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Despite the apparent stability of the wage bargaining institutions in West Germany, aggregate union membership has been declining dramatically since the early 90's. However, aggregate gross membership numbers do not distinguish by employment status and it is impossible to disaggregate these sufficiently. This paper uses four waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees. We estimate a correlated random effects probit model suggested in Chamberlain (1984) to take proper account of individual specfic effects. Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Thus, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also use the estimates to predict net union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample for the time period 1985 to 1997. JEL - Klassifikation: J5
Based on a broad set of regional aggregated and disaggregated consumer price index (CPI) data from major industrialized countries in Asia, North America and Europe we are examining the role that national borders play for goods market integration. In line with the existing literature we find that intra-national markets are better integrated than international market. Additionally, our results show that there is a large "ocean" effect, i.e., inter-continental markets are significantly more segmented than intra-continental markets. To examine the impact of the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on integration, we split our sample into a pre-EMU and EMU sample. We find that border effects across EMU countries have declined by about 80% to 90% after 1999 whereas border estimates across non-EMU countries have remained basically unchanged. Since global factors have affected all countries in our sample similarly and major integration efforts across EMU countries were made before 1999, we suggest that most of the reduction in EMU border estimates has been "nominal". Panel unit root evidence shows that the observed large differences in integration across intra- and inter-continental markets remain valid in the long-run. This finding implies that real factors are responsible for the documented segmentations across our sample countries.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country s legal system, would require.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
Mit dem 3. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz wurde im Jahr 1998 die Investmentaktiengesellschaft in das deutsche Investmentrecht eingeführt. Die in Anlehnung an die USamerikanische "Investment Company" geschaffene Rechtsform sollte das deutsche Kapitalanlagegeschäft beleben und insbesondere für ausländische Fondssponsoren attraktiver machen. Diese Erwartungen wurden enttäuscht: Die Bestimmungen zur Investmentaktiengesellschaft sind bis heute totes Recht geblieben.1 Dies haben einige Autoren frühzeitig vorhergesehen.2 Im Zuge der anstehenden tiefgreifenden Reform des Investmentrechts durch das Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Investmentwesens und zur Besteuerung von Investmentvermögen (Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz) 3 wird auch das Recht der Investmentaktiengesellschaft wesentlich geändert. Neue Wege beschreitet der Gesetzgeber dabei insbesondere mit der Einführung der Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kapital. Dieser zur Vervollständigung der Bestimmungen zur Investmentaktiengesellschaft in das deutsche Recht eingeführte Typus wirft aus Sicht des Aktienrechts eine Vielzahl interessanter Fragen auf, denen im Folgenden nachgegangen werden soll. Zuvor sollen jedoch die investmentrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Investmentaktiengesellschaft und der Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kapital im Besonderen kurz beleuchtet werden.
Effiziente Zirkulationsmärkte für Wertpapiere sind wegen ihres Zusammenhanges mit den Emissionsmärkten für die Kapitalversorgung der Unternehmen ebenso unentbehrlich wie als Informationsquelle und Handelsplattform für institutionelle und private Investoren. Die juristische Aufarbeitung der Vorfälle am Neuen Markt weist deutlich auf Defizite des gegenwärtigen Systems hin. Eine überzeugende Ordnung der Sekundärmarktpublizität macht sich die mit einer richtig justierten Haftung verbundenen Anreize und die Privatinitiative betroffener Anleger als Regulierungsinstrument zunutze. Der nachstehende Beitrag greift Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung des Haftungsregimes für Falschinformation des Kapitalmarktes auf und erörtert Einzelfragen.
Vortrag auf der Konferenz „Europäischer Kapitalmarkt im 21. Jahrhundert“, Düsseldorf, 6. Dezember 2002. Am 4.11. dieses Jahres hat eine von dem Niederländer Jaap Winter geleitete Gruppe von Gesellschaftsrechtsexperten, die Kommissar Bolkestein eingesetzt hatte, ihren Bericht „A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe“ (im Folgenden: Bericht) vorgelegt. Der Bericht umfaßt mit Anhängen 160 Druckseiten und enthält Empfehlungen u. a. zu Corporate Governance, Unternehmensfinanzierung, Konzernen, Umwandlung und Sitzverlegung, aber auch zu einer Europäischen Privatgesellschaft analog zur deutschen GmbH, zu europäischen Genossenschaften und weiteren Unternehmensformen. In meinem Vortrag heute beschränke ich mich auf die Vorschläge zur Corporate Governance.
