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The so-called Troika, consisting of the EU-Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was supposed to support the member states of the euro area which had been hit hard by a sovereign debt crisis. For that purpose, economic adjustment programs were drafted and monitored in order to prevent the break-up of the euro area and sovereign defaults. The cooperation of these institutions, which was born out of necessity, has been partly successful, but has also created persistent problems. With the further increase of public debt, especially in France and Italy, the danger of a renewed crisis in the euro area was growing. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) together with the European Commission will replace the Troika in the future, following decisions of the EU Summit of December 2018. It shall play the role of a European Monetary Fund in the event of a crisis. The IMF, on the other side, will no longer play an active role in solving sovereign debt crises in the euro area. The current course is, however, inadequate to tackle the core problems of the euro zone and to avoid future crises, which are mainly structural in nature and due to escalating public debt and lack of international competitiveness of some member countries. The current Corona crisis will aggravate the institutional problems. It has led to a common European fiscal response ("Next Generation EU"). This rescue and recovery program will not be financed by ESM resources and will not be monitored by the ESM. One important novelty of this package is that it involves the issuance of substantial common European debt.
Der Einsatz von Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) – Technologien eröffnet viele Chancen, birgt aber auch viele Risiken – insbesondere in der Finanzbranche. Dieses Whitepaper gibt einen Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der Anwendung und Regulierung von KI-Technologien in der Finanzbranche, und diskutiert Chancen und Risiken von KI. KI findet in der Finanzbranche zahlreiche Anwendungsgebiete. Dazu gehören Chatbots, intelligente Assistenten für Kunden, automatischer Hochfrequenzhandel, automatisierte Betrugserkennung, Überwachung der Compliance, Gesichtserkennungssoftware zur Kundenidentifikation u. v. m. Auch Finanzaufsichtsbehörden setzen zunehmend KI-Anwendungen ein, um große und komplexe Datenmengen (Big Data) automatisiert und skalierbar auf Muster zu untersuchen und ihren Aufsichtspflichten nachzukommen.
Die Regulierung von KI in der Finanzbranche ist ein Balanceakt. Auf der einen Seite gibt es eine Notwendigkeit Flexibilität zu gewährleisten, um Innovationen nicht einzudämmen und im internationalen Wettbewerb nicht abgehängt zu werden. Strenge Auflagen können in diesem Zusammenhang als Barriere für die erfolgreiche Weiter-)Entwicklung von KI-Applikationen in der Finanzbranche wirken. Auf der anderen Seite müssen Persönlichkeitsrechte geschützt und Entscheidungsprozesse nachvollziehbar bleiben. Die fehlende Erklärbarkeit und Interpretierbarkeit von KI-Modellen entsteht in erster Linie durch Intransparenz bei einem Großteil heutiger KI-Anwendungen, bei welchen zwar die Natur der Ein- und Ausgaben beobachtbar und verständlich ist, nicht jedoch die genauen Verarbeitungsschritte dazwischen (Blackbox Prinzip).
Dieses Spannungsfeld zeigt sich auch im aktuellen regulatorischen Ansatz verschiedener Behörden. So werden einerseits die positiven Seiten von KI betont, wie Effizienz- und Effektivitätsgewinne sowie Rentabilitäts- und Qualitätssteigerungen (Bundesregierung, 2019) oder neue Methoden der Gefahrenanalyse in der Finanzmarktregulierung (BaFin, 2018a). Andererseits, wird darauf verwiesen, dass durch KI getroffene Entscheidungen immer von Menschen verantwortet werden müssen (EU Art. 22 DSGVO) und demokratische Rahmenbedingungen des Rechtsstaats zu wahren seien (FinTechRat, 2017).
Für die Zukunft sehen wir die Notwendigkeit internationale Regularien prinzipienbasiert, vereinheitlicht und technologieneutral weiterzuentwickeln, ohne dabei die Entwicklung neuer KIbasierter Geschäftsmodelle zu bremsen. Im globalen Wettstreit sollte Europa bei der Regulierung des KI-Einsatzes eine Vorreiterrolle einnehmen und damit seine demokratischen Werte der digitalen Freiheit, Selbstbestimmung und das Recht auf Information weltweit exportieren. Förderprogramme sollten einen stärkeren Fokus auf die Entwicklung nachhaltiger und verantwortungsvoller KI in Banken legen. Dazu zählt insbesondere die (Weiter-)Entwicklung breit einsetzbarer Methoden, die es erlauben, menschen-interpretierbare Erklärungen für erzeugte Ausgaben bereitzustellen und Problemen wie dem Blackbox Prinzip entgegenzuwirken.
