Refine
Year of publication
- 2003 (150) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (150) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (150)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (150) (remove)
Keywords
- Deutschland (27)
- Geldpolitik (11)
- Bank (7)
- Europäische Union (7)
- Corporate Governance (6)
- Going Public (6)
- Schätzung (6)
- Germany (5)
- Inflation (5)
- Kreditwesen (5)
Institute
This paper proposes a non-standard way to combine lazy functional languages with I/O. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach, a tiny lazy functional core language FUNDIO , which is also a call-by-need lambda calculus, is investigated. The syntax of FUNDIO has case, letrec, constructors and an IO-interface: its operational semantics is described by small-step reductions. A contextual approximation and equivalence depending on the input-output behavior of normal order reduction sequences is defined and a context lemma is proved. This enables to study a semantics of FUNDIO and its semantic properties. The paper demonstrates that the technique of complete reduction diagrams enables to show a considerable set of program transformations to be correct. Several optimizations of evaluation are given, including strictness optimizations and an abstract machine, and shown to be correct w.r.t. contextual equivalence. Correctness of strictness optimizations also justifies correctness of parallel evaluation. Thus this calculus has a potential to integrate non-strict functional programming with a non-deterministic approach to input-output and also to provide a useful semantics for this combination. It is argued that monadic IO and unsafePerformIO can be combined in Haskell, and that the result is reliable, if all reductions and transformations are correct w.r.t. to the FUNDIO-semantics. Of course, we do not address the typing problems the are involved in the usage of Haskell s unsafePerformIO. The semantics can also be used as a novel semantics for strict functional languages with IO, where the sequence of IOs is not fixed.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
Die durch jahrzehntelange Planwirtschaft geprägten Strukturen sind in Russland noch fest verwurzelt. Dementsprechend ist das Bankensystem auch zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes unterentwickelt. Die markantesten Merkmale der Finanzwirtschaft sind die ungewöhnliche Größenstruktur der Banken; deren Schwierigkeiten, die rapide zunehmende Zahl kleinster, kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen mit Finanzdienstleistungen zu versorgen sowie die geringe Rolle ausländischer Banken. Überdies sind die weiterhin bestehenden Systemrisiken nicht zu unterschätzen.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.
The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Wissen ist in jüngster Zeit zu einem zentralen Begriff in der Debatte um regionale Entwicklung geworden. Wissen gilt schlechthin als Motor des innovationsgetriebenen ökonomischen Wachstums. Es nimmt gegenwärtig neben den bekannten klassischen Produktionsfaktoren die Rolle desjenigen Produktionsfaktors ein, der als grundlegend für regionale Entwicklung verstanden wird. In diesem Kontext übernehmen wissensintensive Dienstleister die zentrale Rolle als Mittler von Wissen: Sie dienen als Transmissionsriemen in Wissensprozessen. Sie sind heute von erheblicher Bedeutung, da man annimmt, dass Unternehmen nicht mehr in der Lage sind, allein durch eigene Anstrengungen in ausreichendem Maße neues Wissen zu schaffen; neues Wissen, das nur durch Transfer für Unternehmen nutzbar gemacht werden müsste, schlicht nicht in akademischen Einrichtungen wie Universitäten vorhanden ist; die Bedingungen volatiler Märkte und eines zunehmenden Innovationswettbewerbs die Anforderungen an die Wissensgenerierung durch Unternehmen radikal erhöht haben. Neue Wege der Wissensgenerierung müssen daher beschritten werden. Die alte Vorstellung eines linearen Prozesses der Wissensgenerierung vom akademischen Grundlagenwissen über die Angewandte Forschung bis zur Entwicklung und Anwendung, den man auch mit dem Konzept des mode 1 Modells bezeichnet, wird durch das Konzept des interaktiven Modells beziehungsweise des mode 2 Modells der Wissensgenerierung ergänzt, wenn nicht ersetzt (Gibbons et al. 1994). Dieses Konzept sieht die Wissensgenerierung als einen vielfältig vernetzten, rekursiven und reflexiven Prozess (zusammenfassend Malecki 2000). Fragen, wie Prozesse der Wissensgenerierung und des Lernens organisiert werden, rücken damit in den Vordergrund. Daher wird das gegenwärtige Stadium der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung gerne als Lernende Ökonomie bezeichnet (Lundvall/Johnson 1994, OECD 2001, Archibugi/Lundvall 2002). Eine der Konsequenzen dieser Debatte ist, dass uns heute wissensintensive Prozesse als solche sowie in ihrer Geographie komplexer erscheinen als früher. Auf der einen Seite wird den wissensintensiven Dienstleistern ein wesentlicher