Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (805) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (805)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (805) (remove)
Keywords
- monetary policy (18)
- Banking Union (16)
- Covid-19 (12)
- financial stability (12)
- COVID-19 (10)
- ESG (10)
- Solvency II (10)
- regulation (10)
- systemic risk (10)
- Financial Stability (9)
Institute
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (805) (remove)
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
New provisioning rules introduced by IFRS 9 are expected to reduce the procyclicality of provisioning. Heterogeneity among banks in the procyclicality of provisioning may not only reflect the formal accounting rules, but also variation in discretionary provisioning policies. This paper presents empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of provisioning procyclicality among significant banks that are directly supervised by the ECB. In particular, this paper finds that provisioning is relatively procyclical at banks that have i) high loans-to-assets ratios, ii) high shares of non-interest income in total operating income, iii) low capitalization rates, and iv) low total assets. Supervisory guidance provided to banks on how to implement IFRS 9 has mostly been of a qualitative nature, and may prove inadequate to prevent an undesirably wide future variation in provisioning among EU banks.
This paper was provided at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament and commissioned and drafted under the responsibility of the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
Seit 2006 haben die Bundesländer das Recht, den Steuersatz der Grunderwerbsteuer selbst zu bestimmen. Von diesem Recht wurde in den meisten Bundesländern – mit Ausnahme von Bayern und Sachsen – ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht. Mit dieser Entwicklung sind verschiedene negative Begleiterscheinungen der Steuer weiter in den Vordergrund gerückt. Ausweichreaktionen und Preiseffekte auf dem Immobilienmarkt führten dazu, dass aus jedem Prozent, um das der Steuersatz erhöht wurde, schätzungsweise nur rund 0,6 Prozent zusätzliche Steuereinahmen resultierten, während ohne Ausweichreaktionen und Preiseffekte eine Einnahmenerhöhung um ein Prozent zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Hinter diesem unterproportionalen Aufkommenseffekt sind verschiedene Mechanismen zu vermuten, wie etwa die Umgehung durch den Kauf des Grundvermögens als Teil einer Kapitalgesellschaft.
In Anbetracht der gestiegenen Steuersätze wurde im letzten Bundestagswahlkampf aus CDU sowie FDP der Ruf laut nach einem Freibetrag für Immobilienkäufer, die erworbenes Wohneigentum selbst nutzen möchten. Die Kinderzahl soll den Freibetrag je nach Vorschlag erhöhen.
Der Beitrag diskutiert kritisch die Forderung nach einer Familienkomponente der Grunderwerbssteuer und zeigt darüber hinaus mögliche Alternativen zur Einschränkung der Steuergestaltungen durch Share Deals auf.
Coming (great) events cast their (long) shadow before. As the financial crisis gave birth to the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the imminent Brexit now serves as an impulse to rather extensively reorganize it. Pursuant to the preferences of the Commission—as revealed in its draft for a regulation amending the regulations founding the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA)—the supervision (and regulation) of the financial sectors should be further centralized and integrated and additional powers should be given to the ESAs. To a large degree these alterations are intended to adjust the competences of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to better meet its new objectives under the Capital Markets Union (“CMU”). In view that an equivalent to the CMU or the Banking Union—in the sense of a European Insurance Union—is not yet on the horizon for the insurance sector (or the occupational pensions sector), one could prima vista take the view that insurance supervision and regulation is once again taken captive by the necessity of regulatory reforms stemming from other financial sectors. However, even if that is partially the case, the outcome of the intended reforms might still be advantageous for the insurance sector and an important step in the right direction. Therefore, it needs to be intensively discussed.
At this stage, some of the most prominent envisioned changes to the structure, tasks and powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and their necessity, usefulness or counter-productivity still have to be examined.
During the last IAIS Global Seminar in June 2017, IAIS disclosed the agenda for a gradual shift in the systemic risk assessment methodology from the current Entity Based Approach (EBA) to a new Activity Based Approach(ABA). The EBA, which was developed in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, defines a list of Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) based on a pre-defined set of criteria related to the size of the institution. These G-SIIs are subject to additional regulatory requirements since their distress or disorderly failure would potentially cause significant disruption to the global financial system and economic activity. Even if size is still a needed element of a systemic risk assessment, the strong emphasis put on the too-big-to-fail approach in insurance, i.e. EBA, might be partially missing the underlying nature of systemic risk in insurance. Not only certain activities, including insurance activities such as life or non-life lines of business, but also common exposures or certain managerial practices such as leverage or funding structures, tend to contribute to systemic risk of insurers but are not covered by the current EBA (Berdin and Sottocornola, 2015). Therefore, we very much welcome the general development of the systemic risk assessment methodology, even if several important questions still need to be answered.
This Chapter explores how an environment of persistent low returns influences saving, investing, and retirement behaviors, as compared to what in the past had been thought of as more “normal” financial conditions. Our calibrated lifecycle dynamic model with realistic tax, minimum distribution, and Social Security benefit rules produces results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age behavior of U.S. households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66. In the context of a zero-return environment, we show that workers will optimally devote more of their savings to non-retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts, since the relative appeal of investing in taxable versus tax-qualified retirement accounts is lower in a low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim Social Security benefits later in a low interest rate environment.
This paper studies the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidities at the firm level. I trace out the long-run investment and growth trajectories of firms which are more adversely affected by a transitory shock to aggregate credit supply. Affected firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years following the shock, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap. I show that affected firms with a higher degree of wage rigidity exhibit a steeper drop in investment and grow more slowly than affected firms with more flexible wages.
We shed new light on the macroeconomic effects of rising temperatures. In the data, a shock to global temperature dampens expenditures in research and development (R&D). We rationalize this empirical evidence within a stochastic endogenous growth model, featuring temperature risk and growth sustained through innovations. In line with the novel evidence in the data, temperature shocks undermine economic growth via a drop in R&D. Moreover, in our endogenous growth setting temperature risk generates non-negligible welfare costs (i.e., 11% of lifetime utility). An active government, which is committed to a zero fiscal deficit policy, can offset the welfare costs of global temperature risk by subsidizing the aggregate capital investment with one-fifth of total public spending.
This paper presents new evidence on the expectation formation process of firms from a survey of the German manufacturing sector. It focuses on the expectation about their future business conditions, which enters the widely followed economic sentiment index and which is an important determinant of their employment and investment decisions. We find that firms extrapolate their experience too much and make predictable forecasting errors. Moreover, firms do not seem to anticipate the upcoming reversals of business cycle peaks and troughs which causes suboptimal adjustment of investment and employment and affects their inventories and profits. However, the impact on expectation errors decreases with the size and the age of the firm as firms learn to reduce their extrapolation bias over time.
We propose a long-run risk model with stochastic volatility, a time-varying mean reversion level of volatility, and jumps in the state variables. The special feature of our model is that the jump intensity is not affine in the conditional variance but driven by a separate process. We show that this separation of jump risk from volatility risk is needed to match the empirically weak link between the level and the slope of the implied volatility smile for S&P 500 options.
Empirical evidence suggests that investments in research and development (R&D) by older and larger firms are more spread out internationally than R&D investments by younger and smaller firms. In this paper, I explore the quantitative implications of this type of heterogeneity by assuming that incumbents, i.e. current monopolists engaging in incremental innovation, have a higher degree of internationalization in their R&D technologies than entrants, i.e. new firms engaging in radical innovation, in a two-country endogenous growth general equilibrium model. In particular, this assumption allows the model to break the perfect correlation between incumbents’ and entrants’ innovation probabilities and to match the empirical counterpart exactly.
The paper provides an overview and an economic analysis of the development of the corporate governance of German banks since the 1950s, highlighting peculiarities – as seen from the meanwhile prevailing standard model perspective – of the German case. These peculiarities refer to the specific German notion and legal-institutional regime of corporate governance in general as well as to the specific three-pillar structure of the German banking system.