Aus Sicht der Unternehmen in der Finanzbranche könnte eine Kooperation mit BigTech-Unternehmen sinnvoll sein, um gemeinsam das Potential der Technologie bestmöglich ausschöpfen zu können. Nützlich wäre auch ein gemeinsames semantisches Metadatenmodell zur Beschreibung der in der Finanzbranche anfallenden Daten. In Zukunft könnten künstliche Intelligenzen Daten aus sozialen Netzwerken berücksichtigen oder Smart Contracts aushandeln. Eine der größten Herausforderungen der Zukunft wird das Anwerben geeigneten Personals darstellen.
Despite the increasing use of cashless payment instruments, the notion that cash loses importance over time can be unambiguously refuted. In contrast, the authors show that cash demand increased steeply over the past 30 years. This is not only true on a global scale, but also for the most important currencies in advanced countries (USD, EUR, CHF, GBP and JPY). In this paper, they focus especially on the role of different crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and analyse the demand for small and large banknote denominations since the 1990s in an international perspective. It is evident that cash demand always increases in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself. However, largely unaffected from crises we observe a trend increase in global cash aligned with a shift from transaction balances towards more hoarding, especially in the form of large denomination banknotes.
Although the elderly are more vulnerable to COVID-19, the empirical evidence suggests that they do not behave more cautiously in the pandemic than younger individuals. This theoretical model argues that some individuals might not comply with the COVID-19 measures to reassure themselves that they are not vulnerable, and that the incentives for such self-signaling can be stronger for the elderly. The results suggest that communication strategies emphasizing the dangers of COVID-19 could backfire and reduce compliance among the elderly.
We study risk taking in a panel of subjects in Wuhan, China - before, during the COVID-19 crisis, and after the country reopened. Subjects in our sample traveled for semester break in January, generating variation in exposure to the virus and quarantine in Wuhan. Higher exposure leads subjects to reduce planned risk taking, risky investments, and optimism. Our findings help unify existing studies by showing that aggregate shocks affect general preferences for risk and economic expectations, while heterogeneity in experience further affect risk taking through beliefs about individuals’ own outcomes such as luck and sense of control.
JEL Classification: G50, G51, G11, D14, G41
The authors embed human capital-based endogenous growth into a New-Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market and skill obsolescence from long-term unemployment. The model can account for key features of the Great Recession: a decline in productivity growth, the relative stability of inflation despite a pronounced fall in output (the "missing disinflation puzzle"), and a permanent gap between output and the pre-crisis trend output.
In the model, lower aggregate demand raises unemployment and the training costs associated with skill obsolescence. Lower employment hinders learning-by-doing, which slows down human capital accumulation, feeding back into even fewer vacancies than justified by the demand shock alone. These feedback channels mitigate the disinflationary effect of the demand shock while amplifying its contractionary effect on output. The temporary growth slowdown translates into output hysteresis (permanently lower output and labor productivity).
Occasionally binding constraints have become an important part of economic modelling, especially since western central banks see themselves (again) constraint by the so-called zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate. A binding ZLB constraint poses a major problem for a quantitative-structural analysis: Linear solution methods do no work in the presence of a non-linearity such as the ZLB and existing alternatives tend to be computationally demanding. The urge to study macroeconomic questions related to the Great Recession and the Covid-19 crisis in a quantitative-structural framework requires algorithms that are not only accurate, but that are also robust, fast, and computationally efficient.
A particularly important application where efficient and fast methods for occasionally binding constraints (OBCs) are needed is the Bayesian estimation of macroeconomic models. This paper shows that a linear dynamic rational expectations system with OBCs, depending on the expected duration of the constraint, can be represented in closed form. Combined with a set of simple equilibrium conditions, this can be exploited to avoid matrix inversions and simulations at runtime for signifcant gains in computational speed.
Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, the authors compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). They find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.
Empirical estimates of equilibrium real interest rates are so far mostly limited to advanced economies, since no statistical procedure suitable for a large set of countries is available. This is surprising, as equilibrium rates have strong policy implications in emerging markets and developing economies as well; current estimates of the global equilibrium rate rely on only a few countries; and estimates for a more diverse set of countries can improve understanding of the drivers. The authors propose a model and estimation strategy that decompose ex ante real interest rates into a permanent and transitory component even with short samples and high volatility. This is done with an unobserved component local level stochastic volatility model, which is used to estimate equilibrium rates for 50 countries with Bayesian methods.
