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Can the democratic constitutions of Hungary and Poland survive an autocratic majority? Hardly. Hungary and Poland seem to be lost for liberal and democratic constitutionalism. At least for the time being, the next question is how democratic constitutionalism can prevent an autocratic majority. The task is to make it difficult for an autocratic parliamentary majority to capture the institutions of critique and control of government and to undermine separation of powers.
Ginsburg and Huq analyze the processes of democratic backsliding and perverting democratic constitutionalism in various countries and ask whether an intelligent constitutional design would be able to prevent this from happening or make it at least more difficult. They do so not out of pure academic interest, but with the intention to protect liberal democratic constitutionalism because they believe it to be morally superior to alternative models.