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Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (115) (remove)
The pressure on tax haven countries to engage in tax information exchange shows first effects on capital markets. Empirical research suggests that investors do react to information exchange and partially withdraw from previous secrecy jurisdictions that open up to information exchange. While some of the economic literature emphasizes possible positive effects of tax havens, the present paper argues that proponents of positive effects may have started from questionable premises, in particular when it comes to the effects that tax havens have for emerging markets like China and India.
Greece: threatening recovery
(2015)
Despite the catastrophic phase between 2008 and the end of 2014, much of a previously unsustainable development has been corrected in Greece and there are clear signs that the deterioration came to a halt in 2014. But what is publicly known about the priorities of the newly elected Syriza government suggests that they may be going largely into the wrong direction.
In Absatz 3 des Artikel 136 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der EU (AEUV) wurde für die Verwendung von ESM Geldern festgelegt, dass diese nur dann zur Gewährung von Finanzhilfen verwendet werden dürfen, wenn „... dies unabdingbar ist, um die Stabilität des Euro-Währungsgebiets insgesamt zu wahren." Im vorliegenden Artikel argumentiert Alfons Weichenrieder, dass die nach dem griechischen Referendum entstandene Situation, die Stabilität des “Euro-Währungsgebiets insgesamt" nicht bedroht, so dass die Vergabe von neuen Krediten, zumal diese voraussichtlich unter weichen und im Zweifel nicht durchsetzbaren Auflagen vergeben würden, ein offensichtlicher Verstoß gegen die Grundlagen des ESM wäre.
Die deutsche Steuerpolitik kombiniert hohe Steuersätze mit zahlreichen Ausnahmen. Das reißt Gerechtigkeitslücken, lenkt Investitionen in die falschen Zwecke und verkompliziert das Steuersystem mitunter bis zur Unkenntlichkeit. Bei der Erbschaftsteuer ist dies besonders augenfällig. Der Versuch mit minimalinvasiven Korrekturen Konsistenz in die Erbschaft- und Schenkungsteuer zu bringen ist fast zwangsläufig zum Scheitern verurteilt. Vieles spricht stattdessen für deutlich abgesenkte Steuersätze und eine gleichzeitige Abschaffung der Vergünstigungen für Betriebsvermögen.
European households face tremendous obstacles when intending to open a savings account outside their home country. The shortage of deposits has become a major reason for banks’ declining loan supply and ultimately is responsible for a substantial part of the investment weakness and GDP decline in affected European countries.
Policy makers have made important efforts to promote European deposit market integration and to stimulate cross border flows of savings within the European Union. But these efforts will only yield the intended benefits if a number of additional non-tariff trade barriers are removed. Currently, these barriers prevent households in surplus countries to transfer their savings to banks in deficit countries where their deposits are most urgently needed.
Projected demographic changes in industrialized and developing countries vary in extent and timing but will reduce the share of the population in working age everywhere. Conventional wisdom suggests that this will increase capital intensity with falling rates of return to capital and increasing wages. This decreases welfare for middle aged asset rich households. This paper takes the perspective of the three demographically oldest European nations — France, Germany and Italy — to address three important adjustment channels to dampen these detrimental effects of aging in these countries: investing abroad, endogenous human capital formation and increasing the retirement age. Our quantitative finding is that endogenous human capital formation in combination with an increase in the retirement age has strong implications for economic aggregates and welfare, in particular in the open economy. These adjustments reduce the maximum welfare losses of demographic change for households alive in 2010 by about 2.2 percentage points in terms of a consumption equivalent variation.
Mehr als 18 Milliarden Euro hat die Commerzbank im Zuge der Finanzkrise in Form von staatlichen Garantien, Kapitalspritzen oder Einlagen erhalten. Auch die Hypo Real Estate, die WestLB, die SachsenLB und die IKB profitierten von Stützungsmaßnahmen. Die EU genehmigte diese und andere staatlichen Hilfsmaßnahmen. Grundsätzlich sind staatliche Stützungsmaßnahmen jedoch als wirtschaftlicher Vorteil zu werten und damit zunächst eine verbotene Beihilfe. In seinem Working Paper betrachtet Tuschl die rechtlichen Grundlagen des EU-Beihilferechts und zeigt die teilweise differierende Praxis der EU-Kommission auf.
