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Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the Second Pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper highlights the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others things, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the second pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper is devoted to highlight the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Der Beitrag führt in das sozialpsychologische Phänomen des Gruppendenkens ein. Kennzeichen und Gegenstrategien werden anhand von Zeugenaussagen vor dem Wirecard-Untersuchungsausschuss am Beispiel des Aufsichtsrats illustriert. Normative Implikationen de lege ferenda schließen sich an. Sie betreffen unabhängige Mitglieder (auch auf der Arbeitnehmerbank), Direktinformationsrechte im Unternehmen (unter Einschluss von Hinweisgebern) und den Investorendialog (auch mit Leerverkäufern).
Access to loans and other financial services is extremely valuable for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises in developing and transition countries as it enables their owners as well as their employees to exploit their economic potential and to increase their income. Although this insight has lead development aid institutions to undertake many attempts to create sustainable microfinance institutions, only a small fraction of these has been successful so far. This article analyses what determines the success of attempts to provide financial services in general, and credit in particular, to low income target groups in these countries. We argue that it is crucial to understand, and to mitigate or even eliminate in practice, the serious and numerous incentive problems at the level of the lending operations as well as those at the levels of the human resource management and the governance of microfinance institutions. We attempt to show moreover, that unsolved incentive problems at only one level will ultimately undermine any potential success at the other levels. In our paper, we first analyse information and incentive problems from a theoretical perspective, using and extending the well-known Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, and derive theoretical requirements for solutions of these problems. In the light of these considerations, we then discuss how problems are solved in practice. Section 3 deals with the credit relationship. Section 4 extends the argument by showing how incentive problems within the institution can be handled, and section 5 analyses corporate governance-related problems of development finance institutions as incentive problems. In section 6 it is demonstrated why, and how, the incentive problems at the different levels, as well as their solutions, are interrelated. From this we derive the proposition that, as the institutional devices for dealing with these problems constitute a complementary system, any sustainable solution requires consistent arrangements of all elements and at all levels of the system. In the last section we will show the potential of strategic networks to set up institutions which we consider to be consistent systems for successfully solving the problems at all three levels simultaneously.
Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa : ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität
(2001)
Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des Pensionssystems eines Landes? Weil dieser Zusammenhang wichtig sein könnte, wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht, ob es Unterschiede zwischen den Finanz- und Pensionssystemen in drei großen europäischen Ländern, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, gibt, ob sich diese Unterschiede in charakteristischer Weise entsprechen und ob sich über diese Entsprechungen hinaus auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Finanzsystem und dem Pensionssystem eines Landes nachweisen lassen.
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in einem ersten Schritt kurz die Unterschiedlichkeit der Finanz- und Pensionssysteme zwischen den drei Ländern skizziert, und es werden parallelen zwischen diesen Unterschieden nachgewiesen. Daran anschließend werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Alterssicherung und der volkswirtschaftlichen Risikoallokation sowie der Ausgestaltung der betrieblichen Alterssicherung für die Unternehmensstrategien, -finanzierung und –verfassung betrachtet. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass es sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Großbritannien eine – wenn auch vollkommen unterschiedlich ausgeprägte – Komplementarität zwischen Finanz- und Pensionssystem gibt, während sich ein solcher Zusammenhang für Frankreich nicht konstatieren lässt. Abschließend werden wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen dieses Zusammenhangs angesprochen
This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements over time. While cash flow statement are mandated under many GAAP regimes, its disclosure has not been mandatory in Germany until recently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of firms provides cash flow statements voluntarily. These firms are likely to be influenced by recommendations of the German accounting profession, IAS 7 as well as the respective standards of other countries. The idea of the paper is to study this influence by looking at the adoption pattern over time and the format of the cash flow statement. It documents the development of voluntary cash flow statement disclosures by German firms with respect to ”milestones” in the evolution of German professional recommendations and respective international standards. The cross-sectional determinants of voluntary and international cash flow statements are analyzed using probit regressions and factor analysis. The results are generally consistent with the idea that capital-market forces drive voluntary cash flow statements that are in line with international reporting practice.
