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This article documents and classifies instances of transnational intellectual property (IP) enforcement and licensing on the Internet with a particular focus on the territorial reach of the respective regimes. Regarding IP enforcement, I show that the bulk of transnational or even global measures is adopted in the context of “voluntary” self-regulation by various intermediaries, namely domain name registrars, access and host providers, search engines, and advertising and payment services. Global IP licensing is, in contrast, less prevalent than one might expect. It is practically limited to freely accessible Open Content, whereas markets for fee-based services remain territorially fragmented. Overall, three layers of IP governance on the Internet can be distinguished. Based on global licenses, Open Content is freely accessible everywhere. Plain IP infringements are equally combatted on a worldwide scale. Territorial fragmentation persists, instead, in the market segment of fee-based services and in hard cases of conflicts of IP laws/rights. All three universal norms (global accessibility, global illegality, global fragmentation) are supported by a quite solid, “rough” global consensus.
On the basis of the economic theory of network effects, this article provides a novel explanation of the so-called patent paradox, i.e. the question why the propensity to patent is so strong when the expected average value of most patents is low. It demonstrates that the patent system of a country resembles a telephone network or a social media platform. Patents are perceived as nodes in a virtual network that, as a whole, exhibits network effects. It is explained why patents are not independent of other patents but that they complement each other in several ways both within and beyond markets and fields of technology, and that patents thus create synchronization value over and above individual interests of patent holders in exclusivity. As a consequence, the more patents there are, the more valuable it is to also seek patents, and vice versa. Since patents thus display increasing returns to adoption, the willingness to pay for the next patent slopes upwards. This explains why, after a phase of early instability and a certain tipping point, many countries’ patent systems expanded quickly and eventually became a rigid standard (“lock-in”). The concluding section raises the question what regulatory measures are suitable to effectively address the ensuing anticommons effects.
The long-standing battle between economic nationalism and globalism has again taken center stage in geopolitics. This article applies this dichotomy to the law and policy of international intellectual property (IP). Most commentators see IP as a prime example of globalization. The article challenges this view on several levels. In a nutshell, it claims that economic nationalist concerns about domestic industries and economic development lie at the heart of the global IP system. To support this argument, the article summarizes and categorizes IP policies adopted by selected European countries, the European Union, and the U.S. Section I presents three types of inbound IP policies that aim to foster local economic development and innovation. Section II adds three versions of outbound IP policies that, in contrast, target foreign countries and markets. Concluding section III traces a dialectic virtuous circle of economic nationalist motives leading to global legal structures and identifies the function and legal structure of IP as the reason for the resilience and even dominance of economic nationalist motives in international IP politics. IP concerns exclusive private rights that are territorially limited creatures of (supra-)national statutes. These legal structures make up the economic nationalist DNA of IP.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
Do current levels of bank capital in Europe suffice to support a swift recovery from the COVID-19 crisis? Recent research shows that a well-capitalized banking sector is a major factor driving the speed and breadth of recoveries from economic downturns. In particular, loan supply is negatively affected by low levels of capital. We estimate a capital shortfall in European banks of up to 600 billion euro in a severe scenario, and around 143 billion euro in a moderate scenario. We propose a precautionary recapitalization on the European level that puts the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) center stage. This proposal would cut through the sovereign-bank nexus, safeguard financial stability, and position the Eurozone for a quick recovery from the pandemic.
The article is designed to introduce and analyze authoritarian constitutionalism as an important phenomenon in its own right, not merely a deficient or deviant version of liberal constitutionalism. Therefore it is not adequate to dismiss it as sham or window-dressing. Instead, its crucial features – participation as complicity, power as property and the cult of immediacy – are related to the basic assumption that authoritarian constitutions are texts with a purpose that warrant careful analysis of the domestic and transnational audience.
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
The EU Collective Redress Recommendation has invited Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms by 26 July 2015. The well-known reservations claim potentially abusive litigation and potential settlement of not well-founded claims resulting from controversial funding of cases by means of contingency fees and from ‘opt-out’ class action procedures. The paper posits that there may also be some fear that the European Commission may try to pursue the enforcement of its regulatory agenda in this way at the expense of individual claimants’ interests. Therefore a comparative analysis is carried out to see to what extent concerns about individual rights as opposed to regulatory goals are reflected in the different newly revised systems in place across Europe. As an iterim result the Dutch settlement procedure for mass damage claims, the English Group Litigation Order and the German test case procedure turn out to be relatively well-suited to deal with mass damage claims. At the same time, none of them can quite reach an optimal balance between individual rights and regulatory goals and therefore each of them is subject to criticism. That is why the further question is raised in how far these procedures could complement each other, thus contributing to the enforcement of individual rights without overregulating markets in Europe.
This paper reexamines the current legal landscape regarding the protection of trade marks and other industrial property rights in signs on the Internet. It is based on a comparative analysis of EU and national laws, in particular, German, U.S., and U.K. law. It starts with a short restatement of the principles governing trade mark conflicts that occur within a particular jurisdiction (part 2) and proceeds to the regulation of transnational disputes (part 3). This juxtaposition yields two basic approaches. Whereas trade mark conflicts within closed legal systems are generally adjudicated according to a binary either/or logic, transnational disputes are and should indeed be solved in a way that leads to a fair coexistence of conflicting trade mark laws and rights under multiple laws. This paper explains how geolocation technologies can alleviate the implementation of the principle of fair coexistence in concrete cases.
On 14 September 2016, the European Commission proposed a Directive on “copyright in the Digital Single Market”. This proposal includes an Article 11 on the “protection of press publications concerning digital uses”, according to which “Member States shall provide publishers of press publications with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC for the digital use of their press publications.” Relying on the experiences and debates surrounding the German and Spanish laws in this area, this study presents a legal analysis of the proposal for an EU related right for press publishers (RRPP). After a brief overview over the general limits of the EU competence to introduce such a new related right, the study critically examines the purpose of an RRPP. On this basis, the next section distinguishes three versions of an RRPP with regard to its subject-matter and scope, and considers the practical and legal implications of these alternatives, in particular having regard to fundamental rights.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Both are distinct sources of public international law (Art. 38(1)(b) and (c) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice). In a first step, I analyze the different meanings of principles as a “source” of international law. Second, I consider different approaches to principles as a norm type in legal theory. Third, I discuss attempts in international legal doctrine to facilitate conceptual issues by either unifying general principles as a source with the source of customary international law or by equating general principles as a source and as a norm type. Finally, I propose that the delimitation between customary international law and general principles of law as sources of international law should follow the distinction between situations dominated by factual reciprocity (which justify customary norms) and situations where such factual reciprocity is absent (which justify general principles). The jurisgenerative processes leading to the emergence of general principles of international law are processes of changing identities and argumentative self-entrapment.