This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives.
From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities.
Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives.
From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities.
Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
Negative Zinsen auf Einlagen – juristische Hindernisse und ihre wettbewerbspolitischen Auswirkungen
(2015)
Im anhaltenden Niedrigzinsumfeld tun Banken sich schwer damit, die ihnen zur Verfügung gestellte Liquidität einer renditeträchtigen Nachfrage zuzuführen. Darüberhinaus müssen sie auf Liquiditätsüberschüsse, die im Rahmen der Einlagenfazilität des Eurosystems über Nacht bei den nationalen Zentralbanken der Eurozone deponiert werden, Strafzinsen entrichtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnten Banken durch negative Einlagenzinsen das Anliegen verfolgen, die Nachfrage nach Aufbewahrung von (Sicht)Einlagen zu verringern. Einer solchen Strategie stehen aber aus juristischer Sicht Hindernisse entgegen, soweit der beschriebene Paradigmenwechsel auch im Rahmen existierender Kundenbeziehungen einseitig vorgenommen werden soll. Die rechtlichen Hürden sind weder Ausdruck einer realitätsfernen Haarspalterei, noch eines verbraucherschützenden Furors. Vielmehr ermöglichen sie privaten und gewerblichen Bankkunden, im Zeitpunkt der angestrebten Zinsanpassung bewusst über die Verwendung ihrer liquiden Mittel zu entscheiden.
This paper investigates whether a fiscal stimulus implies a different impact for flexible and rigid labour markets. The analysis is done for 11 advanced OECD economies. Using quarterly data from 1999 to 2013, I estimate a panel threshold structural VAR model in which regime switches are determined by OECD’s employment protection legislation index. My empirical results indicate significant differences between rigid and flexible labour markets regarding the impact of the fiscal stimulus on output and unemployment. While the impulse response of real GDP to a government spending shock is positive and more effective in flexible labour markets, it has less impact in the rigid ones. Moreover, it is found that a fiscal stimulus leads to higher overall unemployment in highly regulated countries.
Regulatory failures, which came to the fore after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, lead to the question of why some activities by financial institutions were not regulated prior to the crisis of 2007, even though regulators knew about certain dangers to financial stability? The repo-market, although centrally involved in the last crisis, still awaits stringent regulation. At the same time, the regulatory cycle seems to come to an end, boding ill for future crises which will be amplified by this market. In this situation, NGOs are needed to make regulators act upon their knowledge and to tighten their regulations.
We examine how U.S. monetary policy affects the international activities of U.S. Banks. We access a rarely studied US bank‐level dataset to assess at a quarterly frequency how changes in the U.S. Federal funds rate (before the crisis) and quantitative easing (after the onset of the crisis) affects changes in cross‐border claims by U.S. banks across countries, maturities and sectors, and also affects changes in claims by their foreign affiliates. We find robust evidence consistent with the existence of a potent global bank lending channel. In response to changes in U.S. monetary conditions, U.S. banks strongly adjust their cross‐border claims in both the pre and post‐crisis period. However, we also find that U.S. bank affiliate claims respond mainly to host country monetary conditions.
This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using an exogenous variation in organizational design, induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India during 1999-2006, and employing a difference-in-differences research strategy, we find that increased hierarchization of a branch decreases its ability to produce "soft" information on loans, leads to increased standardization of loans and rationing of "soft information" loans. Furthermore, this loss of information brings about a reduction in performance on loans: delinquency rates and returns on similar loans are worse in more hierarchical branches. We also document how hierarchical structures perform better in environments that are characterized by a high degree of corruption, thus highlighting the benefits of hierarchical decision making in restraining rent seeking activities. Finally, we document a channel - managerial interference - through which hierarchy affects loan outcomes.
