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Aus Anlass des Fernseh-Sendebeginns in West- und Ostdeutschland vor 50 Jahren fand im Hans-Bredow-Institut in Hamburg am 5. und 6. Dezember 2002 ein Symposion unter dem Titel "Fernsehgeschichte als Zeitgeschichte - Zeitgeschichte als Fernsehgeschichte" statt. In einem kritischen Beitrag untersuchte Peter Zimmermann vor allem die "Feindbildkonstruktionen" des westlichen Fernsehens, die sich nach Aufffassung des Referenten auch bis nach dem Fall der Mauer nachweisen lassen. Zimmermann: "Im freudetrunkenen Monat November des Jahres 1989 schien das deutsche Wintermärchen mit dem Fall der Mauer endlich ein glückliches Ende zu finden. Ganz ungetrübt verlief die Wiedervereinigung der 'deutschen Brüder und Schwestern' allerdings auch in medialer Hinsicht nicht. Mit der sogenannten Abwicklung des DDR-Fernsehens und der DEFA übernahm das Fernsehen der Bundesrepublik auch die ostdeutsche 'Bilderhoheit'. Die in Film und Fernsehen der DDR bislang dominanten positiven Selbstbilder wurden fortan durch die im Westen dominierenden negativen Fremdbilder ersetzt. Es ist daher wenig verwunderlich, dass seit der Wiedervereinigung in den Fernsehdokumentationen zur deutschen Geschichte fast ausnahmslos der westdeutsche Blick dominiert und die Geschichte der DDR marginalisiert, abgewertet oder karikiert wird."
Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high and in inflation close to target.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
We use consumer price data for 205 cities/regions in 21 countries to study PPP deviations before, during and after the major currency crises of the 1990s. We combine data from industrialized nations in North America (Unites States, Canada and Mexico), Europe (Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal), Asia (Japan and South Korea), and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) with corresponding data from emerging market economies in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand). By doing so, we confirm previous results that both distance and border explain a significant amount of relative price variation across different locations. We also find that currency attacks had major disintegration effects by considerably increasing these border effects and by raising within-country relative price dispersion in emerging market economies. These effects are found to be quite persistent since relative price volatility across emerging markets today is still significantly larger than a decade ago.
We use consumer price data for 81 European cities (in Germany, Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Switzerland) to study the impact of the introduction of the euro on goods market integration. Employing both aggregated and disaggregated consumer price index (CPI) data we confirm previous results which showed that the distance between European cities explains a significant amount of the variation in the prices of similar goods in different locations. We also find that the variation of relative prices is much higher for two cities located in different countries than for two equidistant cities in the same country. Under the EMU, the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility has largely reduced these border effects, but distance and border still matter for intra-European relative price volatility.
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany´s Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign venture capital firms. The discrepancy in the investment and divestment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon, the value-added hypothesis and certification issues. German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than their counterparts from abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral structure of their portfolios differs from that of foreign venture capital firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take companies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually finance firms in a later stage, carry through fewer investment rounds and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In companies where a German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held by the group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at the IPO is higher and the committed lock-up period is longer.
We analyze the venture capitalist´s decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist´s participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project and / or on the experience of the venture capitalist. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the true value of the firm. An earlier version of this paper appeared as: The Decision of Venture Capitalists on Timing and Extent of IPOs (ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-12). This version July 2003.
This paper analyses the long-term effects of improved small-scale lending, often provided by microfinance institutions set up with the support of development aid. The analysis shows that some common assumptions about microfinance are not true at all: First, it shows that the impact on income will accrue not to the microenterprises themselves, but rather to the consumers of their products. Second, microfinance will have a significant positive effect on the wage levels of employees in the informal sector. Third, microfinance will cause high growth rates in the informal production sector, whereas the trade sector will either contract or at best grow very little.
The theoretical derivation of credit market segmentation as the result of a free market process
(2003)
Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whether specific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads to implicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks "refuse" to increase their interest rates beyond this ceiling as this would lower their net returns. Although the maximum interest rate increases as the size of enterprises decreases, such ceilings nonetheless constrain the banks’ ability to set interest rates at a level that would enable them to cover costs. If transaction costs are high, the total costs associated with granting small and medium-sized loans will exceed the maximum average return which the banks can earn by issuing such loans. For this reason, banks do not lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, and, as a consequence, these businesses have no access to formal sector loans. Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for them to rely on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until they reach a certain size. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not make economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they face a growth constraint imposed by the credit market. Medium-sized enterprises earn a lower RoI than small ones, which is why borrowing in the informal credit market is not a worthwhile option for them. Moreover, they do not have access to credit from formal financial institutions, and are thus excluded from obtaining any kind of financing in either of the two credit markets. As the result of free, unregulated market forces we get a stable equilibrium in which the credit market is segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal (large loan) segment and, in between, a "non-market" (medium loan) segment.
