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We provide an assessment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposal to restrict the internal ratings-based approach on bank risk and to introduce risk-weighted asset floors. If well enforced, risk-sensitive capital regulation results in a more efficient credit allocation compared to the standard approach. Thus, the internal ratings-based approach should be maintained. Further, the use of internal ratings-based output floors potentially results in unintended negative side effects. Input floors are likely a valuable tool to achieve risk-weighted assets comparability. Finally, the proposed measures have a potential detrimental impact for European banks as compared to others.
We use the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a rather unique dataset with a long time dimension of panel information on consumption, income and wealth, to structurally estimate a buffer-stock saving model. We exploit the information contained in the joint dynamics of income, consumption and wealth to quantify the degree of insurance against income risk. The estimated model implies that Italian households can insure between 89 and 95 percent of a transitory and between 7 and 9 percent of a permanent income shock. Compared to existing empirical estimates for the same dataset, our findings suggest that Italian households do not have access to significant insurance beyond self-insurance.
“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
Private equity fund managers are typically required to invest their own money alongside the fund. We examine how this coinvestment affects the acquisition strategy of leveraged buyout funds. In a simple model, where the investment and capital structure decisions are made simultaneously, we show that a higher coinvestment induces managers to chose less risky firms and use more leverage. We test these predictions in a unique sample of private equity investments in Norway, where the fund manager's taxable wealth is publicly available. Consistent with the model, portfolio company risk decreases and leverage ratios increase with the coinvestment fraction of the manager's wealth. Moreover, funds requiring a relatively high coinvestment tend to spread its capital over a larger number of portfolio firms, consistent with a more conservative investment policy.
The term 'financialization' describes the phenomenon that commodity contracts are traded for purely financial reasons and not for motives rooted in the real economy. Recently, financialization has been made responsible for causing adverse welfare effects especially for low-income and low-wealth agents, who have to spend a large share of their income for commodity consumption and cannot participate in financial markets. In this paper we study the effect of financial speculation on commodity prices in a heterogeneous agent production economy with an agricultural and an industrial producer, a financial speculator, and a commodity consumer. While access to financial markets is always beneficial for the participating agents, since it allows them to reduce their consumption volatility, it has a decisive effect with respect to overall welfare effects who can trade with whom (but not so much what types of instruments can be traded).
Does an increase in competition increase or decrease bank stability? I exploit how the state-specific process of interstate banking deregulation lowered barriers to entry into urban banking markets and find that greater competition significantly increases bank stability. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects and other influences, such as merger and acquisitions or diversification. Moreover, I find that greater competition reduces banks' nonperforming loans and increases bank profitability. These findings suggest that competition increases stability as it improves bank profitability and asset quality.
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
Die aktuelle Diskussion über eine Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung vermischt Fragen nach dem durchschnittlichen Rentenniveau mit Fragen der Umverteilung von Einkommen im Ruhestand zur Bekämpfung einer etwaigen Altersarmut. Dieser Beitrag kritisiert diesen Ansatz und befasst sich mit fünf Kernaussagen: (1) Die aktuell gültige Rentenformel darf unter keinen Umständen abgeschafft werden. (2) Das Renteneintrittsalter sollte an die durchschnittliche Restlebenserwartung nach dem Erreichen des 65. Lebensjahres gekoppelt werden. (3) Eine Integration der Flüchtlinge in den Arbeitsmarkt wird das Rentenniveau in den Jahren 2030 bis 2040 stützen. (4) Sollte trotz allem die Altersarmut steigen, so kann dem durch die Einführung einer Mindestrente begegnet werden. (5) Die private Altersvorsorge muss weiter gestützt werden.
This paper shows that long debt maturities eliminate equity holders’ incentives to reduce leverage when the firm performs poorly. By contrast, short debt maturities commit equity holders to such leverage reductions. However, shorter debt maturities also lead to higher transactions costs when maturing bonds must be refinanced. We show that this tradeoff between higher expected transactions costs against the commitment to reduce leverage when the firm is doing poorly motivates an optimal maturity structure of corporate debt. Since firms with high costs of financial distress benefit most from committing to leverage reductions, they have a stronger motive to issue short-term debt.
