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Even though tourism has been recognised as an important field for transnational research today, there are few attempts to place tourism in the context of transnational theories or to think about transnationalism from the perspective of tourists. I argue that in researching tourist practices one can add important aspects to transnational approaches. The prerequisites of mobility and interaction for example are the features chosen by backpackers to describe what their Round-The-World-Trip is about. A form of tourism is adopted, or created, that itself confronts many aspects of globalisation: First of all there is the immense dynamic that is involved. Backpackers try to cover as many places and experiences as possible, travelling at high speed. They adopt all kinds of touristic experiences ranging from beach to adventure to culture tourism. They don't focus on a specific area or country but travel the world. They cross national borders perpetually. Additionally they form a transnational network in which they interact with strangers of similar backgrounds (other backpackers, tourist professionals). This network helps them interacting with people from different backgrounds (the socalled hosts or locals). Considering my research Backpackers forge a certain identity from these transnational practices which I want to name globedentity. Globedentity expresses a type of identity construction that not only refers to the individual (I) but reflects the world (globe) in this identity. This globedentity is not fixed but is perpetually re-created and re-defined. It also embraces the increasing popular awareness of globalisation which backpackers, coming from highly educated middle class backgrounds, in particular have identified with. Due to the constant awareness of the latest global social, cultural and economic developments in these educated milieus they know exactly which tools to use to become successful parts of their societies.
Spacially dispersed transnational professional communities can be perceived of as cultural formations living in a global frame of reference, transgressing existing political and cultural boundaries. In their capacity as members of local technical and knowledgebased elites, they take part in circulating and connecting cultural meanings that are both locally produced, and continuously re-working non- local flows. I argue that those elites can be described as actors at cultural interfaces, taking part in shaping and mediating social change. The aim is twofold: one, to point to mutually opposed tendencies, and ambivalences in the framework of a „culture of change“, and two, to look into the question how such situations and groups can be methodologically approached.
The imagination has become a major site for studying transnational cultural flows. Yet it is mainly the mass media that are explored as channels directing the imagination from "the West" towards "the rest". And there is still little empirical "testing" of this field. How do such ‐ and other ‐ imaginary sources work into social practice? And what does such "practised imagination" imply for the practice of transnational anthropology? This article attempts to address these questions from the perspective of fieldwork in progress. In and between Crete and Germany I traced transnational networks based on the reciprocal mobilities of migration, remigration, and tourism. Here, multiple domains of imagination are drawn upon by various audiences, thus effectively contributing to the creation of these relations and the places in which they localise. Anthropological research on tourism and migration has tended to separate the imagination ‐ as being an external impact ‐ from local practice. Yet, transnational ethnography needs to challenge this opposition and is in itself a strategy to do so, in that it perceives the imagination as a practice of transcending physical and cultural distance.
The present article explores perceptions and cultural constructions of the terms capitalism or capitalistic West among ex-Soviet, highly qualified Jewish migrants from Russia and Ukraine after their emigration to Germany between 1990 and 1996. It seems that migration offers a unique opportunity to migrants to realise knowledge that is normally taken for granted, behaviour schemes and values, and to reflect on them. How do they acquire such presumed capitalist knowledge of the new society and new social world, how do they create it, and with what concrete contents do they connect the illusion about monolithic cultural, economic and political capital, the illusion which contributes to group formation and which serves as action orientation? As my research shows, immigrants try to disparage much of what appeared to them in the Soviet Union as normative, right and appropriate; now they often act by way of categories, which were defined in the previous context as "capitalist" and were interpreted as immoral. Without exact ideas or knowledge about behaviour codes, unspoken norms and silent values from the new society, many immigrants orient themselves towards the opposite of what was counted as morally proper in the origin society. Simultaneously they revive old system through the establishing and development of a Russian language enclave. Nevertheless this enclave is not located in a vacuum of "dusty" memories from the past, but build transnational cross-border space connected and corresponding to the processes of to-day's CIS and with the life of those relatives and friends who still live there, und with whom the emigrants share intensive social networks.
This paper focuses on Eastern European migrants who, since the beginning of the 1990s, are entering the Republic Cyprus as “artistes”. This is a visa permit status as well as an euphemism for short-term work permits in the local sex industry. In addition to exploring the migrational experiences of these women and their living and working conditions in the Republic of Cyprus, the paper reconstructs, empirically and analyt ically, the connection between immigration and the local sex industry. Here, several categories of social actors and institutions in Cyprus are actively involved. The rhetoric of government representatives, entrepreneurs and clients in the sex business on the one hand is contrasted with the discourse of local NGO representatives concerned with immigrants’ rights on the other hand. The paper comes to the conclusion that all of these discursive positions ultimately do not do justice to the complex process of decisionmaking that women undergo who migrate into the sex industry. Either, freedom of choice is emphasized – such as by entrepreneurs and the government – or the domination of women – as in the public statements of the NGO. In order to analyze the ambivalent tension between freedom of choice and submission to force by which the women’s decision is characterized, the author employs Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which describes forms of political regulation that use the individual’s freedom of action as an instrument to exercise power.
