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Brazil has one of the worst distributions of income in the world. The wealth of the richest 1% of the population is equal to that of the poorest 50%. Brazil has a greater concentration of wealth than ninety-five percent of the countries on which data is available. In the legal field, tax justice is based on the constitutional principle of the “ability to pay”, according to which taxes should be paid based on the economic capacity of the taxpayer. This principle first appeared in the Brazilian legal order in the 1946 Constitution, was excluded from the texts of 1967/69, and reappeared in § 1 of article 145 of the 1988 Constitution. The aim of this paper is to examine two possible grounds for the ability to pay principle (equal sacrifices and proportional sacrifices) to show how, in Brazil, the interpretations that seek to assign a positive content to the principle are limited to the horizons of a particular form of State associated with the theory of equal sacrifice. This theory for its turn is consistent with a theory of justice, under which no expense or charge levied by the government can alter the distribution of welfare produced by the market. As the application of the ability to pay principle is done within the limits of that horizon, as a consequence, this principle does not play an important role in the issue of reduction of inequality in Brazil.
John Gray is the thinker who has reconstructed the main tenets of ethical pluralism inherent in the work of its initiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its consequences for political philosophy. In particular he singled out three levels of conflict in ethics identifiable in Berlin’s writings: among the ultimate values belonging to the same morality or code of conduct, among whole ways or styles of life and within goods or values which are themselves internally complex and inherently pluralistic.
It is the third, internal kind of conflict that proves to be the richest in implications.Because it undermines a whole constellation of contemporary liberal doctrines informed by the Kantian-Lockean tradition that conform to the legal paradigm. From the pluralist perspective such monumental theories (e.g. those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer sustainable due to the recognition that no ultimate value is immune to the phenomenon of incommensurability. Thus, irresolvable conflicts may also break out within the given regulative value.
Confronting ethical pluralism with general reflection on law has mostly negative consequences. Nevertheless, the incommensurability thesis sheds considerable light on certain legal disputes. This claim will be illustrated by interpreting from the pluralist perspective the controversy over the verdict by the European Tribunal of Human Rights of 3 November 2010 concerning hanging crosses in classrooms.
Since de advent of what is known as new constitucionalism, jurists have faced a difficult task in order to overcome some failures of normative positivism. In this context, the judiciary has played a renewed role, which can be justified on grounds of legal theory and on institutional reasons. However, this new role has led legal philosophers to several concerns, such as the relationship between law and ethics. On one hand, Critical Legal Studies points out that the judge always acts informed by his own convictions. On the other hand, according to R. Forst (within another context, but also relevant here), this is not really a problem, because a rule can be provided with ethics, but not ethically justified. This openness of law to moral makes it difficult for the interpretative judicial discourse to be taken as claimed by K. Günther: as a discourse of application only, and not of justification. All these controversies, however, lead to a common statement: the constitutional adjudication has been exercising a different activity. Some legal systems allows such activity legitimacy in some extent, like Brazilian’s, for example, which i) states a very broad adjudication, ii) provides an extensive catalog of basic rights, and iii) contains several procedural mechanisms for their protection. This empowers the adjudication to exercise what can be called a political activity. Therefore, a series of moral issues which were once exclusive to the political arena have been brought to the judiciary, such as: gay marriage, abortion, affirmative action, religious freedom, federation, separation of powers, distribution of scarce resources. In a democracy, these moral questions ought to be mainly decided through deliberation outside the judiciary, but not always this is what happens. The paper discusses these issues, showing also how the Brazilian Supreme Court has dealt - technically, or not - with this relationship between law and justice in a complex and pluralist society.
After the absurd terrorism and violence of the totalitarianism and bureaucratic administrative and legal systems of the 20th century it does not give any meaning to rationalize harm as meaningful evil that even though it is evil may have some importance for the development of the world towards the good. Rather, evil is incomprehensible and as radical and banal evil it challenges human rationality. This is indeed the case when we are faced with instrumental and rationalized administrative and political evil. Therefore, we must analyse the banality of evil in politics and in administration in order to understand the concept of evil. Moreover, as proposed by Hannah Arendt, we need to fight this evil with political thinking and social philosophy. The only way to deal with harm and wrongdoing is to return a concept of responsibility that is closely linked to reflective thinking. In this paper, we will on the basis of a discussion of the banality of evil explore this in relation to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the administration of evil, as expressed by the personality of Adolf Eichmann. Finally, we will place this concept of administrative evil in Hannah Arendt’s general political philosophy.