Im Nachgang der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise beobachten wir derzeit sehr niedrige Renditen im „sicheren“ Anlagebereich auf dem Geldmarkt und für Staatsanleihen. Gleichzeitig sind Aktienkurse massiv gestiegen und zeichnen sich seit Beginn 2015 durch eine Seitwärtsbewegung aus. Die Ursachen für diese Entwicklung sind teilweise bekannt: Niedrige Zinssätze aufgrund einer expansiven Geldpolitik gepaart mit hoher Unsicherheit an den Märkten reduzieren die Auswahl attraktiver Kapitalanlagemöglichkeiten erheblich. Doch wie wird sich die langfristige Entwicklung gestalten, wenn oder falls die Wirkungen der jüngsten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise nachlassen? Gibt es einen langfristigen Trend? Spiegelt sich dieser Trend etwa bereits heute in den niedrigen Renditen wider?
Vor mehr als einem Jahrzehnt, also bereits einige Jahre vor der jüngsten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, wurde wiederholt die sogenannte „Asset Market Meltdown“-Hypothese postuliert. Nach dieser Hypothese würden in den dreißiger Jahren dieses Jahrhunderts die Kapitalrenditen stark sinken, wenn die „Babyboomer“-Generation in den Ruhestand gehe und infolgedessen Kapital aus dem Wertpapiermarkt abziehe. Heute wird eine ähnliche Debatte unter dem Stichwort „säkulare Stagnation“ geführt. Danach bestehe die Gefahr, dass die nächsten Jahrzehnte durch niedrige Wachstumsraten geprägt sein und negative Realzinsen gar zur Normalität werden könnten. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die demographische Entwicklung für eine solche Stagnation verantwortlich ist.
It is commonly believed that the response of the price of corn ethanol (and hence of the price of corn) to shifts in biofuel policies operates in part through market expectations and shifts in storage demand, yet to date it has proved difficult to measure these expectations and to empirically evaluate this view. We utilize a recently proposed methodology to estimate the market’s expectations of the prices of ethanol, unfinished motor gasoline and crude oil at horizons from three months to one year. We quantify the extent to which price changes were anticipated by the market, the extent to which they were unanticipated, and how the risk premium in these markets has evolved. We show that the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is likely to have increased ethanol price expectations by as much $1.45 in the year before and in the year after the implementation of the RFS had started. Our analysis of the term structure of expectations provides support for the view that a shift in ethanol storage demand starting in 2005 caused an increase in the price of ethanol. There is no conclusive evidence that the tightening of the RFS in 2008 shifted market expectations, but our analysis suggests that policy uncertainty about how to deal with the blend wall raised the risk premium in the ethanol futures market in mid-2013 by as much as 50 cents at longer horizons. Finally, we present evidence against a tight link from ethanol price expectations to corn price expectations and hence to storage demand for corn in 2005-06.
„Corporate groups are a fact of life“.1 This was the starting point for a group of renowned European experts to deliver a report on a possible Directive on corporate group law in 2000.2 We all know that no such Directive has been issued.3 However, these days a fresh group of eminent experts has started, among other things, to develop an initiative „on groups of companies“.4 One reason for a European regulation to take its time might be the enormous national differences in dealing with group situations. While some countries, notably the UK,5 rely on general company law to deal with corporate groups, others provide most detailed rules specifically for groups of companies.6 German law provides an example for the latter. Do we need a law of corporate groups? Most countries regulate one or another aspect of group law.7
This is probably most common for tax and for accounting law. Insolvency law will often take group situations into account and the same is true for labour law. Regulatory oversight for financial institutions or insurance companies usually includes a group dimension. Competition law necessarily does so as well. However, in what follows when we speak about „group law“ we will focus on regulation more specifically tuned to genuine questions of company law such as the protection of minority shareholders or creditors, the standards for managerial behavior and the „enabling“ function of legal structures.
In a field study with more than 1.500 customers of an online-broker we test what happens when investors receive repeated feedback on their investment success in a monthly securities account report. The reports show investors’ last year’s returns, costs, their current level of risk and their portfolio diversification. We find that receiving a report results in investors trading less, diversifying more and having higher risk-adjusted returns. Results are robust to controlling for potential play money accounts and changes in report designs. We also find that investors who are less likely to subscribe equally benefit from the report.
Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is elected. Proponents of “shareholder democracy” have advocated a shift to a majority voting rule in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.
Yet critics are skeptical as to whether majority voting improves board accountability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting rarely fail to receive majority approval – even more rarely than directors of companies with plurality voting. Even when such directors fail to receive majority approval, they are unlikely to be forced to leave the board. This poses a puzzle: why do firms switch to majority voting and what effect does the switch have, if any, on director behavior?
We empirically examine the adoption and impact of a majority voting rule using a sample of uncontested director elections from 2007 to 2013. We test and find partial support for four hypotheses that could explain why directors of majority voting firms so rarely fail to receive majority support: selection; deterrence/accountability; electioneering by firms; and restraint by shareholders.