Challenging and confirming touristic representations of the Mediterranean : migrant workers in Crete
(2006)
From the perspective of Western Europe the Mediterranean is shaped by the imagery of tourism and migration. During the time of the “guest worker”-migration in the 1960s and 70s the notion of the hopelessly underdeveloped South of Europe which pushes “guest workers” towards the rich North became prevalent here. It offered a contrast which let the beginning prosperity in the North appear even clearer. (see von Osten 2006) Besides the attractions “sea, sun and sand” it was exactly this conception of backwardness which – reinterpreted in authentic and traditional Mediterranean lifestyle – made the area attractive for tourist consumption. Today it is again pictures of the Mediterranean, which represent migration dynamics in Europe. In the meantime, however, the countries of origin of the “guest workers” have become countries of immigration and European Union member states or candidates for accession. The representation of the Mediterranean as an area of migration is dominated now by pictures of desperate refugees and illegal immigrants, who risk their life by crossing the sea, in order to enter the “fortress Europe”. In these current representations the “colonial narrative of migrants as members of a territory of underdeveloped” is continued (ibid.). A translation of the migrant area into the tourist area seems, however, more difficult than at the times of the “guest worker”-migration. What constitutes the Mediterranean as a tourist destination seems to have no longer anything in common with the Mediterranean as an area of migration.....
Der nachstehende Aufsatz ist Teil einer breiter angelegten Studie, an der ich derzeit im Rahmen eines Dissertationsvorhabens mit dem Titel: Ideologische Gruppierungen im arnerikanischen Kongress - Zur Rolle innerpateilicher Flügelorganisationen im U.S. Repräsentantenhaus, 1960-1990, arbeite. Die Diskussion der Veränderungen des Stils der Mandatsführung der amerikanischen Abgeordneten seit den 1960er Jahren ist in diesem Zusammenhang als eine wichtige Komponente des Versuchs zu verstehen, einen Erklärungsansatz für die Entstehung und Arbeitsweise der in dem Dissertationsprojekt untersuchten »ideological caucuses« zu formulieren.
Im Zusammenhang mit dem Präventivkrieg der Vereinigten Staaten gegen den Irak ist von einem Versagen der parlamentarischen Kontrolle die Rede. Analog zur Tonkin-Gulf-Resolution von 1964, mit der das amerikanische Parlament Präsident Lyndon B. Johnson praktisch eine Blankovollmacht für den Vietnamkrieg erteilt hatte, sei der USKongress im Oktober 2002 davor zurückgeschreckt, seiner verfassungsrechtlichen Verantwortung, welche ihm vor allem aus dem alleinigen Rechtzur Kriegserklärung erwächst, auch nur in Ansätzen nachzukommen. Häufig wird dieses Verhalten auf die Bedrohungslage und das politische Klima nach dem 11. September zurückgeführt. Wie eine kursorische Durchsicht der einschlägigen Literatur zeigt, handelt es sich bei der mangelnden institutionellen Selbstbehauptung des Kongresses im Zusammenhang mit Militäreinsätzen jedoch um kein neues Phänomen: Die Interventionspolitik galt auch schon vor den Terroranschlägen von New York und Washington als ein Politikfeld, in dem es der Legislative allenfalls partiell gelungen ist, die Exekutive nach den Auswüchsen der so genannten imperialen Präsidentschaft wieder stärker zu kontrollieren. Eine Deutung, die in den vergangenen Jahren verstärkt Zulauf erfahren hat, versucht den Ausnahmecharakter der Interventionspolitik mit dem sozialkonstruktivistisch grundierten Konzept einer Kultur der Unterordnung zu erklären. Es existiert aber auch eine rationalistisch argumentierende These, wonach politische Kalküle und Zwänge, die aus einem medial erzeugten Wählerdruck resultieren, das Parlament veranlassen, sich dem Präsidenten in der militärischen Interventionspolitik unterzuordnen. Die Studie will anhand von zwei Fallbeispielen aus den 1990er Jahren,dem zweiten Golfkrieg und dem Kosovokrieg, klären, welcher Stellenwert diesen beiden Faktoren für die mangelnde institutionelle Selbstbehauptung des Kongresses in der militärischen Interventionspolitik zukommt. Unser Befund deutet darauf hin, dass eine separate, besonders stark ausgeprägte Teilkultur der Unterordnung auf Seiten der Republikaner existiert, die ceteris paribus dazu führt, dass sich eine von der Grand Old Party kontrollierte Legislative in Fragen, die Krieg und Frieden betreffen, institutionell grundsätzlich weniger stark behaupten kann als ein demokratisch dominierter Kongress.
