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Predictions of oil prices reaching $100 per barrel during the winter of 2021/22 have raised fears of persistently high inflation and rising inflation expectations for years to come. We show that these concerns have been overstated. A $100 oil scenario of the type discussed by many observers, would only briefly raise monthly headline inflation, before fading rather quickly. However, the short-run effects on headline inflation would be sizable. For example, on a yearover- year basis, headline PCE inflation would increase by 1.8 percentage points at the end of 2021 under this scenario, and by 0.4 percentage points at the end of 2022. In contrast, the impact on measures of core inflation such as trimmed mean PCE inflation is only 0.4 and 0.3 percentage points in 2021 and 2022, respectively. These estimates already account for any increases in inflation expectations under the scenario. The peak response of the 1-year household inflation expectation would be 1.2 percentage points, while that of the 5-year expectation would be 0.2 percentage points.
Vehicle registrations have been shown to strongly react to tax reforms aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from passengers’ cars, but are the effects equally strong for positive and negative tax changes? The literature on asymmetric reactions to price and tax changes has documented asymmetries for everyday goods but has not yet considered durables. We leverage multiple vehicle registration tax (VRT) reforms in Norway and estimate their impact on within car-model substitutions. We estimate stronger effects for cars receiving tax cuts and rebates than for those affected by tax increases. The corresponding estimated elasticity is − 1.99 for VRT decreases and 0.77 for increases. As consumers may also substitute across car models, our estimates represent a lower bound.
The centrality of the United States in the global financial system is taken for granted, but its response to recent political and epidemiological events has suggested that China now holds a comparable position. Using minute-by-minute data from 2012 to 2020 on the financial performance of twelve country-specific exchange-traded funds, we construct daily snapshots of the global financial network and analyze them for the centrality and connectedness of each country in our sample. We find evidence that the U.S. was central to the global financial system into 2018, but that the U.S.-China trade war of 2018–2019 diminished its centrality, and the Covid-19 outbreak of 2019–2020 increased the centrality of China. These indicators may be the first signals that the global financial system is moving from a unipolar to a bipolar world.
This study explores the implications of rising markups for optimal Mirrleesian income and profit taxation. Using a stylized model with two individuals, the main forces shaping welfare-optimal policies are analytically characterized. Although a higher profit tax has redistributive benefits, it adversely affects market competition, leading to a greater equilibrium cost-of-living. Rising markups directly contribute to a decline in optimal marginal taxes on labor income. The optimal policy response to higher markups includes increasingly relying on the profit tax to fund redistribution. Declining optimal marginal income taxes assists the redistributive function of the profit tax by contributing to the expansion of the profit tax base. This response alone considerably increases the equilibrium cost-of-living. Nevertheless, a majority of the individuals become better off with the optimal policy. If it is not possible to tax profits optimally, due, for example, to profit shifting, increasing redistribution via income taxes is not optimal; every individual is worse off relative to the scenario with optimal profit taxation.
Small businesses face major challenges to becoming more innovative. These challenges are particularly prevalent in emerging economies where high uncertainties are a barrier to innovation. We know from previous studies that linkages to universities, on the one hand, and public procurement, on the other, support large and innovative firms in their efforts to become more innovative. However, we do not know whether these positive effects also hold true for small businesses. In this paper, we focus on how policy strategies reducing information, market and financial uncertainties shape small businesses’ innovation in China. Based on a sample of 926 small businesses derived from the World Bank Enterprises Survey in China (2012), we find that university-industry linkages enhance innovation, though only when it comes to minor forms of innovation. In line with the resource-based view of the firm, this effect is stronger for small businesses with higher capabilities. Moreover, we show that bidding for or delivering contracts to public sector clients has a positive effect on innovation, and in particular of major forms of innovation. In the bidding selection process, private firms and firms with higher capabilities are selected. Our findings show that both policy strategies have enhanced innovation, though with different effects on the degree of novelty. We attribute this finding to the different degrees of uncertainties they address.
The disposition effect is implicitly assumed to be constant over time. However, drivers of the disposition effect (preferences and beliefs) are rather countercyclical. We use individual investor trading data covering several boom and bust periods (2001-2015). We show that the disposition effect is countercyclical, i.e. is higher in bust than in boom periods. Our findings are driven by individuals being 25% more likely to realize gains in bust than in boom periods. These changes in investors’ selling behavior can be linked to changes in investors’ risk aversion and in their beliefs across financial market cycles.