Since August 2009, German legislation allows for voluntary Say on Pay Votes (SoPV) during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). We examine 1,169 AGMs of all German listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010-2013 to identify (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary SoPVs, (2) the effect of voluntary SoPVs on AGM participation, and (3) the effect of SoP on executive compensation. Our data reveals that in the first four years of the voluntary say on pay regime every second firm in our sample has opted for having a SoPV. The propensity for a SoPV increases with firm size, abnormal executive compensation and free float of shares. Indeed, smaller firms with concentrated ownership do not only have a lower propensity for a SoPV, but also show a higher propensity to opt for only limited disclosure of executive compensation. Approval rates of SoPVs are lower than the approval rate for the average AGM agenda item and this effect is stronger in (i) widely held firms as well as in (ii) firms with abnormal executive compensation. Additionally, SoPVs actually can increase AGM participation; however, this result is particularly evident for widely held firms. Finally, we find stronger pay for performance elements within total executive compensation, particularly when the effect of executive compensation is lagged over the years following the vote. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoPV to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration. This is enforced, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders consider SoPVs as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions, with these decisions leading to a higher degree of alignment between executive management boards and shareholders.
This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation.
It finds that the European Commission’s proposal to submit (significant) related party transactions to enhanced transparency, outside fairness review, and ex ante shareholder approval is both flawed in its design and based on contestable assumptions on informed voting of institutional investors. In particular, the contemplated exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries allows controlling shareholders to circumvent the rule extensively. Moreover, vesting voting rights with (institutional) investors will not lead to the informed assessment that is hoped for, because these investors will rationally abstain from active monitoring and rely on proxy advisory firms instead whose competency to analyze non-routine significant related party transactions is questionable.
The paper further delineates that the proposed recognition of an overriding interest of the group requires strong counterbalances to adequately protect minority shareholders and creditors. Hence, if the Commission choses to go down this route it might end up with a comprehensive regulation that is akin to the unpopular Ninth Company Law Directive in spirit, though not in content. The latter prediction is corroborated by the pertinent parts of the proposal for a European Model Company Act.
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit einem wichtigen Aspekt der Offenlegung der Bezüge von Entscheidungsträgern im Bankensektor. Komplementär zu der Diskussion um die Veröffentlichung der Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern börsennotierter Unternehmen ist auch auf Landeseben versucht worden, die Transparenz der Vergütung von Führungskräften kommunaler oder landeseigener Unternehmen zu erhöhen. Namentlich sind die Träger der Sparkassen durch den neuen § 19 Abs. 6 des Sparkassengesetzes von Nordrhein-Westfalen verpflichtet worden, darauf „hinzuwirken“, dass die „gewährten Bezüge jedes einzelnen Mitglieds des Vorstands, des Verwaltungsrates und ähnlicher Gremien unter Namensnennung“ veröffentlich werden. Diese Vorschrift ist jedoch weitgehend wirkungslos geblieben; nicht zuletzt weil das OLG Köln in einer einstweiligen Verfügung die Vorschrift mangels Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Landes als nichtig behandelt hat. In dieser Situation ist am 8. August 2013 der Vorschlag eines Gesetzes „zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet“ durch die Fraktion der Piraten im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen eingebracht worden. Der Entwurf ist Gegenstand der Stellungnahme, die Helmut Siekmann für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen erstellt hat. Sie stellt maßgebend darauf ab, dass die Sparkassen als Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts einen öffentlichen Auftrag zu erfüllen haben und den Grundsätzen des Verwaltungsorganisationsrechts unterliegen. Als Teil der (leistenden) Verwaltung müssen sie Transparenz- und Kontrollansprüchen der Bürger und ihren Repräsentanten in den Parlamenten genügen.