Auf dem Hintergrund der Analyse der kanadischen Entwicklung und der sie begleitenden Diskussion um die Integration in den nordamerikanischen Wirtschaftsraum und die Problematik des Quebecer Minderheitennationalismus lassen sich folgende Schlussfolgerungen ziehen: Zum ersten kann im Falle Kanadas tatsächlich nur von einer internationalen Wirtschaftsintegration im Sinne einer regionalen Integration gesprochen werden und nicht von einer Globalisierung der ökonomischen Beziehungen. Die Ergebnisse und Daten haben gezeigt, dass sich der Handel zunehmend auf den nordamerikanischen Kontinent konzentriert. Diese Ergebnisse lassen sich auch durch andere Untersuchungen zum europäischen Binnenmarkt und auch zum asiatischen Markt bestätigen. Die regionale Integration innerhalb der drei Wirtschaftsblöcke kann eher definiert werden als eine Gegenreaktion gegen eine globale ökonomische Liberalisierung denn als ein erster Schritt in Richtung eines globalen Marktes. Ähnlich vorsichtig und differenziert argumentieren auch Hirst und Thompson, wenn sie in den Nationalstaaten weiterhin die grundlegenden Einheiten der internationalen Wirtschaft sehen. Eine relative Trennung von nationalen und internationalen Bezugssystemen werde nach Hirst und Thompson nicht aufgehoben, der Einfluß von internationalen Ereignissen auf die Binnenökonomie werde noch immer gefiltert von nationalen Maßnahmen und Prozessen. Diese Schlussfolgerungen konnten auch durch die Analyse der Verhandlungen zur Implementierung des Free trade agreements mit den USA und den sich anschließenden Verhandlungen zur NAFTA bestätigt werden. Es sind staatliche Akteure und Institutionen, die die Regeln der Integration festschreiben und auch noch weite rhin Einflussmöglichkeiten im Rahmen dieser Kooperationsgebilde besitzen. Natürlich ergeben sich hieraus andere Akteurskonstellationen und Handlungsspielräume für die staatlichen Akteure, aber von einem generellen Bedeutungsverlust kann keinesfalls gesprochen werden. Genau hier fehlt es in der Globalisierungsdi skussion noch an empirischen Untersuchungen, die den veränderten Charakter, die unterschiedlichenHandlungsebenen und die veränderte Funktion nationaler Wirtschaftspolitik genauer beleuchtet. Dem Staat kommen nach Hirst und Thompson auch weiterhin zentrale Aufgaben im Wirtschaftsbereich zu. Dazu gehören die Herstellung eines V erteilungskompromisses zur Beeinflussung der Wirtschaft, die Herbeiführung eines sozialen Konsenses und eine adäquate Aufteilung der Steuereinnahmen und -ko mpetenzen auf den verschiedenen Regierungsebenen. Es kann also keinesfalls von einem völligen Verlust der nationalen Souveränität durch die Globalisierung gesprochen werden, wobei hier gefragt werden muss, inwieweit das Konzept staatlicher Souveränität in seiner juristischen und rechtswissenschaftlichen Zuspitz ung je zutraf. Die Forschung müsste sich stärker konzentrieren auf das neue Konkurrenzverhältnisvon internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und Handelsströmen einerseits und den Machtbefugnissen des Staates anderer seits. Verschiedene Akteure treten neb en dem Nationalstaat auf verschiedenenEbenen mit unterschiedlichen Interessen auf. Diese neuen Interaktionsformen und die Handlungsspielräume, in denen sie stattfinden, bedürfen noch einer genauen empirischen Analyse, um Prognosen über die Zukunft des Nationalstaates zu machen. Der Nationalstaat wird aber weiterhin eine bedeutende Rolle in der Vermittlung zwischen den sozialen, politischen und ökonomischen Dimensionen der Realität spielen.