We examine the inter-linkages between financial factors and real economic activity. We review the main theoretical approaches that allow financial frictions to be embedded into general equilibrium models. We outline, from a policy perspective, the most recent empirical papers focusing on the propagation of exogenous shocks to the economy, with a particular emphasis on works dealing with time variation of parameters and other types of nonlinearities. We then present an application to the analysis of the changing transmission of financial shocks in the euro area. Results show that the effects of a financial shock are time-varying and contingent on the state of the economy. They are of negligible importance in normal times but they greatly matter in conditions of stress.
The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
The paper traces the developments from the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union to this date. It discusses the fact that the primary mandate of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is confined to safeguarding price stability and does not include general economic policy. Finally, the paper contributes to the discussion on whether the primary law of the European Union would support a eurozone exit. The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
In its meeting on 6 September 2012, the Governing Council of the ECB took decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (OMT). This decision was challenged in the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) by a number of constitutional complaints and other petitions. In its seminal judgment of 14 January 2014, the German court expressed serious doubts on the compatibility of the ECB’s decision with the European Union law.
It admitted the complaints and petitions even though actual purchases had not been executed and the control of acts of an organ of the EU in principle is not the task of the GFCC. As justification for this procedure the court resorted to its judicature on a reserved “ultra vires” control and the defense of the “constitutional identiy” of Germany. In the end, however, the court referred the case pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings on several questions of EU law. In substance, the German court assessed OMT as an act of economic policy which is not covered by the competences of the ECB. Furthermore, it judged OMT as a – by EU primary law – prohibited monetary financing of sovereign debt. The defense of the ECB (disruption of monetary policy transmission mechanism) was dismissed without closer scrutiny as being “irrelevant”. Finally the court opened, however, a way for a compromise by an interpretation of OMT in conformity with EU law under preconditions, specified in detail.
Procedure and findings of this judgment were harshly criticized by many economists but also by the majority of legal scholars. This criticism is largely convincing in view of the admissibility of the complaints. Even if the “ultra vires” control is in conformity with prior decisions of court it is in this judgment expanded further without compelling reasons. It is also questionable whether the standing of the complaining parties had to be accepted and whether the referral to the ECJ was indicated. The arguments of the court are, however, conclusive in respect of the transgression of competences by the ECB and – to somewhat lesser extent – in respect of the monetary debt financing. The dismissal of the defense as “irrelevant” is absolutey persuasive.
A premise of the capabilities perspective in strategy is that firm-specific capabilities allow some firms to be unusually adept at exploiting growth opportunities. Since few firms have the capacity to internally generate the quantity or variety of strategic resources needed to exploit growth opportunities, the ability to externally acquire complementary resources is critical to the acquisition of competitive advantage. However, the external sourcing of resources exposes the firm’s strategic resources to risks of expropriation. We argue this threat gives capable firms incentive to use internally generated strategic resources to pursue growth opportunities before turning to external sources. A pecking order theory of strategic resource deployment is implied. Data from a 22-year sample of cross-border investment partnership decisions made by U.S.-based venture capital firms lend support to our theory.
In this statement the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is advocating a conditional relief of Greek’s government debt based on Greece meeting certain targets for structural economic reforms in areas such as its labor market and pensions sector.The authors argue that the position of the European institutions that debt relief for Greece cannot be part of an agreement is based on the illusion that Greece will be able to service its sovereign debt and reduce its debt overhang after implementing a set of fiscal and structural reforms. However, the Greek economy would need to grow at an unrealistig level to achieve debt sustainability soley on the basis of reforms.The authors therefore view a substantial debt relief as inevitable and argue that three questions must be resolved urgently, in order to structure debt relief adequately: First, which groups must accept losses associated with debt relief. Second, how much debt relief should be offered. Third, under what conditions should relief be offered.
