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Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people.
On October the 2nd the Colombian people rejected the peace agreement between the government and the FARC in a referendum with a very thin majority of 0.4%. With this unexpected rejection, the referendum was in some ways similar to the Brexit referendum, for the results of which David Cameron was as little prepared as Juan Manuel Santos for his rejection; there was obviously no Plan B. In the last weeks, the government undertook ten changes to the agreement, but it will not go through a referendum again. Santos, as he said, has learned his lesson from the rejection and will seek to have the amended peace agreement approved in Congress. This will likely lead to the implementation of the peace agreement and the furtherance of its goals, such as a DDR process, land reforms, a transitional justice process and reparations for victims, just to mention a few. But this progress in peace will be seen as being at odds with popular opinion. Many of the “no” voters are still not satisfied with the adjustments made by the government and the FARC, and neither are the sectors of the opposition mainly responsible for the rejection. Nevertheless, the government and the FARC are progressing with the implementation, and peace talks with the second-largest – and now the last standing – guerrilla group, the ELN, are scheduled to start in 2017. The prospects for 2018 and onwards, when the presidency election will be held, are more questionable.
This article uses survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to analyze the persistence of educational attainment across three generations in Germany. I obtain evidence of a robust effect of grandparents’ education on respondents’ own educational attainment in West Germany, net of parental class, education, occupational status, family income, parents’ relationship history, and family size. I also test whether the grandparent effect results from resource compensation or cumulative advantage and find empirical support for both mechanisms. In comparison, the intergenerational association between grandparents’ and respondents’ education is considerably weaker in East Germany and is also mediated completely by parental education. There are hardly any gender differences in the role of grandparents for respondents’ educational attainment, except for the fact that resource compensation is found to be exclusively relevant for women’s attainment in both West Germany and in East Germany after German reunification and the associated transition to an open educational system.
Beyond radicalism and resignation: the competing logics for public participation in policy decisions
(2016)
Participation – like justice or freedom – is a term that can be constructed in multiple ways. However, existing typologies of participation pay little attention to the alternative logics for public participation in policy decisions: either they assume one particular normative bias or categorise by institutional design features without reference to the broader ideology that informs the use of these designs. This paper outlines an alternative approach that connects the variety in participatory practices to competing theories of democracy and public administration. It identifies four archetypes of participation: knowledge transfer; collective decision-making; choice and voice; and arbitration and oversight.
This working paper is based on a lecture given at the Summer School “Multiple Inequalities in the Age of Transnationalization”, June 23-27 2014 at Goethe University Frankfurt. In it, I explore the linkages between sexuality and migration and aim to show that instead of deeming them a narrow subfield of migration studies, thinking through these linkages has much wider implications for different fields, including post- and decolonial queer studies, the study of race and sexuality, the study of citizenship and state projects of inclusion/exclusion, and for work that attempts to ce-center the predominant knowledge production focused on the Global North.
Highly-skilled labour migration in Switzerland: household strategies and professional careers
(2016)
The article investigates household strategies in the context of highly-skilled labour migration. It focuses on the ways highly-skilled migrants are taking up residence in Switzerland. The analysis shows different household strategies based on the perception of a further professional move. The perceived likeliness of a further move implies household strategies characterized by a high motility: the household remains ready to move and mobilises dedicated organisations (like outplacement agencies or international schools). When a further move is neither perceived nor wanted, the household develops more anchored strategies which are often cheaper. In order to cope with frequent mobilities, the analysis shows that household strategies are deeply gendered.
This is the last post in the blog series „Movements and Institutions“. Check out the introductory post for more information on the series and click here for all contributions.
This blog series reflected on the interactions between social movements and institutions. These interactions have proven to be among the most complicated areas of social movement research, especially because causality is very hard to establish: (how) do movements influence formal political institutions – and vice versa? How to study, understand and explain the consequences of the institutionalization of social movements? The difficulties of addressing these questions are also related to definitional problems as social movements and institutions can be understood and defined in various ways. All authors contributing to this blog series highlight the importance of studying interactions between social movements from one perspective or another.