Although many observers consider the Bush administration’s “faith-based initiative” a unique breach in the wall of separation between church and state, close ties between the federal government and religious agencies are no novelty in the history of American public policy. Since the end of the Second World War, billions of dollars of public funds have been made available to religiously-affiliated hospitals, nursing homes, educational institutions, and social services - institutions which were regarded as vital to Cold War preparedness. By the same token, government use of religious foreign aid agencies, the donation of surplus land and military facilities to religious charities, and the funding of the chaplaincy in the armed forces have undergirded Cold War foreign policy goals. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, post-war public policy thus integrated religious groups into the framework of the welfare and national security state in ways which underwrote both the expansion of the federal government and the growth of religious agencies. Crucially, public funding relations involved not only mainline Protestant, Jewish and Catholic organizations, but also white evangelicals, who had traditionally been the most outspoken opponents of closer ties between church and state. Cold War Anti-Communism, the fear of Catholic or secularist control of public funds, and pragmatic considerations, however, ushered in the gradual revision of their separatist views. Ironically, the programs of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, so vilified by the Christian Right, pioneered many of the funding streams most beneficial to evangelical providers. Considering that since 1945 the sprawling and loosely organized evangelical movement has become the largest single religious faction in the US, and that conservative Protestants now form the most strongly Republican group in the religious spectrum, these findings are of particular importance. They suggest that Cold War state-building and the resurgence of Evangelicalism mutually reinforced each other in ways which have been largely ignored by scholarship on conservatism and its focus on the “backlash” against the political and cultural upheaval of the 1960s. Based on newly accessible archival materials and a comprehensive review of secondary literature, this paper suggests that the institutional and ideological ties between evangelicals and the state, which developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, are as important in understanding the political mobilization of conservative Protestants as the more recent “culture war” sentiments.
Taxation and tax policy reform appears on the political agenda in most advanced welfare states in Europe and North America. Of course studies of taxation and tax policy are nothing new and have existed ever since people have paid taxes. The current work is situated in the context of the future of the welfare state and the reinforced international economic and political integration referred to as "globalization." The purpose of this paper is to analyze how globalization is affecting tax policy in advanced welfare states. In comparing the evolution of tax policy in Canada with those in the United States, Germany and Sweden from 1960 to 1995, I will try to review the conventional antiglobalization thesis, i.e., that globalization leads to a "race to the bottom" in revenue and expenditures policies, or as others have called it, a "beggar the neighbour policy" (Tanzi and Bovenberg 1990, 187). ... Conclusion: The empirical data and theoretical models clearly show that globalization is one relatively minor factor among many that explain tax policy reforms. And even that limited influence is mediated by domestic political systems, institutions and constellations of actors. As the data has shown, the conventional globalization thesis of a race to the bottom is not borne out. Tax rates and tax revenues are still increasing, despite the ongoing trend toward international trade integration. Countervailing pressures like the high cost of welfare programs, different parties in government, strong labour unions, and institutional veto players counteract the pressure of globalization on tax policy. As for the future of taxation in Canada, it is more likely to be one of gradual evolution than radical change. Although the data don’t show any downward pressure on tax rates and tax revenues comparatively speaking, there are at least four key factors in Canada that are likely to put pressure on future tax rates, although regional political dynamics and the workings of fiscal federalism suggest that tax reductions will be a higher priority in some provinces than others (Hale 2002). First, neoliberalism will continue to shape fiscal and tax policy, including the role of the tax system in delivering social policies and programs in most parts of Canada. Second, governments that seek to define their own economic and social priorities rather than simply react to events beyond their borders will have to exercise centralized control over budgetary policies and spending levels if they hope to foster the economic growth needed to finance social services in the context of Canada’s changing demographics. Third, the ability of governments to combine the promotion of economic growth and higher living standards will be closely linked to their ability to develop a workable division of responsibilities among federal and provincial governments and with other national governments. Finally, the diffusion of new technologies will continue to transform national and regional economies while giving individuals greater opportunity to avoid government and tax regulations that run contrary to their perceived interests and values. This discussion of determinants that shape tax policy reform has shown that successful management of fiscal and tax policy requires a capacity to set priorities; adapt to changing circumstances; and build a consensus that enables competing economic, social, regional and ideological interests to identify their own well-being in the broader political and economic environment. Tax policy is shaped by many political, economic and social determinants. As Geoffrey Hale correctly concludes, "it should not be surprising if the tax system stubbornly refuses to confirm either economic theories or political ideologies, but reflects past decisions and the policy tradeoffs of the political process" (2002, 71). The notion of tax policy being driven by globalization and forces associated with globalization (both positive and negative) is simply not borne by the facts.