The most striking changes in the corporate governance of German banks during the past 50 years occurred in the case of the large shareholder-owned banks. For them, capital markets have become an important element of corporate governance, and their former orientation towards the interests of a broadly defined set of stakeholders has largely been replaced by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, the corporate governance regimes of the smaller local public savings banks and the local cooperative banks have remained virtually unchanged. They acknowledge a broader horizon of stakeholder interests and put an emphasis on monitoring.
The Great Financial Crisis, beginning in 2007, has led to a considerable reassessment in the academic and political debate on bank governance. On an international level, it has revived the older notion that, in view of their high leverage and their innate complexity, banks are “special” and bank corporate governance also – and needs to be seen in this light, not least because research indicates that banks with a strong and one-sided shareholder orientation – and thus with what appears to be the best corporate governance according to the standard model – have suffered most in the crisis. In the German case, the crisis has shown that the smaller local banks have survived the crisis much better than large private and public banks, whose funding strongly depends on wholesale markets. This may point to certain advantages of their governance and ownership regimes. But the differences in the performance during the crisis years may also, or even more so, be a consequence of the business models of large vs small banks than of their different governance regimes.
This study provides a graphic overview on core legislation in the area of economic and financial services. The presentation essentially covers the areas within the responsibility of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON); hence it starts with core ECON areas but also displays neighbouring areas of other Committees' competences which are closely connected to and impacting on ECON's work. It shows legislation in force, proposals and other relevant provisions on banking, securities markets and investment firms, market infrastructure, insurance and occupational pensions, payment services, consumer protection in financial services, the European System of Financial Supervision, European Monetary Union, euro bills and coins and statistics, competition, taxation, commerce and company law, accounting and auditing. Moreover, it notes selected provisions that might become relevant in the upcoming Article 50 TEU negotiations.
The German savings and cooperative banks of the 19th century were precursors of modern microfinance. They provided access to financial services for the majority of the German population, which was formerly excluded from bank funding. Furthermore, they did this at low costs for themselves and affordable prices for their clients. By creating networks of financially viable and stable financial institutions covering the entire country, they contributed significantly to building a sound and “inclusive” financial infrastructure in Germany. A look back at the history of German savings and cooperative banks and combining these experiences with the lessons learned from modern microfinance can guide current policy and be valuable for present and future models of microfinance business.
Effective market discipline incentivizes financial institutions to limit their risk-taking behavior, making it a key element for financial regulation. However, without adequate incentives to monitor and control the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions market discipline erodes. As a consequence, bailing out financial institutions, as happened unprecedentedly during the recent financial crisis, may impose indirect costs to financial stability if bailout expectations of investors change. Analyzing US data covering the period between 2004 and 2014, Hett und Schmidt (2017) find that market participants adjusted their bailout expectations in response to government interventions, undermining market discipline mechanisms. Given these findings, policymakers need to take into account the potential effects on market discipline when deciding about public support to troubled financial institutions in the future. Considering the parallelism of events and public responses during the financial crisis as well as the recent developments of Italian banks, these results not only concern the US, but also have important implications for European financial markets and policy makers.
On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 – in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB’s monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ’s findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters – and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.
Crowdfunding is a buzzword that signifies a sub-set in the new forms of finance facilitated by advances in information technology usually categorized as fintech. Concerns for financial stability, investor and consumer protection, or the prevention of money laundering or funding of terrorism hinge incrementally on including the new techniques to initiate financing relationships adequately in the regulatory framework.
This paper analyzes the German regulation of crowdinvesting and finds that it does not fully live up to the regulatory challenges posed by this novel form of digitized matching of supply and demand on capital markets. It should better reflect the key importance of crowdinvesting platforms, which may become critical providers of market infrastructure in the not too distant future. Moreover, platforms can play an important role in investor protection that cannot be performed by traditional disclosure regimes geared towards more seasoned issuers. Against this background, the creation of an exemption from the traditional prospectus regime seems to be a plausible policy choice. However, it needs to be complemented by an adequate regulatory stimulation of platforms’ role as gatekeepers.
Fleckenstein et al. (2014) document that nominal Treasuries trade at higher prices than inflation-swapped indexed bonds, which exactly replicate the nominal cash flows. We study whether this mispricing arises from liquidity premiums in inflation-indexed bonds (TIPS) and inflation swaps. Using US data, we show that the level of liquidity affects TIPS, whereas swap yields include a liquidity risk premium. We also allow for liquidity effects in nominal bonds. These results are based on a model with a systematic liquidity risk factor and asset-specific liquidity characteristics. We show that these liquidity (risk) premiums explain a substantial part of the TIPS underpricing.
Coming early to the party
(2017)
We examine the strategic behavior of High Frequency Traders (HFTs) during the pre-opening phase and the opening auction of the NYSE-Euronext Paris exchange. HFTs actively participate, and profitably extract information from the order flow. They also post "flash crash" orders, to gain time priority. They make profits on their last-second orders; however, so do others, suggesting that there is no speed advantage. HFTs lead price discovery, and neither harm nor improve liquidity. They "come early to the party", and enjoy it (make profits); however, they also help others enjoy the party (improve market quality) and do not have privileges (their speed advantage is not crucial).
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
This paper studies a consumption-portfolio problem where money enters the agent's utility function. We solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and provide closed-form solutions for the optimal consumption and portfolio strategy both in an infinite- and finite-horizon setting. For the infinite-horizon problem, the optimal stock demand is one particular root of a polynomial. In the finite-horizon case, the optimal stock demand is given by the inverse of the solution to an ordinary differential equation that can be solved explicitly. We also prove verification results showing that the solution to the Bellman equation is indeed the value function of the problem. From an economic point of view, we find that in the finite-horizon case the optimal stock demand is typically decreasing in age, which is in line with rules of thumb given by financial advisers and also with recent empirical evidence.
This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis, the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived.
These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process, which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Moreover, the idea that nearly all positions on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet should be subjected to bail-in is misguided. Instead, a concentration of PSI in instruments that fall under the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is preferable.
Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
Since 2014 the ECB has implemented a massive expansion of monetary policy including large-scale asset purchases and negative policy rates. As the euro area economy has improved and inflation has risen, questions concerning the future normalization of monetary policy are starting to dominate the public debate.
The study argues that the ECB should develop a strategy for policy normalization and communicate it very soon to prepare the ground for subsequent steps towards tightening. It provides analysis and makes proposals concerning key aspects of this strategy. The aim is to facilitate the emergence of expectations among market participants that are consistent with a smooth process of policy normalization.
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory PSI. From this analysis the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived. These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.
This paper examines the welfare implications of rising temperatures. Using a standard VAR, we empirically show that a temperature shock has a sizable, negative and statistically significant impact on TFP, output, and labor productivity. We rationalize these findings within a production economy featuring long-run temperature risk. In the model, macro-aggregates drop in response to a temperature shock, consistent with the novel evidence in the data. Such adverse effects are long-lasting. Over a 50-year horizon, a one-standard deviation temperature shock lowers both cumulative output and labor productivity growth by 1.4 percentage points. Based on the model, we also show that temperature risk is associated with non-negligible welfare costs which amount to 18.4% of the agent's lifetime utility and grow exponentially with the size of the impact of temperature on TFP. Finally, we show that faster adaptation to temperature shocks results in lower welfare costs. These welfare benefits become substantially higher in the presence of permanent improvements in the speed of adaptation.
We propose a 2-country asset-pricing model where agents' preferences change endogenously as a function of the popularity of internationally traded goods. We determine the effect of the time-variation of preferences on equity markets, consumption and portfolio choices. When agents are more sensitive to the popularity of domestic consumption goods, the local stock market reacts more strongly to the preferences of local agents than to the preferences of foreign agents. Therefore, home bias arises because home-country stock represents a better investment opportunity for hedging against future fluctuations in preferences. We test our model and find that preference evolution is a plausible driver of key macroeconomic variables and stock returns.