Biopower, governmentality, and capitalism through the lenses of freedom: a conceptual enquiry
(2012)
In this paper I propose a framework to understand the transition in Foucault’s work from the disciplinary model to the governmentality model. Foucault’s work on power emerges within the general context of an expression of capitalist rationality and the nature of freedom and power within it. I argue that, thus understood, Foucault’s transition to the governmentality model can be seen simultaneously as a deepening recognition of what capitalism is and how it works, but also the recognition of the changing historical nature of the actually existing capitalisms and their specifically situated historical needs. I then argue that the disciplinary model should be understood as a contingent response to the demands of early capitalism, and argue that with the maturation of the capitalist enterprise many of those responses no longer are necessary. New realities require new responses; although this does not necessarily result in the abandonment of the earlier disciplinary model, it does require their reconfiguration according to the changed situation and the new imperatives following from it.
The relation between law, moral, society and science is shifting in Brazil as it is changing in democratic contemporary societies. This paper proposes to reflect about this change in the Brazilian legal and social context. Jurisprudence and legal practice have been transformed intensively after the Brazilian redemocratization that began in 1985 and Federal Constitution of 1988. In the field of Jurisprudence (Legal Theory), a new legal theory called post-positivism progressively has been overcoming legal critical studies and legal positivism. In recent years, ideas as any moral values can be improved by law (positivism) or law is one of many oppressive institutions in capitalist society (legal critical studies – Marxism) have been losing place in legal theory. Nowadays, when Brazilian Constitution implements just society and legal system, different from the authoritarian military regime (1964 – 1985), it is difficult to work with a complete relativistic idea of law (positivism) or difficult to accept that law is necessarily oppressive in capitalistic societies. Otherwise the idea of science in law at post-positivistic point of view try to overcome in a dialectic way a pure science methodology (normativistic positivism) and the complete political and economic studies of law (critical legal studies – Marxism). After that, the text will show that Brazilian legal practice have changed intensively after post positivistic methodology of law and will reflect about same dilemmas of post-positivism in Brazil in the legal theory and practice.
This paper seeks to analyse the debate on equality between women and men found in the claims against the subjects related to Education for Citizenship. These claims were resolved in the Spanish Supreme Court and High Courts of the Autonomous Communities. In this debate, there is a strong rejection of antidiscrimination law assumptions, namely that the different roles and social roles of women and men have a cultural and social base and it is unnatural, as evidenced by the concept of gender. But many appellants and judgments defend the difference between women and men as if it was informed and legitimated on human nature. Hence gender is considered an ideology, that is, a category of analysis by means of which the reality of true human nature can be concealed or distorted. But these arguments are opposed to recent legal reforms since they are questioning its normative value, by prioritizing certain moral principles against these laws. We are talking about the Organic Law for Effective Equality between Women and Men, the Law on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender Violence and the Law on Education. However their arguments are not fully justified.
O presente artigo tem como objetivo a realização de uma aproximação entre a Teoria do Reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, representante da Escola de Frankfurt, com a teoria do Bem Jurídico penal. Acredita-se que, desse modo, possa ser feito contributo para melhor elucidar as aporias do conceito de bem jurídico penal. Portanto, pretende-se explicitar que a Teoria do Reconhecimento oferece um arcabouço teórico que permite o desenvolvimento e fundamentação de um Direito Penal voltado à proteção de bens jurídicos, no contexto de um Estado Democrático do Direito, que, ao mesmo tempo, não ignora e, pelo contrário, permite a compreensão da lógica moral dos conflitos sociais.
Das Gesetz zur Änderung des Vormundschafts- und Betreuungsrechts ist am 14. April 2011 vom Deutschen Bundestag beschlossen worden; der Bundesrat hat am 25.05.2011 zugestimmt. Dieses Gesetz trat – mit einigen Ausnahmen, die erst ein Jahr nach der Verkündung des Gesetzes in Kraft treten – am 6.7.2011 in Kraft. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags soll nicht bei den durch diese Reform bereits erfolgten bzw. demnächst in Kraft tretenden Änderungen und den sich bereits abzeichnenden Schwierigkeiten seiner Umsetzung liegen, vielmehr soll es um die Ziele und Grundsätze einer noch weitergehenden Reform (zweite Stufe) gehen, die die Rechtspolitik im Rahmen der Verabschiedung dieses Gesetzes für erforderlich gehalten und bereits in Aussicht gestellt hat (zweite Stufe). Dennoch sollen zunächst die Essentials dieses ersten wichtigen und richtigen Reformschritts nochmals in Stichworten am Anfang dieses Beitrags stehen. Dieses Gesetz wurde auch schon als "Amtsvormundschaftsverbesserungsgesetz" und als Minimalkompromiss apostrophiert, was angesichts der Fokussierung dieses ersten Reformschrittes nicht überrascht.