Since August 2009, German legislation allows for voluntary Say on Pay Votes (SoPV) during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). We examine 1,169 AGMs of all German listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010-2013 to identify (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary SoPVs, (2) the effect of voluntary SoPVs on AGM participation, and (3) the effect of SoP on executive compensation. Our data reveals that in the first four years of the voluntary say on pay regime every second firm in our sample has opted for having a SoPV. The propensity for a SoPV increases with firm size, abnormal executive compensation and free float of shares. Indeed, smaller firms with concentrated ownership do not only have a lower propensity for a SoPV, but also show a higher propensity to opt for only limited disclosure of executive compensation. Approval rates of SoPVs are lower than the approval rate for the average AGM agenda item and this effect is stronger in (i) widely held firms as well as in (ii) firms with abnormal executive compensation. Additionally, SoPVs actually can increase AGM participation; however, this result is particularly evident for widely held firms. Finally, we find stronger pay for performance elements within total executive compensation, particularly when the effect of executive compensation is lagged over the years following the vote. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoPV to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration. This is enforced, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders consider SoPVs as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions, with these decisions leading to a higher degree of alignment between executive management boards and shareholders.
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between credit risk and liquidity in the sovereign bond market in the context of the European Central Bank (ECB) interventions. Using a comprehensive set of liquidity measures obtained from a detailed, quote-level dataset of the largest interdealer market for Italian government bonds, we show that changes in credit risk, as measured by the Italian sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread, generally drive the liquidity of the market: a 10% change in the CDS spread leads a 11% change in the bid-ask spread. This relationship is stronger, and the transmission is faster, when the CDS spread is above the 500 basis point threshold, estimated endogenously, and can be ascribed to changes in margins and collateral, as well as clientele effects. Moreover, we show that the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) intervention by the ECB weakened the sensitivity of the liquidity provision by the market makers to changes in the Italian government's credit risk. We also document the importance of market-wide and dealer-specific funding liquidity measures in determining the market liquidity for Italian government bonds.
The Federal Reserve’s muddled mandate to attain simultaneously the incompatible goals of maximum employment and price stability invites short-term-oriented discretionary policymaking inconsistent with the systematic approach needed for monetary policy to contribute best to the economy over time. Fear of liftoff—the reluctance to start the process of policy normalization after the end of a recession—serves as an example. Causes of the problem are discussed, drawing on public choice and cognitive psychology perspectives. The Federal Reserve could adopt a framework that relies on a simple policy rule subject to periodic reviews and adaptation. Replacing meeting-by-meeting discretion with a simple policy rule would eschew discretion in favor of systematic policy. Periodic review of the rule would allow the Federal Reserve the flexibility to account for and occasionally adapt to the evolving understanding of the economy. Congressional legislation could guide the Federal Reserve in this direction. However the Federal Reserve may be best placed to select the simple rule and could embrace this improvement on its own, within its current mandate, with the publication of a simple rule along the lines of its statement of longer-run goals.
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as a potential mechanism to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. We develop a stylized model with a direct financial connection between banking and insurance and study the effects of various types of bonds such as non-convertible bonds, write-down bonds and CoCos on banks' and insurers' risk situations. In addition, we compare insurers' capital requirements under the proposed Solvency II standard model as well as under an internal model that ex-ante anticipates additional risks due to possible conversion of the CoCo bond into bank shares. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we consider different CoCo designs (write-down factor, trigger value, holding time of bank shares) and compare the resulting capital requirements with those for holding non-convertible bonds. We identify situations in which insurers benefit from buying CoCo bonds due to lower capital requirements and higher coupon rates. Furthermore, our results highlight how the Solvency II standard model can mislead insurers in their CoCo investment decision due to economically irrational incentives.