We investigate how solvency and wholesale funding shocks to 84 OECD parent banks affect the lending of 375 foreign subsidiaries. We find that parent solvency shocks are more important than wholesale funding shocks for subsidiary lending. Furthermore, we find that parent undercapitalization does not affect the transmission of shocks, while wholesale shocks transmit to foreign subsidiaries of parents that rely primarily on wholesale funding. We also find that transmission is affected by the strategic role of the subsidiary for the parent and follows a locational, rather than an organizational pecking order. Surprisingly, liquidity regulation exacerbates the transmission of adverse wholesale shocks. We further document that parent banks tend to use their own capital and liquidity buffers first, before transmitting. Finally, we show that solvency shocks have higher impact on large subsidiary banks with low growth opportunities in mature markets.
We introduce an innovative approach to measure bank integration, based on the corporate culture of multinational banking conglomerates. The new measure, the Power Index, assesses the prevalence of a language of power and authority in the financial reports of global banks. We employ a two-step approach: as a first step, we investigate whether parent-bank or parent-country characteristics are more important for bank integration. In a second step, we analyze whether bank integration affects the transmission of shocks across borders. We find that the level of integration of global banks is determined by parent-bank-specific factors, as well as by the social centralization in the parent’s country: ethnically diverse and linguistically homogenous countries nurture decentralized corporate structures. Political and economic factors, such as corruption, political rights and economic development also affect bank integration. Furthermore, we find that organizational integration affects the transmission of exogenous shocks from parent banks to their subsidiaries: the more centralized a global bank is, the lower the lending of its subsidiaries after a solvency shock. Wholesale shocks do not appear to be transmitted through this channel. Also, past experience with solvency shocks reduces the integration between parents and subsidiaries.
We develop a state-space model to decompose bid and ask quotes of CDS into two components, fair default premium and liquidity premium. This approach gives a better estimate of the default premium than mid quotes, and it allows to disentangle and compare the liquidity premium earned by the protection buyer and the protection seller. In contrast to other studies, our model is structurally much simpler, while it also allows for correlation between liquidity and default premia, as supported by empirical evidence. The model is implemented and applied to a large data set of 118 CDS for a period ranging from 2004 to 2010. The model-generated output variables are analyzed in a difference-in-difference framework to determine how the default premium, as well as the liquidity premium of protection buyers and sellers, evolved during different periods of the financial crisis and to which extent they differ for financial institutions compared to non-financials.
Given rising life expectations around the world, it seems that old-age pension benefits will need to be cut and pension contributions boosted in many nations. Yet our research on old-age system reforms does not require raising mandatory retirement ages or contributions. Instead, we offer ways to enhance incentives for people to work longer and delay retirement. There are good reasons to incentivize older people to work longer and delay retirement. These include rising longevity, the shrinking workforce, and emerging evidence indicating that working longer can be associated with better mental and physical health for many people. Nevertheless, old age Social Security systems in many nations find that people tend to claim benefits early, usually leading to reduced benefits.In the United States, for instance, a majority of Americans claim their Social Security benefits at the earlier feasible age, namely 62, even though their monthly benefits would be 75% higher if they waited until age 70. To test whether this is the result of people underweighting the economic value of higher lifetime benefit streams, we examine whether people would claim later and work longer if they were rewarded with a lump sum instead of a higher lifetime benefit stream for deferring. Two arguments have been offered to explain early claiming. One is that workers claim early to avoid potentially “forfeiting” their deferred benefits should they die too soon (Brown et al., 2016). A second explanation is that many people underweight the economic value of lifetime benefit streams (Brown et al., 2017). This latter rationale motivates the present study.
The Judgement of the EGC in the Case T-122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank is the first statement of the European judiciary on the sub-stantive law of the Banking Union. Beyond its specific holding, the decision is of great importance, because it hints at the methodological approach the EGC will take in interpreting prudential banking regulation in the appeals against supervisory measures that fall in its jurisdiction under TFEU, arts. 256(1) subpara 1 and 263(4). Specifically, the case pertained to the scope of direct ECB oversight of significant banks in the euro area and the reassignment of this competence to national competent authorities (NCAs) in individual circumstances (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara 2; SSM Framework Regulation, arts. 70, 71).
For some time now, structural macroeconomic models used at central banks have been predominantly New Keynesian DSGE models featuring nominal rigidities and forwardlooking decision-making. While these features are widely deemed crucial for policy evaluation exercises, most central banks have added more detailed characterizations of the financial sector to these models following the Great Recession in order to improve their fit to the data and their forecasting performance. We employ a comparative approach to investigate the characteristics of this new generation of New Keynesian DSGE models and document an elevated degree of model uncertainty relative to earlier model generations. Policy transmission is highly heterogeneous across types of financial frictions and monetary policy causes larger effects, on average. The New Keynesian DSGE models we analyze suggest that a simple policy rule robust to model uncertainty involves a weaker response to inflation and the output gap in the presence of financial frictions as compared to earlier generations of such models. Leaning-against-the-wind policies in models of this class estimated for the Euro Area do not lead to substantial gains. With regard to forecasting performance, the inclusion of financial frictions can generate improvements, if conditioned on appropriate data. Looking forward, we argue that model-averaging and embracing alternative modelling paradigms is likely to yield a more robust framework for the conduct of monetary policy.
We study the general equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities, asset prices, and welfare by utilizing two endogenous growth models. The expanding variety model features only homogeneous innovations by entrants. The Schumpeterian growth model features heterogeneous innovations: "incremental" innovations by incumbents and "radical" innovations by entrants. The government levies taxes on labor income and corporate profits and supplies subsidies to consumption, capital investment, and investments in research and development by entrants and, if applicable, incumbents. With these models at hand, we provide new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy.
During the 1970s, industrial countries, including the US and continental Europa, experienced a combination of slow productivity growth and high unemplyoment. Subsequent research has shown that the standard model of unemployment actually gives counterfactual predictions. Motivated by the observation that the 1970s were also characterized by high and rising inflation, Tesfaselassie and Wolters examine the effect of growth on unemployment in the presence of nominal price rigidity.
The authors demonstrate that the effect of growth on unemployment may be positive or negative. Faster growth leads to lower unemployment if the rate of inflation is high enough. There is a threshold level of inflation below which faster growth leads to higher unemployment and above which faster growth leads to lower unemployment. The threshold level in turn depends on labor market characteristics, such as hiring efficiency, the job destruction rate, workers' relative bargaining power and the opportunity cost of work.
To broaden the scope of monetary policy, cash abolishment is often suggested as a means of breaking through the zero lower bound. However, practically nothing is said about the welfare costs of such a proposal. Rösl, Seitz and Tödter argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be analyzed analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. They gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the euro area and for Germany.
Their findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by money holders are large, notably if implemented in the current low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percentage points on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for the euro area and of €18bn for Germany. Therefore, the authors argue that cash abolishment or negative interest rates on cash to break through the zero lower bound at any price can hardly be a meaningful policy goal.
The currrent debate on monetary and fiscal policy is heavily influenced by estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate. Beyer and Wieland re-estimate the U.S. equilibrium rate with the methodology of Laubach and Williams and further modifications. They provide new estimates for the United States, the euro area and Germany and subject them to sensitivity tests. Beyer and Wieland conclude that due to the great uncertainty and sensitivity, the observed decline in the estimates is not a reliable indicator of a need for expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, if those estimates are employed to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance, such estimates are better used together with the consistent estimate of the level of potential output.