Germany is the focus of this paper, owing to the fact that since 1938 it has had the strictest laws on compulsory schooling worldwide. As a result, homeschooling in Germany has become virtually impossible. There are interesting divergences between policy and practice in the German setting, both in the country’s educational history and present educational problems. The Länder (federal states) have the responsibility for education, and they are taking a much stricter line against homeschoolers than a decade ago, especially by depriving parents of the custody of their homeschooled children at an early stage. The laws relied upon, however, were never intended to deal with such educational matters; they were designed to punish parents who abuse or neglect their children. The present, highly questionable legal action succeeds only because of the consent of state schools, state social welfare offices, and courts. The same laws are not used against the parents of the approximately 250,000 teens who are truant. The functioning of the legal and sociological machinery in Germany is being employed aggressively to stamp out homeschooling, while at the same time it ignores the crucial issue of parents who allow their children to skip school—thus depriving them of an adequate education at home or elsewhere. At the same time, the number of specialists in law and education, as well as politicians and governmental experts who argue in favor of homeschooling is growing, and media reports on homeschooling are much more positive than they were a decade ago.
The aim of this contribution is to introduce and outline a third theory of rights. Concentrating on claim-rights, it proposes to approach this aim via the concept of a directed duty. This approach is justified by the widely shared presupposition that an entity has a right if and only if a duty is owed to this entity. Unlike some prominent other proposals, this contribution does not contrast directed duties with undirected ones. It contrasts two ways a duty can be related to an entity. On the one hand, a duty can be owed to an entity. In this case it is directed to this entity. On the other hand, a duty can concern an entity. There is no reason to presuppose that they exclude each other, on the contrary. Theories of rights have to reconstruct the difference between these two ways a duty can be related to an entity. After having introduced the starting point for a theory of rights in that way, the two classic theories of rights will be rejected, the will theory and the interest theory. The main focus lies on the shortcomings of the different versions of the interest theory. This criticism helps to formulate the conditions a convincing theory of rights has to meet. In the last part, the status theory of rights will be outlined.
Die rechtsförmige Bewältigung von Leid, Ungerechtigkeit und Unrecht, die durch die kommunistischen Regime der DDR, Osteuropas und der UdSSR verursacht wurden, ist Gegenstand zahlreicher rechts- und geschichtswissenschaftlicher Studien. Untersucht werden die Aufarbeitung des Unrechts durch Strafrecht und die Regelung von Restitution sowie Entschädigung im Fall von Enteignungen. Oft wird – auch infolge der Spezialisierung der jeweiligen Wissenschaftler – das Genre des Länderberichts gewählt. Untersuchungen, die in vergleichender Absicht auch die Aufarbeitung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts einbeziehen, gehen von einer Vergleichbarkeit aus, ohne dass darüber ein neuer Historikerstreit entbrannt wäre. ...
Axiomatic method and the law
(2012)
The process of finding evidence of what truthfully happened in a conflictive situation interests jurists and journalists but in different ways. When the work of journalists and judges are concerned the paradox is at stake. Both categories must tell a story about a conflict must listen to all involved, must inform what happened to the general public. Although both categories must use the freedom must use the freedom of speech their point of view about something with objectivity, their timing is different as well as the process and the effect of fulfilling their task. That question that should be made is what happen to law when it becomes the subject matter to the news in the world of full information? In what measurement journalists also pass judgements and how this affects the formal processes of law? The effort to answer these questions and the ones related to them is important to understand some of the problems that must be approached in order to establish the ways of law and of the mass media technological society.
