde sind durch die Öffentlichkeitsklausel des § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG in verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklicher Weise ausgeschlossen. Dagegen besagt § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG nichts über die Schutzrichtung der Regelungen über das Angebotsverfahren. Die Vorschrift steht dementsprechend nicht einer Anfechtung begünstigender Verfügungen durch Dritte entgegen, soweit das Gesetz auch den Schutz ihrer Interessen bezweckt. Daher sind insbesondere Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft befugt, mit Widerspruch und Beschwerde gegen Befreiungen nach §§ 36 und 37 WpÜG vorzugehen, die in ihr Recht auf Abgabe eines Pflichtangebotes eingreifen.
Thema dieses Beitrags ist zum einen eine kritische Würdigung des Flächentarifvertrages (FTV) im Hinblick auf seine Regelungsdichte und zum anderen die theoretische Analyse eines Elements des Flexibilisierungspotentials des FTV, namlich der Öffnungsklausel, unter Berücksichtigung der Insider-Outsider-Problematik. Im Ergebnis kommt dieser Beitrag zu dem Schluß, daß der FTV nicht überholt, wohl aber dringend und umfassend überholungsbedürftig ist. Wichtig erscheint eine differenzierende Betrachtung, denn nicht alle diskutierten Flexibilisierungsmaßnahmen führen notwendigerweise zu Beschäftigungsgewinnen. Die Regelungsdichte des FTV kommt unter anderem zum Tragen, wenn bisher tarifgebundene Unternehmen beispielsweise auf Grund einer überzogenen Lohnpolitik den FTV verlassen wollen. Sie müssen zunächst erhebliche Nachwirkungsfristen des FTV beachten, können aber häufig selbst als nicht (mehr) tarifgebundene Unternehmen keine Lohnabschlüsse mit ihrem Betriebsrat tätigen. Die Regelungsdichte wird zudem durch die Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit verstärkt, beispielsweise durch das in diesem Beitrag kritisierte Urteil des Bundesarbeitsgerichts, welches unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen eine Verbandsklage als zulässig erklärt. Ein gründlich reformierter FTV, der einer erforderlichen Flexibilität auf der betrieblichen Ebene Rechnung trägt, weist eine Reihe von Vorteilen auf. Denn Lohnverhandlungen ausschließlich auf der betrieblichen Ebene führen dort zu teilweise beachtlichen Transaktionskosten, zwingen die Unternehmensleitung zur Offenlegung der Bücher (gegenüber dem Betriebsrat) und verstärken unter Umständen ein Insider-Outsider-Verhalten. Der Beitrag unternimmt im weiteren eine theoretische Analyse der Beschäftigungswirkungen des FTV und eines Haustarifvertrages (HTV) als mögliche Alternative. Das vorgeschlagene Modell integriert Insider-Outsider-Verhalten und die Möglichkeit einer Tariföffnungsklausel. Das Modell zeigt, daß aus theoretischer Sicht keine eindeutige Rangordnung zwischen HTV und FTV hinsichtlich ihrer Beschäftigungswirkungen besteht. Auch führt eine Tariföffnungsklausel nicht notwendigerweise zu höherer Beschäftigung, da die Gewerkschaften fur die Situationen mit günstigen Güternachfrageschocks einen vergleichsweise hohen Lohn anstreben. Angesichts der theoretisch unklaren Ergebnisse plädiert die Arbeit fur eine Reform des FTV anstelle eines drastischen Systemwechsels hin zu HTV.