I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which the leverage of borrowers as well as banks and housing finance play a crucial role in the model dynamics. The model is used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of a policy to inject capital into banks versus a policy to relieve households of mortgage debt. In normal times, when the economy is near the steady state and policy rates are set according to a Taylor-type rule, capital injections to banks are more effective in stimulating the economy in the long-run. However, in the middle of a housing debt crisis, when households are highly leveraged, the short-run output effects of the debt relief are more substantial. When the zero lower bound (ZLB) is additionally considered, the debt relief policy can be much more powerful in boosting the economy both in the short-run and in the longrun. Moreover, the output effects of the debt relief become increasingly larger, the longer the ZLB is binding.
We designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2014 HRS which seeks to measure older persons’ willingness to voluntarily defer claiming of Social Security benefits. In addition we evaluate the stated willingness of older individuals to work longer, depending on the Social Security incentives offered to delay claiming their benefits. Our project extends previous work by analyzing the results from our HRS module and comparing findings from other data sources, which included very much smaller samples of older persons. We show that half of the respondents would delay claiming if no work requirement were in place under the status quo, and only slightly fewer, 46 percent, with a work requirement. We also asked respondents how large a lump sum they would need with or without a work requirement. In the former case, the average amount needed to induce delayed claiming was about $60,400, while when part-time work was required, the average was $66,700. This implies a low utility value of leisure foregone of only $6,300, or about 10 percent of older households’ income.
On average young people \undersave" whereas old people \oversave" with respect to the rational expectations model of life-cycle consumption and savings. According to numerous studies on subjective survival beliefs, young people also \underestimate" whereas old people \overestimate" their objective survival chances on average. We take a structural behavioral economics approach to jointly address both empirical phenomena by embedding subjective survival beliefs that are consistent with these biases into a rank-dependent utility (RDU) model over life-cycle consumption. The resulting consumption behavior is dynamically inconsistent. Considering both naive and sophisticated RDU agents we show that within this framework underestimation of young age and overestimation of old age survival probabilities may (but need not) give rise to the joint occurrence of undersaving and oversaving. In contrast to this RDU model, the familiar quasi-hyperbolic discounting (QHD), which is nested as a special case, cannot generate oversaving.
We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in costly social interactions. Differential selectivity states that women invest less than men in interactions with new individuals. Differential opportunism states that women’s investment in social interactions is less responsive to information about the interaction’s payoffs. The hypotheses imply that women’s social networks are more stable and path dependent and composed of a greater proportion of strong relative to weak links. During their introductory week, we let new university students play an experimental trust game, first with one anonymous partner, then with the same and a new partner. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that women invest less than men in new partners and that their investments are only half as responsive to information about the likely returns to the investment. Moreover, subsequent formation of students’ real social networks is consistent with the experimental results: being randomly assigned to the same introductory group has a much larger positive effect on women’s likelihood of reporting a subsequent friendship.
Bank regulators have the discretion to discipline banks by executing enforcement actions to ensure that banks correct deficiencies regarding safe and sound banking principles. We
highlight the trade-offs regarding the execution of enforcement actions for financial stability. Following this we provide an overview of the differences in the legal framework governing supervisors’ execution of enforcement actions in the Banking Union and the United States. After discussing work on the effect of enforcement action on bank behaviour and the real economy, we present data on the evolution of enforcement actions
and monetary penalties by U.S. regulators. We conclude by noting the importance of supervisors to levy efficient monetary penalties and stressing that a division of competences among different regulators should not lead to a loss of efficiency regarding
the execution of enforcement actions.
In this paper we propose a way forward towards increased financial resilience in times of growing disagreement concerning open borders, free trade and global regulatory standards. In light of these concerns, financial resilience remains a highly valued policy objective. We wish to contribute by suggesting an agenda of concrete, do-able steps supporting an enhanced level of resilience, combined with a deeper understanding of its relevance in the public domain.
First, remove inconsistencies across regulatory rules and territorial regimes, and ensure their credibility concerning implementation. Second, discourage the use of financial regulatory standards as means of international competition. Third, give more weight to pedagogically explaining the established regulatory standards in public, to strengthen their societal backing.
We document that natural disasters significantly weaken the stability of banks with business activities in affected regions, as reflected in lower z-scores, higher probabilities of default, higher non-performing assets ratios, higher foreclosure ratios, lower returns on assets and lower bank equity ratios. The effects are economically relevant and suggest that insurance payments and public aid programs do not sufficiently protect bank borrowers against financial difficulties. We also find that the adverse effects on bank stability dissolve after some years if no further disasters occur in the meantime.
This paper applies the theory of structured finance to the regulation of asset backed securities. We find the current regulation in Europe (Article 405 of the CRR) and the US (Section D of Dodd-Frank Act) to be severely flawed with respect to its key intention: the imposition of a strict loss retention requirement. While nominal retention is always 5%, the true level of loss retention varies across available retention options between zero loss retention and full loss retention at the extreme ends. Based on a standard model of structured finance transactions, we propose a new risk retention metric RM measuring the level of an issuer’s skin-in-the-game. The new metric could help to achieve a better implementation of CRR/CRD-IV and DFA, by making disclosure of the RM-number compulsory for all ABS transactions. There are also implications for the operation of rating agencies. On a general level, the RM metric will be instrumental in achieving simplicity and transparency in securitizations (STS).
According to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), introduced as a lesson from the recent financial crisis, the losses a failing bank incurred should generally be borne by its investors. Before a minimum bail-in has occurred, government money can only be injected in emergency cas-es to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to preserve financial stability. This policy letter argues that in case of the Italian Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), which the Italian gov-ernment currently plans to bail out, a resolution would most likely not cause such a systemic event. A bailout contrary to the existing rules will lead to a mispricing of bank capital and retard the re-structuring of the European banking sector, the authors write. They appeal to the European Central Bank, the Systemic Risk Board and the EU Commission to follow the rules as the test-case MPS will have a direct impact on the credibility of the new BRRD regime and the responsible institutions.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from banks’ trading activities. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative reforms in the US, the UK and the EU, specifically with respect to the role of proprietary trading. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of proprietary trading, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the US and in the current proposal of the European Commission (Barnier proposal), is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it is likely to crowd out desired trading activities, thereby possibly affecting financial stability negatively. Second, trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations, as suggested under the Vickers Report for the UK and the Liikanen proposal for the EU, is a more effective solution. Separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies and risk management across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
We provide an assessment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposal to restrict the internal ratings-based approach on bank risk and to introduce risk-weighted asset floors. If well enforced, risk-sensitive capital regulation results in a more efficient credit allocation compared to the standard approach. Thus, the internal ratings-based approach should be maintained. Further, the use of internal ratings-based output floors potentially results in unintended negative side effects. Input floors are likely a valuable tool to achieve risk-weighted assets comparability. Finally, the proposed measures have a potential detrimental impact for European banks as compared to others.
The Capital Markets Union-project of the European Commission aims for an increase of marketbased debt financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), complementing bank lending. In this essay we argue that rather than focussing on pure non-bank lending, a reasonable mix of bankand market-based financing should be considered. Banks are said to have a comparative advantage in critical lending functions such as credit screening, debtor monitoring and debt renegotiation. All forms of lending require a persistent skin-in-the-game of critical players in order to be effective. The regulator should insist on full disclosure of skin-in-the-game, thereby improving capital allocation and reducing systemic risks.
The impact of network connectivity on factor exposures, asset pricing and portfolio diversification
(2017)
This paper extends the classic factor-based asset pricing model by including network linkages in linear factor models. We assume that the network linkages are exogenously provided. This extension of the model allows a better understanding of the causes of systematic risk and shows that (i) network exposures act as an inflating factor for systematic exposure to common factors and (ii) the power of diversification is reduced by the presence of network connections. Moreover, we show that in the presence of network links a misspecified traditional linear factor model presents residuals that are correlated and heteroskedastic. We support our claims with an extensive simulation experiment.