Scholarship and practice
(2016)
How can I as an international lawyer, conscious that international law is deeply implicated in today’s global injustices and that the course of history will not be changed by any grand legal design, practice law responsibly? Taking as a point of departure my own desire not to seek comfort in the formulation of a critique of law, but to aspire to a responsible practice, I consult two quite different bodies of work: first, critical theory of law and second, recent scholarship on international law that argues a practice guided by ethics may enhance the legitimacy of international law. I turn then to my own practice of international economic law focusing on my occasional role as legal expert on the so-called megaregionals the EU aims to conclude with Canada and the United States. I propose that the debate on international economic law lacks an investigation into the role of law in shaping political economy; that this lack can be explained by the compartmentalization of expertise which leads to justification gaps with respect to projects such as the megaregionals. One way how lawyers can assume responsibility is to work on closing these gaps even if it means leaving the ‘inside’ of the legal discipline. Finally, I suggest that a responsible legal practice of social change might follow Roberto Unger’s call for institutional imagination. Maybe I can satisfy my wish for a transformative practice by joining forces with friends in experimenting with institutions, hoping to build an alternative political economy.
Constitutionalization beyond the nation state can be observed as an evolutionary process that leads in two quite different directions: (1) constitutions evolve in transnational political processes outside the nation state; (2) simulta-neously, constitutions evolve outside international politics in global society’s ‘private’ sectors. What, however, is the specifically societal element in societal constitutionalism? This is currently the object of a controversy regarding the subjects of non-state constitutions, their origin, their legitimization, their scope, and their internal structures. This article interprets the controversy as a theme with a number of variations. What is the distinctive ‘compositional principle’ in each particular variation? Which problems become evident in its ‘development’? What are its most valuable ‘motifs’? The article starts with David Sciulli’s theme of societal constitutionalism. Then it presents six variations on Sciulli. In a first group, constitutionalization is perceived as the expansion of a single rationality into all spheres of society. In a second group, the motif of the unity of the consti-tution can still be heard, despite the essential pluralism of societal constitution-alism. In the final movement, three further variations will then reprise and devel-op further the most important motifs, in a resumption of the original theme.
The article, which summarizes key findings of my German book ‘Die Gemeinfreiheit. Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik’ (‘The Public Domain: Theory, Func-tion, Doctrine’), asks whether there are any provisions or principles under Ger-man and EU law that protect the public domain from interference by the legisla-ture, courts and private parties. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to step out of the intellectual property (IP) system and to analyze this body of law from the outside, and – even more important – to develop a positive legal conception of the public domain as such. By giving the public domain a proper doctrinal place in the legal system, the structural asymmetry between heavily theorized and protected IP rights on the one hand and a neglected public do-main on the other is countered. The overarching normative purpose is to devel-op a framework for a balanced IP system, which can only be achieved if the public domain forms an integral part of the overall regulation of information.
According to the prevailing view, the purpose of digital copyright is to balance conflicting interests in exclusivity on the one hand and in access to information on the other. This article offers an alternative reading of the conflicts surrounding copyright in the digital era. It argues that two cultures of communication coexist on the internet, each of which has a different relationship to copyright. Whereas copyright institutionalizes and supports a culture of exclusivity, it is at best neutral towards a culture of free and open access. The article shows that, depending on the future regulation of copyright and the internet in general, the dynamic coexistence of these cultures may well be replaced by an overwhelming dominance of the culture of exclusivity.
Dieser Beitrag ist ein Besprechungsaufsatz zu Beatrice Brunhöbers 2010 erschienener Dissertation Die Erfindung „demokratischer Repräsentation“ in den Federalist Papers (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 14), in der Brunhöber die innovative – und auch die Verfassungsentwicklung andernorts prägende – Kraft der Verbindung von Demokratie, politischer Repräsentation und Föderalismusidee durch die amerikanischen Verfassungsväter herausarbeitet. Auf der Basis von Brunhöbers Untersuchung geht es insbesondere darum, wie sich das von Hamilton, Madison und Jay entworfene ‚alte‘ Konzept zur Gestaltung eines starken Gemeinwesens (eingeschlossen das vertrauensbildende Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung) für einen integrativen Umgang mit den ‚modernen‘ Gegebenheiten pluralistischer Gesellschaften nutzbar machen läßt, im Blick die Gesamtheit (und Vielfalt) des Staatsvolkes als Geltungsfundament legitimer Herrschaft. Im Hintergrund steht die Frage nach Möglichkeiten zur Nutzbarmachung historischer Vergewisserungen für heutige Debatten überhaupt.
Ecolabels are frequently presented as consumer information tools that efficiently promote environmental aims such as the sustainability of fisheries. Two recent WTO dispute settlement cases -- Tuna II and COOL -- have called into question the characterisation of labels as ‘consumer information tools’ by illuminating the regulatory power and purposes of labelling. Tuna II moreover clarifies that WTO law does not necessarily privilege ecolabelling over more openly interventionist government measures aimed at environmental protection. In this contribution I first sketch two views of ecolabelling -- one that depicts ecolabelling as primarily aiming at consumer information and another that stresses the regulatory function of labelling. I then turn to the dispute settlement reports in Tuna II and COOL in order to specify the government authority involved in many labelling schemes. I conclude this contribution with the call for a critical assessment of ecolabelling. The power of ecolabelling may be employed to reshape markets and promote green growth. At the same time, however, it may consolidate a trend that places the consumer at the centre of initiatives for societal change and loses sight of potentially more radical transformations through the engagement of human beings as citizens.
This country report was prepared for the 19th World Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in Vienna in 2014. It is structured as a questionnaire and provides an overview of the legal framework for Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and other alternative license models like (e.g.) Creative Commons under German law. The first set of questions addresses the applicable statutory provisions and the reported case law in this area. The second section concerns contractual issues, in particular with regard to the interpretation and validity of open content licenses. The third section deals with copyright aspects of open content models, for example regarding revocation rights and rights to equitable remuneration. The final set of questions pertains to patent, trademark and competition law issues of open content licenses.
