Refine
Year of publication
- 2015 (45) (remove)
Document Type
- Article (45) (remove)
Language
- English (18)
- Portuguese (9)
- Spanish (8)
- German (6)
- Italian (4)
Has Fulltext
- yes (45)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (45)
Keywords
- Recognition (5)
- Reconhecimento (4)
- Axel Honneth (3)
- climate change (3)
- Critical Theory (2)
- Critical theory (2)
- Dialética negativa (2)
- Domination (2)
- Education (2)
- Educação (2)
Institute
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (45) (remove)
La distinzione fra apollineo e dionisiaco è ritornata di moda grazie a Friedrich Nietzsche, che se ne è servito nella sua famosa opera La nascita della tragedia dallo spirito della musica. Questo scritto, tuttavia, non persegue affatto l’intento di contribuire a comprendere questi concetti, ma si serve di questa distinzione per spiegare due aspetti di colonialismo d’insediamento in forma di stato, con particolare riferimento all’esempio dell’Africa Sud Occidentale e della sua capitale Windhoek. Come è noto, Apollo veniva considerato il Dio del sole e della ragione, mentre Dionisio era visto come il Dio dell’ebbrezza e dell’estasi. Nel presente contesto, l’apollineo rappresenta il sogno utopico di potere di stato coloniale, comportante il diritto assoluto all’uso della forza, a giudicare, a proteggere ed a praticare una politica attentamente pianificata, mentre il dionisiaco rappresenta, grosso modo, la mentalità pionieristica dei coloni e le loro tendenze anomiche, derivanti alla fin fine dall’illegittimità incontrastata dell’intero progetto coloniale. Nello stesso tempo questo scritto si avvale di un altro contrasto: giorno e notte. È usato in senso metaforico – ma non esclusivamente. E mentre il primo rispecchia “il regno della luce”, basato sul potere dello stato e su una vita pubblica che evidenzia le caratteristiche di società civile, la seconda rappresenta la fase del giorno in cui la notte scende ed il controllo da parte dello stato viene a cessare del tutto, mentre la «vita coloniale sotterranea» si risveglia.
In cases in which there is the possibility of massive human losses, the threshold likelihood of their occurrence, and the non-excessive costs of their prevention, we ought to act now. This is all the more definitely the case because it may well be that this is the time-of-last-opportunity to head off one or more potential disasters, all of which may still be preventable by sufficiently rapid reductions in carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuel. It is unfair that the present generation should incur as heavy a burden as it does of seizing the last opportunity for prevention of disasters like large sea-level rises, but the unfairness is not sufficient to make the burden unreasonable to bear, especially since it is not in fact as heavy as often believed.
In the nineties, Habermas redirected his political writings to the post-national constellation (global and European) and the possibilities of a society politically integrated through transnational democracy (or post-national democracy). This thematic reorientation took place on two fronts. The first one is the global transnational democracy, which includes the impacts of the economic globalization on national democracies, as well the proposal for a political Constitution for a pluralistic world society, based on a constitutionalization of international law. The second one is the European transnational democracy, which includes the redefinition of the political profile of European welfare state for an economic liberal profile, as well the paradox of democratic technocracy operated by European institutions and the proposal to overcome the decoupled technocratic policy model. This paper will address only this last topic, describing the reasons of the democratic deficit and the consequent delay of European political Union. Despite numerous reforms, the technocratic policies have not eliminated the discrepancy between centralization and democratization, and mistakenly indicate another direction further reinforcing the problem of European undemocratic institutions. In contrast, Habermas argues that the democratic deficit could only be overcome replacing the technocratic approach by a deeper democratization of European institutions.
European energy policy dates back to the founding days of integration, yet the emergence of supranational governance is a recent development. The article examines the extent to which European policymakers have succeeded in building up governance capacity, and what the facilitating and impeding factors were that have shaped the governance mix. The conceptual framework differentiates between orders of governance in the multilevel context, and between policy modes involving hierarchical and non-hierarchical settings and varying actor constellations. The article finds that governance capacity has emerged where second order governance (institutional and procedural rules) is concerned, while first order governance (the concrete policy process) remains the remit of national and private actors. This becomes even more obvious once the interaction between policy modes is taken into account: governance networks enhance governance capacity in the area of competition policy and agency governance; self-regulation by industry constitutes a fall-back option in case of insufficient governance capacity on cross-border issues; soft governance helps to bridge multiple policy areas and levels of governance. The article concludes that second order governance may prove effective where it combines with hierarchy but that it may fail to overcome both trade-offs between contradicting goals and resistance at lower levels.