Equilibrium rates were lower in emerging markets and developing economies than in advanced economies in the 1980s, similar in the 1990s, and have been higher since 2000. In line with economic integration and rising global capital markets, synchronization has been rising over time and is higher among advanced economies. Equilibrium rates of countries with stronger trade linkages and similar demographic and economic trends are more synchronized.
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.
Following the financial crash and the subsequent recession, European policymakers have undertaken major reforms regarding the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, the success rate is mixed. Several reform proposals have either completely failed due to opposition forces or are still pending, sometimes for years. This article provides an overview of reforms in four major policy fields: financial stabilisation, economic governance, fiscal solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Building on the conceptual foundation of policy analysis, it distinguishes between policy outputs and outcomes. Policy output refers to legislation being adopted or agreement on treaty changes, while policy outcomes depict the result from the implementation process.
This policy white paper shows, using data on European Commission (EC) lobby meetings, that financial institutions and finance trade associations have substantial access to EC policymakers. While lobbying could transfer policy-relevant information and expertise to policymakers, it could also result in the capture of policymakers by the industry, which could harm consumers and taxpayers. How could policymakers prevent regulatory capture, but retain the benefits of the sector expertise in policy decisions? Awareness of regulatory capture by policymakers is one of the most important remedies. This paper provides an overview of the origins of the regulatory capture theory and recent academic evidence. The paper shows that regulatory capture could emerge in a variety of institutions and policy areas but is not ubiquitous and depends on the incentives of policymakers and the policy environment. Subsequently, the paper discusses various measures to prevent regulatory capture, such as more transparency, diverse expert groups, and cooling-off periods.
Fiscal policies and household consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic: a review of early evidence
(2020)
We review early evidence on how household consumption behavior has evolved over the pandemic and how different groups of households have responded to fiscal stimulus programs. Due to the scarcity of evidence for Europe, our review focuses on evidence from the US. Notwithstanding the institutional and demographic differences, we highlight generalizable findings and challenges to the design of stimulus policies from the pandemic. In conclusion, we identify several open issues for dis cussion.
OTC discount
(2020)
We document a sizable OTC discount in the interdealer market for German sovereign bonds where exchange and over-the-counter trading coexist: the vastmajority of OTC prices are favorable with respect to exchange quotes. This is a challenge for theories of OTC markets centered around search frictions but consistent with models of hybrid markets based on information frictions. We show empiricallythat proxies for both frictions determine variation in the discount, which is largely passed on to customers. Dealers trade on the exchange for immediacy and via brokers for opacity and anonymity, highlighting the complementary roles played by the di↵erent protocols.
We relate time-varying aggregate ambiguity (V-VSTOXX) to individual investor trading. We use the trading records of more than 100,000 individual investors from a large German online brokerage from March 2010 to December 2015. We find that an increase in ambiguity is associated with increased investor activity. It also leads to a reduction in risk-taking which does not reverse over the following days. When ambiguity is high, the effect of sentiment looms larger. Survey evidence reveals that ambiguity averse investors are more prone to ambiguity shocks. Our results are robust to alternative survey-, newspaper- or market-based ambiguity measures.
Supranational rules, national discretion: increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?
(2020)
We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that treated banks exploit discretion in the calculation of regulatory capital to inflate their capital ratios without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. Regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
In diesem Beitrag wird ein Vorschlag vorgestellt, wie es trotz langfristiger Niedrigzinsen möglich ist, die vor 18 Jahren eingeführte Riester-Rente so umzugestalten, dass alle Beteiligten davon profitieren. Wird die Mindestauszahlung am Ende der Vertragslaufzeit nur für die Eigenbeiträge, nicht aber für die staatlichen Zulagen garantiert, können deutlich höhere Renditen erzielt werden. Unter dem Strich haben dann nicht nur Privatleute mehr Geld aus ihrer Altersvorsorge, sondern der Staat wird mehr Steuern einnehmen und die Anbieter haben mehr Spielraum für bedarfsgerechte Produktgestaltung.
The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.
Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond? No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis. The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it approached or reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind-down strategy. That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.