This is the fourth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
Terror from the extreme right has again gained a wider public attention in 2011 with the devastating attacks carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway and the detection of the right-wing terrorist cell called “National Socialist Underground” (NSU), which had committed ten murders, three bombings and a dozen bank robberies during more than a decade of time in Germany. In many Western countries violence motivated by racism, anti-government hate, anti-Semitism or other aspects of right-wing extremism, appears to be a regular part of criminal activities. Hate crime legislation and statistics vary strongly but show that next to high intense terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the attacks in London, Madrid or Paris, right-wing violence and terrorism is the most dangerous politically motivated threat. In the United States for example Perliger (2012) counted 4,420 right-wing terrorist incidents between 1990 and 2012 causing 670 fatalities and 3,053 injuries. In Germany official statistics counted 69 right-wing attacks between 1990 and 2015 causing 75 casualties, while civil society watchdogs count up to 184 deaths. In Russia some experts speak of approximately 450 right-wing motivated killings between 2004 and 2010. Nevertheless, this specific form of political violence remains largely under-researched and misunderstood as non-terroristic. In consequence the threat from the far right is continuously downplayed with severe consequences for victims and the internal security.
This working paper gives insights on a theoretical perspective on class formation in the context of global financial markets and presents first empirical findings regarding the formation of a global financial class. It draws on numerous encounters with financial professionals that were inter- viewed in Frankfurt (Germany) and Sydney (Australia). As a preliminary conclusion from those inves- tigations on a micro-perspective, we state that acting on the market creates a sense of global socia- bility, whereby organizations only play a secondary role. Careers in finance follow internationally homogenized pathways. This process of global class formation is taking place prominently in global financial centers. Therefore we link the level of investigation on a micro-perspective (experience of financial professionals) with global city life and the fabric of the city. This results in empirical findings on a meso-level from an ethnography of the social and professional urban environment of finance in the two global cities. Symbolic struggles engraved in the built environment of Frankfurt and Sydney are traced and discussed against the background of every-day-practices of aspiration in the financial districts investigated.
Radicalisation is a phenomenon that has been striking not only in parts of Asia and Africa but also in the heart of Europe. While the number of Muslims in Germany is estimated by 4,7 millions (5,8%), 70% of the almost 900,000 asylum-seekers have arrived in recent years are believed to be Muslims. It is undeniable that there is discrimination in Germany, and it is equally undeniable that more on issues of integration and conflict prevention should be done. Thus, could effective integration processes prevent radicalisation of the Muslim youth in Europe?
In modern welfare states, family policies may resolve the tension between employment and care-focused demands. However these policies sometimes have adverse consequences for distinct social groups. This study examined gender and educational differences in working parents’ perceived work–family conflict and used a comparative approach to test whether family policies, in particular support for child care and leave from paid work, are capable of reducing work–family conflict as well as the gender and educational gaps in work–family conflict. We use data from the European Social Survey 2010 for 20 countries and 5296 respondents (parents), extended with information on national policies for maternity and parental leave and child care support from the OECD Family Database. Employing multilevel analysis, we find that mothers and the higher educated report most work–family conflict. Policies supporting child care reduce the level of experienced work–family conflict; family leave policy appears to have no alleviating impact on working parents’ work–family conflict. Our findings indicate that family policies appear to be unable to reduce the gender gap in conflict perception and even widen the educational gap in work–family conflict.
In the 21st century, the division of housework remains gendered, with women on average still spending more time doing chores than their male partners. While research has studied why this phenomenon is so persistent, few studies have yet been able to assess the effect of gender ideology and socio-economic resources at the same time, usually due to data restrictions. We use data from the pairfam, a new and innovative German panel study, in order to test the effect of absolute and relative resources as well as his and her gender ideology on the division of housework. We employ a life course perspective and analyze trajectories of couples’ housework division over time, using multi-level random effects growth curve models. We find that an egalitarian gender ideology of both him and her significantly predicts more egalitarian division-trajectories, while neither absolute nor relative resources appear to have an effect on the division of housework over time. Furthermore, our results expand the literature by investigating how these processes differ among childless couples and couples who experience the first birth.