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Dieser Beitrag stellt das transnationale Rohstoffrecht und seine Entwicklung aus einer Konfliktperspektive dar und setzt es in Beziehung zu geopolitischen Transformationen und Wandlungen des Entwicklungsbegriffs. Sachlicher Gegenstand dieses Unterfangens sind erschöpfliche Vorkommen von Rohstoffen in Entwicklungsländern, ihre Ausbeutung und der Handel mit den gewonnenen Rohstoffen. Der Fokus liegt auf Mineralien, Öl und Gas. Der Text ist ein Versuch, Verantwortlichkeiten verschiedener Akteure für anhaltende Armut trotz Rohstoffreichtums greifbarer zu machen.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q3
(2013)
Research: Joachim Weber, Benjamin Loos, Steffen Meyer, Andreas Hackethal "Individual Investors' Trading Motives and Security Selling Behavior"
Ignazio Angeloni, Ester Faia "Monetary Policy and Prudential Regulations with Bank Runs"
Helmut Siekmann "Legal Limits to Quantitative Easing"
Policy Margit Vanberg "SAFE Summer Academy 2013 on 'International Financial Stability'"
Guest Commentary Peter Praet "Cooperation between the ECB and Academia"
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the ECB has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross-country dataset which includes a rich set of socio-economic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust-building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long-run.
We examine whether the robustifying nature of Taylor rule cross-checking under model uncertainty carries over to the case of parameter uncertainty. Adjusting monetary policy based on this kind of cross-checking can improve the outcome for the monetary authority. This, however, crucially depends on the relative welfare weight that is attached to the output gap and also the degree of monetary policy commitment. We find that Taylor rule cross-checking is on average able to improve losses when the monetary authority only moderately cares about output stabilization and when policy is set in a discretionary way.
The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) and its amendment of 2012 highlight some fundamentals of collective redress in civil law countries at the example of model case procedures in the field of investor protection. That is why a survey of the ongoing activities of the European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the member state level forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 2012 amendment of the KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific regulation with an emphasis on the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a “coherent approach” strengthening the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory policy and collective redress are two sides of the same coin today. With respect to the KapMuG such a development brings about some tension between its aim to aggregate small individual claims as efficiently as possible and the dominant role of individual procedural rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be illustrated by some specific rules of the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier procedure of a model case procedure, the newly introduced notification of claims and the new opt-out settlement under the amended §§ 17-19.
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions.
Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt auf, dass die zunehmende Komplexität der Aufgaben von Zentralbanken zu einer strukturellen Überforderung führen kann. Aufgrund der funktionellen Komplexität einer makroprudenziellen Prozesspolitik auf der Ziel- und Instrumentenebene sollte eher nach einer Reduktion als nach einer Ausweitung des makroprudenziellen Werkzeugkastens Ausschau gehalten werden. Weiterhin steht die sich derzeit teilweise noch vergrößernde institutionelle Komplexität der makroprudenziellen Politik ihrer funktionellen Komplexität um nichts nach. Bei entsprechenden Vorkehrungen können die bereits eingetretenen und die potenziellen Überforderungen jedoch zumindest teilweise in verkraftbare Herausforderungen überführt werden. Der Aufsatz schließt mit Empfehlungen für entsprechende Maßnahmen.
The German corporate governance code includes a recommendation as to diversity on corporate boards. Two draft bills on gender quotas are currently under way in legislative proceedings. However, the ruling coalition rejects those, advocating a “flexible quota”. The present study provides an overview on legislative proposals currently presented and on academic scholarship on the issue. Legal obstacles to the introduction of a “fix” quota under German law are discussed and the “soft” version of “flexible” quotas is advocated.
Until about 25 years ago, almost all European countries had a so-called “three pillar” banking system comprising private banks, (public) savings banks and (mutual) cooperative banks. Since that time, several European countries have implemented far-reaching changes in their banking systems, which have more than anything else affected the two “pillars” of the savings and cooperative banks. The article describes the most important changes in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain and characterizes the former and the current roles of savings banks and cooperative banks in these countries. A particular focus is placed on the German case, which is almost unique in so far as the German savings banks and cooperative banks have maintained most of their traditional features. The article concludes with a plea for diversity of institutional forms of banks and argues that it is important to safeguard the strengths of those types of banks that do not conform to the model of a large shareholder-oriented commercial bank.