I assess how Basel III, Solvency II and the low interest rate environment will affect the financial connection between the bank and insurance sector by changing the funding patterns of banks as well as the investment strategies of life insurance companies. Especially for life insurance companies, the current low interest rate environment poses a key risk since declining returns on investments jeopardize the guaranteed return on life insurance contracts, a core component of traditional life insurance contracts in several European countries. I consider a contingent claim framework with a direct financial connection between banks and life insurers via bank bonds. The results indicate that life insurers' demand for bank bonds increases over the mid-term but ultimately declines in the long-run. Since life insurers are the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe, banks could lose one of their main funding sources. In addition, I show that shareholder value driven life insurers' appetite for risk increases when the gap between asset return and liability growth diminishes. To check the robustness of the findings, I calibrate a prolonged low interest rate scenario. The results show that the insurer's risk appetite is even higher when interest rates remain persistently low. A sensitivity analysis regarding industry-specific regulatory safety levels reveals that contagion between bank and life insurer is driven by the insurers' demand for bank bonds which itself depends on the regulatory safety level of banks.
This chapter outlines the conditions under which accounting-based smoothing can be beneficial for policyholders who hold with-profit or participating payout life annuities (PLAs). We use a realistically-calibrated model of PLAs to explore how alternative accounting techniques influence policyholder welfare as well as insurer profitability and stability. We find that accounting smoothing of participating life annuities is favorable to consumers and insurers, as it mitigates the impact of short-term volatility and enhances the utility of these long-term annuity contracts.
This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit.
The paper discusses an additional reform proposal for enhancing Social Security solvency which reframes the existing debate in a different light. In our research, we focus on incentives to prolong working years and to delay benefits claiming as a way of sustaining Social Security. Specifically, we analyze how the offer of a budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment - instead of the current delayed retirement credit – would encourage people to delay claiming their OASI benefits and work longer. The results of our research will be useful for policymakers, namely in (1) measuring who would delay claiming benefits if offered a lump sum instead of higher annuity payments, (2) examining how long they would wait, and (3) how much longer, if at all, they would continue working in the interim.
The standard view suggests that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement reduces informality and boosts investment and growth. However, a general equilibrium approach shows that this conclusion may hold to a lesser extent in countries with a constrained supply of funds because of, for example, a more concentrated banking sector or lower financial openness. When the formal sector grows larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy, but the higher pressure on the credit market limits further capital accumulation. We show empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.
n the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.
This paper investigates the effect of a change in informational environment of borrowers on the organizational design of bank lending. We use micro-data from a large multinational bank and exploit the sudden introduction of a credit registry, an information-sharing mechanism across banks, for a subset of borrowers. Using within borrower and loan officer variation in a difference-in-difference empirical design, we show that expansion of credit registry led to an improvement in allocation of credit to affected
borrowers. There was a concurrent change in the organizational structure of the bank that involved a dramatic increase in delegation of lending decisions of affected borrowers to loan officers. We also find a significant expansion in scope of activities of loan officers who deal primarily with affected borrowers, as well as of their superiors. There is suggestive evidence that larger banks in the economy were better able to implement similar changes as our bank. We argue that these patterns can be understood within the framework of incentive-based and information cost processing theories. Our findings could help rationalize why improvements in the information environment of borrowers may be altering the landscape of lending by moving decisions outside the boundaries of financial intermediaries.
This paper explores how banks adjust their risk-based capital ratios and asset allocations following an exogenous shock to their asset quality caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We find that independent banks based in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane, while those part of a bank holding company do not. The effect on independent banks mainly comes from the subgroup of high-capitalized banks. These banks increase their holdings in government securities and reduce loans to non-financial firms. Hence, banks that become more stable achieve this at the cost of reduced lending.
Euro crash risk
(2015)
n this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the importance of two different channels through which academic talent is transmitted across generations (persistence of innate ability vs. the impact of parental education) for the optimal design of these policies and model different forms of labor as imperfect substitutes, thereby generating general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that subsidizing higher education has important redistributive benefits, by shrinking the college wage premium in general equilibrium. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.