Financial markets are to a very large extent influenced by the advent of information. Such disclosures, however, do not only contain information about fundamentals underlying the markets, but they also serve as a focal point for the beliefs of market participants. This dual role of information gains further importance for explaining the development of asset valuations when taking into account that information may be perceived individually (private information), or may be commonly shared by all traders (public information). This study investigates into the recently developed theoretical structures explaining the operating mechanism of the two types of information and emphasizes the empirical testability and differentiation between the role of private and public information. Concluding from a survey of experimental studies and own econometric analyses, it is argued that most often public information dominates private information. This finding justifies central bankers´ unease when disseminating news to the markets and argues against the recent trend of demanding full transparency both for financial institutions and financial markets themselves.
After more than a decade of post-socialist transition, transition theories are increasingly criticised for their inability to grasp the new post-socialist reality. However, even in the light of political, economic, social and cultural restructuring processes taking place on a global scale, the structural legacies of socialist and pre-socialist development are not erased. On the contrary, they continue to play an important role by filtering the impact of global tendencies upon post-socialist societies. With reference to a case study from the Romanian city of Timisoara I will address in the following the ambivalencies connected to the efforts of local elites in the process of implementing global-level requirements in a post-socialist environment.
A rapidly growing literature has documented important improvements in volatility measurement and forecasting performance through the use of realized volatilities constructed from high-frequency returns coupled with relatively simple reduced-form time series modeling procedures. Building on recent theoretical results from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2003c,d) for related bi-power variation measures involving the sum of high-frequency absolute returns, the present paper provides a practical framework for non-parametrically measuring the jump component in realized volatility measurements. Exploiting these ideas for a decade of high-frequency five-minute returns for the DM/$ exchange rate, the S&P500 market index, and the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield, we find the jump component of the price process to be distinctly less persistent than the continuous sample path component. Explicitly including the jump measure as an additional explanatory variable in an easy-to-implement reduced form model for realized volatility results in highly significant jump coefficient estimates at the daily, weekly and quarterly forecast horizons. As such, our results hold promise for improved financial asset allocation, risk management, and derivatives pricing, by separate modeling, forecasting and pricing of the continuous and jump components of total return variability.
In this study a regime switching approach is applied to estimate the chartist and fundamentalist (c&f) exchange rate model originally proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986). The c&f model is tested against alternative regime switching specifications applying likelihood ratio tests. Nested atheoretical models like the popular segmented trends model suggested by Engel and Hamilton (1990) are rejected in favour of the multi agent model. Moreover, the c&f regime switching model seems to describe the data much better than a competing regime switching GARCH(1,1) model. Finally, our findings turned out to be relatively robust when estimating the model in subsamples. The empirical results suggest that the model is able to explain daily DM/Dollar forward exchange rate dynamics from 1982 to 1998.
Learning and equilibrium selection in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices
(2003)
We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model set up but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests to analyze learning in stochastic models.
This paper considers a sticky price model with a cash-in-advance constraint where agents forecast inflation rates with the help of econometric models. Agents use least squares learning to estimate two competing models of which one is consistent with rational expectations once learning is complete. When past performance governs the choice of forecast model, agents may prefer to use the inconsistent forecast model, which generates an equilibrium where forecasts are inefficient. While average output and inflation result the same as under rational expectations, higher moments differ substantially: output and inflation show persistence, inflation responds sluggishly to nominal disturbances, and the dynamic correlations of output and inflation match U.S. data surprisingly well.
This paper compares Bayesian decision theory with robust decision theory where the decision maker optimizes with respect to the worst state realization. For a class of robust decision problems there exists a sequence of Bayesian decision problems whose solution converges towards the robust solution. It is shown that the limiting Bayesian problem displays infinite risk aversion and that decisions are insensitive (robust) to the precise assignment of prior probabilities. This holds independent from whether the preference for robustness is global or restricted to local perturbations around some reference model.
We study optimal nominal demand policy in an economy with monopolistic competition and flexible prices when firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. Parametrizing firms´ information imperfections by a (Shannon) capacity parameter that constrains the amount of information flowing to each firm, we study how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on this parameter. When price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements, for a large range of capacity values optimal policy nominally accommodates mark-up shocks in the short-run. This finding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms´ capacity parameter. With persistent mark-up shocks accommodation may increase in the medium term, but decreases in the long-run thereby generating a hump-shaped price response and a slow reduction in output. Instead, when prices are strategic substitutes, policy tends to react restrictively to mark-up shocks. However, rational expectations equilibria may then not exist with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge.
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(2003)
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(2003)