In assessing the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election of 2009 in Iran, one question has received less critical analysis than other complexities of this event: What can explain the remarkable non-violent character of the Green Movement in Iran? I propose that the answer, inter alia, lies with the following three learning experiences: 1) The experience of loss brought about by the Iran/Iraq war; 2) the experience of relative opening during Khatami’s presidency; and 3) the experience of modernization of faith in the work of the post-Islamist thinkers that aimed to make political Islam compatible with democracy. Together, these learning processes fostered a new mode of thinking that is civil and non-violent in character.
The development of laboratory animal science and animal care of legislation and the consummation
(2012)
Laboratory animal science is the use of non-human animals in experiments to obtain new knowledge and new technologies in biomedical research and testing. In order to develop science and technology, the human carried out a large number of animal experiments, these experiments greatly expanded the vision of related research field, and make a great contribution to human beings. Meanwhile, animal experiments also bring us a certain extent of negative effects. Countries around the world have adopted legislative measures to regulate behavior of animal experiments, but in the process of legislation and enforcement are not wholly satisfactory. On the basis of present situation of laboratory animal science and existing problems, with the comparison of animal welfare act between Europe and China, the author puts forward the ideas of perfecting experimental animals’ laws and its enforcement proposals.
The improvement of accident prevention technology in many fields of social life has spurred new challenges to the doctrinal tools of fault and strict based civil liability in the law of torts. Amid these challenges lies the identification of the proper scope of the respective criteria of liability in a changing factual environment, their suitability as doctrinal tools, as well as their actual application to concrete cases given the amount of information which would be needed to render adequate judgments. Precedents and old laws should be assessed with caution, taking into account the tacit cost-benefit analysis embedded in them, for they may or may not serve the interests of welfare maximization in an environment with constantly renewed accident prevention technology.
In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and Value-Sensitive Design and their relevance in the context of e-democracy. In part 2, I analyze three different e-democracy tools from a VID-perspective. The paper ends with some conclusions concerning the merits of VID for e-democracy as well as some considerations concerning the dual tasks of philosophers in assessing and promoting value-sensitive technology design.
Some advances in legal practical reason: for a progressive dialogue with contemporary hermeneutics
(2012)
This paper intends to critically discuss some points of the contemporary thesis concerning constitutional hermeneutics and methodology of law. Once identified some authors and the lines of argumentation affiliated grosso modo to the linguistic turn and rhetoric, as well as the core of the transcendental powers of communication (v.g. N. MacCormick, R. Alexy, K. Günther), the objective is to identify some dialogue with economics and political science, enlightened by recent researches about Hegel-Marx interpretations of social life. Of course the discussion inevitably passes through methodological questions, opposing analytics vs. dialectics, idealistic vs. realists standpoints. In a effort to foment the inclusive dialogue between points of view concerning the concept of law that may create (not necessarily) radical opponents, the lines of conclusion intents to revisit some foundations of Hegelian "method" (so to speak) and intends to give a modest contribution to a more profound analysis of the relations between sein and sollen categories, in order to enrich the discussions about technology and social life, specially the life of the law nowadays.
Seit dem 17. Jahrhundert gibt es historische Reflexionen darüber, wie und warum das antike römische Recht, geformt durch Lehre und Praxis des mittelalterlichen Italiens nördlich der Alpen, "rezipiert" worden sei. Ebenso diskutierte man seit dem 19. Jahrhundert über das Lübecker Stadtrecht im Rahmen der Hanse sowie die Ausbreitung des Magdeburger Rechts auf Städte im slawischen Osten. Die heutige Rechtsgeschichte sucht nach neuen Modellen und Terminologien, um den Transfer von Gesetzbüchern, Rechtsprinzipien, Institutionen, Rechtssprache oder kulturellem Habitus von Rechtsanwendern angemessener zu erfassen. Berichtet wird hier über ein Südosteuropaprojekt (1850 bis 1933) mit Blick auf den Transfer normativer Ordnungen (Verfassungsrecht, Zivilrecht, Strafrecht) in ehemaligen Provinzen des Osmanischen Reichs, die nun zu jungen Nationalstaaten wurden, etwa Griechenland, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Serbien, Montenegro und Albanien.