In der vorliegenden Studie werden die sozialpolitischen Reformen in den USA und Kanada während der 1990er Jahren in einer vergleichenden Perspektive analysiert. Dabei wird insbesondere die Rolle steuerpolitischer Instrumentarien in den Reformen thematisiert und der Frage nachgegangen, ob sich hier ein neuer Typ von Wohlfahrtsstaat herausbildet. Im ersten Teil des Papiers wird das in der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung etablierte Modell des liberalen Wohlfahrtsstaats skizziert, um vor diesem Hintergrund die Reformen in den USA und Kanada zu untersuchen und zu vergleichen. Anschließend wird in einer breiteren vergleichenden Perspektive die out-put-Leistung der beiden Wohlfahrtsstaaten analysiert. Al normative Kriterien hierbei gilt in erster Linie die Umverteilungsfunktion sozialpolitischer Instrumentarien, hier in erster Linie verstanden als Einkommensumverteilung.
Am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts wird der Zustand der US-Demokratie kontrovers diskutiert. Während manche Beobachter eine zu hohe Responsivität des politischen Systems gegenüber den Ansprüchen seiner Bürger entdeckt haben wollen und deshalb von demosclerosis und einer Hyperdemokratie sprechen, in welcher der Volkswille in einen unantastbaren, göttlichen Rang erhoben worden sei, kommen andere zu dem Schluss, dass die Gründerväter im Hinblick auf ihre handlungsanleitende Furcht vor einer »Tyrannei der Mehrheit« ganze Arbeit geleistet und ein nahezu unüberwindbares System von Vetopositionen geschaffen hätten, das Partikularinteressen strukturell bevorzuge und deshalb nur in Ausnahmesituationen die Mehrheitspräferenzen der Bürger in Politik umsetze. Kurzum: Die Furcht der Federalists vor einer »Mehrheitstyrannei« habe einer »Minderheitstyrannei« Tür und Tor geöffnet. Der Artikel versucht die Vereinigten Staaten in diesem Spannungsbogen zu verorten. Ziel ist es, die Qualität der amerikanischen Demokratie am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts zu problematisieren. Dabei werden auch die Entwicklungen nach dem 11. September berücksichtigt.
A resampling method based on the bootstrap and a bias-correction step is developed for improving the Value-at-Risk (VaR) forecasting ability of the normal-GARCH model. Compared to the use of more sophisticated GARCH models, the new method is fast, easy to implement, numerically reliable, and, except for having to choose a window length L for the bias-correction step, fully data driven. The results for several different financial asset returns over a long out-of-sample forecasting period, as well as use of simulated data, strongly support use of the new method, and the performance is not sensitive to the choice of L. Klassifizierung: C22, C53, C63, G12
We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement constraints in that state of the world. These unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than constrained households, i.e. they are located in the lower tail of the crosssectional consumption growth distribution. We use household consumption data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate the pricing kernel implied by the model and to evaluate its performance in pricing aggregate risk. We employ the same data to construct aggregate consumption and to derive the standard complete markets pricing kernel. We find that the limited enforcement pricing kernel generates a market price of risk that is substantially larger than the standard complete markets asset pricing kernel. Klassifizierung: G12, D53, D52, E44
In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante (before ability is realized) expected (with respect to uninsurable productivity shocks) utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded in this welfare criterion is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redistribution among agents of different abilities. Such insurance and redistribution can be achieved by progressive labor income taxes or taxation of capital income, or both. The policy maker has then to trade off these concerns against the standard distortions these taxes generate for the labor supply and capital accumulation decision. We find that the optimal capital income tax rate is not only positive, but is significantly positive. The optimal (marginal and average) tax rate on capital is 36%, in conjunction with a progressive labor income tax code that is, to a first approximation, a flat tax of 23% with a deduction that corresponds to about $6,000 (relative to an average income of households in the model of $35,000). We argue that the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is due to the insurance and redistribution role of the income tax system. Klassifizierung: E62, H21, H24
Assumptions about the dynamic and distributional behavior of risk factors are crucial for the construction of optimal portfolios and for risk assessment. Although asset returns are generally characterized by conditionally varying volatilities and fat tails, the normal distribution with constant variance continues to be the standard framework in portfolio management. Here we propose a practical approach to portfolio selection. It takes both the conditionally varying volatility and the fat-tailedness of risk factors explicitly into account, while retaining analytical tractability and ease of implementation. An application to a portfolio of nine German DAX stocks illustrates that the model is strongly favored by the data and that it is practically implementable. Klassifizierung: C13, C32, G11, G14, G18
Baby boomer retirement security: the roles of planning, financial literacy and housing wealth
(2006)
We compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study: the early Baby Boomers in 2004, and individuals in the same age group in 1992. Levels and patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time, though Boomers rely more on housing equity than their predecessors. Most important, planners in both cohorts arrive close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than non-planners. Instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no wealth. Klassifizierung: D91, E21