Our results further suggest that the reasons for and effects of adopting majority voting may differ between early and later adopters. We find that early adopters of majority voting were more shareholder-responsive than other firms even before they adopted majority voting. These firms seem to have adopted majority voting voluntarily, and the adoption of majority voting has made little difference in their responsiveness to shareholders responsiveness going forward. By contrast, for late adopters, we find no evidence that they were more shareholder-responsive than other firms before they adopted majority voting, but strong evidence that they became more responsive after adopting majority voting.
Differences between early and late adopters can have important implications for understanding the spread of corporate governance reforms and evaluating their effects on firms. Reform advocates, rather than targeting the firms that, by their measures, are most in need of reform, instead seem to have targeted the firms that are already most responsive. They may then have used the widespread adoption of majority voting to create pressure on the nonadopting firms. Empirical studies of the effects of governance changes thus need to be sensitive to the possibility that early adopters and late adopters of reforms differ from each other and that the reforms may have different effects on these two groups of firms.
This paper investigates the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany. We try to shed light on some key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German natural experiment that originates with the 2009 amendments to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965. In order to do this, we deploy a hand-collected data set for Germany's major firms (i.e. DAX 30), for the years 2006-2012. Rather than focusing exclusively on CEO remuneration we collected data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. We observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are quite closely linked to key performance measures. In addition, we find that salaries increase with the size of the company and that ownership concentration has no significant effect on compensation. Also, our findings suggest that the two-tier system seems to matter a lot when it comes to compensation. However, it would be misleading to state that we see no significant impact of the introduction of the German say on pay-regime. Our findings suggest that supervisory boards anticipate shareholder-behavior.
The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies — diversification and seniority — can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
Euro area shadow banking activities in a low-interest-rate environment: a flow-of-funds perspective
(2016)
Very low policy rates as well as the substantial redesign of rules and supervisory institutions have changed background conditions for the Euro Area’s financial intermediary sector substantially. Both policy initiatives have been targeted at improving societal welfare. And their potential side effects (or costs) have been discussed intensively, in academic as well as policy circles. Very low policy rates (and correspondingly low market rates) are likely to whet investors’ risk taking incentives. Concurrently, the tightened regulatory framework, in particular for banks, increases the comparative attractiveness of the less regulated, so-called shadow banking sector. Employing flow-of-funds data for the Euro Area’s non-bank banking sector we take stock of recent developments in this part of the financial sector. In addition, we examine to which extent low interest rates have had an impact on investment behavior. Our results reveal a declining role of banks (and, simultaneously, an increase in non-bank banking). Overall intermediation activity, hence, has remained roughly at the same level. Moreover, our findings also suggest that non-bank banks have tended to take positions in riskier assets (particularly in equities). In line with this observation, balance-sheet based risk measures indicate a rise in sector-specific risks in the non-bank banking sector (when narrowly defined).
Chen and Zadrozny (1998) developed the linear extended Yule-Walker (XYW) method for determining the parameters of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with available covariances of mixed-frequency observations on the variables of the model. If the parameters are determined uniquely for available population covariances, then, the VAR model is identified. The present paper extends the original XYW method to an extended XYW method for determining all ARMA parameters of a vector autoregressive moving-average (VARMA) model with available covariances of single- or mixed-frequency observations on the variables of the model. The paper proves that under conditions of stationarity, regularity, miniphaseness, controllability, observability, and diagonalizability on the parameters of the model, the parameters are determined uniquely with available population covariances of single- or mixed-frequency observations on the variables of the model, so that the VARMA model is identified with the single- or mixed-frequency covariances.
Mis-selling by banks has occurred repeatedly in many nations over the last decade. While clients may benefit from competition – enabling them to choose financial services at lowest costs – economic frictions between banks and clients may give rise to mis-selling. Examples of mis-selling are mis-representation of information, overly complex product design and non-customized advice. European regulators address the problem of mis-selling in the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" (MiFID) I and II and the "Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation" (MiFIR), by setting behavioral requirements for banks, regulating the compensation of employees, and imposing re-quirements on offered financial products and disclosure rules.
This paper argues that MiFID II protects clients but is not as effective as it could be. (1) It does not differentiate between client groups with different levels of financial literacy. Effective advice requires different advice for different client groups. (2) MiFID II uses too many rules and too many instruments to achieve identical goals and thereby generates excessive compliance costs. High compliance costs and low revenues would drive banks out of some segments of retail business.