The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdeveloped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent developments. When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for block trading. Klassifikation: G 51 . Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
1. Die Vorschrift des § 18 Abs. 2 WpÜG ist gegen den zu weit geratenen Wortlaut unter Berücksichtigung des Regelungszwecks einschränkend dahin auszulegen, dass ein Angebot mit einem Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsvorbehalt versehen werden kann, sofern der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen den Eintritt des Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsgrunds nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können. 2. Eine Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots i.S. des § 10 Abs. 1 Satz 1 WpÜG ist gegeben, wenn die Entscheidung nur noch von Umständen abhängt, deren Eintritt der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können, die also nicht aus dem Herrschaftsbereich des Bieters stammen. 3. Der Bieter kann die Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots analog § 18 Abs. 2 WpÜG ebenso wie ein Angebot unter einen Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsvorbehalt stellen, sofern der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen den Eintritt des Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsgrunds nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können. Zulässig ist analog §§ 18 Abs. 1, 25 WpÜG zudem ein auf die Zustimmung der Gesellschafterversammlung des Bieters bezogener Vorbehalt. Darüber hinaus darf der Bieter eine Angebotsankündigung mit einem Finanzierungsvorbehalt für den Fall versehen, dass die Gesellschafterversammlung nicht vor Veröffentlichung der Angebotsunterlage einer für die Finanzierung des Angebots erforderlichen Kapitalmaßnahme zustimmt. 4. Der Widerruf der Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots ist als actus contrarius zu der Angebotsankündigung erst mit Veröffentlichung analog § 10 Abs. 3 Satz 1 WpÜG beachtlich. 5. Mit ordnungsgemäß veröffentlichtem Widerruf der Entscheidung wird der Bieter von der Pflicht zur Übermittlung einer Angebotsunterlage an die BaFin (§ 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 WpÜG) sowie zur Veröffentlichung einer Angebotsunterlage (§ 14 Abs. 2 Satz 1 WpÜG) frei. Eine Untersagung des Angebots gemäß § 15 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 oder 4 WpÜG kommt damit nicht mehr in Betracht. Darüber hinaus stellt die Nichtübermittlung oder Nichtveröffentlichung der Angebotsunterlage in diesem 15 Fall keine Ordnungswidrigkeit gemäß § 60 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 a) oder Nr. 2 a) WpÜG dar.
Mord-Geschichten
(2003)
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
Efficient systems for the securities transaction industry : a framework for the European Union
(2003)
This paper provides a framework for the securities transaction industry in the EU to understand the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the industry players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We evaluate the three functions and the strategic parameters - the boundary decision, the communication standard employed and the governance implemented - along the lines of three efficiency concepts. By structuring the main factors that influence these concepts and by describing the underlying trade-offs among them, we provide insight into a highly complex industry. Applying our framework, the paper describes and analyzes three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry. We point out that one of the systems, denoted as 'contestable monopolies', demonstrates a superior overall efficiency while it might be the most sensitive in terms of configuration accuracy and thus difficult to achieve and sustain.