Concepts of legal capacity and legal subjectivity have developed gradually through intermediate stages. Accordingly, there are numerous types of legal subjects and partial legal subjects, and ever-new types can develop, at the latest once the law confronts new social and technological challenges. Today such challenges seem to be making themselves felt especially in the field of information and communication technologies. Their specific communicative conditions resulting from the technological networking of social communication have a particularly pronounced influence on legal attributions of identity and action, and hence above all on issues of liability in electronic commerce. Here in particular it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish concrete human actors and, for example, to identify them as authors of declarations of intent or even as individually responsible agencies of legal transgressions. The communicative processes in this area appear instead as new kinds of chains of effects whose actors seem to be more socio-technical ensembles of people and things – whereby the artificial components of these hybrid human being-thing linkages can sometimes even be represented as driving forces and independent agents.
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
(2014)
This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants’ efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.
This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation.
It finds that the European Commission’s proposal to submit (significant) related party transactions to enhanced transparency, outside fairness review, and ex ante shareholder approval is both flawed in its design and based on contestable assumptions on informed voting of institutional investors. In particular, the contemplated exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries allows controlling shareholders to circumvent the rule extensively. Moreover, vesting voting rights with (institutional) investors will not lead to the informed assessment that is hoped for, because these investors will rationally abstain from active monitoring and rely on proxy advisory firms instead whose competency to analyze non-routine significant related party transactions is questionable.
The paper further delineates that the proposed recognition of an overriding interest of the group requires strong counterbalances to adequately protect minority shareholders and creditors. Hence, if the Commission choses to go down this route it might end up with a comprehensive regulation that is akin to the unpopular Ninth Company Law Directive in spirit, though not in content. The latter prediction is corroborated by the pertinent parts of the proposal for a European Model Company Act.
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
(2014)
This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants’ efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.
While distribution conflicts over natural resources were central to the debates on a New International Economic Order, during the last decades the specific distribution conflicts surrounding natural resource exploitation no longer have been at the core of international law. In this paper I trace the developments in the relationship between international law and resource distribution conflicts. I first argue that the New International Economic Order favored the political resolution of distribution conflicts over natural resources and envisaged international distribution conflicts to be addressed by the political organs of international institutions within legal procedures Second, I show how the NIEO was surpassed by a different order that relied largely on the market as a distribution mechanism for raw materials and how international institutions and international law played a crucial role in the establishment of this order by promoting the privatization of natural resource exploitation and protecting foreign direct investment and trade. With reference to the copper industry in Zambia I thirdly illustrate how international investment law, and more broadly international economic law, is shaping (and affecting the resolution of) not only distribution conflicts between, but also within States. I conclude with a call for a renewed focus on an international law of resource conflicts to allow for their political resolution given the countermoves we can observe with respect to international investment law and the persistence of (violent) conflicts over natural resource exploitation within States.
Expressivist theories of punishment, according to which a penal sanction articulates or expresses a certain meaning to the offender, to the victim and to society, become more and more prominent among the traditional theories of punishment as retribution or deterrence. What these theories have in common is the idea that the conveyance of the meaning is in need of a communicative action, and that the penal sanction is such a communicative act. This article argues that pure communicative theories of punishment face great difficulties in generating any justification for hard treatment. One challenge is that certain types of sanctions – in particularly, hard treatment – restrict the communicative opportunities of the incarcerated individual; which generates a paradox, in that it turns punishment into a communicative action of non-communication. Beyond that, moreover, all practices of hard treatment potentially become unnecessary, if expressing the moral message of censure constitutes a kind of action in itself, and as such, itself a treatment of the offender, embedded in a communicative relationship between offender, victim and society; such that we may be able to think of the history of punishment as a development where hard treatment becomes more and more unnecessary for the conveyance of the message.
From the late middle ages to early modern times (ca. 1200-1600) the Lübeck City Council was the most important courthouse in the Baltic. About 100 cities and towns on its shores lived according to the law of Lübeck. The paper deals with the old theory that Imperial law, i.e. mainly the learned Ius commune, was generally rejected by the council on the grounds of its foreign nature. The paper rejects this view with the help of 8 case studies. There exist rather spectacular statements against Imperial Law, but a closer look reveals that they have to be seen in the light of a specific practical context. They must not be confounded with general statements in which the council had no interest. Its attitude towards Learned Law was flexible and purely pragmatic.
Even though fiscal sovereignty still counts as a fundamental principle of government, global and regional economic integration as well as increasing levels of sovereign debt severely limit governments’ tax policy choices. In particular the redistributive function of taxation has suffered in the pursuit of economic competitiveness. As inequality rises and attention is directed again at taxation as a means for redistribution, international cooperation appears as an avenue to enable redistribution through taxation. Yet, one of the predominant international institutions dealing with tax matters – the OECD – with its focus on economic growth and competitiveness and resulting tax policy advice prevents rather than promotes national and international debates on taxation as a question of social justice. The paper argues that questions of taxation need to be perceived as questions of social justice and thus as questions of politics, and not merely of economics. Only if taxation is not considered a mere economic instrument can a ‘political economy’ be maintained. The paper addresses the three objectives of taxation – revenue generation, redistribution and regulation -- and how they are affected as governments aim for fiscal consolidation to conclude that governments’ power to freely pursue and calibrate these objectives has come to appear rather as a myth than the core of sovereignty. It then demonstrates how the OECD’s tax policy advice and cooperation in tax matters react to the constraints on governmental taxation powers; how they aim at economic growth and competitiveness to the detriment of (other) ideas of social justice. The paper concludes with a call for (re)integrating social and global justice concerns into debates on taxation.
The article introduces a research project financed by the Academy of Sciences and Literature Mainz began in 2013 and will extend over an 18-year period. It aims at producing a historical-semantic dictionary elucidating central terms of the School of Salamanca's discourses and their significance for modern political theory and jurisprudence. The project's fundament will be a digital corpus of important texts from the School of Salamanca which will be linked up with the dictionary's online version. By making the source corpus accessible in searchable full text (as well as in high quality digital images), the project is creating a new research tool with exciting possibilities for further investigations. The dictionary will be a valuable source of information for the interdisciplinary research carried out in this field.