Este artículo presenta una lectura crítica de un trabajo central de Axel Honneth desde la teoría de la sujeción de Judith Butler. Intenta mostrar que, por la ausencia en su escrito de una consideración sobre el poder, el pensador alemán no logra cumplir satisfactoriamente su objetivo propuesto de enfrentar las posturas que cuestionan el potencial crítico del reconocimiento. La hipótesis que aquí se maneja es que esa ausencia está ligada a su definición del reconocimiento como lo contrario de las prácticas de dominio o sometimiento. Ahora bien, Honneth afirma que el escepticismo de esas posturas respecto del reconocimiento se basa en la idea de que toda praxis recognoscente reproduce de alguna manera el orden social dominante. El presente trabajo se propone entonces, cuestionar esta aseveración del autor advirtiendo que un análisis sobre el modo en que el poder actúa en las prácticas cotidianas de reconocimiento no necesariamente conlleva una renuncia de la función crítica del concepto para la teoría social. Más bien, como sugiere la noción butleriana (y foucaultiana) de crítica, sólo enmarcando al reconocimiento en el horizonte normativo que lo delimita puede convertirse en la base de la indagación social.
Sublimity, negativity, and architecture. An essay on negative architecture through Kant to Adorno
(2015)
Architecture defines and consumes people. It exposes them to a multitude of varieties of different aesthetic engagements. Architecture becomes a lived experience. However, this lived experience is always caught in the inner workings of the social and more specifically within cultural ideology. In modern capitalism, culture pervades every aspect of our lives. It shows its presence everywhere from our own homes to the public streets. Culture is everywhere, and architecture is a tool used for both the benefit and detriment of the “culture industry”. Kant speaks of the sublime as a profound moment of reason realizing its ability to overcome its own limits. In this experience is it possible to be completely ravaged and descend into hades and melancholy? Is there a beauty in this descent? More specifically, can architecture become banal or pedestrian, uplifting or depressing? According to Theodor Adorno, our subjectivity is defined by the constant dialectical struggle between freedom and unfreedom (among other things). It is realizing our freedom in the face of our unfreedom that makes us truly able to attain some form of resistance. The sublime experience can be transformed into a spirit of revelation and beautifully allow us to in a way resist the one-dimensional tendencies of modern capitalism. Architecture, which is immersed in our societal being and contributes to many of our own subjective unfreedoms, comes to define our lives as inhabited space. When does architecture produce a sublime experience? Can architecture’s authentic “aura” stand out amongst the reproduced city and produce a sublime feeling that can be a form of resistance against the culture industry? Does Grand Central Terminal provide the key to an architecturally sublime experience? Using dialectical experience and examining the sublime feeling (in a critique of the Kantian sublime) as the key to breaking through the culture industry’s banal architectural hold on our subjectivity, this essay will examine the experience of the sublime as a key to unfolding resistance in the face of the banality of modern architecture in the city and opening our minds to the Great Refusal through the exploration of Grand Central Terminal.
Ibegin by providing some background to conceptions of responsibility. I note the extent of disagreement in this area, the diverse and cross-cutting distinctions that are deployed, and the relative neglect of some important problems. These facts make it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change, but so do some features of climate change itself which I go on to illuminate. Attributions of responsibility are often contested sites because such attributions are fundamentally pragmatic, mobilized in the service of a normative outlook. We should be pluralists about responsibility and shape whatever conceptions can help to explain, guide, and motivate our responses to climate change. I sketch one such notion, ‘intervention-responsibility’, and argue that it should be ascribed to international regimes and organizations, states and other jurisdictions, individuals, and firms. Each has different capacities and thus different intervention-responsibilities responsibilities, but these differences are not always mirrored in public discussion. In particular, the moral responsibility of firms has been greatly neglected.