Die Begrenzung der Beteiligungen von Einlagenkreditinstituten an Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG ist mit der Einführung des Begriffs der qualifizierten Beteiligung (§ 1 Abs. 15 KWG) durch das Vierte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz1 neu geregelt worden, nachdem § 12 KWG bereits zuvor im Rahmen der 6. KWG-Novelle2 gänzlich umgestaltet wurde3. Bislang knüpfte die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Reglementierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen an den Begriff der bedeutenden Beteiligung im Sinne von § 1 Abs. 9 KWG an. Da dieser Begriff zugleich Anknüpfungspunkt für die Regeln über die Anteilseignerkontrolle gemäß § 2b KWG ist und beiden Regelungsbereichen ein unterschiedlicher Normzweck zugrunde liegt, hat es der Gesetzgeber aus Gründen der Rechtsklarheit für erforderlich gehalten, den Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung einzuführen, um nicht völlig unterschiedliche Sachverhalte mit dem gleichen juristischen Term zu besetzen 4. § 2b KWG dient dazu, die an Instituten tatsächlich bestehenden Machtverhältnisse offenzulegen, um es der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) zu ermöglichen, etwaige Gefahren für die Funktionsfähigkeit von Instituten rechtzeitig abzuwehren5. Demgegenüber sollen durch die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 und 2 KWG in erster Linie Ansteckungsrisiken reduziert werden6. Beteiligungen können die Solidität des beteiligten Unternehmens in Gefahr bringen, wenn das Beteiligungsunternehmen in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten gerät oder sogar insolvent wird. Für Einlagenkreditinstitute ist die Gefahr einer beteiligungsbedingten Ansteckung besonders hoch, da sie ihre Aktiva durch die Hereinnahme von Einlagen überwiegend fremd finanzieren7. Die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Beteiligungsreglementierung verdient vor dem Hintergrund ihrer neuen Fassung eine nähere Überprüfung. Bei der Untersuchung wird insbesondere der für die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen zentrale Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung nach 1 Abs. 15 KWG analysiert (dazu III.). Darüber hinaus werden die sonstigen Tatbestandsmerkmale des § 12 Abs. 1 KWG (dazu II. und IV.) sowie die Folgen der Überschreitung vorgegebener Beteiligungsbegrenzungen erörtert (dazu V.). Eine Beurteilung der Regulierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG rundet den Beitrag ab.
Methoden der Filmauswertung
(2003)
This paper proposes a non-standard way to combine lazy functional languages with I/O. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach, a tiny lazy functional core language FUNDIO , which is also a call-by-need lambda calculus, is investigated. The syntax of FUNDIO has case, letrec, constructors and an IO-interface: its operational semantics is described by small-step reductions. A contextual approximation and equivalence depending on the input-output behavior of normal order reduction sequences is defined and a context lemma is proved. This enables to study a semantics of FUNDIO and its semantic properties. The paper demonstrates that the technique of complete reduction diagrams enables to show a considerable set of program transformations to be correct. Several optimizations of evaluation are given, including strictness optimizations and an abstract machine, and shown to be correct w.r.t. contextual equivalence. Correctness of strictness optimizations also justifies correctness of parallel evaluation. Thus this calculus has a potential to integrate non-strict functional programming with a non-deterministic approach to input-output and also to provide a useful semantics for this combination. It is argued that monadic IO and unsafePerformIO can be combined in Haskell, and that the result is reliable, if all reductions and transformations are correct w.r.t. to the FUNDIO-semantics. Of course, we do not address the typing problems the are involved in the usage of Haskell s unsafePerformIO. The semantics can also be used as a novel semantics for strict functional languages with IO, where the sequence of IOs is not fixed.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
Die durch jahrzehntelange Planwirtschaft geprägten Strukturen sind in Russland noch fest verwurzelt. Dementsprechend ist das Bankensystem auch zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes unterentwickelt. Die markantesten Merkmale der Finanzwirtschaft sind die ungewöhnliche Größenstruktur der Banken; deren Schwierigkeiten, die rapide zunehmende Zahl kleinster, kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen mit Finanzdienstleistungen zu versorgen sowie die geringe Rolle ausländischer Banken. Überdies sind die weiterhin bestehenden Systemrisiken nicht zu unterschätzen.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.