The paper focuses on the problems of a juridical classification and evaluation of Ancient Near Eastern treaties with regard to the question if there existed an Ancient Near Eastern International Law or not. Alternatively treaties and their content are looked at uncommitted as mechanisms of conflict and dispute resolution. Main aspects are preliminary and prophylactic conflict resolution in treaties and the procedural context and efficiency of treaties.
Stability maintenance at the grassroots: China’s weiwen apparatus as a form of conflict resolution
(2013)
This working paper explores the history and potential of “stability maintenance” (weiwen) as a form of conflict resolution in China. Its emphasis on conflict resolution is novel. Previous examinations of the weiwen apparatus have concentrated on its political function, namely to manage resistance within society and maintain the authority of the party-state. This avenue of investigation has proved fruitful as a means of characterising the political motivation and the higher-level strategies involved in stability maintenance. Nonetheless, there remain significant conceptual and empirical gaps relating to how stability maintenance offices and processes actually function, particularly out of larger cities and at local levels. The research described in this paper aims to consider the effectiveness of stability maintenance as a part of the “market” for conflict resolution in local China, and to test the hypothesis that conflict resolution as facilitated by weiwen is the most pragmatic and effective means of actually resolving conflicts in the current Chinese political context, notwithstanding the closeness of the stability maintenance discourse to state authority and its relative distance from rule of law-based methods of dispute resolution...
The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) and its amendment of 2012 highlight some fundamentals of collective redress in civil law countries at the example of model case procedures in the field of investor protection. That is why a survey of the ongoing activities of the European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the member state level forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 2012 amendment of the KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific regulation with an emphasis on the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a “coherent approach” strengthening the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory policy and collective redress are two sides of the same coin today. With respect to the KapMuG such a development brings about some tension between its aim to aggregate small individual claims as efficiently as possible and the dominant role of individual procedural rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be illustrated by some specific rules of the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier procedure of a model case procedure, the newly introduced notification of claims and the new opt-out settlement under the amended §§ 17-19.
The article makes two points regarding the fundamental rights dimensions of intellectual property (IP). First, it explains why the prevailing approach to balancing the fundamental right to intellectual property with conflicting fundamental freedoms as if they were of equal rank is conceptually flawed and should be replaced by a justification paradigm. Second, it highlights the pre-eminent role of the legislature and the much more limited role of the judiciary in developing IP law. The arguments are based on an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and last but not least the German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, regarding the respective inter-/supra-/national fundamental-rights regimes.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus underincentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state.
By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
Between the 12th and 16th centuries the Hanseatic merchants obtained extremely important privileges from the rulers of the countries with whom they traded. These secured their commercial and legal status and the autonomy of their staples in Flanders, England, Norway, Denmark and Russia. Within these privileges no other subject receives so extensive a treatment as court procedure. Here, the single most important concern of the Hanseatic merchants was their position in front of alien courts. The article analyses the great attention given to court procedure in the twenty main Hanseatic privileges: What did the merchants require? Which procedural rules were necessary to encourage them to submit their disputes to alien public court instead of taking the matter into their own hands and turning to extra-judicial methods to resolve matters, e.g. cancellation of business relations, boycotts or even trade wars? This analysis suggests that the two most important concerns reflected in the procedural rules were to avoid delay to the next trading trip and to ensure a rational law of proof. The former was addressed by pressing for short-term scheduling and swift judgment and by the dispensation from appearing before the court in person. The latter included avoidance of duels and other ordeals and the attempt to obtain parity by appointing half of the jurors from Hanseatic cities.
Although intellectual property law is a distinctively Western, modern, and relatively young body of law, it has spread all over the world, now encompassing all but a very few outsiders such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Vanuatu. This article presents three legal transfers that contributed to this development: first, from real property in land and movables to intellectual property in the late 18th century in Western Europe; second, from Western Europe, in particular from the United Kingdom and France to the rest of the world during the colonial era in the 19th and early 20th century; third, from the protection of new knowledge to the protection of traditional knowledge, held by indigenous communities in developing countries, on 5 August 1963. This story illuminates how legal transfers in a broad sense – including, but not limited to legal transplants - drive the evolution of law.
This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of crisis prevention. In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a perceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alternative solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in crossborder banking groups.
Power and law in enlightened absolutism : Carl Gottlieb Svarez' theoretical and practical approach
(2012)
The term Enlightened Absolutism reflects a certain tension between its two components. This tension is in a way a continuation of the dichotomy between power on one hand and law on the other. The present paper shall provide an analysis of these two concepts from the perspective of Carl Gottlieb Svarez, who, in his position as a high-ranking Prussian civil servant and legal reformist, has had unparalleled influence on the legislative history of the
Prussian states towards the end of the 18th century. Working side-by-side with Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, who held the post of Prussian minister of justice from 1779 to 1798, Svarez was able to make use of his talent for reforming and legislating. From 1780 to 1794 he was primarily responsible for the elaboration of the codification of the Prussian private law – the “Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten” in 1794. In the present paper, Svarez’ approach to the relation between law and power shall be analysed on two different levels. Firstly, on a theoretical level, the reformist’s thoughts and reflections as laid down in his numerous works, papers and memorandums, shall be discussed. Secondly, on a practical level, the question of the extent to which he implemented his ideas in Prussian legal reality shall be explored.
It has become popular for journalists who are trying to sell newspapers, and politicians who are trying to solicit votes, to refer to this financial crisis as the worst since the Great Depression or WWII. I don’t know whether it is the worst or not so will leave that question to the historians and economists of the future once the storm has past. But it is indeed a “storm” as described by Vince Cable, Member of Parliament in his UK bestselling book entitled “The Storm – The World Economic Crisis and What it Means”. He describes this “storm” as a very destructive one displacing jobs, businesses, banks and whole economies from Iceland to the United Kingdom to the United States. I propose to offer a short chronology and summary of the causes of the current economic crisis. Then I will review several of the regulatory responses to the crisis focusing on the Turner Report, the de Larosière Group and certain US Treasury statements. I will offer my critiques of these proposals and then make some predictions of what the financial services industry may look like in the future.
After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 and the Brazilian “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas” of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies (“Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”. This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP – Banco Comercial Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, “Portugal-Telecom”).
Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups – The Committee on Capital Market Regulation, The Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company. Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While multiple regulatory forces are targeted by each report’s call for reform, each of the reports singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the not too distant past. Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 Among the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which the court chooses from among competing petitioners a lead plaintiff for the class. The statute commands that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness to the plaintiff’s economic self interest to the suits’ prosecution. Also, by eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel which Congress believed too frequently gave rise to incomplete and insubstantially pled causes of action. The PSLRA also introduced for securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement8 as well as a bar to the plaintiff obtaining any discovery prior to the district court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. By introducing the requirement that allegations involving fraud must be plead not only with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside, albeit only for securities actions, the much lower notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of American civil procedure for decades. Substantive changes to the law were also introduced by the PSLRA. With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced by proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is capped by that defendant’s relative degree of fault. Similarly, contribution rights among co-violators are also based on proportionate fault of each defendant. Three years after the PSLRA, Congress returned to the topic again by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act;13 this provision was prompted by aggressive efforts of plaintiff lawyers to bypass the limitations, most notably the bar to discovery and higher pleading requirement, of the PSLRA by bringing suit in state court. Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are exclusively the domain of the federal court. In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums – small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendantcompany, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.” Part I of this paper sets forth the contemporary debate surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In this section, we set forth the insights advanced in three prominent reports focused on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. In Part II we first provide descriptive statistics of our extensive data set, and thenuse multivariate regression analysis to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely examine small settlements for clues to whether they reflect evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy recommendations based on our analysis of the data. Our goals in this paper are more modest than the Committee Report, the Chamber Report and the McKinsey Report, each of which called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed securities fraud settlements so as to determine whether the reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think it was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further cutbacks in private securities class action so soon after the Act was passed.
The market reaction to legal shocks and their antidotes : lessons from the sovereign debt market
(2008)
This Article examines the market reaction to a series of legal events concerning the judicial interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. More generally, the Article provides insights into the reactions of investors (predominantly financial institutions), issuers (sovereigns), and those who draft bond covenants (lawyers), to unanticipated changes in the judicial interpretation of certain covenant terms.
On 27 and 28 September 2007, a commission formed on the initiative of the authors held its first meeting in Aarhus, Denmark to deliberate on its goal of drafting a "European Model Company Law Act" (EMCLA). This project, outlined in the following pages, aims neither to force a mandatory harmonization of national company law nor to create a further, European corporate form. The goal is rather to draft model rules for a corporation that national legislatures would be free to adopt in whole or in part. Thus, the project is thought as an alternative and supplement to the existing EU instruments for the convergence of company law. The present EU instruments, their prerequisites and limits will be discussed in more detail in Part II, below. Part III will examine the US experience with such "model acts" in the area of company law. Part IV will then conclude by discussing several topics concerning the content of an EMCLA, introducing the members of the EMCLA Working Group, and explaining the Group's preliminary working plan.
This paper identifies some common errors that occur in comparative law, offers some guidelines to help avoid such errors, and provides a framework for entering into studies of the company laws of three major jurisdictions. The first section illustrates why a conscious approach to comparative company law is useful. Part I discusses some of the problems that can arise in comparative law and offers a few points of caution that can be useful for practical, theoretical and legislative comparative law. Part II discusses some relatively famous examples of comparative analysis gone astray in order to demonstrate the utility of heeding the outlined points of caution. The second section offers a framework for approaching comparative company law. Part III provides an example of using functional definition to demarcate the topic "company law", offering an "effects" test to determine whether a given provision of law should be considered as functionally part of the rules that govern the core characteristics of companies. It does this by presenting the relevant company law statutes and related topical laws of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, using Delaware as a proxy for the 50 states. On the basis of this definition, Part IV analyzes the system of legal functions that comprises "company law" in the United States and the European Union. It selects as the predominant factor for consideration the jurisdictions, sub-jurisdictions and rule-making entities that have legislative or rule-making competence in the relevant territorial unit, analyzes the extent of their power, presents the type of law (rules) they enact (issue), and discusses the concrete manner in which the laws and rules of the jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions can legally interact. Part V looks at the way these jurisdictions do interact on the temporal axis of history, that is, their actual influence on each other, which in the relevant jurisdictions currently takes the form of regulatory competition and legislative harmonization. The method of the approach outlined in this paper borrows much from system theory. The analysis attempts to be detailed without losing track of the overall jurisdictional framework in the countries studied.
This paper will sketch out some of the developments in European company law as seen from the current moment, which might be referred to as post- 2003 Action Plan, and from my purely personal viewpoint. I will thus restrict myself to presenting the current and expected legislative projects of the EU, with particular focus on the plans and activities of the Commission, and for the moment bracket out both a number of important and interesting decisions of the European Court of Justice and the debates among European legal scholars.
In this paper, I tackle the question whether one share - one vote should become a European law rule. I examine, first of all, the economic theory concerning one share - one vote and its optimality, and the law and economics literature on dual class recapitalizations and other deviations from one share - one vote. I also consider the agency costs of deviations from one share - one vote and examine whether they justify regulation. I subsequently analyze the rules implementing the one share - one vote standard in the US and Europe. In particular, I analyze the self-regulatory rules of US exchanges, the relevant provisions of the European Takeover Directive (including the well known break-through rule), and the European Court of Justice's position as to golden shares (which also are deviations from the one share - one vote standard). I conclude that one share - one vote is not justified by economic efficiency, as also confirmed by comparative law. Also the European breakthrough rule, which ultimately strikes down all deviations from one share - one vote, does not appear to be well grounded. Only transparency rules appear to be justified at EU level as disclosure of ownership and voting structures serves a pricing and governance function, while harmonisation of the relevant rules reduces transaction costs in integrated markets.
This Paper will look at the changing nature of asset management, and will examine the nature of the European framework for collective investment undertakings, enshrined in the UCITS Directive2 in that light. This question whether the UCITS Directive in its current form remains an appropriate European response to the changing investment management landscape is an issue with which the European Commission is actively engaging through its Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds, published in July 2005.3 But before considering these important questions, it is necessary to begin with an idea of what a collective investment, more specifically a UCITS actually is and how it fits conceptually in the broader world of pooled investments.....
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the ‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.