Having a gatekeeper position in a collaborative network offers firms great potential to gain competitive advantages. However, it is not well understood what kind of collaborations are associated with such a position. Conceptually grounded in social network theory, this study draws on the resource-based view and the relational factors view to investigate which types of collaboration characterize firms that are in a gatekeeper position, which ultimately could improve firm performance in subsequent periods. The empirical analysis utilizes a unique longitudinal data set to examine dynamic network formation. We used a data crawling approach to reconstruct collaboration networks among the 500 largest companies in Germany over nine years and matched these networks with performance data. The results indicate that firms in gatekeeper positions often engage in medium-intensity collaborations and less likely weak-intensity collaborations. Strong-intensity collaborations are not related to the likelihood of being a gatekeeper. Our study further reveals that a firm's knowledge base is an important moderator and that this knowledge base can increase the benefits of having a gatekeeper position in terms of firm performance.
Smart(phone) investing? A within investor-time analysis of new technologies and trading behavior
(2021)
Using transaction-level data from two German banks, we study the effects of smartphones on investor behavior. Comparing trades by the same investor in the same month across different platforms, we find that smartphones increase purchasing of riskier and lottery-type assets and chasing past returns. After the adoption of smartphones, investors do not substitute trades across platforms and buy also riskier, lottery-type, and hot investments on other platforms. Using smartphones to trade specific assets or during specific hours contributes to explain our results. Digital nudges and the device screen size do not mechanically drive our results. Smartphone effects are not transitory.
Using the pandemic as a laboratory, we show that asset markets assign a time- varying price to firms' disaster risk exposure. In 2020 the cross-section of realized and expected stock returns reflected firms' different exposure to the pandemic, as measured by their vulnerability to social distancing. Realized and expected return differentials initially widened and then narrowed, but disaster exposure still commanded a risk premium in December 2020. When inferred from market outcomes, resilience correlates not only with social distancing, but also with cash and environmental ratings. However, vulnerability to social distancing is the only characteristic that identifies persistently scarred firms.
Expectations about economic variables vary systematically across genders. In the domain of inflation, women have persistently higher expectations than men. We argue that traditional gender roles are a significant factor in generating this gender expectations gap as they expose women and men to different economic signals in their daily lives. Using unique data on the participation of men and women in household grocery chores, their resulting exposure to price signals, and their inflation expectations, we document a tight link between the gender expectations gap and the distribution of grocery shopping duties. Because grocery prices are highly volatile, and consumers focus disproportionally on positive price changes, frequent exposure to grocery prices increases perceptions of current inflation and expectations of future inflation. The gender expectations gap is largest in households whose female heads are solely responsible for grocery shopping, whereas no gap arises in households that split grocery chores equally between men and women. Our results indicate that gender differences in inflation expectations arise due to social conditioning rather than through differences in innate abilities, skills, or preferences.
We assess the effect and the timing of the corporate arm of the ECB quantitative easing (CSPP) on corporate bond issuance. Because of several contemporaneous measures, to isolate the programme effects we rely on one key eligibility feature: the euro denomination of newly issued bonds. We find that the significant increase in bonds issuance by eligible firms is due to the CSPP and that this effect took at least six months to unfold. This result holds even when comparing firms with similar ratings, thus providing evidence that unconventional monetary policy can foster a financing diversification regardless of firms’ risk profile. We also highlight the impact of the programme on the real economic activity. The evidence suggests that while all firms increased investment in capital expenditures and intangible assets, the CSPP induced eligible firms to invest in marketable and equity securities, to repurchase their own stocks, to hold cash and to carry out short-term investment.
The authors present evidence of a new propagation mechanism for wealth inequality, based on differential responses, by education, to greater inequality at the start of economic life. The paper is motivated by a novel positive cross-country relationship between wealth inequality and perceptions of opportunity and fairness, which holds only for the more educated. Using unique administrative micro data and a quasi-field experiment of exogenous allocation of households, the authors find that exposure to a greater top 10% wealth share at the start of economic life in the country leads only the more educated placed in locations with above-median wealth mobility to attain higher wealth levels and position in the cohort-specific wealth distribution later on. Underlying this effect is greater participation in risky financial and real assets and in self-employment, with no evidence for a labor income, unemployment risk, or human capital investment channel. This differential response is robust to controlling for initial exposure to fixed or other time-varying local features, including income inequality, and consistent with self-fulfilling responses of the more educated to perceived opportunities, without evidence of imitation or learning from those at the top.
By focusing on the cost conditions at issuance, I find that not only the Covid-19 pandemic effects were different across bonds and firms at different stages, but also that the market composition was significantly affected, collapsing on investment- grade bonds, a segment in which the share of bonds eligible to the ECB corporate programmes strikingly increased from 15% to 40%. At the same time the high-yield segment shrunk to almost disappear at 4%. In addition to a market segmentation along the bond grade and the eligibility to the ECB programmes, another source of risk detected in the pricing mechanism is the weak resilience to pandemic: the premium requested is around 30 basis points and started to be priced only after the early containment actions taken by the national authorities. On the contrary, I do not find evidence supporting an increased risk for corporations headquartered in countries with a reduced fiscal space, nor the existence of a premium in favour of green bonds, which should be the backbone of a possible “green recovery”.