Mit Blick auf die gescheiterten Verhandlungen mit Griechenland, argumentiert Jan Krahnen im vorliegenden Policy Beitrag, dass eine zielführende Reformagenda nur von der gewählten Regierung Griechenlands formuliert werden kann. Die Euro-Staaten müssten Griechenland für die Zeitdauer einer Restrukturierungszeit eine Grundsicherung zusagen. Die EU-Staaten fordert Krahnen dazu auf, aus der Griechenlandkrise die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Auch die Eurozone brauche eine effektive Reformagenda. Die Verschuldungsdynamik innerhalb der Währungsunion, deren Auswüchse am Beispiel Griechenlands besonders deutlich werden, könne bei fehlendem guten Willen nur durch eine politische Union und eine in sie eingebettete Fiskalunion aufgelöst werden. Krahnen argumentiert, dass ein Weiterverhandeln über Restrukturierungsauflagen aus der derzeitigen verfahrenen Situation nicht herausführen wird. Entscheidend sei, ein mehr oder weniger umfassendes Paket zu schnüren, das Elemente eines teilweisen internationalen Haftungsverbunds mit Elementen eines partiellen nationalen Souveränitätsverzichts verbindet.
In light of the failed negotiations with Greece, Jan Krahnen argues that an effective reform agenda for Greece can only be designed by the elected government. Fundamental reforms will take time to take full effect and euro area member states will, in the meantime, have to offer Greece a basic level of economic security.
Krahnen demands that policy makers and the professional public involved view the Greek crisis as an opportunity to take the next necessary steps to formulate a reform agenda for the European Monetary Union. A community of supranational and non-party researchers and intellectuals could take the initiative and in a structured process develop a trustworthy and realistic concept that drafts the next big step towards a political union of Europe, including elements of a fiscal union.
We set up and solve a rich life-cycle model of household decisions involving consumption of both perishable goods and housing services, stochastic and unspanned labor income, stochastic house prices, home renting and owning, stock investments, and portfolio constraints. The model features habit formation for housing consumption, which leads to optimal decisions closer in line with empirical observations. Our model can explain (i) that stock investments are low or zero for many young agents and then gradually increasing over life, (ii) that the housing expenditure share is age- and wealth-dependent, (iii) that perishable consumption is more sensitive to wealth and income shocks than housing consumption, and (iv) that non-housing consumption is hump-shaped over life.
In 2000 Italy replaced its traditional system of severance pay for public employees with a new system. Under the old regime, severance pay was proportional to the final salary before retirement; under the new regime it is proportional to lifetime earnings. This reform entails substantial losses for future generations of public employees, in the range of €20,000-30,000, depending on seniority. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we estimate the impact of this unanticipated change in lifetime resources, on the current consumption and wealth accumulation of employees affected by the reform. In line with theoretical simulations, we find that each euro reduction in severance pay reduces the average propensity to consume by 3 cents and increases the wealth-income ratio by 0.32. The response is stronger for younger workers and for households where both spouses are public sector employees.
Spätestens seit die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) ihr Ankaufprogramm für Wertpapiere bekannt gegeben hat, ist die Diskussion über die Wirksamkeit dieser Maßnahmen auch in Europa angekommen. Wegen der besonderen institutionellen Umstände des Euroraums – Kauf von Anleihen der einzelnen Nationalstaaten und des Verbots der monetären Finanzierung – reichen die möglichen Nebenwirkungen hierzulande über den rein geldpolitischen Horizont hinaus.
The banking system is highly interconnected and these connections can be conveniently represented as an interbank network. This survey presents a systematic overview of the recent advances in the theoretical literature on interbank networks. We assess our current understanding of the structure of interbank networks, of how network characteristics affect contagion in the banking system and of how banks form connections when faced with the possibility of contagion and systemic risk. In particular, we highlight how the theoretical literature on interbank networks offers a coherent way of studying interconnections, contagion processes and systemic risk, while emphasizing at the same time the challenges that must be addressed before general results on the link between the structure of the interbank network and financial stability can be established. The survey concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of interbank network models with a special focus on macroprudential policies and monetary policy.
