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The aim of this contribution is to introduce and outline a third theory of rights. Concentrating on claim-rights, it proposes to approach this aim via the concept of a directed duty. This approach is justified by the widely shared presupposition that an entity has a right if and only if a duty is owed to this entity. Unlike some prominent other proposals, this contribution does not contrast directed duties with undirected ones. It contrasts two ways a duty can be related to an entity. On the one hand, a duty can be owed to an entity. In this case it is directed to this entity. On the other hand, a duty can concern an entity. There is no reason to presuppose that they exclude each other, on the contrary. Theories of rights have to reconstruct the difference between these two ways a duty can be related to an entity. After having introduced the starting point for a theory of rights in that way, the two classic theories of rights will be rejected, the will theory and the interest theory. The main focus lies on the shortcomings of the different versions of the interest theory. This criticism helps to formulate the conditions a convincing theory of rights has to meet. In the last part, the status theory of rights will be outlined.
Es ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, richtige, d.h. möglichst vernünftige Entscheidungen anzuleiten. Der wissenschaftliche Geltungsanspruch umfasst immer sowohl einen Wahrheits- wie einen Wert- und einen Gerechtigkeitsanspruch.
Vernunft lässt sich nur in einem sowohl rationalen wie interrationalen Diskurs annähern:
(1) Im rationalen Diskurs wird der Anspruch erhoben, innerhalb einer bestimmten Rationalität richtige Antworten auf ausgewählte Fragen zu finden (meist innerhalb der Grenzen bestimmter institutionalisierter Schulen oder Disziplinen).
(2) Der interrationale Diskurs setzt bei der Relation zwischen verschiedenen Fragen mit unterschiedlicher Rationalität an und versucht,
(a) zwischen diesen Fragen eine wechselseitige Verständigung herzustellen (Diskurs zur Verständlichkeit), bevor er
(b) auf den Diskurs über die Richtigkeit von Antworten verschiedener Fragestellungen im Zusammenhang eintritt (materieller interrationaler Diskurs).
Der interrationale Diskurs bedarf der Verfassung:
(1) Formelle Verfassung des Diskurses
(a) Institutionelle Strukturen und Prozesse (Gleichberechtigung aller Beteiligten, Symmetrie der Strukturen, z.B. die Tagesordnung einer Ratssitzung)
(b) Methodische Argumentationsstrukturen und -abläufe (Wahrheit, Wert und Gerechtigkeit; Fragen- und Antwortdimension).
(2) Materielle Verfassung: Inhaltliches Argumentarium guter Gründe im Diskurs (bewährte Argumente aus bisherigen Diskursen).
Der religiöse Pluralismus innerhalb der multikulturellen Gesellschaft erfordert vom Staat das Bemühen, die wechselseitige Achtung nicht nur zwischen Personen mit unterschiedlichen religiösen Glaubensüberzeugungen, sondern auch zwischen Glaubenden und Nicht-Glaubenden sicherzustellen. In diesem Kontext wird es für die vom Staat übernommene Funktion entscheidend sein, rechtzeitig zu beurteilen, ob er eine aktive und positive Rolle als eine Institution spielt, welche dafür sorgt, dass die Religionsfreiheit der Einzelnen und der Gruppen geachtet wird. Im Vorliegenden werden einige Gefahren und Bedrohungen für die Religionsfreiheit in der heutigen Gesellschaft analysiert und eine kritische Betrachtung als Antwort auf diese Krisensituation vorgelegt. Konkret werden die folgenden Punkte erörtert: 1. Der Glaube, daß die Religion nicht mit den Werten einer modernen, liberalen Gesellschaft zu vereinbaren ist. 2. Die Konfessionalisierung des Staates. 3. Der Missbrauch der staatlichen Macht, um die Präferenzen der Bürger durch absichtliche Änderungen im sozialen Kontext zu beeinflussen. 4. Die unnötigen Behinderungen und Beschränkung des Rechts auf Verweigerung aus Gewissengründen, die von einem falschen Verständnisses desselben herrühren. 5. Die Verherrlichung eines falsch verstandenen, radikalen Individualismus. 6. Ein Verständnis des Grundsatzes der Nichtdiskriminierung als ,,Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Unterschieden“.
Die Auffassung des Rechts in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie weicht bekanntlich von dem ab, was üblicherweise unter „Recht“ verstanden wird. Schon deshalb sind Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts nicht einfach neben andere Werke zur Rechtstheorie zu stellen. Aber Hegels Bestimmung des Rechts ergänzt nicht nur das Recht äußerlich, sondern lässt es auf etwas gründen, das über es selbst deutlich hinausweist: auf jener Normativität, die er als Sittlichkeit bezeichnet. So ist Hegels Rechtsphilosophie nur als eine Sozialphilosophie der Sittlichkeit zu verstehen. Sie kann als die philosophische Selbstreflexion einer Gesellschaft verstanden werden, die sich selbst primär als durch das Recht bestimmt versteht, aber auf eine andere Form von Normativität bezogen ist.