Die Wissenschaftsgeschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, ein noch schwaches Pflänzchen im Garten der Rechtsgeschichte, kann erfreuliche Zuwächse verzeichnen, und zwar aus der Schweiz. Zum einen sind in Band 130 (2011) der Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht zwei große, fast Buchformat erreichende Aufsätze erschienen, von Anne-Christine Favre, Cent ans de droit administratif: de la gestion des biens de police à celle des risques environnementeaux, 227–330 sowie von Benjamin Schindler, 100 Jahre Verwaltungsrecht in der Schweiz, S. 331–437. Zum anderen gibt es das hier zu würdigende Werk von Andreas Kley, der in Zürich Öffentliches Recht, Verfassungsgeschichte sowie Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie lehrt. Nimmt man diese drei Arbeiten zusammen und fügt noch die Verfassungsgeschichte der Schweiz des unvergessenen Alfred Kölz (1944–2003) hinzu, dann kann geradezu von einem Quantensprung gesprochen werden. ...
Free riders play fair
(2012)
After the demise of the social contract theory, the argument from fair play, which employs the principle of fair play, has been widely acknowledged as one of the most promising ways of justifying political obligation. First, I articulate the most promising version of the principle of fair play. Then, I show that free riders play fair, that is, that their moral fault lies not in unfairness but in the violation of a rule by appealing to the example of three-in-a-boat. Finally, I conclude that even the most promising version is false because those who have accepted benefits from a social cooperative scheme do not owe an obligation of fair play.
Principles can be directly expressed by law or may be found in jurisprudence, philosophy or literature. Often the principles are contradictory, as in the case of transparency and the taboo of state information disclosure. At the individual level, transparency and taboo, the sense and purpose of privacy may compliment each other. Moreover the rise of cyberspace has blurred the distinction between privacy and public. The taboo is widening. The development of the internet and of the social networks can alter the once apparently stable legal situation, bringing a new dynamic into play in both state and individual spheres. In the context of the internet it is as though the secret workings of the state are projected on its "walls and facades", reminding us of Plato's "Myth of the Cave". As Plato described, disillusionment and reflexive defensiveness can follow.
This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of crisis prevention. In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a perceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alternative solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in crossborder banking groups.
The bare life and (the) modern law : a journey to some key concepts or conceptions of Agamben
(2012)
This text is imitating a journey which tries to explore what is completely unknown. It starts Homo Sacer and traces some key concepts namely der Muselmann, bare life, state of exception, sovereignty and nihilism in law. Doing so, it hopes to reach a general picture of biopolitics or biopower according to Agamben. So, first part of this text generally tries to clarify some fundamental concepts or conceptions in order to use them for its aim. The second part suggests an alternative reading of Agamben, centered around his concept of der Muselmann which is the ultimate figure defined by Primo Levi and Agamben chooses the term because of its resemblance to or representation of Homo Sacer. Der Muselmann was a derogatory term in its origin and very meaning has still been unclear today. So, the second part tries to clarify the meaning of der Muselmann (and unbaptized babies) from a different outlook, not from outside but inside of the referred concept. It tries to show a Muslim’s image of a non Muslim world in order to reveal what are the very meanings of sovereignty, law and biopolitics. So at the end of the journey, this text hopes to reach a different picture of modern life and a modern law.
In this article, I examine how open borders can serve the idea of global distributive justice by asking how or how not the existing practices of immigration to rich countries may contribute to global economic redistribution. There are two observations. First, migration is not the redistributive option that anyone has an equal access. In order to make use of migration as a means of global redistribution, rich countries need to provide a chance to migrate to those who cannot afford movement by themselves. Second, as long as brain-drain problems happen, what the perspective of global distributive justice requires is the compensation for some educational cost of raising professionals or some control of their movement. Immigration admissions largely focusing on getting highly skilled professionals may not serve the idea of global redistribution.
In reconsideration of the composition and operation of European law, it is the description of its underlying mentality that may cast best light on the query whether European law is the extension of domestic laws or a sui generis product. As to its action, European law is destructive upon the survival of traditions of legal positivism, for it recalls post modern clichés rather. Like a solar system with planets, it is two-centred from the beginning, commissioning both implementation and judicial check to member states. As part of global post modernism, a) European law stems from artificial reality construction freed from particular historical experience and, indeed, anything given hic et nunc. By its operation, b) it dynamises large structures and sets in motion that what is chaos itself. It is owing to reconstructive human intent solely that any outcome can at all be seen as fitting to some ideal of order, albeit neither operation nor daily management strives for implementing any systemicity. This is the way in which the European law becomes adequate reflection of the underlying (macro) economic basis, which it is to serve as superstructure. Accordingly, c) the entire construct is operated (as integrated into one well-working unit) within the framework of an artificially animated dynamism. With its “order out of chaos” philosophy it assures member states’ standing involvement and competition, achieving a flexibly self-adapting (and unprecedentedly high degree of) conformity.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and politics, the so-called “hedgehog’s approach”. The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and morality are internally connected, in addition to interpretative concepts of equality, liberty, and democracy. Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophical foundations, individual ethics, personal morality and political morality are mutually connected. The aforementioned ethical and moral foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological conception regarding value concepts in law, politics and morality, and with his episthemological conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism.