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which information is only gradually available over time (diligence). Optimal compensation contracts trade off the cost and benefit of delay resulting from agent impatience and the informational gain. Mandatory deferral may increase or decrease equilibrium diligence depending on the importance of the acquisition task. We provide concrete conditions on economic primitives that make mandatory deferral socially (un)desirable.
We show that the size of collateralized household debt determines an economy’s vulnerability to crises of confidence. The house price feeds back on itself by contributing to a liquidity effect, which operates through the value of housing in a collateral constraint. Over a specific range of debt levels this liquidity feedback effect is strong enough to give rise to multiplicity of house prices. In a dynamic setup, we conceptualize confidence as a realization of rationally entertainable belief-weightings of multiple future prices. This delivers debt-level-dependent bounds on the extent to which confidence may drive house prices and aggregate consumption.
Empirical credit demand analysis undertaken at the aggregate level obscures potential behavioral heterogeneity between various borrowing sectors. Looking at disaggregated data and analyzing bank loans to non-financial companies, to financial companies, to households for consumption and for house purchases separately with respect to a common set of macroeconomic determinants may facilitate more accurate empirical relationships and more reliable insights for economic policy. Using quarterly Euro area panel data between 2003 and 2013, empirical evidence for heterogeneity in borrowing behavior across sectors and the credit cycle with respect to interest rates, output and house prices is found. The results motivate sector-specific, counter-cyclical capital requirements.
This paper is motivated by the fact that nearly half of U.S. college students drop out without earning a bachelor’s degree. Its objective is to quantify how much uncertainty college entrants face about their graduation outcomes. To do so, we develop a quantitative model of college choice. The innovation is to model in detail how students progress towards a college degree. The model is calibrated using transcript and financial data. We find that more than half of college entrants can predict whether they will graduate with at least 80% probability. As a result, stylized policies that insure students against the financial risks associated with uncertain graduation have little value for the majority of college entrants.
Signaling cooperation
(2015)
We examine what an applicant’s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and therefore is less likely to free-ride in teamwork situations. We find that contributions in a public goods game strongly increase in a subject’s degree of social engagement as indicated on her résumé (and rated by an independent third party). Engagement in other domains, such as student or sports associations, is not positively correlated with contributions. In a prediction experiment with human resource managers from various industries, we find that managers use résumé content effectively to predict relative differences in subjects’ willingness to cooperate. Thus, young professionals signal important behavioral characteristics to potential employers through the choice of their extracurricular activities.
A number of recent studies regress a "narratively" identified measure of a macroeconomic shock directly on an outcome variable. In this note, we argue that this approach can be viewed as the reduced-form regression of an instrumental variable approach in which the narrative time series is used as an instrument for an endogenous series of interest. This motivates evaluating the validity of narrative measures through the lens of a randomized experiment. We apply our framework to four recently constructed narrative measures of tax shocks by Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2013), and Mertens and Ravn (2012). All of them turn out to be weak instruments for observable measures of taxes. After correcting for weak instruments, we find that using any of the considered narrative tax measures as an instrument for cyclically adjusted tax revenues yields tax multiplier estimates that are indistinguishable from zero. We conclude that the literature currently understates the uncertainty associated with quantifying the tax multiplier.
There is a large, but yet growing debate about the need to complement the European monetary union with a stronger fiscal union. This paper reviews the potential trade-offs between effectiveness, moral hazard problems, and permanent redistribution. In particular, we contribute to the question of how member states may be willing to enter into a stronger fiscal union if the evolution of this union may imply large redistribution under incomplete contracting. We discuss clawback mechanisms that have been suggested in the literature, but conclude that clawbacks are undesirable, as they would essentially destroy the insurance value of a fiscal union. Instead, we propose that a clearly defined exit option as a guarantee against involuntary redistribution can make entry into a stronger fiscal union less risky and hence more attractive for member states.