Die Hauptthese dieses Papers geht von dem Konzept der normativen Verfassung der Nachkriegzeit aus und setzt sich kritisch mit dem Konzept des 19. Jahrhunderts „Verfassungswandlung“ auseinander. Das Konzept des Verfassungswandels ist mit der Verfassungsdemokratie inkompatibel. Statt von einem Verfassungswandel zu sprechen, sollte man die Entwicklung des Sinns der Normen in der Zeit als dynamische Interpretation bezeichnen.
Die brasilianische Verfassung hat ein System detaillierter materieller und prozessualer Rechte etabliert und damit die richterliche Kontrolle hoheitlicher Akte in fast allen politisch relevanten Bereichen ermöglicht. Auf dem Gebiet der ökologischen und sozialen Rechte, wo eine intensive Positivierung individueller und kollektiver Ansprüche stattgefunden hat, ist die wachsende Judizialisierung der staatlichen Programme nicht als übertriebene Einmischung der Gerichte in politische Fragen anzusehen, sondern fördert die Ausbildung des gesellschaftlichen Bewusstseins. Die Gesetzestexte enthalten kaum konkrete materielle Anforderungen oder Richtlinien zur Gewichtung von Gütern und Werten, sondern setzen lediglich Verbote fest oder regeln die föderativen Zuständigkeiten bzw. das Verwaltungsverfahren. Deswegen kann die Genehmigung umweltgefährdender Aktivitäten kaum auf der Grundlage dogmatisch abgeklärter Rechtsbegriffe erfolgen. Die fachliche Qualifikation vieler Verwaltungsbeamter und Richter entspricht noch nicht den Herausforderungen einer korrekten Gesetzesauslegung. Die akademische Diskussion konzentriert sich derweilen auf Themen wie die philosophische Hermeneutik, Semiotik oder Systemtheorie und unterschätzt dabei die Wichtigkeit des juristischen Methodenkanons, weswegen es ihr nicht gelingt, den Praktikern gangbare Direktiven zur Herstellung richtiger und gut begründeter Entscheidungen anzubieten. Nötig ist daher eine mehr pragmatisch orientierte Debatte über den angemessenen Gebrauch der traditionellen und modernen Methoden und Techniken der Rechtsfindung, um die dogmatische Basis des Umweltrechts in Brasilien zu stärken und es an das Modell eines Umweltstaats heranzuführen.
Principles can be directly expressed by law or may be found in jurisprudence, philosophy or literature. Often the principles are contradictory, as in the case of transparency and the taboo of state information disclosure. At the individual level, transparency and taboo, the sense and purpose of privacy may compliment each other. Moreover the rise of cyberspace has blurred the distinction between privacy and public. The taboo is widening. The development of the internet and of the social networks can alter the once apparently stable legal situation, bringing a new dynamic into play in both state and individual spheres. In the context of the internet it is as though the secret workings of the state are projected on its "walls and facades", reminding us of Plato's "Myth of the Cave". As Plato described, disillusionment and reflexive defensiveness can follow.
Der zweifache Urteilsspruch des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Fall “Lautsi gegen Italien” hat sich zum Paradigma der Schwierigkeiten entwickelt, welche Europa bei der adäquaten Ansiedlung der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich erfährt. Die Lösung kann sich ändern, wenn, anstatt dem politischen Problem (wann ist die Ausübung von Macht erlaubt) einzuräumen, die Möglichkeit einer praktischen Vernunft und ihre Verträglichkeit mit dem religiösen Glauben zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht wird. Diese würde zweifelsfrei zu einer politischen Fragestellung zu einer Präsenz der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich einladen, die auf eine positive Laizität mehr Rücksicht nimmt, dabei den Laizismus ablehnt, der darauf drängt, die Rationalität zur Macht auch einen nicht kognitivistischen Code zu reduzieren.
Making use of United Nations (U.N.) materials and documents, Anja Matwijkiw and Bronik Matwijkiw argue that the organization – in 2004 – converted to a stakeholder jurisprudence for human rights. However, references to “stakeholders” may both be made in the context of narrow stakeholder theory and broad stakeholder theory. Since the U.N. does not specify its commitment by naming the theory it credits for its conversion, the authors of the article embark on a comparative analysis, so as to be able to try the two frameworks for fit. The hypothesis is that it is the philosophy and methodology of broad stakeholder theory that best matches the norms and strategies of the U.N. While this is the case, certain challenges nevertheless present themselves. As a consequence of these, the U.N. has to – as a minimum – take things under renewed consideration.