Notenbanken haben heute nicht die Aufgabe die Geldmenge zu kontrollieren. Ihr Job ist es, den Wert des Geldes – und damit den Preis der Wirtschaftsgüter in der jeweiligen Währung – zu stabilisieren. Doch wie ist diese Preisstabilität am besten herzustellen? Muß man dabei nicht doch die Geldmenge im Auge behalten? Unter monetären Ökonomen gibt es dazu eine wissenschaftliche Debatte.
The latest appointment to the ECB's Executive Board initiated a political dispute between the European Parliament and the Euro Group on the question of representation of females on the Executive Board and the Governing Council of the ECB. The dispute has raised awareness to the fact that a culture of equality and equal opportunity should be built from the ground up. A long term plan helping talented women to emerge and be prepared to take increasing responsibilities is necessary to make sure that there is a growing pool of qualified female candidates.
This present comment suggests an amendment to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The current proposal focuses on bail-in, but does not sufficiently take into account the pressure exerted on central bankers, supervisors and politicians by the fear of interbank contagion. The only way out of this hold-up type of situation can be found in bail-in bonds. Bail-in bonds are dedicated loss taking debt instruments, whose status of being first in line if it comes to default is clearly communicated from day one.
There is a prevalent view outside Greece that promotion of competitiveness is tantamount with price reductions for Greek goods and services. Massive horizontal salary cuts appear, at first, to promote competitiveness by reducing unit labor costs and to reduce fiscal deficits by reducing the wage bill of the public sector. Upon closer look, however, horizontal salary cuts have been much greater than needed for Greek competitiveness, providing an alibi vis a vis the Troika for reforms that are still to be implemented, but at the same time undermining both competitiveness and the potential to reduce public debt through sustainable development.
In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten wurden hohe Garantieverzinsungen in den Lebensversicherungsverträgen vereinbart. Dauert die herrschende Niedrigzinsphase noch einige Jahre an, wird es für einige Lebensversicherungsunternehmen schwierig werden, die gegebenen Langzeitgarantien über ihre Kapitalanlage zu erwirtschaften. Der Gesetzgeber sollte festlegen, dass Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die eine Höhe übersteigen, die zur Gewährleistung eines intergenerativen Risikoausgleichs notwendig ist. Weiterhin sollten Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die aus Kapitalanlagen entstehen, die nicht festverzinsliche Wertpapiere umfassen.
Am 6. Februar 2013 hat die Bundesregierung den "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Abschirmung von Risiken und zur Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen” veröffentlicht. Artikel 2 des Gesetzesentwurfs sieht vor bei systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen das Einlagen- und Kreditgeschäft vom Handelsgeschäft abzutrennen. Die Zielsetzung des Gesetzentwurfs, Kapitalkosten wieder in direkte Abhängigkeit des Risikos von Geschäftsfeldern zu setzen und eine Abwicklung zu erleichtern, die ohne den Einsatz von Steuermitteln gelingen kann, ist begrüßenswert. In seiner derzeitigen Ausgestaltung läuft der Gesetzesentwurf jedoch Gefahr, zwar symbolträchtig zu sein, aber in der Zielerreichung hinsichtlich Stabilität des Finanzmarktes und Schutz von Einlegern und Steuerzahlern hinter den Erwartungen zurückzubleiben.
Die Stellungnahme bezieht sich auf die aktuellen Formulierungsvorschläge für Änderungen am DCGK für börsennotierte deutsche Aktiengesellschaften aus den Plenarsitzungen der Regierungskommission vom 9. Januar und 31. Januar 2013. Der Text enthält zudem Anmerkungen zur Aufsichtsratvergütung, zur Besetzung des Prüfungsausschusses mit Financial Experts, zu Fragen der Mitbestimmung und zu Möglichkeiten der Bündelung der Corporate Governance Berichterstattung.
Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im Europäischen Bankensektor: Managementvergütung im Bankensektor
(2013)
In der ersten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Krahnen und Dr. Thomas Mayer den im Liikanen-Bericht enthaltenen Vorschlag zur Managervergütung im Bankensektor. Der Vorschlag baut auf einem der Kernvorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission auf, nach dem Finanzinstitute gehalten sein sollen, einen Teil ihres Fremdkapitals so zu strukturieren, dass, bei Schieflage des Finanzinstituts, eine Inhaftungnahme der Gläubiger dieses Fremdkapitals möglich wird. Um dies zu erreichen, empfiehlt die Liikanen-Kommission für alle Banken, dass diese einen festgelegten Prozentsatz ihres Kapitals als „Bail-in Anleihen“ begeben müssen. Der Vorschlag zur Managervergütung sieht vor Bail-in Anleihen für die leistungsorientierte und anreizorientierte Entlohnung von Managern einzusetzen, um Anreize zu geben, die Risikopolitik des Unternehmens so zu verankern, dass auch längerfristig keine exorbitanten Risiken auftreten.
What happened in Cyprus
(2013)
This policy letter sheds light on the economic and political backround in Cyprus and provides an analyses of the factors which lead to an intensification of the crisis there. It discusses the severe consequences of the errors made in the recent establishment of an adjustment program for Cyprus by the Europroup for European economic management as a whole.
Mittels des Gesetzes zur zusätzlichen Aufsicht über beaufsichtigte Unternehmen eines Finanzkonglomerats (Konglomerate, die aus mehreren Unternehmen aus verschiedenen Finanzmarktsektoren bestehen, beispielsweise aus dem Bankensektor und dem Versicherungssektor) sollen Regelungslücken geschlossen werden, die insbesondere die Gefahr betreffen, die sich aus der „Ansteckung“ einzelner Finanzkonglomerats-Unternehmen ergeben. Die vorliegende Stellungnahme weist auf eine Inkonsistenz in der beabsichtigten Ansiedlung der Aufsichtskompetenz hin und bietet einen Vorschlag zur Präzisierung der Eigenmittelvorschriften.
Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen
Bankensektor : Zukunft der Universalbanken
(2013)
In der zweiten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen und Dr. Michael Kemmer die Zukunft der Universalbanken. Anlass war der Vorschlag der Liikanen-Kommission, dass Finanzinstitute einen Teil ihres Investmentbankings, den Eigenhandel und das Market-Making, ab einer bestimmten Größenordnung ausgliedern sollen.
Mindfully Resisting the Bandwagon – IT Implementation and Its Consequences in the Financial Crisis
(2013)
Although the ”financial meltdown” between 2007 and 2009 can be substantially attributed to herding behaviour in the subprime market for credit default swaps, a “mindless” IT implementation of participating financial services providers played a major role in the facilitation of the underlying bandwagon. The problem was a discrepancy between two core complementary capabilities: (1.) the (economic-rationalistic) ability to execute financial transactions (to comply with the herd) in milliseconds and (2.) the required contextualized mindfulness capabilities to comprehend the implications of the transactions being executed and the associated IT innovation decisions that enabled these transactions.
Pursuant to art. 45 of the Solvency II Framework Directive, all insurance undertakings will be obliged to conduct an “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” (ORSA). ORSA’s relevance is not limited only to the second pillar of Solvency II, where mainly qualitative requirements are to be found. ORSA rather exhibits strong interlinks with the first pillar and its quantitative requirements and may also serve as a trigger for transparency duties which form Solvency II’s third pillar. ORSA may thus be described in some respects as the glue that binds together all three pillars of Solvency II. ORSA is one of the most obvious examples of the supervisory shift from a rules-based to a principles-based approach. As such, ORSA has hitherto been only very roughly defined. Since it is for the undertaking to determine its own specific risk profile and to evaluate whether this risk profile deviates significantly from the assumptions underlying the standard formula, it seems only natural that the supervisor must specify in greater detail what these underlying assumptions are. The most practicable way to do so would be for EIOPA to establish a “standard insurer”, which implies a translation of the assumptions concerning the underlying probability distributions into directly observable characteristics. The creation of the standard insurer would be an important step towards relaxing the insurers’ fear of what ORSA might bring about.