The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Wissen ist in jüngster Zeit zu einem zentralen Begriff in der Debatte um regionale Entwicklung geworden. Wissen gilt schlechthin als Motor des innovationsgetriebenen ökonomischen Wachstums. Es nimmt gegenwärtig neben den bekannten klassischen Produktionsfaktoren die Rolle desjenigen Produktionsfaktors ein, der als grundlegend für regionale Entwicklung verstanden wird. In diesem Kontext übernehmen wissensintensive Dienstleister die zentrale Rolle als Mittler von Wissen: Sie dienen als Transmissionsriemen in Wissensprozessen. Sie sind heute von erheblicher Bedeutung, da man annimmt, dass Unternehmen nicht mehr in der Lage sind, allein durch eigene Anstrengungen in ausreichendem Maße neues Wissen zu schaffen; neues Wissen, das nur durch Transfer für Unternehmen nutzbar gemacht werden müsste, schlicht nicht in akademischen Einrichtungen wie Universitäten vorhanden ist; die Bedingungen volatiler Märkte und eines zunehmenden Innovationswettbewerbs die Anforderungen an die Wissensgenerierung durch Unternehmen radikal erhöht haben. Neue Wege der Wissensgenerierung müssen daher beschritten werden. Die alte Vorstellung eines linearen Prozesses der Wissensgenerierung vom akademischen Grundlagenwissen über die Angewandte Forschung bis zur Entwicklung und Anwendung, den man auch mit dem Konzept des mode 1 Modells bezeichnet, wird durch das Konzept des interaktiven Modells beziehungsweise des mode 2 Modells der Wissensgenerierung ergänzt, wenn nicht ersetzt (Gibbons et al. 1994). Dieses Konzept sieht die Wissensgenerierung als einen vielfältig vernetzten, rekursiven und reflexiven Prozess (zusammenfassend Malecki 2000). Fragen, wie Prozesse der Wissensgenerierung und des Lernens organisiert werden, rücken damit in den Vordergrund. Daher wird das gegenwärtige Stadium der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung gerne als Lernende Ökonomie bezeichnet (Lundvall/Johnson 1994, OECD 2001, Archibugi/Lundvall 2002). Eine der Konsequenzen dieser Debatte ist, dass uns heute wissensintensive Prozesse als solche sowie in ihrer Geographie komplexer erscheinen als früher. Auf der einen Seite wird den wissensintensiven Dienstleistern ein wesentlicher und zunehmender Anteil an der Generierung von Innovationen und Lösungen für neue Geschäftsvorgänge zugemessen (Bryson u.a. 2000). Die Organisation von Wissensprozessen wird für diese Unternehmen zu einem wichtigen Faktor ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Auf der anderen Seite wird vermutet, dass Wissen eine 3 räumliche Komponente hat und daher Wege der räumlichen Organisation von Wissensprozessen zu den bedeutenden Instrumenten gehören, im Wettbewerb zu bestehen. Der kognitive Prozess der Generierung und Aneignung von Wissen macht die Organisation von Kommunikation und sozialer Interaktion notwendig. Dies ist eine wesentliche Aufgabe des Wissensmanagements, das sich dazu verschiedener Dimensionen von Nähe bedient. Dieser Beitrag will die Rolle, die ökonomische Akteure den verschiedenen Dimensionen von Nähe im Management von Wissensprozessen zumessen, an zwei Fallstudien beleuchten. Er wird mit dem M&AGeschäft einen Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den Dienstleistungssektor, genauer den Finanzsektor, mit einem Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den produzierenden Sektor hier die Modellentwicklung in der Automobilindustrie vergleichen. Wir hoffen, mit dem Vergleich einerseits aufzuzeigen, dass die konkrete Form der Organisation von Nähen in Wissensprozessen kontext-spezifisch ist, und andererseits die Bedingungen aufzudecken, die die jeweilige Form der Organisation bestimmen.
In this paper we demonstrate how to relate the semantics given by the nondeterministic call-by-need calculus FUNDIO [SS03] to Haskell. After introducing new correct program transformations for FUNDIO, we translate the core language used in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler into the FUNDIO language, where the IO construct of FUNDIO corresponds to direct-call IO-actions in Haskell. We sketch the investigations of [Sab03b] where a lot of program transformations performed by the compiler have been shown to be correct w.r.t. the FUNDIO semantics. This enabled us to achieve a FUNDIO-compatible Haskell-compiler, by turning o not yet investigated transformations and the small set of incompatible transformations. With this compiler, Haskell programs which use the extension unsafePerformIO in arbitrary contexts, can be compiled in a "safe" manner.
The imagination has become a major site for studying transnational cultural flows. Yet it is mainly the mass media that are explored as channels directing the imagination from "the West" towards "the rest". And there is still little empirical "testing" of this field. How do such ‐ and other ‐ imaginary sources work into social practice? And what does such "practised imagination" imply for the practice of transnational anthropology? This article attempts to address these questions from the perspective of fieldwork in progress. In and between Crete and Germany I traced transnational networks based on the reciprocal mobilities of migration, remigration, and tourism. Here, multiple domains of imagination are drawn upon by various audiences, thus effectively contributing to the creation of these relations and the places in which they localise. Anthropological research on tourism and migration has tended to separate the imagination ‐ as being an external impact ‐ from local practice. Yet, transnational ethnography needs to challenge this opposition and is in itself a strategy to do so, in that it perceives the imagination as a practice of transcending physical and cultural distance.