Diese Arbeit untersucht empirisch den Zusammenhang von Beschäftigung und Lohnstrukturen zwischen sowie innerhalb von Qualifikations- und Altersgruppen. Zunächst werden Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Qualifikations- und Altersgruppen geschätzt und die Lohnveränderungen bestimmt, die notwendig gewesen wären, um im Jahre 1997 die qualifikationsspezifischen Arbeitslosenquoten zu halbieren. Die geschätzten Substitutionselastizitäten sind sehr hoch. Die notwendige Lohnreduktion liegt nominal zwischen 9% und 10,6% und fällt umso höher aus, je geringer die Qualifikation der Arbeitnehmergruppe ist. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen residualer Lohnungleichheit und Beschäftigungsdynamik. Es werden konkurrierende Implikationen aus der Theorie der Grenzproduktivitätsentlohnung und der Suchtheorie abgeleitet und empirisch untersucht. Die Ergebnisse sind für keine der beiden Theorien überzeugend. Das robuste Ergebnis einer signifikant positiven Korrelation zwischen dem Niveau der Arbeitslosenquote und der residualen Lohnungleichheit legt allerdings nahe, dass Suchfriktionen zur Erklärung der residualen Lohndispersion beitragen können. JEL - Klassifikation: J31 , J21 , E24 , J64
Despite the apparent stability of the wage bargaining institutions in West Germany, aggregate union membership has been declining dramatically since the early 90's. However, aggregate gross membership numbers do not distinguish by employment status and it is impossible to disaggregate these sufficiently. This paper uses four waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees. We estimate a correlated random effects probit model suggested in Chamberlain (1984) to take proper account of individual specfic effects. Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Thus, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also use the estimates to predict net union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample for the time period 1985 to 1997. JEL - Klassifikation: J5
The paper analyses the financial structure of German inward FDI. From a tax perspective, intra-company loans granted by the parent should be all the more strongly preferred over equity the lower the tax rate of the parent and the higher the tax rate of the German affiliate. From our study of a panel of more than 8,000 non-financial affiliates in Germany, we find only small effects of the tax rate of the foreign parent. However, our empirical results show that subsidiaries that on average are profitable react more strongly to changes in the German corporate tax rate than this is the case for less profitable firms. This gives support to the frequent concern that high German taxes are partly responsible for the high levels of intracompany loans. Taxation, however, does not fully explain the high levels of intra-company borrowing. Roughly 60% of the cross-border intra-company loans turn out to be held by firms that are running losses. JEL - Klassifikation H25 , F23 .
Differenzierte Verdienststrukturen, wie zum Beispiel qualifikatorische Verdienstunterschiede, tragen der Heterogenität am Arbeitsmarkt und somit auch einer notwendigen Flexibilität der Löhne Rechnung. Trotz dieser bedeutenden Rolle der Lohnstruktur für den Arbeitsmarkt gibt es relativ wenig detaillierte empirische Evidenz zu deren Ausgestaltung und Dynamik für Westdeutschland. In dieser Arbeit werden auf Basis der Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebungen für die Jahre 1990 und 1995 sowohl die Lohndispersion innerhalb bestimmter Erwerbsgruppen („Within-Dispersion“) als auch zwischen diesen Gruppen („Between-Dispersion“) untersucht. Im Fokus der Analysen steht dabei der Vergleich zwischen den Erwerbsgruppen der vollzeitbeschäftigten Männer, der vollzeitbeschäftigten Frauen und der teilzeitbeschäftigten Frauen nach den Qualifikationsniveaus: ohne Berufsabschluss, mit Berufsabschluss und mit Hochschulabschluss. Dichteschätzungen des Bruttotageslohns zeigen, dass vollzeiterwerbstätige Männer über die gesamte Verteilung den höchsten Verdienst aufweisen. Weiterhin deuten die Dichteschätzungen darauf hin, dass die geschlechtsspezifischen Lohndifferentiale mit zunehmendem Verdienst steigen. Der selbe Sachverhalt findet sich auch für die qualifikatorischen Verdienstunterschiede. Mit steigendem Qualifikationsniveau steigt sowohl der Lohn als auch die Dispersion. Besonders ausgeprägt ist die qualifikatorische Dispersion für Männer. Eine Analyse der Lohndifferentiale sowohl innerhalb der Erwerbsgruppen als auch zwischen Männern und Frauen weist darauf hin, dass in der Gruppe der teilzeiterwerbstätigen Frauen die größte Lohndispersion vorzufinden ist und dass diese im Zeitablauf zugenommen hat. Ferner sind die Lohndifferentiale im unteren Bereich der Verteilung kleiner als im oberen. Die weitere Disaggregation nach dem Qualifikationsniveau reduziert die Within-Dispersion, wobei die Lohnunterschiede innerhalb der Erwerbsgruppen mit steigendem Qualifikationsniveau tendenziell zunehmen. Schließlich nimmt die Within-Dispersion für vollzeitbeschäftigte Hochschulabsolventinnen im Zeitablauf zu, während sie für die Teilzeitbeschäftigten sinkt. Betrachtet man die Qualifikations- und die Verteilungsdimension, zeigt