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave more money on the table to take the marginal firms public.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
During the last years the relationship between financial development and economic growth has received widespread attention in the literature on growth and development. This paper summarises in its first part the results of this research, stressing the growth-enhancing effects of an increased interpersonal re-allocation of resources promoted by financial development. The second part of the paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial development based on Diamond's theory of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. The analysis shows that the quality of corporate governance of banks is the key factor in financial system development. Accordingly, financial sector reforms in developing countries will only succeed if they strengthen the corporate governance of financial institutions. In this area, financial institution building has an important contribution to make. Paper presented at the First Annual Seminar on New Development Finance held at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, September 22 - October 3, 1997
Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale Aspekte der Theorie und Empirie der Managementkontrolle bei asymmetrischer Information. Ziel ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der unlängst vorgetragenen These zu den Mythen der Unternehmenskontrolle (Martin Hellwig 1997). Der aktuelle Überblick wird entwickelt vor dem Hintergrund der Gutenberg’schen Position eines eigenständigen Unternehmensinteresses, losgelöst von den Interessen der shareholder oder anderer stakeholder. Diese Position von Gutenberg verbindet sich im dritten Band der „Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen“ von 1969 mit der Forderung nach Einhaltung eines sog. finanziellen Gleichgewichts. Erst in jüngster Zeit werden auch kapitalmarkttheoretisch fundierte Modelle entwickelt, die auch Raum bieten für eine Autonomie des Managements gegenüber dessen stakeholders.
Our study provides evidence on the share price reactions to the announcement of equity issues in Germany, where capital market is characterized by institutional features distinct from the U.S. market. German seasoned equity issues yield a positive market reaction which contrasts to the significant negative abnormal returns reported for the U.S. We provide evidence that these results are due to differences in both issuing characteristics and floatation methods, and in the corporate governance and ownership structures of the two countries. Our study explains much of the empirical puzzle of different market reactions to seemingly similar events across financial markets.
Untersuchungsgegenstand ist der empirische Gehalt der ökonomischen Theorie eines Hedgings auf Unternehmensebene. In den USA wurde die Hedging-Theorie in einer Reihe von empirischen Studien aufgegriffen. Die Befunde sind zumeist konsistent mit dem Erklärungsansatz von Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), wonach eine Verringerung der Cashflow-Volatilität – unter der Annahme steigender Außenfinanzierungskosten – zu einer Reduzierung von Unterinvestitionskosten führt. Bei deutschen Unternehmen besitzt dieser Ansatz bemerkenswerterweise jedoch nur einen geringen Erklärungsgehalt. Die Ergebnisunterschiede können auf unterschiedliche Kapitalmarktverhältnisse zurückgeführt werden: Die unterstellten steigenden Kosten der Außenfinanzierung besitzen für deutsche Unternehmen aufgrund der Dominanz des Bezugsrechtsverfahrens sowie der Rolle der Hausbank als Mechanismus zur Überwindung von Informationsproblemen eine vergleichsweise geringere Bedeutung. Die Managerinteressen erweisen sich bei deutschen Unternehmen als eine wesentliche Hedging-Determinante. Zwischen der Höhe des gebundenen Managervermögens und der Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht entsprechend der Hedging-Theorie ein signifikanter positiver Zusammenhang. Entgegen den amerikanischen Befunden kann jedoch eine disziplinierende Wirkung von Großaktionären auf die Hedging-Entscheidung nicht beobachtet werden. Zur Berücksichtigung der spezifischen deutschen Kapitalmarktverhältnisse wird der Einfluss von Bankenbeteiligungen und Familienunternehmen auf die Hedging-Entscheidung untersucht. Ein Bankeneinfluss auf die Derivateeinsatz-Entscheidung kann jedoch nicht festgestellt werden. Entgegen Diversifikations- und Kapitalmarktüberlegungen besteht bei Familienunternehmen interessanterweise eine signifikant geringere Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
Wenn man untersuchen möchte, ob sich die Finanzsysteme verschiedener Länder im Verlauf der letzten Jahre aneinander angeglichen haben oder demnächst angleichen werden, braucht man ein Konzept zur Beschreibung von Finanzsystemen, durch das wesentliche Strukturen, deren Unterschiede und Veränderungen erkennbar werden, ohne dabei in "Systemgeschwafel" (D. Schneider) abzugleiten. Wir haben dafür das Konzept der Komplementarität als nützlich identifiziert. Der Beitrag stellt dieses Konzept vor und soll und seine Eignung belegen. Letztlich geht es dabei auch um die Frage, ob reale Finanzsysteme konsistente Systeme mit komplementären Elementen darstellen. Nach der Vorstellung der formalen Konzepte der Komplementarität und der Konsistenz wird "das Finanzsystem" auf seine Komple mentarität untersucht. Dazu wird ein Finanzsystem aus der Sicht von Unternehmen des nichtfinanziellen Sektors als ein System gekennzeichnet, das aus drei Teilsystemen besteht. Das erste Teilsystem ist das Finanzierungssystem einschließlich Finanzsektor und Mustern der Unternehmensfinanzierung, das zweite das Corporate Governance-System und das dritte das Unternehmens-Strategie-System. Für alle drei Teilsysteme wird – allgemein und mit Bezug auf die Finanzsysteme Deutschlands, Japans und der USA - gezeigt, inwieweit die Elemente der betreffenden Teilsysteme untereinander komplementär sind, und geprüft, ob sie in ihren Ausprägungen auch konsistent sind, d.h. wirklich "zueinander passen". Untersucht wird auch die Komplementarität und Konsistenz zwischen den Teilsystemen selbst. Der Beitrag endet mit Überlegungen über die Anwendung des Komplementaritätskonzepts. Dass ein Finanzsystem die Eigenschaft der Komplementarität aufweist, hat nicht nur weitreichende Implikationen für die Methodik der Analyse von Finanzsystemen, sondern auch für die Vorhersehbarkeit der Entwicklung von Finanzsystemen und damit für die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Konvergenz von Finanzsystemen, für deren Effizienzeigenschaften und für die Möglichkeiten, Finanzsysteme durch gestaltende Eingriffe zu verbessern.