We develop a behavioral exchange rate model with chartists and fundamentalists to study cyclical behavior in foreign exchange markets. Within our model, the market impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of their belief in fundamental analysis. Estimation of a STAR GARCH model shows that the more the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the more fundamentalists leave the market. In contrast to previous findings, our paper indicates that due to the nonlinear presence of fundamentalists, market stability decreases with increasing misalignments. A stabilization policy such as central bank interventions may help to deflate bubbles.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enableme to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enable me to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
JEL classification: G13; J33; M41; M52
Liturgische Filmnächte
(2003)
This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and to update continuously their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of dynamic interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We find that policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation are prone to episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the United States during the 1970s. Our results highlight the value of effective communication of a central bank's inflation objective and of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. July 2003.
Der Titel des Vortrags benennt eine der wichtigsten Abgrenzungsfragen, die man sich zu stellen hat, sobald man es mit Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation zu tun hat. Was ist zulässiges Marktverhalten, was muss jeder Marktteilnehmer tun dürfen, ohne mit einem Bein im Gefängnis zu stehen und wo fängt die verbotene Kursmanipulation an? Eine bedeutsame Unterscheidung für die aktiven Akteure am Kapitalmarkt, um Klarheit darüber zu haben, was erlaubt ist und was nicht. Der Markt braucht das Vertrauen der Anleger, und Anleger vertrauen nur in ordnungsgemäß funktionierende Märkte, in Märkte, an denen Preisbildungsmechanismen funktionieren und kontrolliert werden. Daher ist es notwendig,Vorkehrungen zu treffen, die gewährleisten, dass Märkte funktionieren und Preise sich an Märkten manipulationsfrei bilden können und auch bilden. Auf der präventiven Seite tragen hierzu die Handelsregeln der verschiedenen Börsen bei, die insbesondere dezidierte Regelungen zur Preisbildung beinhalten. Sie sollen gewährleisten, dass Preise ordnungsgemäß zustande kommen und einen fairen Ausgleich von Angebot und Nachfrage darstellen. Ergänzt wird dieser präventive Aspekt durch die repressive Seite, nämlich die Ahndung von Fehlverhalten. Hierzu gab es bisher die Regelung des Kursbetrugs in § 88 Börsengesetz. Diese Vorschrift existierte inhaltlich bereits über 100 Jahre, in denen sie aber, wenn nicht tot, so doch zumindest annähernd scheintot war. Denn es sind kaum Verurteilungen oder sonstige Maßnahmen auf der Grundlage dieser Norm bekannt. Wollte man aus diesem Schattendasein allerdings folgern, dass aufgrund des integren Verhaltens der Marktteilnehmer eine solche Regelung obsolet sei, so wäre das ein Fehlschluss. Mit dem Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, das zum 01. Juli 2002 in Kraft tat, wurde dann auch eine Reform durchgeführt. Die alte Vorschrift wurde gestrichen und durch die neue Regelung des Verbots der Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation im Wertpapierhandelsgesetz ersetzt. Dort wurden §§ 20a und 20b neu eingefügt. Die Aufgabe der Überwachung dieses Manipulationsverbots und die Verfolgung von Verstößen wurde der BaFin übertragen.
This paper investigates various theories explaining banks´ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. JEL - Klassifikation: D44 , E32
The use of GARCH models with stable Paretian innovations in financial modeling has been recently suggested in the literature. This class of processes is attractive because it allows for conditional skewness and leptokurtosis of financial returns without ruling out normality. This contribution illustrates their usefulness in predicting the downside risk of financial assets in the context of modeling foreign exchange-rates and demonstrates their superiority over use of normal or Student´s t GARCH models.
Using the Johansen test for cointegration, we examine to which extent inflation rates in the Euro area have converged after the introduction of a single currency. Since the assumption of non-stationary variables represents the pivotal point in cointegration analyses we pay special attention to the appropriate identification of non-stationary inflation rates by the application of six different unit root tests. We compare two periods, the first ranging from 1993 to 1998 and the second from 1993 to 2002 with monthly observations. The Johansen test only finds partial convergence for the former period and no convergence for the latter.