In der dritten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Krahnen und Dr. Theodor Weimer die Auswirkungen von Regulierung auf Bankverhalten und Wettbewerb, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Vorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission. Weimer verwies auf die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten einer zu strengen Bankenregulierung, u.a. negative Auswirkungen auf die Kreditvergabe. Weimer warnte auch davor, dass man in Europa, und gerade in Deutschland, strenger reguliere als in anderen Ländern. Krahnen erklärte, man habe durch die Liikanen-Vorschläge vor allem das Problem des systemischen Risikos im Bankensektor adressieren wollen. Außerdem sei es ein Ziel der Kommission gewesen, Banken so zu regulieren, dass der Steuerzahler im Krisenfall nicht länger für die Risiken der Banken haften müsse. Es sei notwendig, den Bankensektor zu reformieren, damit Banken abgewickelt werden könnten, auch wenn diese untereinander vernetzt sind.
In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.
In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.
The analyses of intersectoral linkages of Leontief (1941) and Hirschman (1958) provide a natural way to study the transmission of risk among interconnected banks and to measure their systemic importance. In this paper we show how classic input-output analysis can be applied to banking and how to derive six indicators that capture different aspects of systemic importance, using a simple numerical example for illustration. We also discuss the relationship with other approaches, most notably network centrality measures, both formally and by means of a simulated network.
This paper compares two classes of models that allow for additional channels of correlation between asset returns: regime switching models with jumps and models with contagious jumps. Both classes of models involve a hidden Markov chain that captures good and bad economic states. The distinctive feature of a model with contagious jumps is that large negative returns and unobservable transitions of the economy into a bad state can occur simultaneously. We show that in this framework the filtered loss intensities have dynamics similar to self-exciting processes. Besides, we study the impact of unobservable contagious jumps on optimal portfolio strategies and filtering.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state.
By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with managerial incentives to report high equity earnings. Managers rely most heavily on debt to finance their asset growth when their future earnings prospects are poor, when they are under pressure due to past declines in earnings, negative past stock returns, and excessively optimistic analyst earnings forecasts, and when the earnings yield is high relative to bond yields so that from an accounting perspective equity is ‘expensive’. Managers of high debt issuing firms are more likely to be newly appointed and also more likely to be replaced in subsequent years. Abnormal returns on portfolios formed on the basis of asset growth and debt issuance are strongly positively associated with the contemporaneous changes in returns on assets and on equity as well as with earnings surprises. This may account for the finding that debt issuance forecasts negative abnormal returns, since debt issuance also forecasts negative changes in returns on assets and on equity and negative earnings surprises. Different mechanisms appear to be at work for firms that retire debt.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach on how to estimate systemic risk and identify its key determinants. For all US financial companies with publicly traded equity options, we extract their option-implied value-at-risks (VaRs) and measure the spillover effects between individual company VaRs and the option-implied VaR of an US financial index. First, we study the spillover effect of increasing company risks on the financial sector. Second, we analyze which companies are most affected if the tail risk of the financial sector increases. We find that key accounting and market valuation metrics such as size, leverage, balance sheet composition, market-to-book ratio and earnings have a significant influence on the systemic risk profile of a financial institution. In contrast to earlier studies, the employed panel vector autoregression (PVAR) estimator allows for a causal interpretation of the results.
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
Credit boom detection methodologies (such as threshold method) lack robustness as they are based on univariate detrending analysis and resort to ratios of credit to real activity. I propose a quantitative indicator to detect atypical behavior of credit from a multivariate system - a monetary VAR. This methodology explicitly accounts for endogenous interactions between credit, asset prices and real activity and detects atypical credit expansions and contractions in the Euro Area, Japan and the U.S. robustly and timely. The analysis also proves useful in real time.
This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate governance changes on operational performance. Our analysis shows significant positive abnormal growth in several performance ratios for the private period of our sample companies relative to comparable public companies. These performance differences come from the increase in ownership concentration after the leveraged buyout transaction.
We are able to shed light on the black box of restructuring tools private equity investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies. By building on previous work considering performance evaluation of PE backed companies, we analyze whether private equity improves operating efficiency and which of the typical restructuring tools are the main performance drivers. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions of the last thirty years, we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency, these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors’ experience has a positive influence while financial leverage has no influence on operational performance.
The paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to years with higher growth. Overall, our analysis of a panel of European countries provides support for this expectation. The difference in fiscal policies depending on government trust levels may help explaining why better governed countries have been found to have less severe business cycles. It suggests that trust and credibility play an important role not only in monetary policy, but also in fiscal policy.
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy.
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). Within a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions. Using daily data, we can trace out the spillover effects over time in a set of impulse response functions and find that they reach their peak after 10 to 15 days.
The paper uses fiscal reaction functions for a panel of euro-area countries to investigate whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to shocks in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to changes in the specification, such as an exclusion of Greece from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large extent from preexisting debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal prudence in a common currency, while an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions for most countries does not apply.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on results from the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model and fine that relative wealth equivalent losses are below 1.16% if the jump size is stochastic and below 1% if the jump size is constant and γ ≥ 5. We perform robustness checks for various levels of risk-aversion, expected jump size, and jump intensity.
We show that the optimal consumption of an individual over the life cycle can have the hump shape (inverted U-shape) observed empirically if the preferences of the individual exhibit internal habit formation. In the absence of habit formation, an impatient individual would prefer a decreasing consumption path over life. However, because of habit formation, a high initial consumption would lead to high required consumption in the future. To cover the future required consumption, wealth is set aside, but the necessary amount decreases with age which allows consumption to increase in the early part of life. At some age, the impatience outweighs the habit concerns so that consumption starts to decrease. We derive the optimal consumption strategy in closed form, deduce sufficient conditions for the presence of a consumption hump, and characterize the age at which the hump occurs. Numerical examples illustrate our findings. We show that our model calibrates well to U.S. consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q2
(2013)
The efficacy of monetary authority actions depends primarily on the ability of the monetary authority to affect inflation expectations, which ultimately depend on agents' trust. We propose a model embedding trust cycles, as emerging from sequential coordination games between atomistic agents and the policy maker, in a monetary model. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factor, namely the price of future risk, and their expectation formation process: these effects in turn interact with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer survey we analyze the link between trust on the one side and the transmission mechanism of shocks and of the policy rate on the other: data show that the two interact significantly and in a way comparable to the obtained in our model.
This paper investigates risk-taking in the liquid portfolios held by a large panel of Swedish twins. We document that the portfolio share invested in risky assets is an increasing and concave function of financial wealth, leading to different risk sensitivities across investors. Human capital, which we estimate directly from individual labor income, also drives risk-taking positively, while internal habit and expenditure commitments tend to reduce it. Our micro findings lend strong support to decreasing relative risk aversion and habit formation preferences. Furthermore, heterogeneous risk sensitivities across investors help reconcile individual preferences with representative-agent models.
We develop a dynamic network model whose links are governed by banks' optmizing decisions and by an endogenous tâtonnement market adjustment. Banks in our model can default and engage in firesales: risk is transmitted through direct and cascading counterparty defaults as well as through indirect pecuniary externalities triggered by firesales. We use the model to assess the evolution of the network configuration under various prudential policy regimes, to measure banks' contribution to systemic risk (through Shapley values) in response to shocks and to analyze the effects of systemic risk charges. We complement the analysis by introducing the possibility of central bank liquidity provision.
This paper analyzes the equilibrium pricing implications of contagion risk in a Lucas-tree economy with recursive preferences and jumps. We introduce a new economic channel allowing for the possibility that endowment shocks simultaneously trigger a regime shift to a bad economic state. We document that these contagious jumps have far-reaching asset pricing implications. The risk premium for such shocks is superadditive, i.e. it is 2.5\% larger than the sum of the risk premia for pure endowment shocks and regime switches. Moreover, contagion risk reduces the risk-free rate by around 0.5\%. We also derive semiclosed-form solutions for the wealth-consumption ratio and the price-dividend ratios in an economy with two Lucas trees and analyze cross-sectional effects of contagion risk qualitatively. We find that heterogeneity among the assets with respect to contagion risk can increase risk premia disproportionately. In particular, big assets with a large exposure to contagious shocks carry significantly higher risk premia.
This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.
Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: pay structures as a regulatory signal : [March 6, 2013]
(2013)
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel - monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output.