This paper has shown that some of the principal arguments against shareholder voice are unfounded. It has shown that shareholders do own corporations, and that the nature of their property interest is structured to meet the needs of the relationships found in stock corporations. The paper has explained that fiduciary and other duties restrain the actions of shareholders just as they do those of management, and that critics cannot reasonably expect court-imposed fiduciary duties to extend beyond the actual powers of shareholders. It has also illustrated how, although corporate statutes give shareholders complete power to structure governance as they will, the default governance structures of U.S. corporations leaves shareholders almost powerless to initiate any sort of action, and the interaction between state and federal law makes it almost impossible for shareholders to elect directors of their choice. Lastly, the paper has recalled how the percentage of U.S. corporate equities owned by institutional investors has increased dramatically in recent decades, and it has outlined some of the major developments in shareholder rights that followed this increase. I hope that this paper deflated some of the strong rhetoric used against shareholder voice by contrasting rhetoric to law, and that it illustrated why the picture of weak owners painted in the early 20th century should be updated to new circumstances, which will help avoid projecting an old description as a current normative model that perpetuates the inevitability of "managerialsm", perhaps better known as "dirigisme".
"In this paper, I analyse the conduct of business rules included in the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) which has replaced the Investment Services Directive (ISD). These rules, in addition to being part of the regulation of investment intermediaries, operate as contractual standards in the relationships between intermediaries and their clients. While the need to harmonise similar rules is generally acknowledged, in the present paper I ask whether the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture, which governs securities lawmaking in the EU, has in some way improved regulation in this area. In section II, I examine the general aspects of the Lamfalussy process. In section III, I critically analyse the MiFID s provisions on conduct of business obligations, best execution of transactions and client order handling, taking into account the new regime of trade internalisation by investment intermediaries and the ensuing competition between these intermediaries and market operators. In sectionIV, I draw some general conclusions on the re-regulation made under the Lamfalussy regulatory structure and its limits. In this section, I make a few preliminary comments on the relevance of conduct of business rules to contract law, the ISD rules of conduct and the role of harmonisation."
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country s legal system, would require.
This memorandum describes the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in monitoring and, where appropriate, regulating the use of research reports by investment banking firms in connection with securities transactions. The memorandum addresses the historical system of regulation, which continues in large measure to apply. It also examines the new initiatives taken, following a number of prominent corporate, accounting and banking scandals and a significant decline in U.S. and international capital markets, to supplement the current system in what some have dubbed the "post-Enron era".
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This paper investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for German firms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance practices to firm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR firms and shorted low-CGR firms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period. We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR firms.
The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.
The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms commercialization of biotechnology, or by the their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the internet and world wide web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms - organizational forms particularly well suited to innovation - with capital market access that is tailored to the special task of financing these high risk, high return activities.
This article presents a structural overview of corporate disclosure in Germany against the background of a rapidly evolving European market. Professor Baums first makes the theoretical case for mandatory disclosure and outlines the standard, regulatory elements of market transparency. He then turns to German law and illustrates both how it attempts to meet the principle, theoretical demands of disclosure and how it should be improved. The article also presents in some detail the actual channels of corporate disclosure used in Germany and the manner in which German law now fits into the overall development of the broader, European Community scheme, as well as the contemplated changes and improvements both at the national and the supranational level.
The paper was submitted to the conference on company law reform at the University of Cambridge, July 4th, 2002. Since the introduction of corporation laws in the individual German states during the first half of the 19th century, Germany has repeatedly amended and reformed its company law. Such reforms and amendments were prompted in part by stock exchange fraud and the collapse of large corporations, but also by a routine adjustment of law to changing commercial and societal conditions. During the last ten years, a series of significant changes to German company law led one commentator to speak from a "company law in permanent reform". Two years ago, the German Federal Chancellor established a Regierungskommission Corporate Governance ("Government Commission on Corporate Governance") and instructed it to examine the German Corporate Governance system and German company law as a whole, and formulate recommendations for reform.
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive1 introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the Proposed Directive). The Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing Directives relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms.
It is an established policy in the United States to separate commercial banking (the business of taking deposits and making commercial loans) from other commercial activities. The separation of banking and commercial activities is achieved by federal and state banking laws, which enumerate the powers that banks may exercise, the activities that banks may engage in, and the investments that banks may lawfully make, and expressly exclude banks from certain activities or relationships. Some of these provisions could be circumvented if a nonbank company could carry on banking activities through a banking subsidiary and nonbanking activities either itself or through a nonbanking subsidiary.
The institutionalization and internationalization of shareholdings, the globalization of capital markets and the rapid development of information technologies have placed our corporate law system under increasing pressure to adapt to the ever changing requirements of the market. For this reason, in May 2000, the German government called together a group of industrialists, representatives of shareholder associations and institutional investors, trade unionists, politicians and scholars to form an expert Panel with the task of reviewing the German corporate governance system. This Government Panel on Corporate Governance prepared a questionnaire on key issues in the field, and solicited responses and input from numerous national and international experts and institutions. In July 2001, the Commission presented its 320 page report (available at www.ottoschmidt. de/corporate_governance.htm) to the German Chancellor. The Report made nearly 150 recommendations for amendments or changes to existing provisions of German law and also set forth proposals on how the German corporate governance system should be further developed in order to maintain a normative framework that is suitable and attractive not only for companies, but also for domestic and foreign investors. In order that the Panel s proposals may receive careful consideration from a diverse audience, it seems very useful to keep a wider public informed of the Panel s recommendations. Therefore, also on behalf of the Panel, I very much appreciate that the international law firm Shearman & Sterling has taken the initiative to have the summary of the Panel s recommendations translated into English.
The road to shareowner power
(1999)
A dramatic rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This will require changing the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new System. lt would eliminate the natura1 monopoly feature of the current System, and spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
Shareholder voting is back on the agenda of public debate for several reasons. One is the investors’ internationalization of capital investments and the raising of funds globally by companies. It can be predicted that considering the growing together of capital markets the trend to international investments will increase not least because the introduction of the Euro will create a uniform European stock market. This leads to the question how the law deals with this development and its problems. The EU Commission has commissioned a comparative study dealing, inter alia, with shareholders’ representation at general meetings in the EU member states.1 The aim is to simplify the operating regulations for public limited companies in the EU. Furthermore, the internationalization of shareholdings leads the investors to ask how their interests are protected abroad. Are the mechanisms of shareholder protection sufficient for foreign investors? In particular the formation of transnational companies like Daimler-Chrysler will change corporate governance systems. It remains to be seen whether and how foreign institutional investors will use measures of - in this case - German corporate law to control the management. From a microeconomic point of view the question is what specific features of a given corporate governance system might contribute to better performance of firms. The following remarks will however, be confined to one specific aspect of corporate governance only, the exercise of shareholders’ voting rights at the general meeting.