We use data from several waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances to document credit and debit card ownership and use across US demographic groups. We then present recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of credit and debit card behavior. Utilization rates of credit lines and portfolios of card holders present several puzzles. Credit line increases initiated by banks lead households to restore previous utilization rates. High-interest credit card debt co-exists with substantial holdings of low-interest liquid assets and with accumulation of retirement assets. Although available evidence disputes ignorance of credit card terms by card holders, redit card rates do not respond to competition. There is a rising trend in bankruptcy and delinquency, partly attributable to an increased tendency of households to declare bankruptcy associated with reduced social stigma, ease of procedures, and financial incentives. Co-existence of credit card debt with retirement assets can be explained through self-control hyperbolic discounting. Strategic default motives contribute partly to observed co-existence of credit card debt with low-interest liquid assets. A framework of “accountant-shopper” households, in which a rational accountant tries to control an impulsive shopper, seems consistent with both types of co-existence and with observed utilization of credit lines. JEL Classification: G11, E21
The tax codes in many countries allow for special tax advantages for investments in special retirement plans. Probably the most important advantage to these plans is that profits usually remain untaxed. This paper deals with the question, which assets are preferable in a taxdeferred account (TDA). Contrary to the conventional wisdom that one should prefer bonds in the TDA, it is shown that especially in early years, stocks can be the preferred asset to hold in the TDA for an investor maximizing final wealth, given a certain asset allocation. The higher the performance of stocks compared to bonds, the higher the tax burden put on stocks compared to bonds. Simultaneously, the longer the remaining investment horizon, the larger the relative outperformance of the optimal asset location strategy compared to the myopic strategy of locating bonds in the TDA. An algorithm is provided to determine the investment strategy that maximizes (expected) funds at the end of a given investment horizon when there is an analytical solution.
This paper analyzes the relation between demographic structure and real asset returns on treasury bills, bonds and stocks for the G7-countries (United States, Canada, Japan, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany). A macroeconomic multifactor model is used to examine a variety of different demographic factors from 1951 to 2002. There was no robust relationship found between shocks in demographic variables and asset returns in the framework of these models, which suggests that Asset Meltdown is rather fiction than fact.
Both banks and open end real estate funds effectuate liquidity transformation in large amounts and high scales. Because of this similarity the latter should be analyzed using the same methodologies as usually applied for banks. We show that the work in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), especially Allen and Gale (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), provides an applicable theoretical framework. We used this as the basis for our model for open end real estate funds. We then examined the usefulness of the modeling structure in analyzing open end real estate funds. First, we could show that withdrawing of capital resulting in a run is not always inefficient. Instead, withdrawing can as well be referred to the situation where the low return of an open end fund unit in comparison to other opportunities makes, (partial) withdrawal viewed from the risk-sharing perspective optimal. Even with costly liquidation, this result will hold, though we will have deadweight losses in such a situation. Second, introducing a secondary market in our model does, not in general, resolve the problem of deadweight losses associated with foreclosure. If assets are sold during a run, we do not only have a transfer of value but it can also create an economic cost. Because funds are forced to liquidate the illiquid asset in order to fulfill their obligations, the price of the real estate asset is forced down making the crisis worse. Rather than providing insurance, such that investors receive a transfer in negative outcomes, the secondary market does the opposite. It provides a negative insurance instead. Third, our model proves that the open end structure provides a monitoring function which serves as an efficient instrument to discipline the funds management. Therefore, we argue that an open end structure can represent a more adequate solution to securitize real estate or other illiquid assets. Instead of transforming open end in closed end structures, fund runs should be accepted as a normal phenomenon to clear the market from funds with mismanagement.
Die Studie befaßt sich mit den rechtlichen Anforderungen an die Umwandlung und den Umtausch von Finanzinstrumenten. Finanzinstrumente in dem hier gemeinten Sinne sind Aktien und ausgewählte Schuldverschreibungsformen (Finanzierungsgenußrechte; Wandelschuldverschreibungen; einfache Schuldverschreibungen). Die Umwandlung oder der Umtausch von Finanzinstrumenten, zusammenfassend auch als Konversion bezeichnet, sind Verfügungsgeschäfte. Dabei werden hier nur Verfügungsgeschäfte zwischen dem Emittenten und dem Investor betrachtet. Nicht behandelt werden auch die besonderen Gestaltungsfragen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten, die sich für die Emittenten und Investoren bei der Umstrukturierung (Umwandlung, Konzernierung usw.) des Emittenten selbst ergeben. ....
Reasoning about the correctness of program transformations requires a notion of program equivalence. We present an observational semantics for the concurrent lambda calculus with futures Lambda(fut), which formalizes the operational semantics of the programming language Alice ML. We show that natural program optimizations, as well as partial evaluation with respect to deterministic rules, are correct for Lambda(fut). This relies on a number of fundamental properties that we establish for our observational semantics.