Causality is a widely-used concept in theoretical and empirical economics. The recent financial economics literature has used Granger causality to detect the presence of contemporaneous links between financial institutions and, in turn, to obtain a network structure. Subsequent studies combined the estimated networks with traditional pricing or risk measurement models to improve their fit to empirical data. In this paper, we provide two contributions: we show how to use a linear factor model as a device for estimating a combination of several networks that monitor the links across variables from different viewpoints; and we demonstrate that Granger causality should be combined with quantile-based causality when the focus is on risk propagation. The empirical evidence supports the latter claim.
People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present.
The international diffusion of technology plays a key role in stimulating global growth and explaining co-movements of international equity returns. Existing empirical evidence suggests that countries are heterogeneous in their attitude toward innovation: Some countries rely more on technology adoption while other countries rely more on internal technology production. European countries that rely more on adoption are also typically characterized by lower fiscal policy exibility and higher labor market rigidity. We develop a two-country model – where both countries rely on R&D and adoption – to study the short-run and long-run effects of aggregate technology and adoption probability shocks on economic growth in the presence of the aforementioned asymmetries. Our framework suggests that an increase in the ability to adopt technology from abroad stimulates economic growth in the country that benefits from higher adoption rates but the beneficial effects also spread to the foreign country. Moreover, it helps explaining the differences in macro quantities and equity returns observed in the international data.
Asymmetric social norms
(2017)
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
I show that disruptions to personal sources of financing, aside from commercial lending supply shocks, impair the survival and growth of small businesses. Entrepreneurs holding deposit accounts at retail banking institutions that defaulted following the financial crisis reduce personal borrowing and are consequently more likely to exit their firm. Exposure to the corresponding investment losses from delisted publicly traded bank stocks strongly reduces the rate of firm survival, particularly for early-stage ventures. At the intensive margin, owners who remain in business reduce employees after personal wealth losses. My results suggest that personal finance is an important component of firm financing.
We develop a model that endogenizes the manager's choice of firm risk and of inside debt investment strategy. Our model delivers two predictions. First, managers have an incentive to reduce the correlation between inside debt and company stock in bad times. Second, managers that reduce such a correlation take on more risk in bad times. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we provide evidence consistent with the model's predictions. Our results suggest that the weaker link between inside debt and company stock in bad times does not translate into a mitigation of debt-equity conflicts.
This paper compares the dynamics of the financial integration process as described by different empirical approaches. To this end, a wide range of measures accounting for several dimensions of integration is employed. In addition, we evaluate the performance of each measure by relying on an established international finance result, i.e., increasing financial integration leads to declining international portfolio diversification benefits. Using monthly equity market data for three different country groups (i.e., developed markets, emerging markets, developed plus emerging markets) and a dynamic indicator of international portfolio diversification benefits, we find that (i) all measures give rise to a very similar long-run integration pattern; (ii) the standard correlation explains variations in diversification benefits as well or better than more sophisticated measures. These Findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks.
his paper examines whether investor mood, driven by World Health Organization (WHO) alerts and media news on globally dangerous diseases, is priced in pharmaceutical companies' stocks in the United States. We concentrate on irrational investors who buy and sell pharmaceutical companies' stocks guided by beliefs as opposed to rational expectations. We argue that disease-related news (DRNs) should not trigger rational trading. We find that DRNs have a positive and significant sentiment effect among investors (on Wall Street). The effect is stronger (weaker) for small (large) companies, who are less (more) likely to engage in the development of new vaccines in the wake of DRNs. A potential negative mood (on Main Street) – induced by disease related fear – does not alter the positive sentiment effect. Our findings give rise to profitable trading strategies leading to significantly positive performances. Overall, this unparalleled research shows that large events of devastating nature to the economy can be considered as good news to some groups of interest, such as stock market traders.
In a field study with more than 1.500 customers of an online-broker we test what happens when investors receive repeated feedback on their investment success in a monthly securities account report. The reports show investors’ last year’s returns, costs, their current level of risk and their portfolio diversification. We find that receiving a report results in investors trading less, diversifying more and having higher risk-adjusted returns. Results are robust to controlling for potential play money accounts and changes in report designs. We also find that investors who are less likely to subscribe equally benefit from the report.
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and its transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise provides an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment, which allows us to identify the effect of higher capital requirements using a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. We also show that this reduction in credit supply results in lower firm-, investment-, and sales growth for firms which obtain a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
This paper studies the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the recent US housing boom-bust cycle. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimation, I find that the enhancement of CRA enforcement in 1998 caused a 7.7 percentage points increase in annual growth rate of mortgage lending by CRA-regulated banks to CRA-eligible census tracts relative to a group of similar-income CRA-ineligible census tracts within the same state. Financial institutions which are not subject to the CRA, however, do not show any change in their mortgage supply between these two types of census tracts after 1998. I take advantage of this exogenous shift in mortgage supply within an instrumental variable framework to identify the causal effect of mortgage supply on housing prices. I find that every 1 percentage point higher annual growth rate of mortgage supply leads to 0.3 percentage points higher annual growth rate of housing prices. Reduced form regressions show that CRA-eligible neighborhoods experienced higher house price growth during the boom and sharper decline during the bust period. I use placebo tests to confirm that this effect is in fact channeled through the shift in mortgage supply by CRA-regulated banks and not by unobserved demand factors. Furthermore, my results indicate that CRA-induced mortgages went to borrowers with lower FICO scores, carried higher interest rates, and encountered more frequent delinquencies.
In order to better differentiate the drivers of corporations’ actions, in particular shareholder wealth and stakeholder interests, the paper explores the significance of the comply or explain-principle and its underlying enforcement mechanisms more generally. Against this background, compliance rates with specific provisions may shed a light on companies’ reasons for following the code. An analysis of these rates at the example of distinct provisions of the German Corporate Governance Code is therefore entered into. In light of the current corporate governance debate and the legitimacy problems that are raised, among the code provisions that exemplify these questions very well are those regulating incentive pay, severance pay caps, and age limits for supervisory board members. Their analysis will lay a basis for an answer to the question about what motivates companies to comply with the code. The motivation then paves the way to arrive at a further specification of the determinants of the regulatory evolution of the Code and the range of stakeholders and their concerns that enter into it.
Little evidence exists on the financing decisions of newly founded firms or on the financing dynamics of these firms over their life cycle. We aim to help filling this gap by investigating the financing dynamics of 2,456 French manufacturing firms founded between 2004 and 2006 through their legally required and reported financial statements. Because we observe significant heterogeneity in the financing decision in the firms' founding year, we focus on analyzing whether these differences widen, persist, or converge by using different convergence concepts. We identify a persistence-cum-convergence pattern. We find the existence of ß-convergence (implying that e.g. firms with lower initial levels of debt accumulate more debt over time) but not of σ-convergence (i.e. we observe an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of the financing structure). We also show that the dynamics of financing matter for the growth path of the firms.
The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, launched in summer 2012, indirectly recapitalized periphery country banks through its positive impact on the value of sovereign bonds. However, the regained stability of the European banking sector has not fully transferred into economic growth. We show that zombie lending behavior of banks that still remained undercapitalized after the OMT announcement is an important reason for this development. As a result, there was no positive impact on real economic activity like employment or investment. Instead, firms mainly used the newly acquired funds to build up cash reserves. Finally, we document that creditworthy firms in industries with a high prevalence of zombie firms suffered significantly from the credit misallocation, which slowed down the economic recovery.