As past research suggest, currency exposure risk is a main source of overall risk of international diversified portfolios. Thus, controlling the currency risk is an important instrument for controlling and improving investment performance of international investments. This study examines the effectiveness of controlling the currency risk for international diversified mixed asset portfolios via different hedge tools. Several hedging strategies, using currency forwards and currency options, were evaluated and compared with each other. Therefore, the stock and bond markets of the, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S, in the time period of January 1985 till December 2002, are considered. This is done form the point of view of a German investor. Due to highly skewed return distributions of options, the application of the traditional mean-variance framework for portfolio optimization is doubtful when options are considered. To account for this problem, a mean-LPM model is employed. Currency trends are also taken into account to check for the general dependence of time trends of currency movements and the relative potential gains of risk controlling strategies.
Past research suggests that international real estate markets show return characteristics and interrelationships with other asset classes, which probably qualify them as an interesting component of national and international asset allocation decisions. However, the special characteristics of real estate assets are quite distinct from that of financial assets, such as stocks and bonds. This is also the case for real estate return distributions. Therefore, the proper integration of real estate markets into asset allocation decisions requires profound understanding of real estate returns' distributional characteristics .
Because of the particular characteristics of real estate, representing real estate markets through reliable a time-series is a complex task. Consequently, reliable real estate indices with a sufficiently long history in major international real estate markets are only scarcely available. Most of the research that has been done on real estate returns was done for the U.K. and U.S., where eligible indices exist. On the other hand, in other important real estate markets, such as Germany, either little or no research has been perfoimed.
In this analysis, the methodology of Maurer, Sebastian and Stephan (2000) for indirectly deriving an appraisal-based index for the German commercial real estate market will be applied. This approach is solely based on publicly available data from German open-ended real estate investment trusts. It could also provide a solution to deriving a reliable real estate time-series for other markets.
We will extend previous analyses for the U.K. and U.S. to provide additional fundamental insights into the return characteristics of the German commercial real estate market. Despite univariate considerations, the main focus is the interrelationships between various international real estate markets, as well as between those respective markets and the international stock and bond markets.
Open-end real estate funds (so called “Offene Immobilienfonds”) play a major role in the German market for securitised real estate investments. Such funds are pools of money from many investors, which are invested in real estate by special investment management companies. This study seeks to identify the risk and return profile of this investment vehicle (before and after income taxes), to compare them with those of other major asset classes, and to provide implications for their appropriate role in a mixed-asset portfolio. Addition-ally, an overview of the institutional architecture and role of German open-end real estate funds is given. Empirical evidence suggests that the financial characteristics of open-end real estate funds are in many respects similar to those reported for direct real estate invest-ments. Accordingly, German open-end real estate funds qualify for medium and long-term investment horizons, rather than for shorter holding periods.
This chapter focuses on institutional investors in the German financial markets. Institutional investors are specialized financial intermediaries who collect and manage funds on behalf of small investors toward specific objectives in terms of risk, return and maturity. The major types of institutional investors in Germany are insurance companies and investment funds. We will examine the nature of their businesses, their size and role in the financial sector, the size and the composition of the assets under their management, aspects of financ ial regulation, and features of their asset-liability-management.
We investigate a restricted one-way cellular automaton (OCA) model where the number of cells is bounded by a constant number k, so-called kC-OCAs. In contrast to the general model, the generative capacity of the restricted model is reduced to the set of regular languages. A kC-OCA can be algorithmically converted to a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). The blow-up in the number of states is bounded by a polynomial of degree k. We can exhibit a family of unary languages which shows that this upper bound is tight in order of magnitude. We then study upper and lower bounds for the trade-off when converting DFAs to kC-OCAs. We show that there are regular languages where the use of kC-OCAs cannot reduce the number of states when compared to DFAs. We then investigate trade-offs between kC-OCAs with different numbers of cells and finally treat the problem of minimizing a given kC-OCA.
The effect of adding two-way communication to k cells one-way cellular automata (kC-OCAs) on their size of description is studied. kC-OCAs are a parallel model for the regular languages that consists of an array of k identical deterministic finite automata (DFAs), called cells, operating in parallel. Each cell gets information from its right neighbor only. In this paper, two models with different amounts of two-way communication are investigated. Both models always achieve quadratic savings when compared to DFAs. When compared to a one-way cellular model, the result is that minimum two-way communication can achieve at most quadratic savings whereas maximum two-way communication may provide savings bounded by a polynomial of degree k.