Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
- 2004 (1) (entfernen)
Dokumenttyp
- Arbeitspapier (1) (entfernen)
Sprache
- Englisch (1) (entfernen)
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (1)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- nein (1)
Schlagworte
- Lieferung (1) (entfernen)
Institut
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1) (entfernen)
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. JEL - Klassifikation: G21 , G78 , G33