We develop a proof method to show that in a (deterministic) lambda calculus with letrec and equipped with contextual equivalence the call-by-name and the call-by-need evaluation are equivalent, and also that the unrestricted copy-operation is correct. Given a let-binding x = t, the copy-operation replaces an occurrence of the variable x by the expression t, regardless of the form of t. This gives an answer to unresolved problems in several papers, it adds a strong method to the tool set for reasoning about contextual equivalence in higher-order calculi with letrec, and it enables a class of transformations that can be used as optimizations. The method can be used in different kind of lambda calculi with cyclic sharing. Probably it can also be used in non-deterministic lambda calculi if the variable x is "deterministic", i.e., has no interference with non-deterministic executions. The main technical idea is to use a restricted variant of the infinitary lambda-calculus, whose objects are the expressions that are unrolled w.r.t. let, to define the infinite developments as a reduction calculus on the infinite trees and showing a standardization theorem.
Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt auf, wie hedonische Preisindizes für Immobilien auf der Basis von Transaktionen berechnet werden können. Der Heterogenität der Immobilien wird dabei durch ein ökonometrisches Modell Rechnung getragen, wobei in dieser Arbeit das Problem der Wahl einer geeigneten Funktionsform durch eine Transformation nach dem Ansatz von Box/Cox (1964) explizit berücksichtigt wird. Die Datenbasis deckt etwa 65% der Transaktionen des Wohnungsmarktes im Zeitraum 1990-1999 ab. Die Korrektur aufgrund unvollständiger Angaben führt zu einem Datensatz von 84 686 Transaktionen. Dieser Datensatz ist ein Vielfaches dessen, was bisher vergleichbaren Studien zugrunde lag und stellt damit eine international einmalige Datengrundlage dar.
This paper employs a multi-country large scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital. Klassifizierung: E17, E25, D33, C68
When liquidity plays an important role as in times of financial crisis, asset prices in some markets may reflect the amount of liquidity available in the market rather than the future earning power of the asset. Mark-to-market accounting is not a desirable way to assess the solvency of a financial institution in such circumstances. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current value of banks’ assets to be less than the current value of their liabilities so the banks are insolvent. In contrast, if historic cost accounting is used, banks are allowed to continue and can meet all their future liabilities. Mark-to-market accounting can thus lead to contagion where none would occur with historic cost accounting. Klassifizierung: G21, G22, M41
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juni 2006]
(2006)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
The phase structure of the scalar field theory with arbitrary powers of the gradient operator and a local non-analytic potential is investigated by the help of the RG in Euclidean space. The RG equation for the generating function of the derivative part of the action is derived. Infinitely many non-trivial fixed points of the RG transformations are found. The corresponding effective actions are unbounded from below and do probably not exhibit any particle content. Therefore they do not provide physically sensible theories.
In this paper, we show the pivotal role business owners play in estimating the importance of the precautionary saving motive. The fact that business owners hold higher-than-average wealth while facing higher income risk than other households leads to a correlation between wealth and labor income risk regardless of whether or not a precautionary motive is important. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the 1980s and the 1990s, we show that within separate samples of both business owners and non-business owners the size of precautionary savings with respect to labor income risk is modest and accounts for less than ten percent of total household wealth. However, pooling together these two groups leads to an artificially high estimate of the importance of precautionary savings. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances further confirms that precautionary savings account for less than ten percent of total wealth for both business owners and non-business owners. Thus, while a precautionary saving motive exists and affects all households, it does not give rise to high amounts of wealth in the economy, particularly among those households who face the most volatile labor earnings. Klassifizierung: D91
We evaluate the importance of the precautionary saving motive by relying on a direct question about precautionary wealth from the 1995 and 1998 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. In this survey, a new question has been designed to elicit the amount of desired precautionary wealth. This allows us to assess the amount of precautionary accumulation and to overcome many of the problems of previous works on this topic. We find that a precautionary saving motive exists and affects virtually every type of household. However, precautionary savings account for only 8 percent of total wealth holdings. Even though this motive does not give rise to large amounts of wealth, particularly for young and middle-age households, it is particularly important for two groups: older households and business owners. Overall, we provide strong evidence that we need to take the precautionary saving motive into account when modeling saving behavior. Klassifizierung: D91, E21, C21