The term “ethics” in a “narrower” sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, while the “ethics” in a “broader” sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other people. The term “morality” however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a sovereign power should treat its citizens.
Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be in the focus of consideration.
The very idea of the European Convention on Human Rights is to bring the laws of contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the Convention is not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a general right. In the case of homeschooling, the Convention sets forth the general principle that “the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” It must not, therefore, allow a contracting state to eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—unless the state can show that the means in question is ineffective.
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic risk assessment tool, enabling organizations to maintain compliance with data protection regulations, to manage privacy risks and to provide public benefits through the success of privacy-by-design efforts. An actual practical implementation of a PIA framework has been realized in the context of RFID applications encompassing detailed steps for the PIA process; a first successful review has been completed. The PIA also allows to introduce a pro-active mitigation of privacy risks through technical and organizational controls. The better the precautionary measures realize the relevant privacy objectives, the less likely will occur with the PIA process afterwards. The recent proposal for a far-reaching revision of the EU Data Protection Directive envisages to state a specific requirement to implement a PIA process. Indeed, since risks for privacy and non-disclosure of personal data are different in not identical circumstances, the protection measures should also be different, i.e. technology should assist in trying to achieve the (at least) second-best solution for the implementation of the data protection regime by a PIA. Insofar, privacy rules can be individualized and matched with the concrete needs in the given environment.
"Community and law approach" provides an illuminating insight into alternative legal orderings within a social unit. The comprehensiveness of legal systems within a community or a social unit, provides a suitable basis for a structural framework of alternative legal systems or Legal Pluralism, which is missing in the discourse on Legal Pluralism. "Identifying the locus of law within a community", provides us with an indication on how autopoetic a legal system can be within a social unit, taking into account the social rootedness of legal norms.
Eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Entschlüsselung herrschender Justizverständnisse ist die Auseinandersetzung mit den Rollen, die die beteiligten Akteure in einem Rechtssystem einnehmen sowie die Untersuchung der rechtlichen und institutionellen Bedingungen unter denen diese Akteure handeln. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich zunächst mit der Macht- und Aufgabenverteilung zwischen Richtern und Parteien. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Rollenallokation nicht einheitlich ist, sondern in Abhängigkeit von unterschiedlichen verfahrensrechtlichen und institutionellen Voraussetzungen variiert. In Verfahren vor einer Jury wird die richterliche Autorität durch eine maximal ausgeprägte Parteiautonomie stark eingeschränkt. Als Rechthonoratioren (im Weberschen Sinne) agieren Richter dagegen immer dann, wenn Sie ohne Geschworene Recht sprechen. Dies geschieht insbesondere in den einzelstaatlichen Obergerichten und den Bundesberufungsgereichten, aber auch in Verfahren erster Instanz, in denen „claims in equity“ zu entscheiden sind. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich abschließend mit dem Einfluss, den die Besonderheiten der amerikanischen Juristenausbildung auf das amerikanische Justizverständnis ausüben: Sie prägen und reproduzieren eine der Rollen und Selbstbilder unter amerikanischen Juristen, sowohl in der Anwaltschaft als auch auf Seiten der Richter.
This paper expands on the concept of legal machine which was presented first at IRIS 2011 in Salzburg. The research subjects are (1) the creation of institutional facts by machines, and (2)
multimodal communication of legal content to humans. Simple examples are traffic lights and vending machines. Complicated examples are computer-based information systems in organisations, form proceedings workflows, and machines which replace officials in organisations. The actions performed by machines have legal importance and draw legal consequences. Machines similarly as humans can be imposed status-functions of legal actors. The analogy of machines with humans is in the focus of this paper. Legal content can be communicated by machines and can be perceived by all of our senses. The content can be expressed in multimodal languages: textual, visual, acoustic, gestures, aircraft manoeuvres, etc. The concept of encapsulatation of human into machine is proposed. Herein humanintended actions are communicated through the machine’s output channel. Encapsulations can be compared with deities and mythical creatures that can send gods’ messages to people through the human mouth. This paper also aims to identify law production patterns by machines.