Esse artigo tem por objetivo analisar as contribuições de Axel Honneth para o atual debate das teorias da justiça, entre as quais a principal é a busca de princípios normativos encrustados na realidade social. Em sua obra O direito da liberdade, o autor indica a liberdade como o grande valor moderno. O medium da justiça seria uma liberdade de tipo social a qual estaria expressa nas instituições vinculadas às relações pessoais, ao mercado e ao universo político. Considerando a lacuna entre os princípios normativos de justiça indicados pelo autor e a realidade social este artigo propõe colocar em discussão as potencialidades e limites da própria reconstrução normativa como instrumento de análise do social, pautando especificamente o mercado de trabalho, a fim de colaborar à discussão das possibilidades de articular a norma compartilhada e a emergência de valores em vias de institucionalização.
The European Union is at the crossroads between intelligent expansion of future horizons and frightened shrinking to a perspective of local areas. Fear of descent of the citizens on one side and a politics of crisis, that goes along with harsh injustice have made upset the national societies against each other, missing courage on the side of politicians, to bring European issues to the fore, endanger the European project. There is only one way to overcome this situation by establishing a democratic union, which conserves not only the social and civilian achievements of the national state, as well as the assets of a greater democratic political unity, that offers an unity of European citizens and European state demos.
In this paper, I examine how maternal myths are deployed in popular development literature. Using critical discourse analysis and working within a feminist postcolonial framework I analyse five texts produced by development organizations for popular consumption. I identify how maternal myths are constructed in each text and conduct a contextual analysis of four myths to identify their ideological significance within the development sector. I conclude that that in their construction of maternal myths, these texts, while intended to elicit support for gender and development interventions, reinforce exploitative gender roles and relations and limit women’s experiences of development.
In my paper, I intend firmly to criticize Taubes' interpretation of Benjamin's Theology as a modern form of Gnosticism (Benjamin as a modern Marcionit). In a positive way, I sustain rather the thesis that Benjamin's Messianism is in close connection with his conception of reason (“the sharpened axe of reason”) and, in particularly, with the paradoxical unity of Mysticism and Enlightenment, which, according to the famous definition of Adorno, distinguishes his thought. As a radically anti-magical and anti-mythical conception of the historical time, Benjamin's Messianism has to be considered as an original synthesis between motifs of the mystical tradition of the Jewish Kabbalah and motifs belonging to the rationalist tradition of the Jewish philosophy. Moving from Cohen's standpoint of a continuity between Maimonides and Kant, I consider therefore the affinity between his messianic conception of history and that of Benjamin. Both, Benjamin and Cohen, share, together with the reference to the a priori of the idea of justice, the reference to the Kantian connection between rationality and hope. Hence originates the non-eschatological Messianism of both. Motives of difference between Cohen and Benjamin’s messianic idea are to be found, conversely, in their different way to consider the idea of "the infinite task" and of its infinite fulfillment in the context of the historical time. Unlike the fundamentally ethical interpretation that Cohen gives of this relationship, Benjamin understands it ontologically in a monadological sense. This explains the constitutive relationship that exists, in Benjamin's philosophy, between Origin, Fragment and Revelation. In the light of this connection, Benjamin's messianic understanding of the historical time exceeds the Scholemian alternative between a restorative and a utopian conception of Messianism. Consequently, the Krausian motto “Ursprung ist das Ziel” (“The Origin is the Goal”) displays its truth in the idea of the messianic fragment or spark.
O presente artigo explora os principais conceitos que compõe a teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, a fim de compreender os propósitos imbricados na idéia de luta por reconhecimento e suas contribuições à nova concepção de identidade surgida a partir da modernidade. No padrão pós-convencional, apresentado por Honneth, o indivíduo é reconhecido em sua individualidade. A identidade subjetiva é constituída de forma intersubjetiva e não mais determinada pelo grupo social. O reconhecimento recíproco é condição para a formação prática da identidade, permitindo ao sujeito participar efetivamente na esfera pública. Contudo, por possuir uma estrutura fundamentalmente intersubjetiva, a identidade individual e coletiva é afetada negativamente pelas diferentes situações de desrespeito presente nos processos de interação social. A negação do reconhecimento de modo injustificado, por meio da violação de expectativas normativas de comportamento, da origem a reações emocionais negativas. Por este motivo, as experiências de desrespeito integram a base motivacional da luta por reconhecimento, dando origem ao conflito social. O tema do conflito em Honneth está vinculado aos processos de formação da identidade prática do sujeito e aos progressos na vida social. O conflito social, traduzido na forma de luta por reconhecimento, caracteriza-se como uma expressão altamente positiva, por contribuir significativamente com a autorrealização individual e coletiva.