The global financial crisis and the ensuing criticism of macroeconomics have inspired researchers to explore new modeling approaches. There are many new models that deliver improved estimates of the transmission of macroeconomic policies and aim to better integrate the financial sector in business cycle analysis. Policy making institutions need to compare available models of policy transmission and evaluate the impact and interaction of policy instruments in order to design effective policy strategies. This paper reviews the literature on model comparison and presents a new approach for comparative analysis. Its computational implementation enables individual researchers to conduct systematic model comparisons and policy evaluations easily and at low cost. This approach also contributes to improving reproducibility of computational research in macroeconomic modeling. Several applications serve to illustrate the usefulness of model comparison and the new tools in the area of monetary and fiscal policy. They include an analysis of the impact of parameter shifts on the effects of fiscal policy, a comparison of monetary policy transmission across model generations and a cross-country comparison of the impact of changes in central bank rates in the United States and the euro area. Furthermore, the paper includes a large-scale comparison of the dynamics and policy implications of different macro-financial models. The models considered account for financial accelerator effects in investment financing, credit and house price booms and a role for bank capital. A final exercise illustrates how these models can be used to assess the benefits of leaning against credit growth in monetary policy.
Amid increasing regulation, structural changes of the market and Quantitative Easing as well as extremely low yields, concerns about the market liquidity of the Eurozone sovereign debt markets have been raised. We aim to quantify illiquidity risks, especially such related to liquidity dry-ups, and illiquidity spillover across maturities by examining the reaction to illiquidity shocks at high frequencies in two ways:
a) the regular response to shocks using a variance decomposition and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes by detecting illiquidity shocks and modeling those as ultivariate Hawkes processes.
We find that:
a) market liquidity is more fragile and less predictable when an asset is very illiquid and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes is structurally different from the regular response.
In 2015 long-term bonds are less liquid and the medium-term bonds are liquid, although we observe that in the extremes the medium-term bonds are increasingly driven by illiquidity spillover from the long-term titles.
Most defined contribution pension plans pay benefits as lump sums, yet the US Treasury has recently encouraged firms to protect retirees from outliving their assets by converting a portion of their plan balances into longevity income annuities (LIA). These are deferred annuities which initiate payouts not later than age 85 and continue for life, and they provide an effective way to hedge systematic (individual) longevity risk for a relatively low price. Using a life cycle portfolio framework, we measure the welfare improvements from including LIAs in the menu of plan payout choices, accounting for mortality heterogeneity by education and sex. We find that introducing a longevity income annuity to the plan menu is attractive for most DC plan participants who optimally commit 8-15% of their plan balances at age 65 to a LIA that starts paying out at age 85. Optimal annuitization boosts welfare by 5-20% of average retirement plan accruals at age 66 (assuming average mortality rates), compared to not having access to the LIA. We also compare the optimal LIA allocation versus two default options that plan sponsors could implement. We conclude that an approach where a fixed fraction over a dollar threshold is invested in LIAs will be preferred by most to the status quo, while enhancing welfare for the majority of workers.
Systemic co-jumps
(2016)
The simultaneous occurrence of jumps in several stocks can be associated with major financial news, triggers short-term predictability in stock returns, is correlated with sudden spikes of the variance risk premium, and determines a persistent increase (decrease) of stock variances and correlations when they come along with bad (good) news. These systemic events and their implications can be easily overlooked by traditional univariate jump statistics applied to stock indices. They are instead revealed in a clearly cut way by using a novel test procedure applied to individual assets, which is particularly effective on high-volume stocks.
This paper addresses whether and to what extent econometric methods used in experimental studies can be adapted and applied to financial data to detect the best-fitting preference model. To address the research question, we implement a frequently used nonlinear probit model in the style of Hey and Orme (1994) and base our analysis on a simulation stud. In detail, we simulate trading sequences for a set of utility models and try to identify the underlying utility model and its parameterization used to generate these sequences by maximum likelihood. We find that for a very broad classification of utility models, this method provides acceptable outcomes. Yet, a closer look at the preference parameters reveals several caveats that come along with typical issues attached to financial data, and that some of these issues seems to drive our results. In particular, deviations are attributable to effects stemming from multicollinearity and coherent under-identification problems, where some of these detrimental effects can be captured up to a certain degree by adjusting the error term specification. Furthermore, additional uncertainty stemming from changing market parameter estimates affects the precision of our estimates for risk preferences and cannot be simply remedied by using a higher standard deviation of the error term or a different assumption regarding its stochastic process. Particularly, if the variance of the error term becomes large, we detect a tendency to identify SPT as utility model providing the best fit to simulated trading sequences. We also find that a frequent issue, namely serial correlation of the residuals, does not seem to be significant. However, we detected a tendency to prefer nesting models over nested utility models, which is particularly prevalent if RDU and EXPO utility models are estimated along with EUT and CRRA utility models.
Microeconomic modeling of investors behavior in financial markets and its results crucially depends on assumptions about the mathematical shape of the underlying preference functions as well as their parameterizations. With the purpose to shed some light on the question, which preferences towards risky financial outcomes prevail in stock markets, we adopted and applied a maximum likelihood approach from the field of experimental economics on a randomly selected dataset of 656 private investors of a large German discount brokerage firm. According to our analysis we find evidence that the majority of these clients follow trading pattern in accordance with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). We also find that observable sociodemographic and personal characteristics such as gender or age don't seem to correlate with specific preference types. With respect to the overall impact of preferences on trading behavior, we find a moderate impact of preferences on trading decisions of individual investors. A classification of investors according to various utility types reveals that the strength of the impact of preferences on an investors' rading behavior is not connected to most personal characteristics, but seems to be related to round-trip length.
Shortcomings revealed by experimental and theoretical researchers such as Allais (1953), Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) that put the classical expected utility paradigm von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) into question, led to the proposition of alternative and generalized utility functions, that intend to improve descriptive accuracy. The perhaps best known among those alternative preference theories, that has attracted much popularity among economists, is the so called Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Its distinctive features, governed by its set of risk parameters such as risk sensitivity, loss aversion and decision weights, stimulated a series of economic and financial models that build on the previously estimated parameter values by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to analyze and explain various empirical phenomena for which expected utility doesn't seem to offer a satisfying rationale. In this paper, after providing a brief overview of the relevant literature, we take a closer look at one of those papers, the trading model of Vlcek and Hens (2011) and analyze its implications on Prospect Theory parameters using an adopted maximum likelihood approach for a dataset of 656 individual investors from a large German discount brokerage firm. We find evidence that investors in our dataset are moderately averse to large losses and display high risk sensitivity, supporting the main assumptions of Prospect Theory.
Ongoing demographic change will lead to a relative scarcity of raw labor to the effect that output growth will be decreasing in the next decades, a secular stagnation. As physical capital will be relatively abundant, this decrease of output will be accompanied by reductions of asset returns. We quantify these effects for the US economy by developing an overlapping generations model with risky and risk-free assets. Without adjustments of human capital, risky returns decrease until 2035 by about 0.7 percentage point, and the risk-free rate by about one percentage point, leading to substantial welfare losses for asset rich households. Per capita output is reduced by 6%. Endogenous human capital adjustments strongly mitigate these effects. We conclude that human capital policies will be crucial in the context of labor shortages.
We study whether the presence of low-latency traders (including high-frequency traders (HFTs)) in the pre-opening period contributes to market quality, defined by price discovery and liquidity provision, in the opening auction. We use a unique dataset from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) based on server-IDs and find that HFTs dynamically alter their presence in different stocks and on different days. In spite of the lack of immediate execution, about one quarter of HFTs participate in the pre-opening period, and contribute significantly to market quality in the pre-opening period, the opening auction that ensues and the continuous trading period. Their contribution is largely different from that of the other HFTs during the continuous period.
The equity trading landscape all over the world has changed dramatically in recent years. We have witnessed the advent of new trading venues and significant changes in the market shares of existing ones. We use an extensive panel dataset from the European equity markets to analyze the market shares of five categories of lit and dark trading mechanisms. Market design features, such as minimum tick size, immediacy and anonymity; market conditions, such as liquidity and volatility; and the informational environment have distinct implications for order routing decisions and trading venues' resulting market shares. Furthermore, these implications differ distinctly for small and large trades, probably because traders jointly optimize their trade size and venue choice. Our results both confirm and go beyond current theoretical predictions on trading in fragmented markets.