I analyze the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of control over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock market is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights arecontrolled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms listed in Germany’s official markets. About two thirds of this amount is controlled by banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies. I show that due to current legislation it is clear for neither group who ultimate exerts control over the shareholding firm itself. For the remaining blockholders, only blocks controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced back to the highest level of ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all reported blocks. The German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is responsible for the consequences of decisions.
We first analyze legal provisions relating to corporate transparency in Germany. We show that despite the new securities trading law (WpHG) of 1995, the practical efficacy of disclosure regulation is very low. On the one hand, the formation of business groups involving less regulated legal forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. On the other hand, the implementation of the law is not practical and not very effective. We illustrate these arguments using several examples of WpHG filings. To illustrate the importance of transparency, we show next that German capital markets are dominated by few large firms accounting for most of the market’s capitalization and trading volume. Moreover, the concentration of control is very high. First, 85% of all officially listed AGs have a dominant shareholder (controlling more than 25% of the voting rights). Second, few large blockholders control several deciding voting blocks in listed corporations, while the majority controls only one block.
The article describes the legal structure of the Daimler-Chrysler merger. It asks why this specific structure rather than another cheaper way was chosen. This leads to the more general question of the pros and cons of mandatory corporate law as a regulatory device. The article advocates an "optional" approach: The legislator should offer various menus or sets of binding rules among which the parties may choose. (JEL: ...)
The previous proposal for a company law directive on takeovers in 1990 was rejected in Germany almost unanimously for several different reasons. The new "slimmed down" draft proposal, in the light of the subsidiarity principle, takes the different approaches to investorprotection in the various member states better into account. Notably, the most controversial principle of the previous draft, viz. the mandatory bid rule as the only means of investorprotection in case of a change of control, has been given up. Therefore a much higher degree of acceptance seems likely. The Bundesrat (upper house) and the industry associations have already expressed their consent; the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) will deal with the proposal shortly. The technique of a "frame directive" leaves ample leeway for the member states. That will shift the discussion back to the national level and there will lead to the question as to how to make use of this leeway (cf. II, III, below) rather than to a debate about principles as in the past. It seems likely that criticism will confine itself to more technical questions (cf. IV, below).
The corporate governance systems in Europe differ markedly. Economists tend to use stylized models and distinguish between the Anglo-American, the German and the Latinist model.1 In this view, for instance, the Austrian, Dutch, German, and Swiss systems are said to be variations of one model. For lawyers the picture is of course, much more detailed as particular rules may vary even where common principles prevail. Many comparative studies on these differences have been undertaken meanwhile.2 I do not want to add another study but to treat a different question. Are there as a consequence of growing internationalization, globalization of markets and technological change, also tendencies of convergence of our corporate governance systems? My answer will be in two parts. As corporate governance systems are traditionally mainly shaped by legislation, the first part will analyze the influence of the economic and technological change on the rule-setting process itself. How does this process react to the fundamental environmental change? That includes a short analysis of the solution of centralized harmonizing of company law within the EU as well as the question of whether EU-wide competition between national corporate law legislators can be observed or be expected in the future. The second part will then turn to the national level. It deals with actual tendencies of convergence or, more correctly, of approach by the German corporate governance system to the Anglo-American one.
Universal banking means that banks are permitted to offer all of the various kinds of financial services. This includes classical banking activities like the credit and deposit business, as well as investment services, placement and brokerage of securities, and even insurance activities, trading in real estate and others. German universal banks also hold stock in nonfinancial firms and offer to vote their clients' shares in other firms. This paper deals with universal banks and their role in the investment business, more specifically, their links with investment companies and their various roles as shareholders and providers of financial services to such companies. Banks and investment companies have, as financial intermediaries, one trait in common: they both transform capital of investors (depositors and shareholders of investment funds, respectively) into funds (loans and equity or debt securities, respectively) that are channeled to other firms. So why should a regulation forbid to combine these transformation tasks in one institution or group, and why should the law not allow banks to establish investment companies and provide all kinds of financial services to them in addition to their banking services? German banking and investment company law have answered these questions in the affirmative. This paper argues that the existing regulation is not a sound and recommendable one. The paper is organized as follows: Sections II - V identify four areas where the combination of banking and investment might either harm the shareholders of the investment funds and/or negatively affect other constituencies such as the shareholders of the banking institution. These sections will at the same time explore whether there are institutional or regulatory provisions in place or market forces at work that adequately protect investors and the other constituencies in question. Concluding remarks follow (VI.).
For the German observer the idea of a Company repurchasing its own shares seems to resemble the picture of a snake eating its own tail. It appears to be highly unnatura1 and one wonders how the tail tan possibly be eatable for the snake. Not in the United States. Although repurchases have once been subject to the most stubbornly fought conflict in US Company law only some modest disclosure requirements and safeguards against overt market manipulation exist today. Large repurchases are an almost everyday event and there is an increasing tendency. The aggregate value of shares repurchased by NYSE listed companies has increased from $ 1 .l billion in 1975 to $ 6.3 billion in 1982 to $ 37.1 billion in 1985*. Few examples may illustrate this practice further: Within three years Ford Motor Corp. repurchased 30 million shares for $ 1.2 billion. In 1985 Phillips Petroleum Corp. was faced with two hostile bids and took several defensive Steps, one of which was to tender for 20 million of its own shares at a total tost of $ 1 billion. And by the end of 1988 Exxon Corp. retired 28 percent of its shares that had once been outstanding at an aggregate tost of $ 14.5 billion. The Situation in Germany is completely different. As it will be shown under German law repurchases are severely restricted and do appreciable amount at all. not take place at an In contrast to German law the United Kingdom does not prohibit repurchases but requires companies to comply with such complex rules that US companies would regard simply as limiting their economic freedom. Therefore UK companies very seldom repurchase their own shares, too. This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.
Until the late 1980s, asset securitisation was an US-American finance technique. Meanwhile this technique has been used also in some European countries, although to a much lesser extent. While some of them have adopted or developed their legal and regulatory framework, others remain on earlier stages. That may be because of the lack of economic incentives, but also because of remaining regulatory or legal impediments. The following overview deals with the legal and regulatory environment in five selected European countries. It is structured as follows: First, this finance technique will be described in outline to the benefit of the reader who might not be familiar with it. A further part will report the recent development and the underlying economic reasons that drive this development. The main part will then deal with international aspects and give an overview of some legal and regulatory issues in five European legislations. Tax and accounting questions are, however, excluded. Concluding remarks follow.