Financial development and financial institution building are important prerequisites for economic growth. However, both the potential and the problems of institution building are still vastly underestimated by those who design and fund institution building projects. The paper first underlines the importance of financial development for economic growth, then describes the main elements of “serious” institution building: the lending technology, the methodological approaches, and the question of internal structure and corporate governance. Finally, it discusses three problems which institution building efforts have to cope with: inappropriate expectations on the part of donor and partner institutions regarding the problems and effects of institution building efforts, the lack of awareness of the importance of governance and ownership issues, and financial regulation that is too restrictive for microfinance operations. All three problems together explain why there are so few successful micro and small business institutions operating worldwide.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that therefore financial patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by Mayer et al. are due to a hidden assumption underlying their methodology. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way.
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
Mängel bei der Abschlußprüfung : Tatsachenberichte und Analysen aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht
(2001)
Unternehmenskrisen, „überraschende“ zumal, standen am Anfang der gesetzlichen Normierung der Abschlußprüfung in Deutschland. Es entspricht daher einem legitimen Anliegen von Öffentlichkeit und Fachwelt, die herrschende Maßstäblichkeit der Qualität von Abschlußprüfungen und die Glaubwürdigkeit4 von Abschlußprüfern insbesondere dann in gesteigertem Maße als Problem zu begreifen, wenn den gesetzlichen Schutzzwecken und Schutznormen der etablierten Abschlußprüfung zum Trotz Unternehmen in eine Krise geraten: Denn innerhalb der institutionellen Mechanismen ihrer Früherkennung – eines funktionalen Teils des deutschen Systems von corporate governance – gilt die Pflichtprüfung mit Recht als pivotales Element. Vieles an festzustellender Kritik mag hierbei einem der Komplexität der zu verhandelnden Sachzusammenhänge unüberbrückbaren Laienverständnis geschuldet sein; manches aber ist sicherlich erklärlich durch verbesserbare gesetzliche Vorschriften, zu lösende theoretische (ökonomische und rechtswissenschaftliche) Problemstellungen und eine zu fördernde gute Berufspraxis. Jüngste fragliche Mängel der Abschlußprüfung geben den Anlaß zu vorliegenden Tatsachenberichten und betriebswirtschaftlichen Analysen. Die getroffene Auswahl der Unternehmen ist hierbei ebenso willkürlich wie die der betroffenen Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften – nicht zufällig ist indes die Auswahl der betriebswirtschaftlichen Grundprobleme: Betreffen diese doch wesentliche Erwartungen an die Abschlußprüfung, die offenbar so regelmäßig enttäuscht wurden, daß selbst in Regierungsbegründungen von Gesetzesvorlagen nunmehr eine „sog. Erwartungslücke“5 bemüht wird. Die Erwartungslücken ergeben sich hierbei insbesondere aus der Vorstellung, daß (a) der gesetzliche Pflichtprüfer bei einer ordnungsmäßigen Prüfung zwingend doloses Handeln aufzudecken habe, daß (b) bilanzielle Wertansätze hinreichend zuverlässige Größen bilden, die über die Vermögenslage des Unternehmens berichten und schließlich (c) die Prüfung der tatsächlichen wirtschaftlichen Lage des Unternehmens und die Unterrichtung hiervon in Prüfungsbericht und Bestätigungsvermerk eine Selbstverständlichkeit der Pflichtprüfung sei. Diesen Erwartungen folgt der Gang der Untersuchung.