Several recent studies have addressed household participation in the stock market, but relatively few have focused on household stock trading behavior. Household trading is important for the stock market, as households own more than 40% of the NYSE capitalization directly and can also influence trading patterns of institutional investors by adjusting their indirect stock holdings. Existing studies based on administrative data offer conflicting results. Discount brokerage data show excessive trading to the detriment of stockholders, while data on retirement accounts indicate extreme inactivity. This paper uses data representative of the population to document the extent of household portfolio inertia and to link it to household characteristics and to stock market movements. We document considerable portfolio inertia, as regards both changing stockholding participation status and trading stocks, and find that specific household characteristics contribute to the tendency to exhibit such inertia. Although our findings suggest some dependence of trading directly-held equity through brokerage accounts on the performance of the stock market index, they do not indicate that the recent expansion in the stockholder base and the experience of the stock market downswing have significantly altered the overall propensity of households to trade in stocks or to switch participation status in a way that could contribute to stock market instability. JEL Classification: G110, E210
This paper compares the boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 with the average boom-bust pattern in industrialized countries as calculated from an international sample for the period 1970-2002. Two clear conclusions emerge. First, the Finnish-Swedish experience is much more volatile than the average boom-bust pattern. This holds for virtually every time series examined. Second, the bust and the recovery in the two Nordic countries differ markedly more from the international pattern than the boom phase does. The bust is considerably deeper and the recovery comes earlier and is more rapid. We explain the highly volatile character of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust episode by the design of economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 was driven by financial liberalization and a hard currency policy, causing large pro-cyclical swings in the real rate of interest transmitted via the financial sector into the real sector and then into the public finances. JEL Classification: E32, E62, E63
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34
Rentenreform in Russland : heutiger Stand und Entwicklungsperspektiven im internationalen Vergleich
(2006)
Das Rentensystem ist ein wichtiges Element jeder modernen Volkswirtschaft. Heutzutage werden Rentenreformen sowohl in den Industriestaaten als auch in den Transformationsländern diskutiert und praktisch umgesetzt. Jedoch sind die Ursachen bzw. Ziele der Rentenreformen in einzelnen Regionen zu unterscheiden. Während der demographische Wandel in den Industriestaaten zur Notwendigkeit der Erhöhung der Einnahmen bzw. Kürzung der Ausgaben der Rentensysteme geführt hat, kämpfen die Transformationsländer mit den Folgen des sozialistischen Systems der Alterssicherung und den Problemen des Transformationsprozesses. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert diese Arbeit die Notwendigkeit sowie die ersten Schritte der Umsetzung der Rentenreform in Russland, setzt diese in Relation zu den Reformschritten in Lateinamerika und Osteuropa und analysiert die Perspektiven zukünftiger Reformen in Russland.
One of the most acute problems in the world today is provision of a respectable living for the elderly. Today the process of aging population (as a result of a declined birth rate and increased life expectancy) has touched all countries of the world - developed countries as well as countries like Russia. Consequently, reforming traditional pension systems to deal with the changing situation has become an important issue around the world. These reforms typically center on the implementation of some form of funding of future pension benefits. This also holds for Russia, where in 1995 pension reform legislation introduced the so-called “accumulation pension”. In this context, this article will deal with the issues concerning the establishment of mutual funds, legal aspects of their operating and their investing opportunities. There will be carried out a comparative analysis of mutual funds with the other forms of public investments, namely: Common Funds of Bank Management, Voucher Investment Funds and Joint-stock Investment Funds.
Open-end real estate funds are of particular importance in the German bankdominated financial system. However, recently the German open-end fund industry came under severe distress which triggered a broad discussion of required regulatory interventions. This paper gives a detailed description of the institutional structure of these funds and of the events that led to the crisis. Furthermore, it applies recent banking theory to open-end real estate funds in order to understand why the open-end fund structure was so prevalent in Germany. Based on these theoretical insights we evaluate the various policy recommendation that have been raised.
In this paper, I tackle the question whether one share - one vote should become a European law rule. I examine, first of all, the economic theory concerning one share - one vote and its optimality, and the law and economics literature on dual class recapitalizations and other deviations from one share - one vote. I also consider the agency costs of deviations from one share - one vote and examine whether they justify regulation. I subsequently analyze the rules implementing the one share - one vote standard in the US and Europe. In particular, I analyze the self-regulatory rules of US exchanges, the relevant provisions of the European Takeover Directive (including the well known break-through rule), and the European Court of Justice's position as to golden shares (which also are deviations from the one share - one vote standard). I conclude that one share - one vote is not justified by economic efficiency, as also confirmed by comparative law. Also the European breakthrough rule, which ultimately strikes down all deviations from one share - one vote, does not appear to be well grounded. Only transparency rules appear to be justified at EU level as disclosure of ownership and voting structures serves a pricing and governance function, while harmonisation of the relevant rules reduces transaction costs in integrated markets.