Using two datasets containing demographically representative samples of the Dutch population, I study how lifetime experiences of aggregate labor market conditions affect personality. Three sets of findings are reported. First, experienced aggregate unemployment is negatively correlated with the levels of all Big Five personality traits, except for conscientiousness (no significant correlation). Second, in panel data models with individual fixed effects I find that changes in experienced aggregate unemployment cause changes in emotional stability and agreeableness for men, and conscientiousness for women. The correlation is positive, and effects are economically large. Thirdly, I report suggestive evidence that the main driver is experienced aggregate unemployment, instead of other macroeconomic variables as experienced GDP, stock market returns or inflation. Taken together, these findings suggest that changes in Big Five personality traits are systematically related to experienced aggregate labor market conditions.
This paper is the outcome of a related broader project, exploring the explanatory power of the Legal Theory of Finance, which proposes a new institution-based analytical framework for the analysis of phenomena of financial markets. One of its most important theoretical assumptions, the legal construction of financial markets, is highlighted by the example of the private creation of money by structured finance products in this paper. Further implications can then be shown referring to pari passu clauses and collective action clauses, which are both exhibit a differential application of these legal rules according to the hierarchical status of the respective market participant, and can therefore endanger sovereign debt restructurings. Legal instruments to avoid this are briefly explored. An example of another key role of the law in crisis that is the task to resolve the tension between market discipline and financial stability is exemplified by the regulation of the OTC derivatives market and proposals of effective loss-sharing among CCPs. Related questions about the significance of legal rules to ensure financial stability are raised in the analysis of minimum capital requirements under Basel III.
“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
This note discusses the basic economics of central clearing for derivatives and the need for a proper regulation, supervision and resolution of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs). New regulation in the U.S. and in Europe renders the involvement of a central counterparty mandatory for standardized OTC derivatives’ trading and sets higher capital and collateral requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.
From a macrofinance perspective, CCPs provide a trade-off between reduced contagion risk in the financial industry and the creation of a significant systemic risk. However, so far, regulation and supervision of CCPs is very fragmented, limited and ignores two important aspects: the risk of consolidation of CCPs on the one side and the competition among CCPs on the other side. i) As the economies of scale of CCP operations in risk and cost reduction can be large, they provide an argument in favor of consolidation, leading at the extreme to a monopoly CCP that poses the ultimate default risk – a systemic risk for the entire financial sector. As a systemic risk event requires a government bailout, there is a public policy issue here. ii) As long as no monopoly CCP exists, there is competition for market share among existing CCPs. Such competition may undermine the stability of the entire financial system because it induces “predatory margining”: a reduction of margin requirements to increase market share.
The policy lesson from our consideration emphasizes the importance of a single authority supervising all competing CCPs as well as of a specific regulation and resolution framework for CCPs. Our general recommendations can be applied to the current situation in Europe, and the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and London Stock Exchange.
Die aktuelle Diskussion über eine Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung vermischt Fragen nach dem durchschnittlichen Rentenniveau mit Fragen der Umverteilung von Einkommen im Ruhestand zur Bekämpfung einer etwaigen Altersarmut. Dieser Beitrag kritisiert diesen Ansatz und befasst sich mit fünf Kernaussagen: (1) Die aktuell gültige Rentenformel darf unter keinen Umständen abgeschafft werden. (2) Das Renteneintrittsalter sollte an die durchschnittliche Restlebenserwartung nach dem Erreichen des 65. Lebensjahres gekoppelt werden. (3) Eine Integration der Flüchtlinge in den Arbeitsmarkt wird das Rentenniveau in den Jahren 2030 bis 2040 stützen. (4) Sollte trotz allem die Altersarmut steigen, so kann dem durch die Einführung einer Mindestrente begegnet werden. (5) Die private Altersvorsorge muss weiter gestützt werden.
Mis-selling by banks has occurred repeatedly in many nations over the last decade. While clients may benefit from competition – enabling them to choose financial services at lowest costs – economic frictions between banks and clients may give rise to mis-selling. Examples of mis-selling are mis-representation of information, overly complex product design and non-customized advice. European regulators address the problem of mis-selling in the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" (MiFID) I and II and the "Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation" (MiFIR), by setting behavioral requirements for banks, regulating the compensation of employees, and imposing re-quirements on offered financial products and disclosure rules.
This paper argues that MiFID II protects clients but is not as effective as it could be. (1) It does not differentiate between client groups with different levels of financial literacy. Effective advice requires different advice for different client groups. (2) MiFID II uses too many rules and too many instruments to achieve identical goals and thereby generates excessive compliance costs. High compliance costs and low revenues would drive banks out of some segments of retail business.
Das Ergebnis des Volksentscheids im Vereinigten Königreich ist ein Weckruf. Alle Entscheidungsträger der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten sind aufgerufen, grundlegende Reformen der Verfassung einer Europäischen Union, möglicherweise nur noch einer europäischen „Kontinentalunion“ unverzüglich in Angriff zu nehmen. Unverzüglich bedeutet, einen Reformprozess nicht erst dann zu beginnen, wenn die Verhandlungen über ein Austrittsabkommen beendet worden sind. Eine Rückentwicklung der Europäischen Union zu einer bloßen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft dürfte dabei keine Lösung sein. Es ist jetzt angezeigt, offen und – notfalls kontrovers – zu diskutieren, wie ein künftiger Bundesstaat auf europäischer Ebene aussehen könnte.
Under ordinary circumstances, the fiscal implications of central bank policies tend to be seen as relatively minor and escape close scrutiny. The global financial crisis of 2008, however, demanded an extraordinary response by central banks which brought to light the immense power of central bank balance sheet policies as well as their major fiscal implications. Once the zero lower bound on interest rates is reached, expanding a central bank’s balance sheet becomes the central instrument for providing additional monetary policy accommodation. However, with interest rates near zero, the line separating fiscal and monetary policy is blurred. Furthermore, discretionary decisions associated with asset purchases and liquidity provision, as well as with lender-of-last-resort operations benefiting private entities, can have major distributional effects that are ordinarily associated with fiscal policy. In the euro area, discretionary central bank decisions can have immense distributional effects across member states. However, decisions of this nature are incompatible with the role of unelected officials in democratic societies. Drawing on the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, this paper explores the tensions arising from central bank balance sheet policies and addresses pertinent questions about the governance and accountability of independent central banks in a democratic society.
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
We show that the net corporate payout yield predicts both the stock market index and house prices and that the log home rent-price ratio predicts both house prices and labor income growth. We incorporate the predictability in a rich life-cycle model of household decisions involving consumption of both perishable goods and housing services, stochastic and unspanned labor income, stochastic house prices, home renting and owning, stock investments, and portfolio constraints. We find that households can significantly improve their welfare by optimally conditioning decisions on the predictors. For a modestly risk-averse agent with a 35-year working period and a 15-year retirement period, the present value of the higher average life-time consumption amounts to roughly $179,000 (assuming both an initial wealth and an initial annual income of $20,000), and the certainty equivalent gain is around 5.5% of total wealth (financial wealth plus human capital). Furthermore, every cohort of agents in our model would have benefited from applying predictor-conditional strategies along the realized time series over our 1960-2010 data period.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the macro-prudential policy paradigm has gained increasing prominence (Bank of England, 2009; Bernanke, 2011). The dynamics of this shift in the economic discourse, and the reasons this shift has not taken place prior to the crisis have not been addressed systemically. This paper investigates the evolution of the economic discourse on systemic risk and banking regulation to better understand these changes and their timing. Further, we use our sample to inquire whether, and if so, why the economic regulatory studies failed to recommend a reliable banking regulation prior to the crisis. By following a discourse analysis, we establish that the economic discourse on banking regulation has not been suitable for providing the knowledge basis required for a dynamically reliable banking regulation, and we identify the underlying reasons for such failure. These reasons include the obsession of economic discourse with optimization and particular forms of formalism, particularly, partial equilibrium analysis. Further, the economic discourse on banking regulation excludes historical and practitioners’ discourses and ignores weak signals. We point out that post-crisis, these epistemological failures of the economic discourse on banking regulation were not sufficiently recognized and that recent attempts to conceptualize systemic risk as a negative externality and to thus price it point to the persistence of formalism, equilibrium thinking and optimization, with their attending dangers.