Seit der Einführung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Kodex) im Jahr 2002 sind deutsche börsennotierte Unternehmen zur Abgabe der Entsprechenserklärung gemäß § 161 AktG verpflichtet (Comply-or-Explain-Prinzip). Auf der Basis dieser Information soll durch den Druck des Kapitalmarkts die Einhaltung des Kodex überwacht und gegebenenfalls sanktioniert werden. Dabei wird regelmäßig postuliert, dass bei überdurchschnittlicher Befolgung bzw. Nichtbefolgung der Kodex-Empfehlungen eine Belohnung durch Kurszuschläge bzw. eine Sanktionierung durch Kursabschläge erfolgt. Die Ergebnisse einer Ereignisstudie zeigen, dass die Abgabe der Entsprechenserklärung keine erhebliche Kursbeeinflussung auslöst und die für das Enforcement des Kodex angenommene (und erforderliche) Selbstregulierung durch den Kapitalmarkt nicht stattfindet. Es wird daher kritisch hinterfragt, ob der für den Kodex gewählte und grundsätzlich zu begrüßende flexible Regulierungsansatz im System des zwingenden deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts einen geeigneten Enforcement-Mechanismus darstellt. This paper studies the short-run announcement effects of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (‘the Code’) on firm value. Event study results suggest that firm value is unaffected by the announcement, although such market reactions to the first time disclosure of the declaration of conformity were widely assumed by the private and public promoters of the Code. This result from acceptance of the German Code add evidence to the hypothesis that regulatory corporate governance initiatives that rely on mandatory disclosure without monitoring and enforcement are ineffective in civil law countries.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk. The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid convergence to the best system. In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence which supports the socio-biological argument. The dynamic properties of systems composed of complementary elements are such that a rapid convergence towards a universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen. We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, "inefficient convergence" of corporate governance systems is a possible future course of events. First version December 1998, this version March 2000.
Paper Presented at the Conference on Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives held in Paris, March 17-19, 1997 To appear in: A. Pezard/J.-M. Thiveaud: Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives, Montchrestien, Paris 1997. The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present shareholders would make it difficult for the firm to establish long-term relationships as the potential partners would have to fear that, at a later stage of the co-operation, the shareholders or a management acting only on their behalf could exploit them because of the inevitable incompleteness of long-term contracts. One way of mitigating these problems is to put in place a corporate governance system which gives some active role to the other stakeholders or constituencies, or which makes their interests a well-defined element of the objective function of the firm. A commitment not to follow a policy of strict shareholder value maximization ex post can be efficient ex ante. Such a system would clearly differ from what is advocated by proponents of a "stakeholder approach", as it would limit the rights of the other constituencies to those which would have been agreed upon in a constitutional contract concluded between them and the founder of the firm at the time when long-term contracts are first established.
Vor dem Hintergrund allgemeiner Bedingungen der Anreizkompatibilität wird für verschiedenen Kapitalmarktmodelle untersucht, ob zwischen den Anteilseignern eines Unternehmens Einmütigkeit besteht und, wenn ja, mit welchem Unternehmensziel der finanzielle Nutzen der Anteilseigner maximiert wird. Von besonderer Bedeutung für die Anreizkompatibilität der üblichen linearen Erfolgsteilung ist die Bedingung pareto-effizienter Risikoteilung. Sind für den Erfolg des Unternehmens spezifische Störterme relevant und soll der Entscheidungsträger in relativ starkem Umfang am Erfolg beteiligt werden, ist die Risikoteilung zwischen ihm und den (anderen) Anteilseignern pareto-inferior. Anreizkompatible erfolgsorientierte Belohnungs- bzw. Prämienfunktionen für den Entscheidungsträger sind dann konvex und zustandsabhängig. Aktienoptionsprogramme können als Approximationen an solche Prämienfunktionen interpretiert werden.
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).