Der vorliegende Band enthält die Referate des 2. Familienrechtlichen Forums
Göttingen vom 2. Juli 2011, welches aktuelle Problemstellungen des Kindschaftsrechts
zum Gegenstand hatte. Vor dem Hintergrund jüngst abgeschlossener
und bevorstehender Gesetzesnovellen erörterten ausgewählte Experten
aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Praxis verschiedene Problemschwerpunkte: Zum
einen wurde die anstehende Novellierung des Sorgerechts nicht miteinander
verheirateter Eltern thematisiert und nach Lösungen für den Umgang mit dem
Umgangsboykott gesucht. Dabei eröffnete die interdisziplinäre und rechtsvergleichende
Annährung an die aufgeworfenen Probleme neue Perspektiven. Zum
anderen wurden die nur wenige Tage nach der Veranstaltung abgeschlossene
Vormundschaftsrechtsreform sowie das inzwischen ebenfalls in Kraft getretene
Bundeskinderschutzgesetz einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. Die Veranstaltung
endete mit einer kritischen Zwischenbilanz zum kindschaftsrechtlichen
Verfahren nach dem FamFG, das die Praxis vor zahlreiche Probleme stellt.
Until three years ago, ICT Technologies represented a main “subordinate clause” within the “grammar” of Participatory Budgeting (PB), the tool made famous by the experience of Porto Alegre and today expanded to more than 1400 cities across the planet. In fact, PB – born to enhance deliberation and exchanges among citizens and local institutions – has long looked at ICTS as a sort of “pollution factor” which could be useful to foster transparency and to support the spreading of information but could also lead to a lowering in quality of public discussion, turning its “instantaneity” into “immediatism,” and its “time-saving accessibility” into “reductionism” and laziness in facing the complexity of public decision-making through citizens’ participation. At the same time, ICTs often regarded Participatory Budgeting as a tool that was too-complex and too-charged with ideology to cooperate with. But in the last three years, the barriers which prevented ICTs and Participatory Budgeting to establish a constructive dialogue started to shrink thanks to several experiences which demonstrated that technologies can help overcome some “cognitive injustices” if not just used as a means to “make simpler” the organization of participatory processes and to bring “larger numbers” of intervenients to the process. In fact, ICTs could be valorized as a space adding “diversity” to the processes and increasing outreach capacity. Paradoxically, the experiences helping to overcome the mutual skepticism between ICTs and PB did not come from the centre of the Global North, but were implemented in peripheral or semiperipheral countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, Dominican Republic and Portugal in Europe), sometimes in cities where the “digital divide” is still high (at least in terms of Internet connections) and a significant part of the population lives in informal settlements and/or areas with low indicators of “connection.” Somehow, these experiences were able to demystify the “scary monolithicism” of ICTs, showing that some instruments (like mobile phones, and especially the use of SMS text messaging) could grant a higher degree of connectivity, diffusion and accountability, while other dimensions (which could risk jeopardizing social inclusion) could be minimized through creativity. The paper tries to depict a possible panorama of collaboration for the near future, starting from descriptions of some of the above mentioned “turning-point” experiences – both in the Global North as well as in the Global South.
Regulierung im Gesundheitswesen ist einerseits spezifisch, andererseits werden zunehmend Regulierungsansätze aus anderen Sektoren übernommen. Dies wirft grundsätzliche rechtswissenschaftliche Fragestellungen auf: Was sind die Besonderheiten des Gesundheitssektors? Dürfen allgemeine Regulierungsformen auf den Gesundheitssektor übertragen werden? Wie beeinflusst die europäische Gesetzgebung diese Entwicklungen? Der Band enthält Beiträge von ausgewiesenen Expertinnen und Experten des Gesundheitsrechts, die sich anhand aktueller Fragen aus den Bereichen Bedarfsplanung, Arzneimittelregulierung, Wettbewerbsrecht sowie der EU-Patientenrichtlinie mit den Möglichkeiten rechtlicher Regulierung im Gesundheitswesen befassen. Dabei wird auch die neuste Gesetzgebung, insbesondere das Versorgungsstrukturgesetz, erörtert.