Im Nachgang der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise beobachten wir derzeit sehr niedrige Renditen im „sicheren“ Anlagebereich auf dem Geldmarkt und für Staatsanleihen. Gleichzeitig sind Aktienkurse massiv gestiegen und zeichnen sich seit Beginn 2015 durch eine Seitwärtsbewegung aus. Die Ursachen für diese Entwicklung sind teilweise bekannt: Niedrige Zinssätze aufgrund einer expansiven Geldpolitik gepaart mit hoher Unsicherheit an den Märkten reduzieren die Auswahl attraktiver Kapitalanlagemöglichkeiten erheblich. Doch wie wird sich die langfristige Entwicklung gestalten, wenn oder falls die Wirkungen der jüngsten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise nachlassen? Gibt es einen langfristigen Trend? Spiegelt sich dieser Trend etwa bereits heute in den niedrigen Renditen wider?
Vor mehr als einem Jahrzehnt, also bereits einige Jahre vor der jüngsten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, wurde wiederholt die sogenannte „Asset Market Meltdown“-Hypothese postuliert. Nach dieser Hypothese würden in den dreißiger Jahren dieses Jahrhunderts die Kapitalrenditen stark sinken, wenn die „Babyboomer“-Generation in den Ruhestand gehe und infolgedessen Kapital aus dem Wertpapiermarkt abziehe. Heute wird eine ähnliche Debatte unter dem Stichwort „säkulare Stagnation“ geführt. Danach bestehe die Gefahr, dass die nächsten Jahrzehnte durch niedrige Wachstumsraten geprägt sein und negative Realzinsen gar zur Normalität werden könnten. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die demographische Entwicklung für eine solche Stagnation verantwortlich ist.
Steueroasen besitzen drei wichtige Merkmale, die aus der Sicht von Steuerhinterziehern und Steuervermeidern anderer Länder besondere Anziehungskraft haben. Sie bieten niedrige Steuersätze für alle oder für bestimmte Kapitaleinkommen. Sie weisen eine hohe politische Stabilität und funktionierende Institutionen auf. Schließlich verbinden sie dies mit einem hohen Maß an faktischer Intransparenz in den Besitzstrukturen von Briefkastenfirmen sowie einer ausgeprägten Vertraulichkeit von Bankdaten. Unter Führung der OECD hat sich in den letzten Jahren der politische Druck auf die internationalen Steueroasen erhöht und zu einer Reihe von bilateralen und multilateralen Abkommen zum Informationsaustausch geführt. Da diese Abkommen nicht alle Steueroasen umfassen, haben sie die Gesamtanlagen in den Steueroasen allerdings bisher nur in sehr geringem Umfang reduzieren können. In Deutschland werden die internationalen Abkommen der letzten Jahre von Seiten der Steuerpolitik aber bereits als Erfolg verbucht und eine stärker progressive Besteuerung von Kapitaleinkünften diskutiert. Falls weiterhin ein Teil der einschlägigen Steueroasen dem Informationsaustausch fernbleibt, bietet es sich an, auf bilateralem Wege Verhandlungen aufzunehmen oder den Druck über multilaterale Verfahren und Sanktionen zu erhöhen.
A stochastic forward-looking model to assess the profitability and solvency of european insurers
(2016)
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conducting forward-looking assessments of profitability and solvency of the main euro area insurance sectors. We model the balance sheet of an insurance company encompassing both life and non-life business and we calibrate it using country level data to make it representative of the major euro area insurance markets. Then, we project this representative balance sheet forward under stochastic capital markets, stochastic mortality developments and stochastic claims. The model highlights the potential threats to insurers solvency and profitability stemming from a sustained period of low interest rates particularly in those markets which are largely exposed to reinvestment risks due to the relatively high guarantees and generous profit participation schemes. The model also proves how the resilience of insurers to adverse financial developments heavily depends on the diversification of their business mix. Finally, the model identifies potential negative spillovers between life and non-life business thorugh the redistribution of capital within groups.
Recently there has been an explosion of research on whether the equilibrium real interest rate has declined, an issue with significant implications for monetary policy. A common finding is that the rate has declined. In this paper we provide evidence that contradicts this finding. We show that the perceived decline may well be due to shifts in regulatory policy and monetary policy that have been omitted from the research. In developing the monetary policy implications, it is promising that much of the research approaches the policy problem through the framework of monetary policy rules, as uncertainty in the equilibrium real rate is not a reason to abandon rules in favor of discretion. But the results are still inconclusive and too uncertain to incorporate into policy rules in the ways that have been suggested.
Understanding the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking: a discursive network analysis
(2016)
While some economists argued for macro-prudential regulation pre-crisis, the macro-prudential approach and its emphasis on endogenously created systemic risk have only gained prominence post-crisis. Employing discourse and network analysis on samples of the most cited scholarly works on banking regulation as well as on systemic risk (60 sources each) from 1985 to 2014, we analyze the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking in the shift to the post crisis period. Our analysis demonstrates that the predominance of formalism, particularly, partial equilibrium analysis along with the exclusion of historical and practitioners’ styles of reasoning from banking regulatory studies impeded economists from engaging seriously with the endogenous sources of systemic risk prior to the crisis. Post-crisis, these topics became important in this discourse, but the epistemological failures of banking regulatory studies pre-crisis were not sufficiently recognized. Recent attempts to conceptualize and price systemic risk as a negative externality point to the persistence of formalism and equilibrium thinking, with its attending dangers of incremental innovation due to epistemological barriers constrains theoretical progress, by excluding observed phenomena, which cannot yet be accommodated in mathematical models.
We argue two alternative routes that lead entrepreneurial start-ups to acquisition outcomes instead of liquidation. On one hand, acquisitions can come about through the control route with external financers such as venture capitalists (VCs). VCs take control through their board seats along with other contractual rights that can bring about changes in a start-up necessary to successfully attract a strategic acquirer. Consistent with this view, we show that VCs often replace the founding entrepreneur as CEO long before an acquisition exit. On the other hand, acquisitions can come about through advice and support provided to the start-up, such as that provided by an incubator or technology park. Based on a sample of 251 Crunchbase companies in the U.S. over the years 2007 to 2014, we present evidence that is strongly consistent with these propositions. Further, we show that the data indicate a tension between VC-backing of start-ups resident in technology parks insofar as such start-ups are slower to become, and less likely to be, acquired.
Intrinsic motivation for honesty is perceived as an important determinant of large and persistent variation in cheating behavior. However, little is known about its actual role due to challenges in obtaining precise measures of motivation for honesty, as well as field outcomes on cheating. We fill these gaps using a unique setting of informal milk markets in India. A novel behavioral experiment, which combines a standard die roll task with Bluetooth technology, is used to measure motivation for honesty of milkmen at both extensive and intensive margins. We then buy milk from the same milkmen and show that cheating in the field, measured by the amount of water added to milk, widens significantly with a milkman’s degree of dishonesty. Additional analyses show that conventional binary measure of motivation for honesty suffers from measurement errors, resulting in underestimation of this association.
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.