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Damage control resuscitation may lead to postoperative intra-abdominal hypertension or abdominal compartment syndrome. These conditions may result in a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle leading to severe physiologic derangements and multiorgan failure unless interrupted by abdominal (surgical or other) decompression. Further, in some clinical situations, the abdomen cannot be closed due to the visceral edema, the inability to control the compelling source of infection or the necessity to re-explore (as a “planned second-look” laparotomy) or complete previously initiated damage control procedures or in cases of abdominal wall disruption. The open abdomen in trauma and non-trauma patients has been proposed to be effective in preventing or treating deranged physiology in patients with severe injuries or critical illness when no other perceived options exist. Its use, however, remains controversial as it is resource consuming and represents a non-anatomic situation with the potential for severe adverse effects. Its use, therefore, should only be considered in patients who would most benefit from it. Abdominal fascia-to-fascia closure should be done as soon as the patient can physiologically tolerate it. All precautions to minimize complications should be implemented.
We analyze the venture capitalist´s decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist´s participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project and / or on the experience of the venture capitalist. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the true value of the firm. An earlier version of this paper appeared as: The Decision of Venture Capitalists on Timing and Extent of IPOs (ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-12). This version July 2003.