und zunehmender Anteil an der Generierung von Innovationen und Lösungen für neue Geschäftsvorgänge zugemessen (Bryson u.a. 2000). Die Organisation von Wissensprozessen wird für diese Unternehmen zu einem wichtigen Faktor ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Auf der anderen Seite wird vermutet, dass Wissen eine 3 räumliche Komponente hat und daher Wege der räumlichen Organisation von Wissensprozessen zu den bedeutenden Instrumenten gehören, im Wettbewerb zu bestehen. Der kognitive Prozess der Generierung und Aneignung von Wissen macht die Organisation von Kommunikation und sozialer Interaktion notwendig. Dies ist eine wesentliche Aufgabe des Wissensmanagements, das sich dazu verschiedener Dimensionen von Nähe bedient. Dieser Beitrag will die Rolle, die ökonomische Akteure den verschiedenen Dimensionen von Nähe im Management von Wissensprozessen zumessen, an zwei Fallstudien beleuchten. Er wird mit dem M&AGeschäft einen Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den Dienstleistungssektor, genauer den Finanzsektor, mit einem Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den produzierenden Sektor hier die Modellentwicklung in der Automobilindustrie vergleichen. Wir hoffen, mit dem Vergleich einerseits aufzuzeigen, dass die konkrete Form der Organisation von Nähen in Wissensprozessen kontext-spezifisch ist, und andererseits die Bedingungen aufzudecken, die die jeweilige Form der Organisation bestimmen.
In this paper we demonstrate how to relate the semantics given by the nondeterministic call-by-need calculus FUNDIO [SS03] to Haskell. After introducing new correct program transformations for FUNDIO, we translate the core language used in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler into the FUNDIO language, where the IO construct of FUNDIO corresponds to direct-call IO-actions in Haskell. We sketch the investigations of [Sab03b] where a lot of program transformations performed by the compiler have been shown to be correct w.r.t. the FUNDIO semantics. This enabled us to achieve a FUNDIO-compatible Haskell-compiler, by turning o not yet investigated transformations and the small set of incompatible transformations. With this compiler, Haskell programs which use the extension unsafePerformIO in arbitrary contexts, can be compiled in a "safe" manner.
The imagination has become a major site for studying transnational cultural flows. Yet it is mainly the mass media that are explored as channels directing the imagination from "the West" towards "the rest". And there is still little empirical "testing" of this field. How do such ‐ and other ‐ imaginary sources work into social practice? And what does such "practised imagination" imply for the practice of transnational anthropology? This article attempts to address these questions from the perspective of fieldwork in progress. In and between Crete and Germany I traced transnational networks based on the reciprocal mobilities of migration, remigration, and tourism. Here, multiple domains of imagination are drawn upon by various audiences, thus effectively contributing to the creation of these relations and the places in which they localise. Anthropological research on tourism and migration has tended to separate the imagination ‐ as being an external impact ‐ from local practice. Yet, transnational ethnography needs to challenge this opposition and is in itself a strategy to do so, in that it perceives the imagination as a practice of transcending physical and cultural distance.
We develop a behavioral exchange rate model with chartists and fundamentalists to study cyclical behavior in foreign exchange markets. Within our model, the market impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of their belief in fundamental analysis. Estimation of a STAR GARCH model shows that the more the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the more fundamentalists leave the market. In contrast to previous findings, our paper indicates that due to the nonlinear presence of fundamentalists, market stability decreases with increasing misalignments. A stabilization policy such as central bank interventions may help to deflate bubbles.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enableme to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enable me to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
JEL classification: G13; J33; M41; M52
Liturgische Filmnächte
(2003)
This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and to update continuously their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of dynamic interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We find that policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation are prone to episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the United States during the 1970s. Our results highlight the value of effective communication of a central bank's inflation objective and of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. July 2003.