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Coming early to the party
(2017)
We examine the strategic behavior of High Frequency Traders (HFTs) during the pre-opening phase and the opening auction of the NYSE-Euronext Paris exchange. HFTs actively participate, and profitably extract information from the order flow. They also post "flash crash" orders, to gain time priority. They make profits on their last-second orders; however, so do others, suggesting that there is no speed advantage. HFTs lead price discovery, and neither harm nor improve liquidity. They "come early to the party", and enjoy it (make profits); however, they also help others enjoy the party (improve market quality) and do not have privileges (their speed advantage is not crucial).
We study whether the presence of low-latency traders (including high-frequency traders (HFTs)) in the pre-opening period contributes to market quality, defined by price discovery and liquidity provision, in the opening auction. We use a unique dataset from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) based on server-IDs and find that HFTs dynamically alter their presence in different stocks and on different days. In spite of the lack of immediate execution, about one quarter of HFTs participate in the pre-opening period, and contribute significantly to market quality in the pre-opening period, the opening auction that ensues and the continuous trading period. Their contribution is largely different from that of the other HFTs during the continuous period.
We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors’ average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.
This paper addresses and resolves the issue of microstructure noise when measuring the relative importance of home and U.S. market in the price discovery process of Canadian interlisted stocks. In order to avoid large bounds for information shares, previous studies applying the Cholesky decomposition within the Hasbrouck (1995) framework had to rely on high frequency data. However, due to the considerable amount of microstructure noise inherent in return data at very high frequencies, these estimators are distorted. We offer a modified approach that identifies unique information shares based on distributional assumptions and thereby enables us to control for microstructure noise. Our results indicate that the role of the U.S. market in the price discovery process of Canadian interlisted stocks has been underestimated so far. Moreover, we suggest that rather than stock specific factors, market characteristics determine information shares.