Human rights and the law: the unbreachable gap between the ethics of justice and the efficacy of law
(2012)
This paper explores the structure of justice as the condition of ethical, inter-subjective responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the interests of the self. From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse. Rights do not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject animated by the universality of the dignity of autonomous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, rights enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.
In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of crisis prevention. In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a perceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alternative solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in crossborder banking groups.
Technologies carry politics since they embed values. It is therefore surprising that mainstream political and legal theory have taken the issue so lightly. Compared to what has been going on over the past few decades in the other branches of practical thought, namely ethics, economics and the law, political theory lags behind. Yet the current emphasis on Internet politics that polarizes the apologists holding the web to overcome the one-to-many architecture of opinion-building in traditional representative democracy, and the critics that warn cyber-optimism entails authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wake up call. This paper sets the problem – “What is it about ICTs, as opposed to previous technical devices, that impact on politics and determine uncertainty about democratic matters?” – into the broad context of practical philosophy, by offering a conceptual map of clusters of micro-problems and concrete examples relating to “e-democracy”. The point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive or a disjunctive function, in respect to stocktaking from past experiences and settled democratic theories. My claim is that there is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics fails or succeeds. The field needs both further empirical and theoretical work.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
The normative position of the judiciary under the traditional conception of democracy as self-legislation by the people is too weak to protect in an effective way the rights of suspects in the global War on Terror. Drawing on arguments elaborated by Hans Kelsen and Karl Popper, we shall attempt to devise in this paper an alternative democracy conception that could serve as a much more solid foundation for the judicial branch of government in a democratic state. Through this jurisprudential strategy, we hope to be able to maintain the balance of normative power among the Trias Politica, which, in turn, may contribute to the preservation of the legal rights of every person during the struggle against terrorists.
In assessing the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election of 2009 in Iran, one question has received less critical analysis than other complexities of this event: What can explain the remarkable non-violent character of the Green Movement in Iran? I propose that the answer, inter alia, lies with the following three learning experiences: 1) The experience of loss brought about by the Iran/Iraq war; 2) the experience of relative opening during Khatami’s presidency; and 3) the experience of modernization of faith in the work of the post-Islamist thinkers that aimed to make political Islam compatible with democracy. Together, these learning processes fostered a new mode of thinking that is civil and non-violent in character.
The revolution will be tweeted : how the internet can stimulate the public exercise of freedoms
(2012)
This article discusses how new technologies of communication, especially the Internet and, more specifically, social network services, can interfere in social interactions and in political relations. The main objective is to problematize the concept of public liberty and verify how the new technologies can promote the reoccupation of public spaces and the recovery of public life, in opposition to the tendency to valorize the private sphere, observed in the second half of the twentieth century. The theoretical benchmark adopted for the investigation is Hannah Arendt's theory about the exercise of fundamental political capacities in order to establish a public space of freedom, as presented in “On Revolution”. The “Praia da Estação” (“Station Beach”) case is chosen to test the hypothesis. In 2010 in the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte, different individuals articulated a movement through blogs, Twitter and facebook, in order to protest against the Mayor’s act that banned the assembling of cultural events in one of the main public places of the city, the “Praça da Estação” (Station Square). By applying Arendt's concepts to the selected case, it is possible to demonstrate that the Internet can assume an important role against governmental arbitrariness and abuse of power, as it can stimulate the public exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of assembly and manifestation.
This paper aims to assess the arguments that claim representative democracy may be enhanced or replaced by an updated electronic version. Focusing on the dimension of elections and electioneering as the core mechanism of representative democracy I will discuss: (1) the proximity argument used to claim the necessity of filling the gap between decision-makers and stakeholders; (2) the transparency argument, which claims to remove obstacles to the publicity of power; (3) the bottom-up argument, which calls for a new form of legitimacy that goes beyond classical mediation of parties or unions; (4) the public sphere argument, referred to the problem of hierarchical relation between voters and their representatives; (5) the disintermediation argument, used to describe the (supposed) new form of democracy following the massive use of ICTs. The first way of conceptualizing e-democracy as different from mainstream 20th century representative democracy regimes is to imagine it as a new form direct democracy: this conception is often underlying contemporary studies of e-voting. To avoid some of the ingenuousness of this conception of e-democracy, we should take a step back and consider a broader range of issues than mere gerrymandering around the electoral moment. Therefore I shall problematize the abovementioned approach by analyzing a wider range of problems connected to election and electioneering in their relation with ICTs.
This work intends to analysis the philosophy of history and to discuss the consequences of this death to the Critical Theory. The concept of reason and the devices of democracy and human rights are discussed in a revision of the historical debate about the end of history operates the life in the interior of the modern society, especially about the intellectual condition at the information society.