The following descriptive overview of the German corporate governance system and the current debate is structured as follows. Part II will give some information on the empirical background. Part III will describe the formal legal setting as well as actual practices in some key areas. Part IV will then deal with some issues of the current debate.
In my following remarks I will focus on a differente which we find in German law as well as in other legislations, the differente b e t w e e n entrepreneurial investments among firms and merely financial investments. Whereas OUT law of groups of companies o f Konzernrecht contains quite an elaborated set of rules, the rules governing financial investments, especially Cross-border financial investments, seems to be somewhat underdeveloped.
In early 1991 the United States Treasury Department of the Bush Administration recommended in ib proposal for Modemizing The FinancialSystem l that, in addition to other remarkable breaks with the traditional United States financial Services framework, the current bank holding Company structure be replaced with a new financial Services holding Company that would reward banks with the ability to engage in a broad new range of financial activities through separate afbliates, including full-service securities, insurance, and mutual fund activities. The Treaaury Department pointed out that commercial banking and investment banking are complementary Services and that the Glass-Steagall Separation was unnecessary. The Treasury Department gave many reasons for the need for financial modernization and why such a modemized System would work better. As an example that demonstrates the advantages of the System proposed by the Treasury Department, the proposal pointed to the German banks and called the German model of a universal banking System the most liberal banking System in the world. -What makes the German universal banking System so unique and desirable? The following outline of the history and the current structure of the Getman banking System is intended to give readers a background tc determine whether the German banking System could be a model for the System of the future.
The task of this Paper as originally described in the outline of the current project was to compare the German banking System, as one type of relationship banking , with the Japanese main bank System. This was, of course, not simply meant in the sense of a mere description and comparison of different institutions. A meaningful contribution rather has to look at the functions of a given banking System as a provider of capital or other financial Services to their client firms, has to ask in what respect the one or the other System might be superior or less efficient, and has to analyze the reasons for this. Such a thorough analysis would have to answer questions like, for instance, to what extent investment is financed by (lang or short term-)bank loans, whether German banks have, because of specific institutional arrangements like own equity holdings, seats on Company boards or other links with their borrowers, informational or other advantages that make bank finance eheaper or easier available; how such banks behave with respect to financial distress and bankruptcy of their client firms, and what their exact role in corporate governance is. While preparing this Paper I found that in Order to give reliable answers to these questions there had to be several other conferences comparable to the present one that had to focus exclusively on our domestic System. Hence what this Paper only tan provide for at this moment is a short overview of the German banking System and its special t r a i t s ( Universalbankensystem and Group Banking ; part I), describe and analyse some aspects of bank lending to firms (Part II), and the role of German banks as delegated monitors in widely held firms (Part Ill). A description of the historical development of the specific links between banks and industry and their impact on the economic growth of Germany during the period of the industrialization and later on would be specifically interesting within the framework of a Conference that discusses the lessons and relevante of banking Systems for developing market economies and for transforming socialist economies. However, historical remarks had to be omitted completely, not least because of lack of own knowledge, time and space, but also because this history is already well documented and available in English publications, too.
Other than in Belgium, German banks may hold even controlling equity participations in industrial firms (and such firms may own banks) and do so to a large extent. Vis-a-vis the European development this leads to two questions: From the perspective of the (Belgian and other) competitors of these banks, whether their own domestic System might be disadvantageous to them. And from a public interest perspective, which advantages and drawbacks are connected with the different regulations in Europe. The article first informs about the legal framework and some statistical facts. Then the various and different reasons why banks acquire and hold shares on own account are analyzed. The following Parts deal with the various public policy arguments whether equity links between banks and industrial firms should be prohibited or not (safety and soundness of banking; autonomie de Ia fonction bancaire ; abuse of confidential information and conflicts of interest; antitrust considerations; negative and positive impacts on the respective firm). In its last part the article deals with recent proposals in the German political debate to limit stockholdings of banks. The article argues that a step-by-step approach to the Single Problems and issues (conflict of interests; anticompetitive effects etc.) should be preferred to a general limitation of stock ownership of banks.
The corporate governance Systems in the U.K. and in Germany differ markedly. German large firms have a two-board structure, they are subject to employee codetermination, their managements are not confronted with public hostile takeover bids, and banks play a major role in corporate governance, through equity stakes, through proxies given to them by small investors, and through bankers positions on the supervisory boards of these firms. One of the main issues of corporate governance in large firms, the Problem of shareholders passivity in monitoring management in Berle-Means type corporations, is thus addressed by an institutional Provision, the role of the banks, rather than by a market-oriented Solution as we find it in the U.K. with its market for corporate control through the threat of hostile takeovers. These two different approaches to corporate governance have been compared several times recently, and it was argued that a bank-based or institutional Solution has clear advantages and should be preferred. Cosh, Hughes and Singh, for example, argue at the conclusion of their discussion of takeovers and short-termism in the U.K. that the institutional shareholder [in the UK] should take a much more active and vigorous part in the internal governance of corporations. . . . In Order for such a proposal to be effective both in disciplining inefficient managements and promoting long-term investments, far reaching changes in the internal workings and behaviour of the financial institutions would be required. The financial institutions would need to pool their resources together, set up specialised departments for promoting investment and innovations - in other words behave like German banks. The following remarks seek to continue this discussion from the German perspective. The article will first attempt to evaluate the monitoring potential of our domestic bank or institution-oriented corporate governance System and then, in a further patt, compare it with that of a market-oriented Solution. lt will be argued that both Systems focus on different Problems and have specific advantages and drawbacks, and that there are still quite a few puzzles to be solved until all pros and cons of each of these monitoring devices tan be assessed. The perception that both Systems focus on different Problems suggests combining institutional monitoring with a market for corporate control rather than considering them to be contrasting and incompatible approaches. The article is organized as follows. Section II will describe the legal structure of the large corporation in Germany in more detail. Section Ill explains why a market for corporate control by the threat of public hostile takeover bids does not exist in Germany. Section IV then Shows how corporate governance in publicly held corporations with small investors is organized instead, and deals with the role of banks in corporate governance in these firms. Section V of the atticle then will try to compare the monitoring potential of a marketoriented and our bank or institution-oriented corporate governance System. Concluding remarks follow.