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The idea of appointing a non-national as Central Bank Governor remains surprisingly controversial. Nevertheless, given the skills required by the Governor in order to manage what no doubt are increasingly complex institutions, considering non-nationals makes good sense for at least two reasons. First, increasing the pool of candidates to include those with broader skills and backgrounds makes it easier to find a suitable person for the job. Second, non-nationals are less likely to be beholden to domestic pressure groups and could help better insulate the central bank from political pressures.
This present comment suggests an amendment to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The current proposal focuses on bail-in, but does not sufficiently take into account the pressure exerted on central bankers, supervisors and politicians by the fear of interbank contagion. The only way out of this hold-up type of situation can be found in bail-in bonds. Bail-in bonds are dedicated loss taking debt instruments, whose status of being first in line if it comes to default is clearly communicated from day one.
With this paper, I propose a simple asset pricing model that accounts for the influence from social interaction. Investors are assumed to make up their mind about an asset’s price based on a forecasting strategy and its past profitability as well as on the contemporaneous expectations of other market participants. Empirically analysing stocks of the DAX30 index, I provide evidence that social interaction rather destabilises financial markets. Based on my results, I state that at least, it does not have a stabilising effect.
An analyst who works in Germany is more likely to publish a high (low) price target regarding a DAX30 stock if other Germany based analysts are also optimistic (pessimistic) about the same stock. This finding is not biased by the fact that DAX30 companies are headquartered in Germany. In times of bull markets, price targets of analysts who regularly exchange their opinion are higher correlated compared to other analysts. This effect vanishes in a bearish market environment. This suggests that communication among analysts indeed plays an important role. However, analysts’ incentives induce them not to deviate too much from the overall average during an economic downturn.
The exceptional circumstances in which the ECB has been operating in the past years are testing not only the currency union itself, but also its institutional design. While the Governing Council of the ECB was designed to mainly set interest rates optimally for the union as a whole, the recent crisis has expanded the tools of the ECB to include unconventional monetary policy actions that potentially increase the risk exposure of its balance sheet. Since each country would contribute to the losses according to its capital key, a different voting mechanism that takes into account the single country’s contribution to the ECB’s capital could be advisable.
In the event of a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the stronger members of the monetary union, especially Germany, face at least two risks: First, the debt of the Greek National Bank vis-à-vis the Eurosystem of central banks will most likely be lost. Secondly, the large flow of capital from Greece and other periphery countries to Germany will accelerate inflation.
Option-implied information and predictability of extreme returns : [Version 24 September 2012]
(2012)
We study whether option-implied conditional expectation of market loss due to tail events, or tail loss measure, contains information about future returns, especially the negative ones. Our tail loss measure predicts future market returns, magnitude, and probability of the market crashes, beyond and above other option-implied variables. Stock-specific tail loss measure predicts individual expected returns and magnitude of realized stock-specific crashes in the cross-section of stocks. An investor, especially the one who cares about the left tail of her wealth distribution (e.g., disappointment-averse), benefits from using the tail loss measure as an information variable to construct managed portfolios of a risk-free asset and market index. The tail loss measure is motivated by the results of the extreme value theory, and it is computed from observed prices of out-of-the-money put as the risk-neutral expected value of a loss beyond a given relative threshold.
In this paper, I analyse the reciprocal social influence on investment decisions within an international group of roughly 2000 mutual fund managers that invested in companies of the DAX30. Using a robust estimation procedure, I provide empirical evidence that in the average a fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight on a particular stock, if other fund managers increase the corresponding position by 1%. The dynamics of this influence on portfolio weights suggest that fund managers adjust their behaviour according to the prevailing market situation and are more strongly influenced by others in times of an economic downturn. Analysing the working locations of the fund managers, I conclude that more than 90% of the magnitude of influence is due to pure observation. While this form of influence varies much in time, the magnitude of influence resulting from the exchange of opinion is more or less constant.
The paper analyzes the mutual influence of the capital structure and the investment decision of a bank, as well as the incentive effects of the bank executives compensation schemes on these decisions. In case the government implicitly or explicitly insures deposits and/or the banks debt, banks are incentivized to invest in risky assets and to have a high leverage. Capital regulation could potentially solve this excessive risk taking problem. However, this is only possible if the regulator can observe and properly measure the investment risks of the bank, which was called into question during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Hence, we propose a regulatory approach that is also able to implement the first best risk taking levels by the bank, but does not require the regulator to know the investment risk of the bank. The regulatory approach involves the implementation of capital requirements, which are made contingent on the management compensation.
We build on previous work on operational performance evaluation of private equity portfolio companies as we are able to at least partially decrypt the black box consisting of restructuring tools these investors use and the corresponding impact on their portfolio companies. Beyond answering whether private equity improves operating efficiency we figure out which of the typical restructuring tools drive operating efficiency. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions in the last thirty years we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors experience has a positive and financial leverage a negative influence on operational performance.