El artículo presenta cómo el filósofo alemán Theodor W. Adorno concibe el estado social de la música de la primera mitad del siglo XX. Para ello recurro a
una serie de conceptos utilizados por el autor y cuyas raíces están en el pensamiento filosófico de la modernidad. Con gran influencia de Walter Benjamin, cada concepto en Adorno es una constelación, es decir, una idea que debe ser desarrollada y que al relacionarse con otros conceptos se llega a una interpretación más abarcadora del problema a considerarse. Así pues, divido el escrito en dos partes: uno dedicado al análisis de la ideología y el otro al de reificación. Cada capítulo así mismo está dividido en distintos apartados, con el ánimo de dar una visión más amplia de cómo Adorno entendió el problema de la experiencia musical para al final dar cuenta de la importancia del pensamiento estético de Adorno al compararlo con otros autores que reflexionaron sobre el mismo tema.
En el presente trabajo abordo la interpretación que Axel Honneth realiza, en su libro Crítica del poder, de la propuesta de Michel Foucault. Honneth señala, a modo de crítica, la existencia de una contradicción entre lo que denomina la teoría del poder de Foucault y sus estudios históricos –en particular, los reunidos en Vigilar y Castigar–. Uno de mis objetivos es explicar esta contradicción y, a partir de ella, proponer una lectura alternativa. En contraposición a Honneth, para quien las instituciones disciplinarias que analiza Foucault terminarían desplazando la acción y la lucha social, intento mostrar –y este es el aporte que busco realizar en el trabajo a partir de una reconstrucción conceptual– que las disciplinas y por añadidura las instituciones disciplinarias deben considerarse tácticas que nunca alcanzan del todo su objetivo. Son tácticas que no logran bloquear, de manera definitiva, las expresiones de resistencia y conflictividad. Esta lectura alternativa que aquí propongo permitiría, en principio, ensayar al menos dos puntos de contacto entre Foucault y la teoría crítica que aún no han sido elucidados.
Adorno’s negative dialectics wants to free the thought from the dictates of the system, taking position against the illusion to grasp the essence of reality by logic. Against that false idea of totality, Adorno devises a philosophy of fragment, a logic of disgregation that presupposes a different concept of totality: a fragmented, scattered and conflicting wholeness. The anti systematic thinking of Adorno is configured, however, as a systematic rejection of any systematic formulation: philosophy can at most claiming a pretension to truth by the practice of interpretation. A dialectic configuration of fragments of totality is at stake here: so, the arrangement of such fragments can both produce an image of reality endowed with meaning and also unfold through heterogeneous combinations that are not definitive, but always renewable from time to time. In Adorno’s reflection are so expressed two different instances which are complementary at the same time: on the one hand it represents the critical and negative element against the system and its hybris, on the other hand it expresses the need of the thought to go beyond and overcome that fragmentation, showing how the need of unity of the system is a need of the thought in itself.
This paper argues that it is necessary to focus on gender rather than exclusively on women in discussions on global poverty eradication. It argues firstly, that the drivers of poverty are complex and multifaceted leading to a least two different forms of deprivation – transitory and structural poverty – each requiring different forms of analysis and treatment. Transitory poverty can arise as a consequence of an event or shock that would diminish an individual’s capacity to retain or secure employment and where a State lacks an appropriate form of social protection. Structural poverty, on the other hand, arises where groups are excluded from the workforce on a more permanent basis due to a wide variety of factors of discrimination such as sex, race, ethnicity, and age. Focusing on the sex of an individual alone cannot explain why some are more likely to experience different forms of poverty than others. Policies that protect women against transitory poverty, such as care related allowances, are not sufficient to eradicate structural poverty. Secondly, structural poverty prompts an examination of gender roles and relations. Unlike the category of ‘women’, the concept of gender demands consideration of a wider range of intersecting factors that influence life chances. The structure of contemporary gender relations, where women continue to experience higher levels of violence, and carry the greatest burden of responsibility for non-market based production activities, create the social conditions where domination and dependence thrive, and where persistently high rates of poverty seem inevitable. Such circumstances are generated by human agency. Thus, thirdly, it argues that these circumstances can and should be changed through human action. Knowledge of these circumstances gives rise to moral obligations for both men and women to avoid upholding values and practices that lead to domination and dependence as a matter of basic justice.