sich, dass in beiden Jahren lediglich für vollzeiterwerbstätige Frauen ohne Berufsabschluss bzw. mit Hochschulabschluss das geschlechtsspezifische Differential über die Verteilung hinweg steigt. Für alle anderen Gruppen geht es über die Verteilung hinweg zurück. Die Lohndifferentiale zwischen Männern und Frauen haben im Zeitablauf abgenommen. Das mittlere Reallohnwachstum zwischen 1990 und 1995 ist für teilzeiterwerbstätige Frauen mit 6,8% am höchsten und für vollzeiterwerbstätige Männer mit 0,7% am geringsten. Die Reduktion der geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede im Zeitablauf ist unter Berücksichtigung des Qualifikationsniveaus noch ausgeprägter. Dies gilt vor allem für teilzeiterwerbstätige Frauen ohne Berufsabschluss und mit Hochschulabschluss. Für teilzeiterwerbstätige Frauen und für vollzeiterwerbstätige Männer findet sich im Zeitablauf eine zunehmende Lohnspreizung, während für vollzeiterwerbstätige Frauen die Verteilung konstant bleibt. Eine Zunahme der Lohnspreizung ist dabei insbesondere bei Hochschulabsolventen festzustellen, sowohl für vollzeiterwerbstätige Männer wie Frauen. Im Unterschied dazu hat für diese Erwerbsgruppen die Lohndispersion bei den Mittelqualifizierten in den 90er Jahren abgenommen.
This paper is a draft for the chapter German banks and banking structure of the forthcoming book The German financial system . As such, the paper starts out with a description of past and present structural features of the German banking industry. Given the presented empirical evidence it then argues that great care has to be taken when generalising structural trends from one financial system to another. Whilst conventio nal commercial banking is clearly in decline in the US, it is far from clear whether the dominance of banks in the German financial system has been significantly eroded over the last decades. We interpret the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patterns of firms between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for our view that the way in which and the extent to which German banks fulfil the central functions for the financial system are still consistent with the overall logic of the German financial system. In spite of the current dire business environment for financial intermediaries we do not expect the German financial system and its banking industry as an integral part of this system to converge to the institutional arrangements typical for a market-oriented financial system. This Version: March 25, 2003
Initiated by the seminal work of Diamond/Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1984), advances in the theory of financial intermediation have sharpened our understanding of the theoretical foundations of banks as special financial institutions. What makes them "unique" is the combination of accepting deposits and issuing loans. However, in recent years the notion of "disintermediation" has gained tremendous popularity, especially among American observers. These observers argue that deregulation, globalisation and advances in information technology have been eroding the role of banks as intermediaries and thus their alleged uniqueness. It is even assumed that ever more efficiently organised capital markets and specialised financial institutions that take advantage of these markets, such as mutual funds or finance companies, will lead to the demise of banks. Using a novel measurement concept based on intermediation and securitisation ratios, the present article provides evidence which shows that banking disintermediation is indeed a reality for the US financial system. This seems to indicate that American banks are not all that "unique"; they can be replaced to a considerable extent. Moreover, many observers seem to believe that what has happened in the US reflects a universal trend. However, empirical results reported in this paper indicate that such a trend has not manifested itself in other financial systems, and in particular, not in Germany or Japan. Evidence on the enormous structural differences between financial systems and the lack of unequivocal signs of convergence render any inferences from the American experience to other financial systems very problematic.
Diese Arbeit vergleicht die Verdienststrukturen in Westdeutschland für die Jahre 1990 und 1995 basierend auf der Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung und der IAB—Beschäftigtenstichprobe. Wir betrachten Verdienstunterschiede im Hinblick auf die berufliche Qualifikation, das Geschlecht, den Erwerbsstatus, die Branchenzugehörigkeit und das Alter. Die Analyse verwendet die Methode der Quantilsregressionen und ist rein deskriptiver Natur. Die beiden Datensätze unterscheiden sich teilweise in der Stichprobenzusammensetzung und es finden sich zum Teil Unterschiede in den geschätzten Verdienstrelationen. Qualitativ stimmen die Ergebnisse vor allem für Männer relativ gut überein. Die Verdienststrukturen erweisen sich als sehr differenziert, beispielsweise nehmen geschlechtsspezifische und qualifikatorische Verdienstunterschiede wie auch die Verdienstdispersion innerhalb einer Arbeitnehmergruppe typischerweise mit dem Alter zu. JEL - Klassifikation: C14 , J31 , C80